During the 12-day major war between Iran and Israel, prior to the ceasefire imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s position was controversial as a central actor employing highly complex diplomatic tools, balancing its deepening alliance with Iran and its special partnership with Israel.
Over the past two decades, Moscow has managed to maintain distinguished relations with both parties, despite their open hostility, especially in the Syrian arena.
Russia’s Dual Approach
Russia’s ability to maintain good relations with both Iran and Israel dates back to the Soviet era, when this principle was a fundamental feature of Soviet diplomacy following the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. President Vladimir Putin has succeeded in developing this legacy and transforming it into a pragmatic, multi-faceted policy.
On one hand, Israel holds a special place in Russian politics due to demographic, economic, and cultural factors. The number of Israeli citizens of Russian origin is estimated at over one million. Additionally, the Russian language is widely spoken within Israeli society.
Russia and Israel are connected by a complex web of economic, cultural, and political interests. Beyond their demographic ties, a significant number of Russian oligarchs hold Israeli citizenship or maintain close economic relations in Tel Aviv. Perhaps the figure of Avigdor Lieberman, a Soviet-born politician who has held senior positions in Israeli politics, exemplifies this interconnectedness. Lieberman has played a major role in strengthening relations between Israel and Russia, especially during Putin’s era.
Russia’s Gazprom was also offered a stake in the development of Israel’s Tamar gas field, although the project never materialized for purely economic reasons. Israel was invited to join the economic union Russia established with the former Soviet states, reflecting Russia’s desire to bring Israel into its economic sphere.
While relations with Israel are driven by identity and economic interests, relations with Iran are governed by deeper strategic considerations. Iran and Russia face Western sanctions together. Their partnership has intensified to unprecedented levels following the war in Ukraine. Tehran has become a major supplier of arms and ammunition to Moscow. The two countries have signed defense cooperation agreements, some inspired by the model between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Among the key areas of cooperation are the development of the “North-South” international transport corridor, which starts in Bandar Abbas, Iran, and passes through the Caspian Sea to Russia. They also collaborate on the development of oil and gas fields and nuclear cooperation at the Bushehr reactor, where more than 250 Russian experts are working.
Syria under the previous regime represented the clearest example of Russia’s attempt to maintain a balance between Tehran and Tel Aviv. While Moscow cooperated with Iran in building infrastructure, it allowed (or turned a blind eye to) repeated Israeli raids on Iranian sites inside Syria, amid reports that Russia may have occasionally provided Israel with coordinates for Iranian arms shipments arriving in Syria. This duality underscores Moscow’s concern to avoid direct conflict between its allies. Even when Russian soldiers were killed in an Israeli attack, the incident was managed to prevent escalation.
Balancing Interests and Internal Division
Following the October 7, 2023, attack launched by Hamas, Moscow publicly adopted a pro-Palestinian stance, referencing UN resolutions and defending Arab rights. However, in practice, it did not take a decisive, concrete stance against Israel, reflecting its traditional approach of balancing slogans with national interests.
It is noteworthy that the Russian elite is divided into two factions: one, a security and government-oriented faction that leans toward Iran, supports its regime, and rejects any change to it; and another, an economic, financial, and oligarchic faction that favors Israel due to strong economic interconnectedness. Russian opinion polls have shown a 50-50 split among the Russian public support between Iran and Israel.
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidency, Russia operated behind the scenes regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. U.S. envoy Steve Vitkov conducted parallel negotiations with Moscow, and agreements were reached to transfer Iran’s uranium enrichment activities to Russia and to ensure that Israel would not be threatened. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected this approach, suggesting that Tel Aviv’s ultimate goal is regime change in Iran rather than merely addressing the nuclear file.
With the recent escalation, Moscow felt betrayed and immediately began efforts to play the role of mediator, with Putin engaging with all parties, including Trump. Yet, the question remains: can Moscow produce effective mediation amid the deepening crises in Ukraine? And is it possible to isolate the Iranian issue from those of Ukraine, Taiwan, and Syria? Suffering from economic pressures and sanctions, Russia faces a significant challenge in translating its influence into practical tools for mediation.
The Moscow-Beijing-Tehran Trilogy
As for China, it aims to de-escalate tensions in the Gulf out of concern for their potential impact on major projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite its public silence, China is actively engaging behind the scenes to prevent a large-scale regional conflict.
Russia, Iran, and China all adopt, to varying degrees, rhetoric opposing U.S. hegemony and unipolarity, seeking to reshape the global order. This stance is evident within the United Nations and international forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They also support each other on sensitive issues, such as Russia’s backing of Iran’s nuclear program and China’s indirect support for Russia in Ukraine.
Additionally, all three are suffering under Western sanctions: Russia after Ukraine, Iran since the revolution, and China in certain technological sectors. This situation has pushed them to promote trade in local currencies instead of the dollar and to attempt to integrate their trade networks, exemplified by the North-South Transport Corridor, which links Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea and also serves China’s land connectivity interests. Iran has benefited from Russian technology in developing the Bushehr reactors, and Iranian drones are being used in Russia’s war in Ukraine, creating a technical link between Russian and Iranian defense systems. Meanwhile, China supplies Iran with dual-use civil-military technologies, albeit cautiously. It remains the largest supplier of some sensitive equipment despite sanctions.
From this, one can speak of an undeclared military-technical axis connecting Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing through a certain level of cooperation and coordination.
Furthermore, China relies heavily on Iranian and Russian oil and is the largest undeclared customer of Iranian crude. Russia and Iran coordinate within the Gas Exporting Countries Forum to influence oil prices and market policies. They have also developed the “energy barter” mechanism across the Caspian Sea—based on exchanging oil for food or equipment—with Chinese knowledge and support.
