The New Syria Deepens the Crisis: A Centralized State and an Ideological Army

In his speech at the opening of the National Dialogue Conference in Damascus on February 25, 2025, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa focused on two topics that he views as major obstacles to the consolidation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) rule and its absorption of the Syrian state. Al-Sharaa asserted that Syria “cannot be divided” and that “weapons must remain in the hands of the state.” In other words, this (supposedly transitional) authority rejects decentralization and criminalizes it by equating it with partition. It does not accept the integration of military structures as blocs into the future Syrian army, but rather aims to dissolve these structures, incorporating them into an army formed on a Salafi-jihadi ideology, a task assigned to its field commanders, both Syrian and foreign.

Al-Sharaa adopts a new/old narrative that characterizes decentralization as a precursor to secession and partition. According to the new Syrian authority’s perspective, such a formula comprises “systems that do not align with the country’s situation.” Otherwise, “societies will turn into experimental fields for political dreams.” This indicates that al-Sharaa and his associates in HTS, which emerged from a military operation whose circumstances remain ambiguous, reject the notion of decentralization and aspire to create a centralized state where they control all levers of power, dictate decision-making, shape policies and relationships, and govern the country according to their vision—without regard for pluralism, diversity, or the realities that have developed after 14 years of internal conflict. This conflict has led to widespread destruction, the displacement of millions of Syrians, the emergence of transnational jihadist organizations, and the Turkish occupation of Syrian territories, which are currently experiencing a systematic Turkification that erases and negates the Syrian national identity.

Al-Sharaa and his jihadist organization, which is currently engulfing the state in the name of patriotism, legitimacy, and external acceptance, seek a highly centralized state devoid of national components and identities. There are no administrative structures to manage local affairs or consider the interests of the periphery, while the center monopolizes decision-making.

Al-Sharaa envisions a return to the pre-2011 Syrian paradigm, where he would be the eternal president and his organization the “leading party of the state and society.” In this centralized Syria, the authority—according to law and constitution—excludes any dissenting opinions. The ruler, along with the party and security services, operates independently, without legal or parliamentary oversight, and without consideration for the interests of the Syrian people.

The transitional president believes that this kind of state will be a unified entity under his control, allowing him to appoint his associates as local rulers over various administrative decentralizations. Through these local rulers, he intends to dictate the affairs of the citizens, making decisions based on his own judgment, eliminating those he deems undesirable and favoring those he wishes to promote (similar to what transpired during the National Dialogue Conference).

Al-Sharaa described the decentralization model demanded by the people of northern and eastern Syria, now echoed by the people of Suwayda, and perhaps soon more prominently by the coastal communities, as “systems that do not suit the state of the country and will turn societies into experimental fields.” This description conceals an ideological stance and a principled refusal to acknowledge the reality of the Syrian population as a mosaic of ethnic, religious, and sectarian components.

The accusations against decentralization and the betrayal of its advocates echo similar accusations that Bashar al-Assad and his regime used against opposition forces demanding democracy, freedoms, and the rule of law. Al-Sharaa believes that this approach will placate the Turkish state, which opposes all forms of administrative decentralization and supports a highly centralized state controlled by a loyalist organization that can fulfill its agendas in Syria.

This stance sends a message internally, demonstrating rejection and stubbornness toward the administration in northern and eastern Syria and the demands of the people of Suwayda. Externally, it aims to gain approval from Turkey, which desires a Syria governed by a satellite regime that dictates the political map of the country and establishes relationships and governance patterns in line with Turkish national security interests rather than those of Syrian national security.

The second part of al-Sharaa’s speech focused on the concept of “unity of arms” and monopolizing them in the hands of the state. This signifies a rejection of demands to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Suwayda Military Council, and the Horan Military Council led by Ahmad al-Awda as cohesive entities into the regular Syrian army. This position aligns with the methodology employed by al-Sharaa and HTS in branding their factions as the “regular national army” while labeling any faction that rejects this reality as outside of the national ranks and, thus, a “militia” that refuses to join the new Syrian army.

Consequently, the authority and its proponents discuss the dissolution of these factions from the southern and northern regions, aiming to assimilate them as members of the HTS/State Army led by both Syrian and foreign jihadists. The media apparatus linked to HTS or those supporting its project for empowerment and control as the central Syrian initiative accuse all factions that refuse to join under the authority’s proposed formula of abandoning the national ranks and leaning toward isolation, regionalism, and separatism.

In reality, the refusal of these forces to join as structured blocs under mutually agreed military titles reveals a trend toward control and centralization, as well as a clear methodology aimed at establishing a totalitarian state. Within this structure, all civil and military institutions would be dominated by HTS under the guise of “Syrian patriotism,” which has become a monopoly reserved for its factions and members alone.

The HTS authority’s rejection of decentralization and insistence on a totalitarian state devoid of political life or freedoms, along with its refusal to allow Syrian military forces from the periphery to join as cohesive blocks, signifies a political and media discourse steeped in incitement and dehumanization. This stance only exacerbates the fears of those components that do not accept the ideological framework of the ruling authority in Damascus, particularly its program of Islamization and its rejection of democracy and pluralism.

As hostile statements against Syrian entities and their military structures increase, the commitment among these factions to solidify decentralization and maintain their military structures—refusing to be absorbed into the state or HTS army—grows stronger. Consequently, there is a heightened inclination to reinforce local gains while seeking regional and international allies capable of providing support to remain outside the undemocratic and totalitarian military rule in Damascus.

Thus, it is the center—not the periphery—that is entrenched and isolated. Those who reject the formula for national coexistence represented by decentralization, which respects the specificities of Syrian components, are indeed entrenched at the center, not the periphery. The center, dominated by the de facto government represented by HTS, which arose through brute force, ignores the possibility of a realistic solution based on acknowledging local specificities. Instead, it insists on a policy of assimilation and homogenization, deepening conflict and crisis, escalating fears among these groups, and prompting them to seek alternatives that can protect them from the oppressive policies of the totalitarian regime.

Moreover, violations against the Alawite community in the Syrian coast and in Homs raise alarm bells and challenge all the authority’s arguments and justifications for national unity.

There is an increasing belief among Syrians that those who relinquish their weapons and submit to the authority of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its leaders—whether civilian or military—are condemning themselves to exile, disappearance, and becoming mere numbers devoid of will and agency. There are voices warning that the authority will succeed in its “cleansing” campaigns against all its adversaries, advancing its empowerment project toward its intended conclusion. Furthermore, there are concerns that the authority will subsequently move to suppress and “discipline” any will that rejects its rule and opposes the reduction of Syria—both as a state and a people—to its singular vision.

A national democratic opposition is beginning to take shape in response to this authority, which aims to permanently alter the face of Syria. This opposition seeks to prevent the transformation of Syria into a dark emirate where every Syrian who rejects its ideology and doctrine is silenced, with the ambition that its version of “Syrian patriotism” becomes the only accepted narrative.