Ankara and the “New Syria” Project: Control, Turkification, and Annexation

The Turkish government is racing against time to capitalize on the change that occurred in Syria on December 8, 2024, marked by the fall of the Syrian regime and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied factions to power in Damascus. With the diminishing influence of Iran and Russia, and the evident divisions among Arab states, Ankara views Syria as an open sphere of influence, believing it has the right to assume control over the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural affairs, effectively becoming a central hub around which any government or authority emerging in Damascus would revolve.

Ankara aims to assert its control in the neighboring country. From the very first days after the opposition forces entered Damascus following the flight of former President Bashar al-Assad and the collapse of the regime along with its military and security structures, the Turkish government began to grasp the significance of this pivotal event and aimed to adapt quickly. It recognized that it had practically stood behind the support for the opposition factions and had long shielded HTS and its government in Idlib, where it still maintains dozens of military bases and outposts.

Controlling the Syrian Economy

Ankara has dispatched official delegations led by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and the head of the intelligence service, with Fidan visiting Damascus twice within a few days to meet Ahmad al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Joulani) at the Republican Palace. This initiative coincided with the Turkish government’s unveiling of various economic plans, including reconstruction projects for Syria, rebuilding the Hejaz railway that connects Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, as well as constructing modern roads between Syrian and Turkish cities and establishing and renovating airports and ports. Additionally, it aims to explore for gas and oil, extend international pipelines, and oversee the Syrian financial and banking sectors.

Turkish media has highlighted the Syrian economic sectors in which Turkey seeks long-term investment, aligning with Ankara’s strategy to dominate the Syrian economy and emerge as a key player in reconstruction efforts. Fidan has called on the international community to lift sanctions on Syria. Reports indicate Ankara’s intention to secure all contracts related to the construction sector, encompassing the building and repair of roads, telecommunications networks, water, electricity infrastructure, and power plants. In 2023, Turkey exported goods and commodities worth $2 billion to Syria. Syria relies heavily on Turkey to meet its diverse needs for goods and products, ranging from food items to construction materials, spare parts, and labor.

Turkish Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Abdulkadir Uraloğlu stated that Turkey aims to reach an agreement with Damascus regarding the demarcation of maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey seeks to exploit the unstable situation in Syria to secure an agreement that would compel Syria to cede sovereignty over large portions of its coastline to Turkey, thereby losing significant gas reserves discovered since 2010. A U.S. geological survey conducted in the same year in the Levant Basin region of the Mediterranean, bordered by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Turkey, estimated the presence of 3,450 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil. This has intensified Turkey’s interest in expanding its exploration efforts beyond its territorial waters, which has faced strong rejection from Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt.

The Greek government asserted that Turkey has no legal right to conclude valid agreements with the transitional authority in Damascus and that any agreement made at this time is questionable in terms of legitimacy. It emphasizes Turkey’s intentions to undermine Greece’s maritime sovereign rights and encroach upon the national waters of Crete and Cyprus. On December 23, 2024, Israel and Greece hastened to sign an agreement to establish the “Green Line,” an undersea high-tension power line that is set to become the longest in the world, connecting Israel to Cyprus, Greece, and the rest of the European Union.

Observers of Turkish policy in the Middle East, particularly regarding military intervention and the expansion of influence in countries that have experienced civil wars and internal strife, believe that Ankara is attempting to capitalize on the changes in Damascus and the presence of its allies in power to secure economic agreements that could provide it with significant advantages and irreplaceable benefits. This strategy mirrors what Turkey accomplished in 2019 when it signed an agreement for oil and gas exploration with the “Libyan National Government,” led by the Islamist Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba, which controls a portion of Libya. This agreement granted Turkey the right to explore in the “common coast” over an area exceeding 7,500 square kilometers, encroaching upon Greek Cyprus—representing an increase of 20% over the maritime area that Greece had originally offered.

Turkey had previously rejected signing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the primary international legal framework for maritime delimitation, which recognizes the rights of Greek islands to full economic zones comparable to those of states. This includes the right for oil and gas exploration in national waters, extending to uninhabited islands or rock formations lying just a few kilometers from Turkish shores, but hundreds of kilometers from Greek shores.

