Violence and death represent the primary response of “Syrians” to the questions posed by the world regarding politics, social, ethnic, religious, cultural, and value pluralism, transitional and non-transitional justice, and the “reconstruction” of the meaning of country, society, and state (or what constitutes society and state) in Syria.
This response is shocking and terrifying in every sense of the word, and it represents the loudest voice. Moreover, it continues without interruption. It not only reveals the bankruptcy or dysfunction of the perceptions, values, and stakes of traditional politics in Syria, but also exposes the fragility of social and cultural structures that were supposed to be solid. The violence witnessed in the country is not merely a transient outburst or the result of a sudden conflict; it is a profound manifestation of a structural crisis in self-understanding and in the conception of belonging and collective identity. This violence speaks a language more eloquent than any political or cultural discourse or claim. Yet, this does not necessarily represent the only or most profound answer.
The Syrian Questions
These realities pose pressing questions regarding the current situation: Is it still possible to speak of Syria—as a society and a state—after all that has happened, after the country has been engulfed in violence and death since 2011, and with the threat of more? Are the overlaps and divisions within the Syrian issue—which have long existed—beyond the capacity of Syrians to handle and manage, as Syrians, with whatever rationality and humanity remain?
These questions impose themselves urgently amid a reality in which “Syria,” as a unifying concept, appears to have disintegrated into warring fragments. More dangerously, this fragmentation is no longer merely a difference in political or social visions; it has turned into an “existential conflict,” in which each party views its survival as dependent on the “annihilation” of the other. This qualitative shift in the nature of the conflict makes any talk of “reconciliation” or “reconstruction” appear naive or detached from reality.
Should Syrians remain fully loyal to the “root” of politics in this Levant and in their history—that is, power, force, dominance, tribal and religious fanaticism, and permissiveness—more than to the “management” of society, diversity, and difference within the social and human phenomenon? Or should they invert the equation so that politics becomes the “management” and “administration” of “difference” and “diversity” within the framework of “society and state”? Oh, the horror of what they are in, and the horror of what they are about to face! For the “Syrian phenomenon” today is nascent and has yet to reveal its full potential and possibilities—which, alas, are disastrous.
At the heart of the catastrophe
Not everything happening is solely the work of “Syrians.” Even what they produce is “entwined” with dynamics of subjugation and penetration that are extremely intense, deep, and comprehensive. Syrians themselves are the “product” or “result” of highly concentrated and highly destructive dynamics of fanaticism and hatred. The more Syrians sink into fanaticism, hatred, and bloodshed, the more they serve others and the less they serve themselves as Syrians. Their situation is truly strange: they squander opportunities and hasten catastrophe with all their energy and enthusiasm. Indeed, they are at the heart of the catastrophe, with full zeal and fervor!
This reveals the complex nature of the Syrian crisis. It is not simply an “internal conflict” between “local components,” but part of a broader network of regional and international contradictions and conflicts. More dangerous still, Syrians—for the most part—are not content to be “victims” of these entanglements; rather, a portion of them have become “agents” of the country’s destruction. Indeed, they compete in deadly wagers and agendas.
Syrians today live a tragic paradox: the more they immerse themselves in violence in the name of “defending identity,” the more they lose their Syrian identity—does that word still carry meaning?—and entrench themselves in their deadly identities. The more they claim to fight for “Syria,” the more they contribute to its erasure. This paradox is not merely a “misunderstanding” or “misjudgment.” It is an expression of a radical reversal in the system of values and the logic of political and social action, where means become ends in themselves, and the destruction of the homeland becomes a means to “save” it!
The fracture of the idea of Syria
A segment of “Syrians”—whose actual size or proportion within society is unknown, but whose presence and overwhelming influence on the scene is evident—believe that sectarian approaches, initiating revenge and genocide on the one hand, and denying their occurrence on the other, build a stable country. The truth is that these approaches fracture the idea of Syria and the concept of a society and state within it. Also true is that killing, sectarianism, and exclusion do not build a country.
Syrians must learn lessons from the past—from their own history and the histories of others, from their present and that of others. It may be possible to establish authority, rule, and a political system, but only under constant anxiety and fear—from both “inside” and “outside.” Those who use weapons against people will only be able to rule them by force; those who build on injustice, aggression, and killing will reap only what they sow—along with shame and collapse. The lessons remain close and urgent.
