Syria: The Land of Grand Stories that Must End

The conflict in and over Syria appears to continually necessitate the invocation or fabrication of grand Stories. In this article, we will borrow the term “Story” from Yuval Noah Harari, who has skillfully employed it to discuss the significance of Stories in a global context. The world has always needed stories to be told—such as those of fascism, communism, liberalism, and the transformations that the latter has undergone. The yearning for a Story not only restores hope to the masses but also distracts them from confronting their real problems. In other words, it mitigates the negative effects of a narrative’s disappearance from the spotlight of political systems, be they democratic or authoritarian. The existence of a Story serves as a motive that keeps the unemployed, the desperate, the disenfranchised, and those desiring change from addressing their true challenges. Meanwhile, the story of Islamic Syria emerges after being shaped by the narratives of others. Thus, it is worthwhile to borrow this key term to aid our understanding of what has transpired, and continues to unfold, in the Syrian context.

The term “narrative” can be seen as the counterpart to the word “story,” as Syrian political literature has commonly used it to describe civil groups’ perceptions of themselves or to express their concerns. However, this term tends to refer primarily to the past, while “story” often denotes visions or fantasies related to the future.

One could argue that the first Syrian narrative was embodied in the efforts of political movements since the formation of the Syrian entity to create singular stories. The narrative following the withdrawal of French forces ignited the imagination of parties derived from the National Bloc to discuss Arab unity, whether it pertained to territorial and political unity with the Hashemites in Iraq or a parallel narrative revolving around unity with Egypt or the Hijaz. This initial foundation for expanding from narrow Syria into a broader Arab space served as the practical groundwork for more extreme trends in Arab nationalism, such as the Baath Party, which emerged shortly before the Palestinian Nakba.

The Story of unity intensified when Syria united with Egypt, leading to both countries forsaking their names in favor of the new one: the United Arab Republic. Although the name Syria had been in widespread use for over a century before this unification, Egypt relinquished the historical significance of its name for the sake of a hastily conceived utopian dream proposed by Syrian nationalists and presented to Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite the separation in 1961, Syrians have revisited the monotonous Story of Arab unity multiple times since the Baath coup leaders took power two years after the separation. However, this Story remained little more than a sign pointing to nothing substantial, serving mainly to address internal mobilization and interference in Arab affairs.

The Palestinian cause was also positioned at the heart of the Syrian Story, categorized under the heading of “freedom.” The country’s official doctrine adopted it in a propagandistic manner that lacked authenticity, especially at a time when Jordanians, Lebanese, Syrians, and even Palestinians themselves were suffering under the weight of the Baath’s measures and policies regarding the Palestinian issue.

It would be inaccurate to claim that the Baath invented the Palestinian cause and the subsequent Stories of resistance and defiance; rather, it co-opted all Syrians into embracing this cause to distract them from matters pertaining to their own political lives. In reality, Palestine served as a common ground for both loyalist and opposition political activity, and it became the preferred Story for most Syrians until 2011. However, the regime’s violence and the realities of the Syrian war radically altered the general Syrian perspective on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While the regime was killing its own supporters of Palestine—namely, the Syrians—with all its weaponry, and while it employed Iranian and Hezbollah fighters to carry out brutal killings and to eliminate any political or humanitarian solutions under the guise of the path to Jerusalem, the Syrians began to transcend the Palestinian cause in favor of their own struggles. This struggle was driven by an intense desire to rid themselves of a regime characterized by killings and displacement, which sought external assistance to subjugate and obliterate internal dissent with unprecedented cruelty.

Armed Babylon

The ongoing Syrian war has led the country to the stage of foreign intervention, transforming Syria into a battleground for both Sunni and Shiite jihadists. Syria has become reminiscent of a new Babylon: a mix of human, cultural, and linguistic elements fighting each other, killing Syrians, and destroying their homeland in the name of grand narratives defined by terms like “jihad” and “national security” from neighboring countries. This occurred with the endorsement of the states vying for influence in Syria before those countries later intervened under their own explicit names.

