Post-Assad Syria: Alliances, projects…. and Islam

By Mohammad Sayed Rassas

Most Syrians were surprised by the geopolitical significance of their country when the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime led to the demise of Iran’s regional axis, a fate not shared by Tehran’s forces in Gaza and Lebanon. Additionally, this collapse restored Russia’s status as a regional power after it gained global power status following its military intervention in Syria in 2015. This was particularly striking given that after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was a fragile state with vulnerabilities in both the Caucasus region (Chechnya, Dagestan, and Georgia) and the West (Ukraine, the three Baltic states, and Finland).

To paraphrase Patrick Seale in his book “The Struggle for Syria,” “Whoever seeks to lead the Middle East must exert control over Syria” (p. 14, Dar al-Anwar, Beirut, 1968). Historical events support this assertion, as Alexander the Great’s control over Syria led to the fall of Egypt, a pattern also seen with the Romans. Moreover, the Battle of Yarmouk preceded the victories at al-Qadisiyah and the subsequent fall of Egypt and Persia to the Muslims. Similarly, the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 precipitated the fall of Egypt and the Hijaz the following year, followed by Iraq to the Ottomans.

Even international-regional projects, such as the Baghdad Pact in 1955, failed due to Damascus’s refusal to join. Moreover, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab project weakened with Syria’s secession from the United Arab Republic in 1961. In fact, the Syrian Baath Party delivered a significant blow to Nasser by competing for leadership of the pan-Arab movement starting in 1963, ultimately splitting the movement into two rival centers.

Between 1921 and 1958, the Hashemites considered returning to Damascus from Baghdad after the events at Maysalun. Later, Saddam Hussein sought to overthrow Hafez al-Assad through various means, including supporting Islamist factions between 1979 and 1982. This perspective stemmed from the understanding that Iraq is analogous to a large bottle with a small opening to the sea, with Latakia rather than Basra serving as its primary harbor. The failure of both the Hashemites and Saddam Hussein regarding the Syrian issue was among the significant factors leading to their downfalls.

Now, following December 8, 2024, we can identify international and regional projects that are likely to fail, such as the railway project proposed by Jacques Saade, a French national from Latakia and owner of CMI-CGM, the third-largest shipping and container transport company in the world. This project was discussed when French President Nicolas Sarkozy pledged to develop a loading and unloading dock in the port of Latakia in 2008, serving as a precursor to the 2013 Chinese initiative known as the “Belt and Road.” Two years ago, amid the rapprochement between China, Russia, and Iran, we witnessed the establishment of a railway link connecting Iraq and Iran, which was preceded by links between Iran and Pakistan and, earlier, from Pakistan to China. The Iranians had plans, with the help and approval of Baghdad and Damascus, to establish a rail connection between Al-Qaim and Deir Ezzor. Meanwhile, the Iranian gas pipeline project to the Syrian coast through Iraq, signed in January 2011, which aimed to transport gas to Europe by sea, is now effectively dead.

Conversely, there are several projects likely to be revived, including one that Bashar al-Assad rejected in 2009: the transportation of Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey to Europe. It is probable that Saudi gas will now be included, with reserves reportedly rivaling those of Russia, aimed at enabling Europe to reduce its dependency on “Putin’s gas station.” There is also potential for reviving a project that Kuwaiti and Gulf businessmen proposed to Assad during his visit to Kuwait in June 2008—one that he ultimately overlooked. This plan entailed constructing a route for trucks and a railway from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to Hamidiya, south of Tartus, along with two oil and gas pipelines. The Gulf states would cover the construction costs, including the development of the Hamidiya port, in order to avoid the logistical challenges of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, as this route would offer a less expensive land transport option compared to maritime shipping.

One can also mention projects that could be adjusted, such as the Indian Corridor proposed in 2023 for transporting oil, gas, and hydrogen pipelines from the Gulf, along with roads and railways to facilitate the movement of goods from India and Asia via the coasts of Oman, the UAE, or both to the port of Haifa. From there, goods could be shipped by sea to the Italian or Greek coasts and then onto Europe, and vice versa. The economic costs would be lower if Syrian territory served as a transit route for the entire corridor leading to Turkey and beyond to Europe, or if Latakia and Beirut shared this role with Haifa.

Given the recent developments concerning Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad, this scenario could become viable if the incidents in Syria on December 8, 2024, and in Lebanon on January 9, 2025, lead to peace agreements similar to those signed by Egypt at Camp David and by Jordan in Wadi Araba, along with a ‘two-state solution’ between Israelis and Palestinians.

The Israeli gas transport project, initially signed to transport gas under the sea to Europe via Cyprus and Greece in 2020, faced difficulties following the withdrawal of American companies. However, the project’s route could be modified to pass through Syria and Turkey, making it a more economical and secure option. Furthermore, it could connect to the Arab gas pipeline running from Arish to Aqaba via Taba, then extend to Syria, reaching Homs, and from there branch off into two lines leading to Tripoli and Banias. Plans had been made to extend this to Turkey for distribution to Europe, but that initiative was halted shortly before the onset of the Arab Spring.

However, all of the above is contingent upon the establishment of a Middle Eastern NATO, which the Jordanian king discussed two years ago, and the Israeli president mentioned a few months ago. This alliance would serve as a regional extension of NATO, which, following its victory over the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact in the fall of 1989, was intended to expand beyond Europe, as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated in the spring of 1990. This concept likely originated in London and Washington in 1955 when the Baghdad Pact was established, but Damascus’s pivot away from Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes towards Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev thwarted those plans.

Today, Syria has shifted into the American sphere of influence, distancing itself from Khamenei and Putin, which has significantly weakened both. This shift could potentially pave the way for the formation of a Middle Eastern NATO; however, its leadership is likely to be based in Riyadh and Tel Aviv rather than Ankara. An Islamic Syria, however, would not be acceptable to the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia within this alliance.

Author

  • Mohammed Sayed Rassas, born in Latakia in 1956, holds a Bachelor's degree in English Language and Literature from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Aleppo. He has been an active journalist since 1998. His notable publications include: 1. After Moscow (1996), 2. The Collapse of Soviet Marxism (1997), 3. Knowledge and Politics in Islamic Thought (2010), and 4. The Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini-Khamenei Iran (first edition 2013, second edition 2021). Additionally, he translated Erich Fromm’s work titled The Concept of Man in Marx (1998).

    View all posts
You might also like

Comments are closed.