Why Rojava’s al-Hol Camp initiative was hobbled?

In the wake of power vacuum created by the collapse of the regime of Bashar Assad late in December 2024, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia- Assad’s patron- prophetically told reporters that Israel emerges to be the main beneficiary of the unfolding situation in Syria.

Conversely, Donald Trump, Putin’s American counterpart, has ever since held a conviction that Turkey- which did an unfriendly takeover without a lot of lives being lost- holds the key to the future of Syria.

Notably, these two discrepant views and disparate opinions as who would assume the position of the new conductor to force the Syrian orchestra to his baton, which substantially delineate external factors shaping the Syrian politics, are utterly reflective of Syria’s grotesque landscape, to which the West is giving a head- burying policy, surpassing the average ostrich in doing the practice more professionally.

Amid this bleak a reality, not against expectations, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS)- unnoticed- is making the headlines.

In late May, ISIS carried out its first ever attack against forces of the new “apostate” government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Jihadist. In less than 48 hours, a similar attack was mounted against the Kurdish forces. Yet more symbolically, the group has appointed Abu Dujana al-Juburi a new vali (governor) for the Aleppo Vilayet.

In the very same month, Trump – within his new Syrian policy – invited al-Sharaa to take charge of detention centers holding ISIS foreign fighters in Syria’s northeast region of Rojava. On this account, reports confirmed that an agreement- or rather more precisely a mechanism- has been reached between the Kurds and al-Sharaa government to let Syrian “detainees” return to their areas of origin in Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib, and elsewhere.

With variance, more or less the same, nearly five years ago, a similar agreement was signed regarding the al-Hol Camp. However, when it produced undesired outcomes, it was sealed clinically dead. A confluence of certain determinants derailed the process.

Highlighting two symbolic yet gory events, this is how the story developed.

On October 4, 2020, Kurdish politician Ilham Ahmed, then President of the Executive Committee of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) announced they were laying down the finishing touches on a non- binding though resolution to send home Syrians held at detention centers across the Kurdish enclave of Rojava, including particularly notably the infamous al-Hol Camp.

Consequentially, six days later, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), enacted decision No. 146, officially ratifying the initiative and more importantly giving “willing” Syrians (men, women, and children) held at the camp to head home, not before all legal procedures were met.

However, while the choice to leave or remain was left to the discretion of the individual, Ahmed clarified the AANES will be responsible for those not leaving the camp.

Prior to the October enactment, many were released from the camp via the ill- advised and largely abortive Tribal Sponsorship System, which saw the release of hundreds of Syrians on the ground their affiliation with the radical group was not of their own volition.

Legally, decision No. 146 was a modified amendment to the one- day, and the stopgap Tribal Forum held on May 3, 2019, in Ain Issa, then de facto capital of AANES, featuring Mazloum Abdi, Commander- in- Chief of Syrian Democratic forces (SDF), and representatives of nearly 70 Arab tribes and clans.

The fate of Syrian ISIS affiliates, sympathizers, and families held at SDF’s custody has always been a hot- button topic with Arab tribal chiefs. It is true to assume, however, that many people found themselves in the squalid camp for merely living in territories fell to the sway of the radical group, and others were civilians displaced by the war seeking refuge. Needless to say, however, that the vast majority of detainees were embracing ISIS ideology.

By no means, the rapid expansion of ISIS was in part a military conquest, and in another, a slow penetration of the group’s ideology into the minds. Propounding a fundamentalist ideology, ISIS drew to itself Sunni supporters. Syrian sympathizers and supporters imbued with the group’s expansionist and exclusionist ideology have proven unrepentant.

Located in an arid area in eastern Hasaka, near the border with Iraq, Rojava’s largest detention center, the al-Hol Camp was initially set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) during the Gulf War in 1991, to accommodate Iraqis fleeing Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime.

