The “aggressive state” model, a recipe for destruction for a fractured society

By Hussain Jummo

The process of stabilizing Syria faces significant challenges from forces operating with conflicting and parallel agendas. On one hand, there is an effort to support the transitional administration led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while on the other hand, HTS is being dragged into new battles that do not align with the interests of this administration. These contradictions are particularly evident in both the stated and unstated policies of Turkey, such as when it pressures HTS to open a front against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Imagine a foreign minister from a neighboring country imposing on Syria a name that has to be accepted without question, namely, the Syrian Arab Republic. This minister has unilaterally declared that the name of the state will remain the Syrian Arab Republic, leaving no room for discussion. This action adds a new role for the Turkish state: it becomes a guardian of the troubled nation-state model, preventing its dissolution and ensuring its survival with aggressive underpinnings that treat the internal population as a kind of internal colony.

It appears that a state not steeped in a national crisis and not practicing racism against parts of its own populace is not allowed to exist. Hafez al-Assad attempted to gain partial legitimacy through state-sanctioned racism against pluralism, targeting the Kurds and even the Alawites, whom he ruled in the background while effectively declaring their “non-existence.”

From the perspective of this neighboring power, the nation-state should be explicitly nationalist, rather than a simple “state of the nation.” Syria should manifest Arab nationalism against the Kurds, rather than pursuing a course of building a unified state with recognized pluralism that accurately reflects Syrian reality. Thus, saving Syria from entering another phase of collapse hinges on ending Turkish guardianship over the core of the Syrian state. The resilience of the Autonomous Administration will be the only viable response to this forced export of internal aggression, prevalent among the various armed groups in a society fractured at all levels. Only an open and civilized Arab nationalism could potentially salvage this societal makeup.

Therefore, it is likely that the Autonomous Administration in the eastern Euphrates will persist, having stronger justifications for survival than for integration, as long as the “aggressive state” remains the only option on the table. Meanwhile, attempts to impose racist ideologies on the new Syrian state proceed unabated, as Ankara continues to manipulate the factions it supports in its ongoing war against the Kurds in Afrin and the eastern Euphrates.

In this context, Volker Perthes, an academic at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, published a detailed article in the American magazine Foreign Affairs titled, “Don’t Let Geopolitics Ruin Syria’s Transition,” with a subtitle emphasizing that “Outside Actors Must Put the Country’s Needs Above Their Narrow Interests”.

Perthes argues that the international actors most directly engaged in Syria, as well as with the Syrian diaspora, should show particular restraint. Turkey, for example, stands to gain significantly from changes in Syria; however, some of its actions pose risks to the political transition. Ankara is pursuing two conflicting goals in Syria: it seeks a stable neighbor, partly to facilitate the return of over three million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, while also expanding its decades-long conflict against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) onto Syrian territory by indirectly combating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The U.S. and Europe should engage in frank discussions with Turkey, a NATO member, regarding its interests and concerns about Syria. They must clarify that a stable transition necessitates a role for Syrian Kurds, including groups that have governed much of the northeast over the past decade, within the Syrian government.

Supporting a transition also necessitates respecting Syria’s sovereignty. For example, during the war against ISIS, the U.S. and the international coalition against ISIS relied on the SDF as their main partner on the ground in Syria. According to Perthes, the coalition should invite Syria (i.e., HTS) to become a member of the group, which would acknowledge Syrian sovereignty and the government’s responsibility to help counter the residual threat from ISIS.

View HTS simply as Turkey’s proxy in Syria would lead to systematic errors in all that follows. Those familiar with the armed forces’ composition in Syria realize that HTS is not among Turkey’s closest allies and that there are loyal proxies fighting and dying to meet Turkey’s national security needs, which Ankara may soon have to abandon if it seeks to support “Syria.” Ankara’s efforts to compel factions operating for its national security to disarm and join the Syrian military will be crucial for paving the way toward a peaceful and acceptable settlement between Damascus and Qamishlo.

Indeed, HTS, a de facto authority lacking unanimous support, has shown a degree of flexibility to Western observers in efforts to help Syria recover from a total collapse of the state and society. However, it is also grappling with two conflicting lines of action that work against each other, much like Turkish policy in Syria.

Perthes warns, “If foreign governments and international bodies focus on their own narrow interests and impose onerous conditions on aid, Syria’s transition is sure to falter. Instead, they should support Syria in its efforts to rebuild its economy, open up to the world, and achieve peace with itself.”

Ultimately, global powers may seek to exploit Syria’s new beginnings for their benefit. However, dragging the interim government into regional or international conflicts could disrupt the transition, as Perthes contends, who believes that geopolitics is not currently a priority for Syria’s new leaders.

For instance, the interim government members, despite their Islamist backgrounds, have refrained from making any hostile anti-Israel statements. They also decided to handle their relationship with Russia, the main external supporter of the old regime, with caution. The new Syrian rulers have restored diplomatic ties with Ukraine and have even spoken of a “strategic partnership” between the two countries. However, Syria does not wish to get caught in the midst of geopolitical rivalry. Its leaders certainly do not need a confrontation with Russia or for Moscow to back what remains of the old regime.

The new government aims to keep Russia out of Syria’s internal affairs without closing any doors. They may even seek to improve relations with Moscow because Syria will not be able, at least in the near term, to replace its almost entirely Russian weaponry or relinquish the expertise on civil infrastructure developed by Russia, including power plants and military equipment.

Author

  • Hussain Jummo is a Kurdish writer from Syria. He has written several political and social studies research reports on the Kurdish issue. He is the author of two books, 'Armed Hospices: The Political History of the Kurdish Naqshbandi Order', and 'Al-Anbar: From the Grassland Wars to the Silk Road'.

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