Syria ponders about foreign powers advice
By Shoresh Darwish
Few Syrian voices have denounced the European advice offered by German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and her French colleague Jean-Yves Le Drian to the Syrian interim government. In fact, the denunciation has taken on a tone of defiance, with phrases such as “we don’t need foreign interference” and “we can solve our own problems without external intervention and European pressure”.
The Syrian government did not issue a formal response to the European vision, particularly the eight-point plan presented by Berlin, but it may have left the matter to a supportive media team. The response was limited to asserting that the country does not need European aid, which reflects an arbitrary and irresponsible attitude towards a poor and impoverished nation in dire need of international assistance. Furthermore, the sanctions file still requires scrutiny and examination by the West and the U.S.
The German-French advice can be seen as conducive to the transition process and the desire to establish guarantees that would lead to a political process that excludes no one, including religious and ethnic groups, and supports women’s participation. Meanwhile, the interim government has made efforts to place national dialogue in the hands of civil society rather than parties, activists, or public figures.
Just before the European foreign ministers’ visit, the justice minister stated that 90% of Syrians are Muslims, implying a clear perception of a majority and minority based on religion. Speaking on behalf of all Muslims, he faced no significant objections when he asserted that this majority has the right to advocate for the rule of Sharia law. On the contrary, the European emphasis on the need to respect and include minorities and Kurds in the political process has reinforced the rhetoric of the new authority.
In reality, the discussion of a Muslim majority this time recalls the notion of an Arab majority during the Baath era, which led to the marginalization of Kurds from political representation and cultural participation. The monopolization of discourse and governance in the name of a non-political majority has always distorted and eroded the concept of equal citizenship. While the inclusion of minorities in the political and constitutional process has been fundamental to forming an inclusive national identity, monopolizing this identity in favor of a non-political majority will result in two interconnected outcomes: the perception of the dominant group, which came to power through force, as the sole and exclusive representative of the majority, and the relegation of the actual national or religious majority to the status of a minority, as the new rulers strip them of all their political rights.
It is noteworthy that the European conditions align with the final statement of the Arab Ministerial Contact Group convened in Aqaba, which called for a comprehensive Syrian dialogue and a peaceful transition under the auspices of the United Nations and the Arab League. The essence of a comprehensive dialogue is that no Syrian party or group should be excluded from the anticipated discussions, a stance echoed by both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, it seems that the resonance of Western rhetoric, even when aligned with Arab positions in substance and outcome, prompts a significant portion of the Syrian community to reject the narrative of the “white man” positioned as a “guardian,” while finding the statements of Arab countries more comprehensible. In any case, it is essential to remember that Western parties coordinate with Arab states and share similar concerns and certain mutual aspirations.
In the context of the preference between one set of foreign advice and another, Turkish suggestions or conditions also stand out. What Turkey says to the Kurds remains steeped in illusions of alleged national security and a push to place Syria under Turkish tutelage through calls for urgent security and military agreements, as well as land and maritime border demarcations. Furthermore, there are simplistic perceptions regarding the shape of the state, how to deal with the Kurds, and the management of the minority issue. In recent days, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan spoke on behalf of Ahmed al-Sharaa about the rights of Syrian minorities, stating that “there is no issue in this regard currently, as the new administration guarantees minority rights.” The specifics of how and what these guarantees entail remain with the Turkish minister, who also outlined his country’s security approach to the issue of Syrian Kurds without granting Syrians the right to address this matter themselves. This brings us back to the sharp interventionist approach that Turkey prefers over encouraging Syrian parties to meet and resolve their differences independently, even if the solution ultimately addresses Turkey’s pretexts and fears.
It appears that Ankara’s statements regarding the future of Syria do not provoke the segment of Syrians who oppose foreign interventions, suggesting that this argument is weak as long as it distinguishes between two “outsiders.”
Additionally, there exists a sense of cleverness in placing the West in the role of a policeman responsible for providing a public service to those who reach out for help when needed. While many Syrians reject “Western interference” in their internal affairs, in September 2011, some of the same individuals called for international intervention to protect Syrians from the brutality of the regime during the “Friday of International Protection.” This duality implies that a complete separation from the West is neither entirely feasible nor consistent within the context of their experience and aspirations.
This path will lead Syrians to self-imprison within their own country, depriving them of the right to demand rescue if a new tyranny emerges, especially if the current or subsequent authorities become adept at securing their own interests with foreign powers, which will plunge the country into a long cycle of tyranny, similar to the one experienced under the Assad regime.
For Syrians to close the door on themselves by claiming they can manage the situation on their own is disingenuous. The nature of the interim authority, including its questionable status as a concern for the West and its leaders’ listing as terrorists by the United Nations, raises suspicions, especially regarding statements made about the transition process, the nature of the state and society, and the constitutional framework.
As a matter of political wisdom, and perhaps national prudence, the focus should be on ending the sanctions file by accepting Western requirements that align with a peaceful transition, as well as ensuring the authority’s non-interference in the distribution of humanitarian aid and avoiding the creation of clientelistic networks favoring the interim authority. The issue of reconstruction remains contingent on Western approval, although Arab countries have expressed their willingness to contribute to this effort. Finding a balanced approach that includes representation from all Syrian minorities, including religious and Kurdish groups, is essential. This inclusion and participation represent a primary national interest, regardless of whether European countries or the United States demand it.
Time is not on our side when it comes to adopting short-sighted stances that perpetually question the credibility of Western countries and deprive Syrians of the opportunity for reconstruction, early recovery, and peaceful democratization. Meanwhile, there is not ninety percent of some imaginary group; rather, it is the actual ninety percent of Syrians who are below the poverty line, according to the latest reports from UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
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