War on the Eastern Euphrates: A Certain Miscalculation

The discourse surrounding the future of Syria is revealing voices calling for war in the northeastern part of the country. Beyond the frenzy and hatred that characterize these voices, it is fair to say that they lack any understanding of the dangers associated with the idea of war, which does not serve the interests of the Syrian people. War would mean tearing apart the already fragile national fabric that has been devastated by over thirteen years of conflict; it would also lead to more Syrians losing their lives and livelihoods, thus destroying the relatively smooth and peaceful transition that ultimately contributed to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Furthermore, war would disrupt the progress towards building state institutions, postpone the lifting of international sanctions on Damascus, and halt ongoing initiatives aimed at reassessing the status of members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham designated as terrorists.

Additionally, the current dire and impoverished conditions in Syria do not indicate the inevitability of resorting to a new conflict. As we have experienced in previous years, war drains an already depleted state treasury and fosters foreign interventions in domestic affairs. With Syria on the verge of eliminating foreign presence, following the withdrawal of Iranian forces and diminishing Russian influence, the outbreak of war could give rise to new foreign interventions, adding another layer of regional and possibly international crises to the country.

Proponents of war feed on the notion that Syrians now have a “legitimate” government and president, believing that this emerging authority has the right to exert control over all Syrian territories—whether with the consent of the governed or forcibly. This includes the armed annexation of the eastern Euphrates to Damascus, taking advantage of Turkey’s longstanding hostility toward the Autonomous Administration and a massive media campaign rife with animosity toward the Kurds and the coexistence project supported by various political and social forces in the Syrian Jazira.

However, the question of “legitimacy” and the right to dominate the decisions of other Syrians may remind us of the justifications used by the former regime for its wars, which it framed in terms of sovereignty and the state’s exclusive right to use violence to ensure security and restore public order. Assad relied on constitutional provisions that granted him the authority to declare war as commander-in-chief of the army and armed forces. However, in the current context, Sharaa lacks this constitutional legitimacy essential for embarking on a military adventure.

In reality, there is a regime in place that operates under questionable legitimacy; only a small number of armed factions have endorsed Sharaa’s appointment as interim president of Syria. This maneuver seems to hinge on Turkish approval to grant Sharaa the necessary legitimacy, as the January 31 meeting to “elect” him was attended by pro-Ankara factions, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and a few peripheral factions, while intentionally excluding leaders from the Southern Front, Rijal al-Karama, and the SDF. This exclusion makes the situation resemble an imposition of a fait accompli, designed to bypass the conditions and obligations that these excluded factions might impose.

Moreover, the military appointment of the president evokes a Mamluk-style factional rule, where factions have become the source of legitimacy, supplanting armies as the grantors of power. This factional legitimacy implies control over decisions related to war and peace, economic policies, and the restructuring of institutions and public representation.

However, what the war advocates surrounding Sharaa fail to realize, despite their chants of “Welcome to the battles,” is that he currently lacks the capacity to go to war. This is especially crucial considering the approximately 15,000 foreign jihadists associated with or under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Should their military involvement be activated, it could prompt the world to revisit the memories of the ISIS caliphate and the fallout from the presence of foreign jihadists in Syria. This situation previously necessitated the forming of a global coalition that succeeded in partnership with the SDF in dismantling the purported caliphate.

It’s worth noting that some of these foreign fighters have joined the new authority, while others have retreated to remote areas to reconsider their ideological positions. However, sparking a conflict in the eastern Euphrates could lead to the establishment of a new jihadist authority based on the dynamics of “gain and spoils.”

Importantly, there is another factor that renders war an unfavorable option. Among the pressing issues troubling the rulers of Damascus is the growing threat of ISIS, which has been regaining strength in the Badia region, with thousands of its fighters still detained in facilities run by the SDF. From a practical perspective, ISIS represents one of the specters that concern Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). A loosening of the SDF’s grip or a breakdown in the detention facilities could potentially escalate into direct confrontations with the Interim Government (HTS), given the bloody history of clashes between the two sides, particularly in the cities of Jazira. HTS’s capabilities remain limited in pursuing ISIS remnants and securing detention facilities. Thus, a mutual understanding on managing this issue is fundamental to the relationship between the SDF and Damascus, contrary to the war advocates’ narrative that ISIS is merely a minor detail.

Moreover, the proponents of war also overlook that negotiations between the new authority and the SDF could yield reasonable results, provided there is mutual willingness and the necessary international backing. Just before Donald Trump took office, the administration of his predecessor, Joe Biden, intensified meetings between the SDF and HTS, aiming to achieve two objectives: to remove the Turkish veto that restricts Damascus’s ability to engage constructively with the SDF and to accustom both Damascus and the SDF to direct meetings as the only way to reach future understandings. What emerged from those meetings, if described as positive in terms of cooling the military option, reflects an acceptance of the possibility of renewed US mediation in the future.

There are signals from “media professionals” close to the Damascus authority, as well as from protesters calling for an urgent war, asserting that a conflict in northeast Syria is inevitable. They base this claim on private statements from Sharaa and his senior officials, who suggest that war is “a matter of time.” Nevertheless, the aforementioned considerations undermine the credibility of such threats, which largely represent psychological warfare aimed at inciting the components of the eastern Euphrates against the Autonomous Administration. Ultimately, declaring war would represent a significant miscalculation for a temporary authority seeking to convince the world of its newfound pragmatism and reduced ideological stance.