In the crucible of the protracted Syrian civil war, ISIS occupied the camp, making it a transit point between Syria and Iraq, until it was finally liberated by the Kurds in 2016.

Backed by the U.S.- led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the SDF came into being in the aftermath of the Battle of Kobane in 2015, with Kurds being the main component. By doing so, the widely acclaimed Kurdish- led force found itself assuming control of roughly a third of Syria’s most strategic and vital geography. Formerly under ISIS, these areas found it painful to concede defeat to the Kurds. Let alone being held at their custody.

With the fall of Baghouz in March 2019, the camp swelled considerably to the size of a modern town, comprising at some point 80.000 people.

By all appearances, the dilemma of al-Hol is a multi-dimensional and a multi- faceted one, in the sense it accommodates families of Islamist Jihadist- leaning Sunni extremists. Recent statistics show that the camp houses right now some 34.927 people, of whom 6.385 are foreigners, 15.681 are Iraqi nationals, with Syrians making a majority with 15.861 people.

However, while repeated calls made by the AANES on foreign countries to repatriate their nationals go unheard, and while Iraqis have been returning home on regular basis, in accordance with an understanding reached with the Iraqi Federal authorities, the issue of Syrians raises it head as a hot topic right now as part of a broader integration process between Rojava and Damascus.

Back in 2019, the hastily- agreed upon Ain Issa Agreement was basically put into effect to exit women and children held at the camp. Conceding to repeated calls, and partly to adhere to formalities which play an important role in the everyday tribal life, some 1.200 women and children left the camp in July and August. The guilty after serving out their sentences were released. Many others, being deradicalized were also freed. Those not covered in the tribal system had to file applications to the SDF- sponsored local councils (communes) in the areas they belonged to.

However, while seemingly humanitarian, the AANES justified the 2020 initiative on the ground to relieve itself of the exorbitant expenses in running the camp- an admittance made by Ahmed- many others, however, believe that the bid came as a sign of acquiescence by the Kurdish authorities to relentless Arab demands, amid widely- circulated though unconfirmed reports of a potential full U.S. withdrawal from the Kurdish enclave after Baghouz- the group’s last pocket of resustance- was conquered.

The notion whether the decision was passed in coordination with the Global Coalition or otherwise, has never been put under any thorough discussion. Either case, the idea that the decision being passed on the first anniversary of the Turkish incursion into the two localities of Ras al-Ain (Sere Kaniye) in Hasaka, and Tal Abyad (Gire Spi) in Raqqa, unjustly codenamed Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, could gain some credence.

At that time, as ISIS’ territorial entity collapsed, many believed that there was no common enemy that could bind the Kurds and the Arabs. Arab tribes put pressure on the SDF not only to release detainees, rather demanded full SDF withdrawal from the recently conquered areas and hand it over to the military councils.

Nonetheless, as no timeline was set for returnees to leave the camp– with a mass release out of consideration as it could have overwhelmed the SDF in volatile areas recently liberated from the group– Kurdish authorities organized limited though steady releases (batches) throughout 2020 and 2021.

The whole process- which could have led to the release of nearly 25.000 Syrians- was abruptly brought to a halt early in 2022. In the years that followed, the idea would be almost consigned to the grave. Not unexpectedly, opponents accused the Kurds of politicizing the case. That, when all is said and done, was an unsuccessful using of the last fig leaf to hide the nakedness of their unsounded claim.

While the Ain Issa Agreement entailed that tribal leaders assume responsibility of reintegration and preventing their return to the radical group, nothing of the kind took place. But why?

Mostly, areas liberated from ISIS were the first to break faith with the Syrian regime. At some point during the war, there were nearly 1000 factions fighting allegedly the Assad regime. From mid-2011, up to early 2019, the vast volatile area was ruled by different factions embracing yet disparate ideologies.

From the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to the al-Nusra Front (now Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham– HTS), followed by ISIS, people changed their allegiance and switched sides repeatedly. Not necessarily out of conviction. This created discord and mistrust among the population.