The three countries also share a strategic vision for Central Asia and the Caucasus, viewing the region’s security and economic vacuum as both a threat and an opportunity. While Russia seeks to restore its geopolitical influence over the former Soviet republics, Tehran focuses on strengthening the “transport axis” through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to expand its eastern influence. Meanwhile, China considers Central Asia the “lung” of the Belt and Road Initiative, investing heavily in railways, ports, and natural resources.
In the Middle East, Russia sees Iran as a necessary ally in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, leveraging its influence among militias and Shiite communities. Although China does not play a direct role in this region, it is concluding major agreements—such as the 25-year deal with Iran—and maintaining a stance of positive neutrality, mainly out of concern for stability. China’s priority is to avoid disruptions to energy supplies, which are vital for its industrial resurgence, and to ensure the security of trade routes and supply chains. It also seeks massive investments that make it an indispensable economic partner for the wealthy Gulf investment funds.
Accordingly, Beijing is pushing to influence Iran’s regional conflicts—whether with Israel or influential Arab states—evident in the historic China-brokered agreement between Tehran and Riyadh.
While Russia aims to connect its southern ports with Iranian ports and from there to the Arabian Sea—part of a strategic project to counter Western control of the straits—China supports the development of Iranian ports such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas and seeks to connect them to the Pakistani port of Gwadar.
These projects strengthen Tehran’s geopolitical position and enable it to present itself as an alternative corridor to bypass the Suez Canal and the Arabian Gulf, especially amid rising risks from Houthi attacks on ships linked to Israeli-Western interests. However, despite their political rapprochement, China and Russia do not fully align with the ideological nature of Iran’s velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurists) regime. This suggests that both might encourage Tehran to adopt more flexible and open domestic policies, given the risks of societal fractures resulting from U.S.-Israeli strikes amid Iran’s dire economic situation.
Both Moscow and Beijing believe that the fall of the Tehran regime would upset the regional balance of power, increasing U.S. and Israeli influence or leading to chaos—repeating scenarios seen in Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and even Syria. This has prompted them to attempt to play a mediating role in regional political and military conflicts, positioning themselves as acceptable intermediaries to Iran (which distrusts European mediation) and to Israel and the Gulf states, which maintain stable and growing political and economic relations with these supposed mediators.
Turkey: Between Energy Interests and Security Concerns
While Turkey closely monitors the evolving situation, it has been accused by Iranian sources of playing an indirect role in facilitating Israeli attacks on Iran through Syrian airspace, as well as gathering intelligence on Iranian military movements via NATO bases in Incirlik and Kurecik on its territory. Turkish-Iranian relations have always been marked by rivalry, despite appearances of cooperation and alignment.
Turkey has long viewed Iran’s regional ambitions as destabilizing. However, Ankara’s dependence on Iran for energy supplies, Tehran’s regional influence, and increasing Gulf concerns over Turkey’s regional policies have prompted Ankara to adopt more flexible and accommodating policies toward its historic neighbor.
Turkey relies heavily on energy imports, sourcing over 72% of its energy needs through high-risk corridors. These include critical infrastructure such as the Iran-Turkey natural gas pipeline and the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline, both of which face increasing threats to their security. Any disruption in these supplies could lead to a collapse of Turkey’s energy production and industrial continuity.
Indirectly, although Turkey’s LNG imports from Qatar and the United States seem geographically distant from the Iran-Israel conflict zone, they remain vulnerable to rising shipping and insurance costs amid the intensifying global conflict environment.
At the same time, Turkey depends on Iran for transit routes to Central Asia and is exploiting Western sanctions to revitalize its financial and economic system, using Turkish institutions to circumvent these sanctions. It also fears that Iran’s economic rise could accelerate if the current regime falls and a Western-friendly government takes power—potentially resembling the pre-revolutionary era of the Shah. Such a shift could diminish Turkey’s role as an economic bridge between Europe and Central or Eastern Asia.
Experts warn of proxy conflicts involving Iranian-backed groups operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, which could indirectly threaten Turkish interests. Additionally, there are early signs of a potential mass exodus and new waves of refugees if the war expands further—an outcome that would intensify Turkey’s social, economic, and energy burdens.
Conclusion
The Russian stance on the Iran-Israel conflict exemplifies a complex model of balancing diplomacy. It deliberately avoids overt bias toward either side by adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach centered on managing rather than resolving conflicts. This delicate strategy seeks to maintain a nuanced equilibrium between an expanding strategic alliance with Iran and deeply rooted economic and cultural interests with Israel.
Syria has served as a key testing ground for this balancing act. However, the war in Ukraine and Moscow’s relative decline in international maneuverability raise questions about its future capacity to serve as an effective guarantor or mediator in the current regional dispute.
Simultaneously, an undeclared axis is emerging that links Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing, encompassing economic coordination and defense cooperation, united by a shared discourse opposing Western hegemony. In this context, China’s role is increasing in efforts to de-escalate tensions, driven by its need for regional stability to secure energy supplies and ensure the continuation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, Turkey remains a cautious observer, oscillating between the imperatives of economic collaboration with Tehran and its own security and strategic concerns regarding regional influence.
Accordingly, this analysis concludes that Moscow remains a pivotal but not decisive actor in the escalation between Iran and Israel. Its capacity to influence outcomes depends heavily on major variables, including the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the degree of coordination with Beijing and Ankara. Importantly, there is a lack of a comprehensive approach that extends beyond mere conflict containment or status quo preservation.