The Syrian regime, along with a segment of the opposition, opened the door for international and regional players to establish a presence on Syrian soil, leading to the emergence of even grander narratives at the heart of the Syrian conflict. In late 2015, Russia resolved to guard Damascus, accumulate assets in Syria, sign contracts in the fields of oil and energy, and seize the country’s vital resources along the 180-km coastal strip. Proponents of the Putinist ideology constructed their narrative of power around the notion that Russia is a land empire, while Washington operates as a sea empire. This pursuit of symbolic equivalence in Putin’s official rhetoric steered Russia toward war in Ukraine, resulting in a humiliating loss of its position and influence in Syria.

With Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s successful expulsion of Bashar al-Assad from Damascus, Moscow lost its long-held ambitions, which dated back to the time of the Tsars, to maintain a comfortable presence along the shores of warm waters. Additionally, it forfeited its anticipated strategic roles in the Middle East, which had begun in Syria in late 2016 when it started preparing to offer its services to Gulf and regional nations as either an alternative or a rival to the American umbrella.

Meanwhile, after the Russian narrative was shattered, what remains for Moscow is its ability to preserve a single aspect of its Syrian Story: maintaining its military bases on the Mediterranean. These bases are at risk, despite the reassurances offered by Ahmed al-Sharaa and his willingness to demonstrate some flexibility toward Moscow, which does not adequately comfort the Russians. The most likely development is the declining sun of Russian-Syrian relations, which began in the mid-1950s, a shift that will be reflected in the arms doctrine of the new Syrian army. This time, the arming of the Syrian army may not follow Eastern models.

Additionally, the Russians did not consider the possibility of regions in Syria where the Syrian coast could become an independent autonomous region, with Russian forces responsible for its protection. Following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s control over the coastal provinces and their towns, the Russians can no longer afford to face the sea while leaving their backs exposed to potential enemies.

In contrast to this dream-like vision held by Russia, the experience of the ISIS caliphate and its televised violence compelled the Americans to revisit the narrative of pursuing jihadists that began after the events of September 11, 2001. This pursuit included rediscovery of the Kurds, which departed from the earlier explorations by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in the late sixties.

The United States has reached the peak of its victories over terrorism, epitomized by its alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces on the Syrian front. With Donald Trump’s desire to keep the memory of the victory over ISIS unembellished, the improvisational president decided to abandon troubled Syria and withdraw his forces. This move, however, was thwarted by strategists in Washington, leading to the emergence of a focus on tracking Iranian influence and the necessity of curbing its presence in Syria. This became especially evident after the strategists’ predictions concerning Iran’s growing influence in Syria potentially threatening Tel Aviv’s interests came true on October 7, 2023. This event added another chapter to the American Story: the security of the Israeli ally necessitates monitoring Iranian activities in the Syrian corridor to Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the second phase of Trump’s vision for the American presence in Syria remains unverified, especially with the capability of Al-Qaeda, operating under its euphemistic name (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), to govern Damascus.

With unprecedented confidence, we can discuss the defeat of Iran, the collapse of its imperialist agenda in the region, and the end of the Revolutionary Guards’ hegemony. The notion of the skilled “carpet makers,” known for their deep strategic patience in the face of Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Syria, has begun to crack. Today, Iran appears closer to being a secondary state, nearing the point of closing its own doors, having transitioned from being a significant regional power with ruling influence in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Sana’a, and across the Persian Gulf.

Tehran has spent tens of billions in Syria and has mobilized numerous sectarian militias from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, equipped with their flags, insignia, and foreign tongues, in an effort to extend its arrogant hegemony. It has constructed dozens of shrines and revived long-forgotten graves under the guise of being burial sites of Shiite imams. Moreover, Iran has interfered with the beliefs of Syrians, as tribal leaders and dignitaries have revealed their claims of kinship to the family of the Prophet and have engaged in Iran’s mobilization efforts for the sake of financial gain, influence, and favor.

Over 14 years, Iran has provided a lesson in arrogance and hubris, consistently failing to call for any initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis through political means. Instead, Iran’s narrative has been zero-sum—or, to put it more starkly, suicidal—centering around a sole hero who must ultimately triumph over what is presented in the vulgar and distorted version of the Shahnameh (Book of Kings) crafted by the Ayatollahs this time.