This belief (sectarian approaches, revenge, etc.) reveals a profound misunderstanding of the nature of political and social structures. Those who believe exclusion and genocide can establish stability confuse temporary “forced calm” with sustainable “true stability.” History is full of examples of policies based on oppression and exclusion that appeared stable for periods, only to collapse under their internal contradictions. Once again: the lessons are close and urgent. True stability is not built on “eliminating” difference, but on “managing” it justly and civilly.
A Historic Failure
Syrians have so far failed to find a proper path to bridge gaps, connect ruptures, dismantle bottlenecks between social formations, and correct the relationship between “society and state” or “what constitutes a society and state,” or even to truly conceive of a “society and state” at all. There is an imbalance in the dynamics and scales of meaning and power, and a failure to understand their reality and its requirements. There is a haste in the process on one hand, and a delay in its calibration, institutionalization, and legitimization on the other. Most importantly, extremism, violence, and hatred have become a means to political ends.
This failure is not simply a “lack of experience” or “weakness of tools,” but an expression of a fundamental crisis in the methodology of political thinking. Syrians appear incapable of strategic or long-term thinking, and are governed by the logic of immediate revenge and quick gains. This logic causes them to miss historic opportunities for building and rush headlong into destruction. They treat politics as a “zero-sum game” where one side can only win by the complete loss of the other, rather than as a “cooperative game” where all sides can win.
The Waste of Human
This imbalance in meaning and power is starkly evident in how many justify the most brutal acts using the noblest concepts. “Security and stability” become synonymous with “invasion” and “displacement,” “justice” becomes “revenge,” “injustice,” and “waste of human life,” while “dignity” becomes “humiliation” and “demeaning others.” This reversal of meanings is not just a “political maneuver,” but a sign of a lost moral and political compass.
Strange explanations—or rather, justifications—are given for sectarian violence and killings, as well as the demonization and stigmatization of broad social (and ethnic, religious, cultural) groups in the country. The “other” and the “different” are thus seen as threats to be eradicated or excluded. This affects social groups with various value systems, ideologies, and political leanings. Instead of halting the killings, there is incitement to do more; instead of tearing down walls, they are strengthened and raised, sometimes even more built. So far, the worst feared has not fully materialized—but what Syrians thought they could overcome, they seem to pursue with great zeal and certainty.
Another sign of the crisis’s depth is that Syrians do not just practice violence; they seek to normalize, legitimize, and sometimes even sanctify it. Violence thus becomes “natural,” “justified,” even “necessary.” Crime becomes part of the “dominant culture,” killing part of the “logic” and “requirements” of politics, and hatred part of the “collective identity.” This deep cultural shift makes escaping the cycle of violence extremely difficult, as it requires a radical transformation in values and meanings.
Stakes and Messages
What Syrians “say” through their lived reality speaks volumes about their conditions and directions. But this does not answer the pressing questions many have about citizenship, institution-building, statehood, participation, and justice. Nor does it answer the “civilized” (!) world’s questions regarding the Syrian issue. The world remains in waiting, even though there are “open doors” and “facilitations” supporting conflicting dynamics within the Syrian reality. There is a kind of “connect-disconnect” — simultaneously supporting something and its opposite, with endless conditions that burden the Syrian phenomenon beyond its capacity.
What Syrians “say” through their actions today sends a clear message to the world: “Participation,” “human rights,” and “civil society” are hollow words when they collide with the “hard realities” of primary affiliations and narrow interests. Worse, global stakes are used as a further excuse for violence in an endless cycle of blame, fear, and closed horizons.
In Conclusion
The harshest moments often carry the greatest potential, and at the heart of the catastrophe, the call to be Syrians—not merely components (sects, tribes, regions, etc.)—still resonates. This is a source of hope, but not automatic nor guaranteed. It is hope conditioned by awareness and the determination to rethink the horizon of society and state, based on politics—not force and militarism; participation and exchange—not monopoly and exclusivity; and the logic of a “nation of citizens” rather than a “saved sect,” both in religion and politics.
If Syrians fail to reflect on their conditions as Syrians, and fail to say anything to the “world” other than what they do and who they are today, continuing blindly on this path with zeal, they will become subject to even more disastrous interventions, stakes, and realities. Syria may remain in name, but as a torn country drowned in violence, death, and shame.