Turkey also resumed discussions about the Qatari gas pipeline, which would extend from Qatar through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey and European countries. Ankara claims that this pipeline could help replace Russian gas in the European market. However, George Zechman, a researcher at the Burkel Institute for Studies in Brussels, highlighted that there is a lack of strong European interest in the Qatari gas pipeline project, largely due to the European Union’s ambitious plans to completely phase out gas by 2050, opting instead for full reliance on renewable energy. Zechman noted that starting in 2030, Europe will begin to diminish financial contributions to natural gas supply projects and will instead focus on developing and expanding renewable energy sectors.

Turkification and Military Bases

The Turkish state intervened militarily in Syria following the arming of popular protests that demanded change, which led to the emergence of armed groups that began clashing with the regular Syrian army starting in 2012. Prior to this, Ankara supported the Syrian opposition, contributing to the unification of its factions and bolstering the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist groups, and nationalist factions that adopted Turkish visions for Syria’s future—views that dismiss Kurdish national identity and clearly reject all forms of decentralized governance.

Turkey has launched three military operations that resulted in the occupation of Syrian territory, accompanied by ethnic cleansing and population displacement that predominantly targeted the Kurdish community. The first operation, called “Euphrates Shield,” aimed at ISIS and resulted in the occupation of Jarablus, Azaz, and al-Bab in the northern Aleppo countryside (August 2016 – March 2017). It was followed by the second operation, named “Olive Branch,” which targeted the Afrin region (January – March 2018). The third operation, “Peace Spring,” commenced on October 9, 2019, and included the Turkish occupation of the regions of Ras al-Ayn/Serê Kaniyê and Tal Abyad/Karê Spî, in alliance with factions of the so-called “National Army,” established by Turkey in 2017 to unify armed opposition militias for use against the Kurdish population and the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria.

In this context, Turkey displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens from these areas, replacing them with settlers brought from within Syria and resettling them in Kurdish homes. In addition, Turkey distributed Kurdish gardens and lands to leaders of armed factions and field commanders.

The Turkish occupation authorities implemented systematic Turkification policies in the areas they occupied during the three military operations. These measures included altering the civil registry of the indigenous population, withdrawing their Syrian identity cards, and replacing them with Turkish ones. Furthermore, the Turkish authorities mandated the use of Turkish language and currency, linking essential services such as health, education, postal services, banking, electricity, water, and telephone to adjacent Turkish regions.

Moreover, the Turkish authorities replaced Syrian educational curricula with Turkish ones in schools. They also established branches of some Turkish universities, including Harran University in Urfa/Riha in northern Syria. The imposition of a Turkish-language education system clearly aims to cultivate a generation that identifies itself intellectually and culturally with Turkish society.

The Turkish authorities place emphasis on Turkish national symbols, displaying the Turkish flag and images of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan above schools, hospitals, and throughout public centers, institutions, and squares. The Turkish government appointed a single governor to oversee the occupied areas in northern Syria, replacing the previous seven governors designated for coordination, signifying the “unification” of the occupied Syrian territories administratively and their integration into Turkey. (See: The Turkish Occupation of Serê Kaniyê/Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad: Consolidating Ethnic Cleansing and Promoting Turkification. Kurdish Centre for Studies, October 29, 2023).

On November 30, 2024, Turkey directed factions of the National Army to launch a military operation dubbed ‘Freedom Dawn,’ aimed at occupying areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This operation was executed with the support and backing of the Turkish army, resulting in the occupation of the areas of Shehba, Tal Rifaat, and Manbij. Pro-Ankara militants committed various violations and crimes against Kurdish civilians and residents accused of collaborating with the Autonomous Administration.

As a consequence of this operation, tens of thousands of displaced Kurds from Afrin province, who had been in al-Shehba camps, were forced to move to areas in Raqqa and Hasakah. The displacement processes were marked by violations, including looting and robbery perpetrated by National Army militants against the displaced Kurds. Pro-Ankara factions continue to launch significant attacks in attempts to seize Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozat Bridge, while Turkey persists in mobilizing its forces and threatening to launch a major military operation to capture the city of Kobanê and the surrounding villages.

In Idlib, where the HTS-affiliated Salvation Government is in control, the Turkish state maintains dozens of military bases equipped with hundreds of soldiers, heavy vehicles, and advanced monitoring and communication equipment, in addition to numerous other military posts. Agreements between Turkey and Russia, alongside the establishment of de-escalation zones in northwest Syria as part of the Astana process, have granted Turkey a green light to deploy military bases in various regions of the Syrian province of Idlib, according to a report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Seven military brigades of Turkish forces are deployed in the de-escalation zones across 49 main military bases: 13 in the western countryside of Aleppo and 30 in rural Idlib, including 11 in the eastern countryside of Idlib, 13 in the southern countryside of Idlib, six in the western countryside of Idlib, and three each in rural Hama and rural Latakia. These bases are connected to dozens of military points surrounding the main bases, ensuring logistical support for the Turkish forces. Each combat brigade is composed of 1,500 soldiers, meaning the total number of Turkish forces in these regions is approximately 10,500, fully equipped.

