The German Institute for International and Security Affairs published a piece titled “Turkey and Israel: Risky Escalation in a Turbulent Regional Order,” which addressed the causes and motives contributing to the disturbance and tension in relations between Turkey and Israel in the past few years. It highlighted October 7, 2023, as a dividing line between two stages that shaped the relations of the two states. Before this date, cooperation based on mutual interests, and even the realization of a shared vision, was the prominent feature of Ankara’s relationship with Tel Aviv. There was diplomatic, political, economic, and military cooperation that developed and took root over time. The Turkish aspiration toward the West—particularly the issue of joining the European Union and solidifying its role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—was the driver and motivation for Turkey to strengthen its relations with Israel.
Following the attack by the Palestinian “Hamas” movement on the Gaza envelope on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent launch of a major military operation in the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas, eliminate its administrative and military structures, and liberate Israeli hostages from underground tunnels and prisons—an undertaking that led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians—and Israel’s subsequent expansion of the military operation to include Lebanon to eliminate the “Hezbollah” organization and liquidate its leaders, foremost among them Hassan Nasrallah, whom Israel killed in September 2024, Turkish-Israeli relations witnessed a setback and a serious fracture. Mutual threats, attacks, and media skirmishes occurred, extending even to hints of direct military confrontation. In addition to these developments, other factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two countries, including Ankara’s sense of a shift in the balance of power in Israel’s favor, the Hebrew state’s resort to escalation and the logic of imposing military force, and a clear divergence in vision regarding many files and issues in the region, as well as a conflict of interests reaching the point of friction and indirect confrontation in several areas, most notably Syria and the Horn of Africa.
From Partnership to Confrontation
Israel used to hold Turkey up as an example when discussing the possibility and prospects of its acceptance in the Middle East and the wider Islamic world. It would point to the history of relations between the two countries, stating that Turkey is one of its “oldest neighbors,” because Ankara moved in 1949 to recognize the State of Israel, thus becoming the first Muslim country to acknowledge the existence of this state in the region despite a comprehensive and overwhelming state of hostility and rejection. Despite this recognition, which opened channels of cooperation in all fields, Ankara maintained a principled position supportive of the Palestinian cause. It held a constant stance despite changes in governments and individuals: the “formal defense” of Palestinian rights, especially their right to self-determination and the building of their own state. The divergence in viewpoints between the two sides was handled through diplomatic channels and away from hostile statements in the media. The 1990s witnessed a true strategic partnership between the two countries, and promising and qualitative military cooperation took place when Turkey allowed Israel to use its airspace, opening it to squadrons of modern Israeli aircraft. This granted Tel Aviv the ability to encircle Syria and Iraq and approach Iran, which led to the deterioration of Ankara’s relations with Damascus and other Arabic capitals.
With the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on the Turkish political scene and its ascension to power in 2002, change began to affect the relations between the two countries. Pro-Palestinian ideological discourse began to emerge in the corridors of Turkish politics, and official media devoted wider spaces to critics of Israel’s policies in the region. It was clear that the Islamist-oriented authority wanted to align with public opinion and the popular criticism directed at Israel and its treatment of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, thereby achieving popularity through such a stance. With the existence of this official and popular anti-Israel base, which began to solidify and expand over time, stronger hostile positions appeared with the outbreak of the Gaza war between 2008 and 2009, and the “One Minute” incident at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, when then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan protested against the moderator for not giving him enough time to respond to Israeli President Shimon Peres. This incident established Erdoğan’s popularity and presence inside and outside Turkey. Following this came the crisis of the Turkish ship “Mavi Marmara” in 2010, which was heading to Gaza and was stormed by an Israeli force in international waters, leading to confrontations with its passengers that resulted in the death of 10 Turkish activists and the injury of 60 others, creating a deep rift in relations between the two countries.
During the period of the so-called “Arab Spring” and the occurrence of large popular protests in several Arab countries—some of which overthrew existing regimes, while others resulted in civil wars and regional and social fractures—Turkey, led by the Justice and Development Party, which enjoyed popularity among the Arab masses as an Islamist party that achieved economic stability while taking supportive positions on Arab causes, moved to intervene directly and support specific forces. Ankara was aided in this by the direct relations the ruling party possessed with political Islam forces in the Arab world. From there, Turkish political and military intervention emerged in Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia, which Israel considered an escalation primarily targeting its influence and a Turkish ambition amounting to a strategic shift. Israel responded by strengthening its relations with Greece and Cyprus, and with some Arab countries within the framework of the Abraham Accords (2020–2021), beginning attempts to form partnerships within a “Regional Cooperation and Peace Front” that excludes Turkey.