Simultaneously, the Turks have pursued their own Stories about a modern Ottoman world, under which various political Islamist and jihadist organizations have flourished. They have begun to attract Syrian opposition figures with specific needs, particularly access to funding, grants, and special benefits. Accordingly, Turkey has sponsored an opposition coalition that remains eternally submissive to Turkish dictates, alongside armed factions that the Turkish government has involved in “armed tourism” programs outside Syria, particularly in Libya, Azerbaijan, and Niger.

Does this not evoke memories of how these factions represented a Turkish caricature of the Iranian “Quds Force”? Or does it remind one of the security companies that amalgamated scattered mercenaries and dispatched them into specific battles? Naturally, Ankara has supported all factions opposed to Assad, some of which had a functional role in combating and displacing the Kurds, while others were designed to maintain a balance with the Russians and Iranians.

On December 8, Turkey implied that it was responsible for bringing down the Assad regime with the hammer of Hay’ at Tahrir al-Sham. It swiftly sent an advance team of its intelligence to Damascus, as well as its foreign minister, who made two visits to deliver a victory statement in a manner reminiscent of mandated countries, calling for the end of the self-administration experiment. Ankara’s haste reveals several intentions, including its desire to replace the Shiite crescent with a Sunni counterpart, as well as its plan to substitute the contracts signed by the Iranians with Assad with Turkish subservience contracts that would include new land and maritime border demarcations, along with the establishment of military and logistical bases. Companies aligned with the government will now be tasked with the reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure. This Turkish eagerness to secure military sustainability contracts may echo its actions in Libya under the governments of Fayez al-Sarraj and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Furthermore, the narrative of claiming leadership over the Sunni world has not diminished since the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt and Tunisia. Turkey aims for Damascus to become the primary gateway for a strategy of regional dominance, much like what Iran has pursued for the past 14 years. This indicates Turkey’s ambition to become the new neighbor of Israel. In recent days, supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have chanted, “Take us to Jerusalem,” to which he calmly responded in Arabic, drawing from the accents of sultans: “He who is patient will succeed.” Meanwhile, Turkish symbolism reached its zenith with slogans from demonstrators and social media trends affirming: “Yesterday, Hagia Sophia; today, the Umayyad Mosque; tomorrow, Al-Aqsa Mosque.”

Erdoğan is now seeking to capitalize on the defeat of Assad, with whom he once frequently met and shook hands, for the sake of his domestic policies. In the recent municipal elections, voters chastised the Justice and Development Party due to what they perceived as the president’s failure to adequately respond to the plight of the people in Gaza. Now, Erdoğan has the opportunity to divert the attention of the average Turkish citizen from the government’s weaknesses in dealing with Israel. Consequently, Syria will be framed as the first step on the purported road to Jerusalem in the populist rhetoric and literature of the ruling party, mirroring the narrative previously adopted by Iran. It’s no surprise that this time the road to Jerusalem is set to pass through Qamishli, Deir ez-Zor, Homs, and Damascus.

In summary, the chapter regarding Iran—and possibly even Russia—has closed, and Turkey appears poised to embark on a journey to position Syria as the centerpiece of its next narrative. This endeavor is daunting and presents an adventure in a quagmire rife with change, violence, and unexpected developments. Turkey may soon recognize that it is set to become a neighbor to Israel, as indicated by reports in Israeli media. Tel Aviv will certainly have the means to manage a challenging guest that is no less shrewd than the Iranians. Furthermore, Turkey has placed itself in a position of geopolitical rivalry against an ambitious Arab world led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, a competition that may subject it to the same regional tensions experienced by Iran.

The Dead End or ‘Those Who Liberate Decide

After the regime’s collapse, the slogan ” Who Liberates Decides” emerged. This slogan reflects a misleading and practical vision that speaks of the victorious ruler who must be obeyed and against whom rebellion is not permitted. Such a vision presents us with Ahmad al-Sharaa, a man with a name registered in the Syrian civil registry, as a ruler who decides the form of national dialogue, the transitional process, its timing, and his visions for the upcoming regime, state administration, and how to deal with the pluralistic social fabric. He also decides his group’s vision for the constitution, parliament, and the laws that must be implemented.