The report indicates that each military base houses dozens of soldiers, potentially numbering in the hundreds, specializing in various fields such as engineering, special forces, artillery and missile operations, and communications. The bases are supplied with artillery pieces, tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft systems, and mine-clearing equipment, in addition to military communication devices and mobile phone towers for Turkish networks.

Turkish forces bolster their bases in these regions with 200 tanks, 400 armored vehicles, and 800 armored personnel carriers, along with dozens of trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles. According to the report, the majority of Turkish forces are stationed south of the M4 Aleppo-Latakia international highway, with approximately 25 military bases located along this route, meaning that more than half of the Turkish military bases are positioned along and south of the highway (See: Turkey establishes its presence in Syria with 10,000 soldiers and dozens of military bases, Asharq Al-Awsat, February 3, 2023).

Recently, after the collapse of the Syrian regime and the effective takeover of power in Damascus by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Turkish government initiated a rapid repositioning and military redeployment process within Syria. This includes discussions about establishing military bases within the country, particularly in Hama, Homs, and even the capital, Damascus.

In an interview with journalists on December 15, 2024, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler mentioned that Ankara is working to finalize a comprehensive agreement on military training and defense cooperation with Syria. Consequently, Turkey is set to oversee the formation of the new Syrian army. The Turkish intelligence agency is responsible for liaising with the new authority in Damascus regarding security cooperation and supervising the establishment of the sectors of the army and security services that Damascus aims to form or restructure.

Sources indicate that the Turkish Ministry of Defense is deploying advisors who work behind the scenes to assist the Syrian Interim Government in managing government operations, rebuilding institutions, and strengthening governance. They also supervise the integration of various factions into the new Syrian army, including the National Army and other groups such as HTS and other Islamist factions that continue to resist disbanding. According to Turkish journalist Sinan Burhan, the Turkish government plans to establish a military base in Damascus and a naval base in Tartus.

Conclusion

Turkey is pursuing the role of guardian for the new Syria, nurturing and influencing the new regime to align with its strategic interests. This Turkish guardianship encompasses military and economic dimensions, along with social and cultural aspects, while actively promoting the role of ‘soft power’ to infiltrate Syrian society and various political factions and armed groups. Ankara envisions the new Syria as an extension of its own territory and a new marketplace for its objectives. It is plausible that the Turkish government may establish a new ministry, tentatively titled the “Ministry of Syria Affairs.”

The following points summarize the key conclusions:

First: Turkey asserts that it has long supported the Syrian armed opposition, providing protection and shelter to millions of Syrians while overseeing the recent military operation dubbed “Deterrence of Aggression.” Consequently, Turkey claims credit for the military victory that led to the collapse of the Syrian regime and President Assad’s flight. As a result, those who have assumed power in Damascus are considered Ankara’s allies, who would not have been able to establish their authority without Turkish support. This reinforces the belief that Ankara should hold a primary position in governing the new Syria. Evidence of this influence has been demonstrated through the visits made by the Turkish foreign minister and intelligence chief to Damascus, their meetings with al-Sharaa and members of the interim government, as well as the ceremonial displays that accompanied these diplomatic engagements.

Second: The Turkish government quickly initiated discussions regarding a maritime border demarcation agreement with the interim government, preempting any unforeseen developments. This agreement is expected to secure rights and privileges for Turkey in terms of gas and oil exploration, opportunities that were unimaginable prior to the recent changes in Damascus, while also bolstering its position against maritime competitors, notably Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. Additionally, Turkey aims to establish strategic military bases in Hama, Homs, and Damascus while overseeing the rebuilding of the Syrian army and security services, thereby embedding Turkish military strategies within Syrian state institutions. Through these actions, Turkey intends to replace the roles of Iran and Russia, effectively constructing a “state within a state” that enables it to exert control over the new Syria.

Third: Turkey aims to transform Syria into a corridor for gas pipelines and international trade routes, with these lines terminating in Turkish ports and airports, allowing Turkey to reap the majority of the benefits. Current discussions include the Qatari gas pipeline as well as the developmental route emerging from the Gulf and Iraq.