Despite all this tension and the shift in political and diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the clear state of hostility reflected in the corridors of international meetings and mutual media campaigns, economic cooperation was not affected. Each side tried to keep the economy and trade sector away from the state of hostility, attraction, and bickering. Consequently, the volume of bilateral trade between the two countries rose from $3.4 billion in 2010 to $8.4 billion in 2021.
The October 7 Variable and Prospects for Direct Confrontation
The strategic variable after October 7, 2023, produced a clear state of intense competition rising to the level of hostility between Turkey and Israel. It was not only Tel Aviv’s management of the war in Gaza and the high number of civilian casualties that changed Turkey’s position, but also a group of regional events and developments which, according to Ankara’s reading, came in favor of Israel and its new “Israeli Founding Doctrine,” relying on crushing military force to destroy enemies and remove them from the circle of threat. Turkey was surprised by Israel’s strength and its ability to strike its opponents and inflict the greatest possible amount of destruction upon them. Turkey watched the amount of harm the Hebrew state inflicted on the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, as well as the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Tel Aviv’s bombardment of the Qatari capital Doha, and the partial Russian withdrawal from the Middle East.
Turkey read all these developments as a “rehearsal” for an Israeli attack on it, which, according to some Turkish voices, has become merely a matter of time. From here, Turkey began to set new priorities regarding its most prominent threats and reconsider its policies to align with the regional order beginning to take shape by virtue of overwhelming Israeli power. A comprehensive review of foreign and security policies was necessary to deal with many internal challenges (with the Kurdish issue at the forefront) and external threats (with Israeli strategic military prowess at the forefront). Turkey has already begun moving according to the new variables and balances under the phobia of crushing Israeli power (See: Tariq Hammo: Turkey’s Impotence in the Face of the Israeli Founding Doctrine. Kurdish Center for Studies. December 1, 2025).
Accompanying the Turkish security apprehension and the hidden strategic preparation for confrontation was a hostile political and diplomatic campaign against Israeli policy, with bilateral relations reaching their lowest levels. Erdoğan attacked Israeli military operations in Gaza, describing them as “genocide,” while describing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally as a “war criminal” and comparing him to the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, predicting the same fate for him! Meanwhile, Hakan Fidan, the Turkish Foreign Minister, accused the Hebrew state of seeking to establish “Greater Israel,” thereby working to weaken and divide neighboring countries and spread a state of chaos and instability in the region.
From the Israeli side, the view of Turkey began to change. It was no longer that first Muslim country that recognized Israel and enjoyed balanced, normal relations with it throughout decades of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Voices appeared in Israel considering Turkey the next danger after Iran; some even went as far as considering it more dangerous than Iran because it is trying to form a broad and influential “Sunni Islamic Front” in the region against Israel. An official Israeli report, known as the “Nagel Committee” report, issued in January 2025, pointed to the risks Turkey represents to Israel and demanded that Tel Aviv prepare from now to face the coming Turkish role. The Israeli government accuses Turkey of wanting to form a “New Ottoman Empire,” in which it would be the leader, to solidify its role and influence as an “imperial” regional power by using its own military forces and those of its allies and activating religious sentiments and political Islam ideologies. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a speech, saying of Jerusalem: “This is our city, Mr. Erdoğan; it is not your city. It is our city and will always remain our city and will not be divided again.” Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar described Erdoğan as a “seditionist Sultan.”
Recently, Israel has increased its level of economic and security cooperation with Greece and Cyprus with the aim of encircling Turkey. In December 2025, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus signed a tripartite military cooperation action plan including joint military maneuvers, exercises, cooperation in weapons development, and the establishment of bases and missile platforms. This new Israeli orientation undermines Ankara’s efforts to consolidate its influence in the Mediterranean and gas exploration in Cypriot and Greek territorial waters, strengthens Greece’s position, and places the Turkish “Blue Homeland” strategy—which sees the shores of the Greek islands and the entire vital sphere of Greece and Cyprus as part of Turkish spheres of influence—in a state of total encirclement.