Al-Sharaa’s Story is deeply rooted in his jihadist background within al-Qaeda. His rule is based on fanaticism, kinship networks, and reliance on his intimate circle. In his current government, four ministers hail from Halfaya in the Hama countryside, including his brother Maher al-Sharaa. All members of his government come from his experience ruling Idlib. The ministry tested in Idlib is the nucleus of Syria’s governance due to its homogeneity, and the time for governmental grafting or coloring has not yet come.

The experience of the leader in the People’s Palace, a title equivalent to the presidency, underscores his ability to avoid foundational concepts for the new Syria, such as democracy, parliament, gender equality, and equal citizenship. Instead, he employs terminology associated with Shura, Shura Council, and social contract. There is an aspiration to construct a narrative similar to the Khomeini experience in al-Julani’s statements, where the republic becomes a solid theocratic entity with laws confining religious minorities to narrow spaces and preventing them from integrating with the majority or the Sunni nation, relegating them to eternal subjects under a medieval contract system.

It is evident that Al-Sharaa seeks to build a story in Syria characterized by an Islamic republic centralized in everything, from its focus on a Sunni Arab male president to the centralization of power in Damascus and the hands of the dominant group, in addition to the centralization of wealth among those with favor and loyalty.

In a theocratic state, the question of disciplining religious or sectarian groups, or those labeled as heretics and alarmists, arises. This implies that Syria may be exposed to civil wars and the subjugation of sub-identities to a constructed grand identity. We have witnessed the first manifestation of this narrative in the Druze and Christian villages of Idlib. We find echoes of it in the intimidation of Alawites on the coast, who are currently retreating from empowerment and the consolidation of power. The Sunni population itself, despite its size, is divided into urban and rural factions, varying social and cultural classes, and different religious trends, leading many to potentially wear attire mandated by the new authority.

There exists a space within this imagined Story about Syria’s future that resembles the Iranian experience, offering the possibility of civil wars that could distance the country from the Iranian model or result in cycles of elimination targeting at least one group to serve as a deterrent to the rest. This presents another potential image of civil war, akin to the Libyan or Sudanese experiences, wherein factional conflict is activated.

Meanwhile, rehearsals are underway for the anticipated national dialogue sessions, which are public gatherings featuring figures from a civil society shattered by the prolonged Syrian war. However, such sessions do not provide the alternative to meaningful dialogue that should include feminist, cultural, opposition, and party representatives, as well as actual representatives from regional areas. This kind of dialogue presents a new version of the “allegiance” model favored by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which is rife with misrepresentations in the name of nationalism. The outcomes typically remain general, with participants engaging in rhetoric about preserving national unity and the integrity of Syrian territory while saying very little of substance.

There are no visions on the horizon from Al-Sharaa to propose a just solution to the chronic issue of the Kurds in Syria beyond the usual monotonous declaration that “the Kurds are part of the Syrian fabric.” This mirrors the discourse in Iran since 1979, where verbal recognition occurs outside the constitutional framework that delineates the country. Meanwhile, the machinery of the Iranian regime violently suppresses the political and cultural presence of the Kurdish people through legal means, the enforcement of Sharia courts, and their towering gallows.

Naturally, Syria is now subject to the conditions of writing a new grand Story about its future, this time authored by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, drawing from the Umayyad and Islamic past to project an imagined sense of supremacy and glory amidst a highly complex present. After being a temporary Arab state and potential homeland for supporters of Arab nationalist movements under the Baath regime, Damascus appears poised to become a waqf for Muslims worldwide, as well as a sanctuary for those pursued by European and Arab courts under the guise of Islamic protection. The transformation of Damascus into an Islamic metropolis represents one chapter in this unfolding story, indicating that the bond of belonging to an imagined Islamic nation for foreign mujahideen arriving from Afghanistan, India, and China may overshadow national identity.

What must always be defended is that Syria should belong to Syrians, both men and women, without exception. It should not be held hostage by the Stories of foreign states that seek to incorporate Syria into their spheres of influence or national security, nor should it be captive to a group fixated on power and its own Stories and worldview. The prevailing desire among most Syrians today is for the country to achieve stability, enabling men and women to find their way to workplaces, bakeries, and the ballot box, free from the grand Stories that have fragmented this nation.

Those who seek liberation should not make unilateral decisions; otherwise, all avenues toward justice, equality, and citizenship will remain obstructed.