The End of Syria as We Knew It

Syria as we knew it is over. This notion did not arise solely from the fall of the regime; in fact, it predates it. When I wrote in an article several years ago that Syria as we knew it no longer exists, both as a society and a state, and that the use of these terms and labels is merely ‘out of habit’ and ‘inertia,’ influenced by the regional and international context, my writing seemed gloomy to some and off-putting to others. I received letters expressing reservations, objections, or dissatisfaction. We won’t debate the questions: Did we really know Syria? What was the nature of our understanding of it? What kind of knowledge did Syrians and those concerned about Syria have of it?

For the past decade and a half, discussions about Syria have been driven by ‘hope’ for the existence of a Syrian society and state, although that hope has significantly waned. Indeed, part of that hope stemmed from ‘fear’ of the collapse of what used to be perceived as society and state, and the country descending into a state of ‘war of all against all.’

In all likelihood, the Syria we knew was not an aspiration for anyone, neither to return to what it was before 2011 nor to the Syria of war. This means that hope for a new Syria under the Assad regime has diminished to the point of stagnation. Here, I refer to Syrian society and state, not just a disconnected or superficially related concept. In the last few years before the regime’s fall, Syrians’ hope for the future was close to zero. In fact, contemplating the future felt akin to ‘attempting the impossible’.

The reason for this sense of the impossible can be traced to ‘cognitive obstacles’ and ‘stereotypical perceptions’ that were exceedingly complex. It also stems from the centrality of the political system and the ‘equation’ that existed between the head of the regime, the regime itself, and the state. This dynamic made the mere thought of change feel like an ‘internal explosion’ or ‘self-destruction’ of both the regime and, of course, the state and society.

Immediately after the fall of the regime, many discovered that part of this ‘impossibility’ was the ‘equivalent’ to the concept of ‘eternity’ that the regime had cultivated and worked on for decades, attempting to ‘reproduce’ and even ‘perpetuate’ it by any means available. Many also recognized that governance was more about ‘managing fears’ than about creating reassurance and security. It was a form of ‘booby-trapping’ society with violence and instability.

In Syria, patterns of extreme brutality emerged alongside a shift toward mere survival—defined as the basic ability to live in a physiological and biological sense—affecting a substantial portion of the population, estimated by some statistics to be between 90-95 percent. What has compounded the brutality of this situation is the absence of any prospect for change and the lack of will among political and governance actors to respond to demands for a solution or settlement.

The country has been on a slow, then accelerating, path toward the abyss, characterized not only by conflict and war. The collapse or fall was not a matter of fate or inevitability; rather, it was the result of the processes and dynamics involving various actors in the Syrian event and phenomenon. Since 2011, Syria has become a battleground for conflicting interests to the point of fatal contradictions. The situation has developed bleakly, with maps, titles, slogans, discourses, and, of course, organizations and institutions disintegrating. The ‘state’ has gradually transformed into a ‘militia,’ while ‘militias’ have evolved into a ‘quasi-state’ or ‘entity.’ Consequently, the country has fragmented into numerous spheres of control, forms of administration and governance, as well as various modes of corruption and tyranny, albeit with significant differences among them.

In this way, the very idea of Syria has eroded, along with its identity, maps, and existence. It has morphed into a country or quasi-country, as if ‘what remains is lost, and what is born is born.’ This deterioration helps explain, among other factors, the frantic and even hysterical tendency to migrate abroad, alongside a desire to distance oneself from everything related to power, the state, or its institutions.

As the situation in Syria as we knew it reached a ‘stalemate’ in meaning and power, and a ‘deadlock’ in assessments and paths, sharp stakes were suddenly thrust forward, accompanied by understandings and agreements among various actors of the Syrian event—both domestically, regionally, and globally. This led, alongside other factors, to the fall of the regime and the humiliating and farcical escape of its president and his inner circle. Assessments were nearly unanimous in declaring him ‘disconnected from reality,’ believing in ‘super-nuclei’ that resulted in widespread corruption, death, and destruction—all of which ultimately circled back to him. The regime represented one of the most significant existential threats to society and the state.

No solution or compromise could be reached, as the regime did not propose a single initiative for resolution or negotiation, nor did it take any steps to alter its political or governance models. Instead, it persisted with its destructive policies that harmed both society and the state, ultimately harming itself. The Syrian actors were unable to compel the regime to accept Resolution 2254 or any variant of it, or even any form of ‘transfer of powers,’ even when it became clear that the regime was in its final hours.

The truth is that the regime was ‘unreformable.’ Every process of ‘reform’ or ‘pretended reform’ aimed not at benefiting the state and society but at ensuring the regime’s continuity and ‘reproduction.’ However, each move in this direction proved ‘counterproductive’ for the regime, hastening its collapse.

In conclusion, it is true that Syria, as we knew it, was formed over a hundred years ago by ‘international wills’ and ‘local capacities.’ Although the ‘outside’ has been the ‘main determining factor’ in much of its major transformations throughout history—including the rise and fall of regimes—there remains a ‘window of opportunity’ for Syrians to shape their own country. This opportunity allows them to mold their nation in a way that aligns more closely with their own image, aspirations, and ambitions, before the ‘outside’ resumes its cycle of interference and coercion.