Furthermore, Israel rejects Turkey’s participation in the plan to rebuild Gaza and its sending of peacekeeping forces within President Donald Trump’s plan to end the crisis, considering it a danger. There are other files witnessing Israeli-Turkish competition, including the Horn of Africa file, where Israel seeks to undermine Turkish influence. Among the recent Israeli measures in which Turkey saw a threat to its interests and a blow to its influence in that region was Tel Aviv’s recognition of the State of Somaliland in December 2025, to benefit from the strategic location this state occupies on the Bab al-Mandab Strait. From the shores of Somaliland, Tel Aviv can monitor access to the Red Sea, and thus navigation coming through the Suez Canal and Turkish movements, as well as encircling the Houthis in Yemen and preventing their attacks and threats to international navigation. Turkey sees this unilateral Israeli recognition of that republic and the dense operational presence there as a hostile act directed at it, especially as it has been involved since 2011 in consolidating its presence in the state of Somalia, moving to establish infrastructure projects, setting military training programs, and strengthening its partner in Mogadishu to gain preference in reconstruction projects and obtain bases and strategic points on the Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Syria: The Open Arena of Confrontation
Post-change Syria, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime at the end of 2024, is the arena where the two countries rub shoulders and compete for control over spaces and actors, showcasing their power. Each state has a vision and a goal in Syria that conflict with the vision and goal of the other. Turkey wants Syria to be a supportive state that does not deviate from its will and fully considers its interests. It also wants it to be a centralized state that does not accept any systems or formulas of federalism or political decentralization. Turkey threatens direct military intervention in the event of the emergence of a political system it does not accept, and exerts great pressure on Damascus through the tools it possesses on the ground (armed militias and administrative and intelligence structures), always waving its cards of power in case the new regime slackens in implementing its demands.
The encirclement of the Autonomous Administration, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the Kurdish identity comes at the top of Ankara’s priorities, and it encourages Damascus to reject Kurdish demands and favor the option of force with the Kurds. Some Israeli statements supporting the Kurds and the Autonomous Administration contribute to exacerbating Ankara’s fears and strengthening extremist views within the Turkish government, which accuse the Kurds in Syria of establishing relations with Israel, adopting the “David Corridor” narrative, and seeking to “divide Syria,” among other theories whose purpose is to reject Kurdish demands, refuse to recognize identity and specificity, and continue to list all these natural national rights and demands under the heading of “threats to national security,” then linking them to external agendas.
As for Israel, it does not want a centralized Syria subordinate to Turkey; rather, it wants a decentralized state with political autonomy for the Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite components, while supporting voices that reject the monopoly of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his Islamist regime over power and state resources, thereby blocking the ways to strengthen the Turkish role and influence in Syria. Israel had bombed airbases near Palmyra in April 2025 that Turkish engineering and military teams had previously inspected to verify their suitability for future military use. Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu moved in November 2025 to visit areas the Israeli army entered in southern Syria, and from there spoke about how his government succeeded in preventing Turkey from penetrating into southern and central Syria and that they had bombed its bases. Additionally, a squadron of Israeli planes approached the Hatay province (Liwa al-Iskandarun) in a message of warning and a show of force directed at Ankara. Before that, in July 2025, Tel Aviv moved to bomb the Republican Palace and the building of the Syrian General Staff to force militias affiliated with the Sharaa regime to stop their attack on Suwayda and the victimizing of the Syrian Druze component.
Israel believes that the Sharaa regime is an Islamist regime hostile to it; therefore, it cannot trust it. From here, it is increasing its monitoring and follow-up of all developments in the Syrian arena, occasionally bombing facilities and military points where it sees that investment and development could constitute a “threat” to it. This comes after the complete destruction of the former Syrian army in more than 600 airstrikes, which was the initial Israeli reaction to the arrival of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” forces and Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus and the flight of Bashar al-Assad after the collapse of his regime. So far, Israel does not believe that Turkey has crossed the red lines it drew for it regarding approaching its borders or inciting and financing Islamists to launch military operations targeting its southern borders. Meanwhile, it keeps the internal regions as a monitoring arena, preventing Ankara from military positioning and building air and land bases, and proceeds in monitoring the armament of the new Syrian army and in practically controlling the Syrian airspace and maritime domain more than Turkey or any other country.
On the broader regional level, Israel believes it must besiege Turkey in every sphere of the Middle East, increase its local alliances with states and political actors, form military alliances, and increase field presence to abort Turkey’s attempts to consolidate influence and reach a point of imposing a fait accompli on the Hebrew state. There is a conviction among Israeli decision-makers that Turkey is moving to occupy Iran’s role, but with a stronger appearance and a wider front—here, the “Sunni front” that rejects Israel’s existence. While Turkey may support the “buffer wall” represented by Iran and its allies in the face of Israel, it is simultaneously preparing a “Plan B,” taking into account the possibility of the collapse of rule in Iran and the unraveling of the alliance it led in the region against the Hebrew state. Consequently, if Israel were to openly and directly place Turkey at the top of its list of enemies, Ankara is quickening its pace to form its own front comprising strong allies from the “Sunni world,” capable of deterring Tel Aviv and preventing it from resorting to a scenario similar to the one it used with Iran, the leader of the “Shia axis” hostile to it.
