The Uncertain Future of Syrian Kurds
By Shoresh Darwish
The Assad regime effectively collapsed 12 days after the start of “Deterrence of Aggression Operation,” after a bloody rule lasting nearly 14 years. Ultimately, the regime came to an official end when its leader fled without engaging in one last ‘honorable’ battle.
However, the remnants of the regime—beyond the brutal prison scenes and family photo albums—remain, and its repercussions persist. The current situation resembles layers of massive rubble under which all Syrians are trapped, concealing a state of instability and fear of security disruptions, service shortages, and extrajudicial reprisals. This remains true despite the tight control exercised by the militarily victorious group to date. Moreover, the aftermath raises under-discussed concerns, particularly regarding the potential monopolization of politics and society by a dominant group that has managed to present itself as the final victor over Assad. This group has imposed an ‘Idlib government’ on Damascus, which many Syrians, though, have accepted as a preferable alternative to chaos. Thus, the next three months might significantly shape the future of the country.
In light of the regime’s recent collapse, there lie challenges and a difficult, winding path ahead to translate the theoretical visions of equal citizenship, human rights, and individual and public freedoms espoused by the regime’s opponents. This involves dismantling the mentality of power monopolization and implementing policies that avoid any nationalistic or religious bias, which historically painted the state in a singular color—similar to the actions committed by the Ba’ath Party and the security-military apparatus against most Syrians. Within this context, the issues of minorities and the Kurdish question emerge prominently, raising the question of how Syrians can effectively deal with these foundational matters as they seek to establish a new political system.
Meanwhile, the Kurds are experiencing profound changes whose consequences remain uncertain. The only constant seems to be the shifting balance of international control in Syria following the defeat of Iran, Russia, and the regime, in favor of parties including Turkey, Israel, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This shift raises questions about the status of the Kurdish issue in the post-conflict phase in Syria and how the Kurds can be included in the political and constitutional process in a manner that reflects their reality and recognizes their capacity to challenge the legitimacy of any political system that overlooks their national rights and equality with Syrian Arabs.
Beyond international and regional tensions, a palpable Syrian nationalism is evident, characterized by a focus on maintaining the country’s territorial integrity and resisting separatist projects. This stance is echoed by the regime, pro-Turkish factions, and supporters of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s claims regarding an American project aimed at establishing a Kurdish state. This is true despite Kurdish parties providing reassurances to Syrians about their commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity—an assurance that seems somewhat ironic when a concerned ethnic minority is expected to guarantee stability for a partnering majority.
Doubt and skepticism about the Kurdish role in the future of Syria have begun to instill fear among the Kurds themselves. Skeptics may commit grave political and humanitarian errors in the name of unilaterally resolving the Kurdish issue, formulating temporary or fragmented solutions, erroneously treating them as final resolutions, or even conflating the Kurdish national question with external agendas aimed at appeasing regional powers. The worst message that Kurds and the Syrians who support their rights could hear in the coming three months would be, “Not now.”
Practically speaking, mutual fears compel the “majority nation” to take the initiative, from the outset of forming the new political system, to offer serious proposals for addressing the concerns of religious and sectarian minorities, as well as their own proposals for resolving the Kurdish issue in a manner that breaks from previous policies of denial and marginalization. Otherwise, the following regime, after the expiration of Mohammad al-Bashir’s interim government, will struggle to overcome the repercussions of these issues. This situation necessitates that the emergency government team rapidly express their intentions by engaging in dialogue with the Kurdish parties, as this can alleviate national tensions and curb chauvinistic tendencies and the promotion of hate speech.
When discussing the Kurdish past in Syria, many Syrians are reluctant to revisit the history of harm and persecution endured by Kurds. They argue that focusing on past injustices risks creating a “Kurdish grievance,” which could enable Kurds to leverage their suffering for political gain at the expense of Arabs. While this rationale is somewhat understandable, it cannot be accepted. The Kurds are not merely seeking privileges based on a historical grievance that has been resolved; rather, their ongoing struggle is directly linked to present realities. This relates to the current policies that have aimed to expel Kurds from their ancestral lands, destroy their homes and farms, as well as kill or imprison them and unlawfully confiscate their properties, as seen in Afrin and Ras al-Ain. Additionally, there is a concerning narrative among some former opponents that Kurds may become the next targets once the regime falls.
The trajectory of the Kurdish-Arab relationship in Syria necessitates that those engaged in Kurdish politics adopt a unified and clear political discourse regarding the future relationship with Damascus. This discourse should start with constitutional visions and extend to governance structures. It is vital to acknowledge that Kurdish parties currently lack sufficiently clear visions beyond the political slogans they have raised over the years, such as legitimate national rights, constitutional recognition, and federalism—slogans that often lack substantive content. This serious shortcoming in Syrian Kurdish politics should be addressed by forming a more competent and flexible political entity that can articulate Kurdish demands and place them at the center of the transitional political process.
Moreover, it is crucial for the Kurds to engage in discussions about technical matters beyond broad political slogans. This includes the integration of Kurds into the Syrian army—not only because they have actively contributed to defeating ISIS, the most dangerous international terrorist organization, and continue to pursue its remnants while protecting its prisoners, but also because the Kurds are the de facto guarantors against Damascus degenerating into a new ideological military loyal to the new ruling power. Furthermore, the Kurds have the right to representation in the army, law enforcement, and intelligence services like other Syrians, especially after being systematically excluded from military and security institutions by chauvinist regimes from the 1950s until the collapse of the Assad regime.
In this context, including Kurds in the emerging state institutions should be viewed as an essential aspect of equal citizenship rights rather than merely a military quota or an imposition of a fait accompli on the Syrian population.
The new Syria should not simply be a sanitized or modified version of “Assad’s Syria.” This is insufficient. Instead, major issues—such as the rights of women and minorities, individual freedoms, social justice, and the Kurdish question—must be addressed forthrightly and comprehensively. These topics can help alleviate the chronic anxiety that Syrians, including Kurds, feel about their futures and destinies. They can also bolster the positions of Syrian democrats who fear a return to violence and repression and the transformation of Syria into a purely authoritarian state that replaces national loyalty with new forms of allegiance.
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