Changing loyalty eroded the authority of tribal leaders and chiefs whose authority no longer exceeded the confines of their tribes, if any. Contrary to Assad, the high prestige and pomposity tribal leaders, chiefs, and sheikhs gained, and the god- like social pedigree, lost its dazzling effulgence under Islamist groups. Besides, occasional shifting allegiances drove a rift within the same tribe, clan, and sometimes the same family.

By 2019, tribal sheikhs and chiefs had lost the spell of the staff of Moses in administering the affairs of their tribesmen. The agreement’s slow releases while on the near term alleviated the strain, however, on the long term, the process as a whole played into the hands of the enemy.

With many people- either secretly or openly- still adhere to an exclusionist medieval ideology, regionalism, tribalism, added to the unfounded suspicion at the SDF as a Kurdish façade to create demographic change in areas with light Kurdish presence, gave ISIS a warm nest to hatch its plots.

With no guarantees or mechanism to reintegrate returnees into their societies, which often received them with suspicion and disrespect, there arose on the horizon an appealing alternative; ISIS. Lacking resources such as rehabilitation centers and reform facilities, and under threats of sleeper cells, or out of conviction, many found comfort in renewing allegiance to the group. One thing became a reality, a contagious malign gangrene was creeping over the minds of men, and conquering the already ungovernable territories.

The humanitarian intent to clear the camp clashed with a dire reality on the ground, the matter that exposed the hollowness of the agreement. The relief of tribal agitation to the ruin of SDF was becoming untenable. In al-Busayrah, in eastern Deir Ezzor, for instance, militants openly in 2020 chanted slogans promoting the group, calling for Islamic Law to be enforced.

It is not genuine to assume that the defeat of the extremist group would have been a concrete reality on the ground had Arab tribes withheld support. Many others, harboring festering- though unfounded- grievances against the Kurdish forces, sought to subvert the project and drive a wedge between SDF and Arab tribes. Added to air strikes by Iranian- backed groups, and Assad’s Baathist elements, the whole governing hierarchy seemed threatened.

It was not a hard- to- define coincidence that throughout 2021 and 2022, assassinations, IED bombs, targeting of tribal leaders, military personal affiliated with SDF, and civilian employees working within AANES institutions, became common and every day occurrences particularly in Deir Ezzor, where the group continued to inflict painful blows on SDF.

Though it no longer held territory, its ideology still continued to spread through the sleeper cells, which gained notoriety for its lethal campaigns and the resilience it showed. It was evident that the group was gaining ground and still garnered support.

In January 2021, in one of the scariest scenes, and yet appalling scenarios, sleeper cells of the group demonstrated their criminal primitive instinct and patriarchal authority on Saada al-Hirmas, co-chair of Tal Shayer Council, and her deputy, Hind al-Khider, in southern Hasaka.

After severing their heads, their bodies were thrown onto the road. No such horror was ever appended to the chapters of books. Panic struck everywhere, and silence prevailed. The Saada- Hind event was not an isolated occurrence, rather it brings into light how the group was undisguisedly hitting hard.

While the murder drew world-wide condemnation, and prompted nation- wide protests denouncing killings, people demanded at the same time revenge for the two slain female administrators, and bring perpetrators to justice. There emerged a growing acknowledgement that evil had to be tackled by action.

The Anti-Terror Units of SDF, a special force trained and supported by the Americans, embarked on security campaigns in the rural areas in Hasaka and Deir Ezzor pursuing the group’s sleeper cells and affiliates in the Hasaka- Deir Ezzor desert close to the border with Iraq, where according to reports, hundreds of ISIS were on the loose.

The year 2022 was fundamental in the Kurdish approach to the multi- faceted dilemma of Syrian Islamist extremists held at its custody. While in January the group mounted a surprise large- scale and yet unexpected attack in Hasaka, sleeper cells attacked a security complex in Raqqa, the group’s former de facto capital, as the year drew to a close.

Within the camp itself- which was becoming a cauldron that could implode at any moment, some 44 people- including 14 women and two children- were killed. No one knew who stood exactly behind the killings. However, all traces left behind were indicative of, and bore the indelible mark of ISIS.

In the period spanning the two events, the SDF found itself in a one- sided version of a war of attrition. Taking SDF patrols and isolated detachment points completely by surprise, attackers– upon unfolding the deadly scene– would either disappear into the sand or recede into the darkness.

Since its territorial dismantlement in the Syrian hamlet of Baghouz, the group resorted to hit- and- run tactic, making use of the porous and discordant Syrian Desert, a vast expanse that extends between Raqqa in the north, Homs and Hama in the west, Deir Ezzor in the east, up to Sweida further in the south, where it maintains a foothold.

However, the tactic the group employed in the onslaught mounted on the school- transformed- Prison– home to group’s members including foreign fighters, and minors– was not a guerrilla- like warfare. It was a fully- engaged battle with the Kurdish forces.

Setting a zero hour which was marked with the loud explosion at the entrance of the prison. Fighters of the group converged on the facility. Within, inmates organized an armed disobedience, taking many guards as human shields and hostage whose lives were not spared for long. In the mess ensued, tens of inmates were able to escape.

In the Sinaa Prison attack, some 300 assailants took part in the assault against the highly fortified detention facility. It was a fresh killing ground just as deadly as a pitched- battle engaging two professional armies. In many ways, the Sinaa onslaught marked a key turning point in SDF’s approach to ISIS.

Confounding the SDF, the U.S. Special Operation forces aided the Kurdish forces to control the situation. Four days to the attack, January 16, convoy (batch) number 49 which comprised 217 people from Deir Ezzor had left the camp. Admittedly, decision N. 146 was a gesture of friendship and the ideals promoted by SDF.

However, the attack served as the major disincentive for the AANES to proceed with the process. Internal Security Forces, colloquially referred to as Asayish- the force in charge of the camp- put the brakes on the process. But for what reasons?

By varying accounts, many attackers who take part in the onslaught were former detainees who had been released under either Tribal Sponsorship System, commune application, or being duly freed having allegedly no blood on their hands.

While reports put the number of inmates and attackers killed at 420, the rows of neat white headstones gave a tragic testimony to the deleterious impact of the onslaught on local population. By all accounts, 121 Kurdish military personnel, prison staff, and servicemen lost their lives.

Before the year drew to a close, a heavily fortified security complex at the center of Raqqa- the group’s former de facto capital- was attacked in late December. Though not comparable to the Sinaa attack, it was testimonial to the unabated rise of the group.

The year 2023, saw an unprecedented Turkish aerial bombardment– largely drone strikes– against Rojava causing terrible havoc, with towering human losses and considerable material damage. Totally, 146 civilians and military personnel were killed.

That same year, the group claimed 121 attacks in Syria. as a whole. Tthe Kurds were grappled with a destroyed military and civilian infrastructure. Life was brought to a dismal halt. A reality that prompted Abdi to state that America’s silence towards Turkish lethal campaign against Rojava signaled a tacit consent. The process of “batches” was pared down to the bone, if any.

Today, with information on the undisclosed mechanism remain murky, and yet to emerge, any impromptu and unstudied release of ISIS members and affiliates held at al-Hol– much truncated than 2019– among others, could further muddy the Syrian waters.

Ridiculously, more recently, a number of militiamen responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity have been installed in high- profile military and security posts, amid report of absorbing some 3.500 foreign Jihadists– mainly Uyghur– into al-Sharaa’s fledgling army, puts the state- building process into question, casting as well a huge gloomy shadow over the future of the war- fatigued country, whose situation hangs on a knife’s edge, with black banners– featuring The Seal of Muhammad– fluttering in the heart of Damascus.