Syria: An Arab Actor or a Turkish Sphere of Influence?

Turkey insists on considering the ‘new Syria’ as an area under its influence, with the political system therein as supportive and subordinate to Ankara. From this perspective, Turkey endeavors to penetrate all segments and institutions of the Syrian state, creating a strong interconnectedness between the various structures within Syria and the administrative and managerial institutions—both civilian and military—inside Turkey. A massive Turkish monitoring and oversight apparatus is emerging to track the Syrian situation, aiming to control, contain, and prevent competitors from entering the Syrian arena.

This Turkish inclination has recently clashed with the strong Arab emergence, particularly from Saudi Arabia, which is actively leveraging relations and pressure tactics in favor of the ‘new Syria’—including lifting economic sanctions, accepting its leadership, and promoting it internationally. Consequently, the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and the interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh on May 14, and Trump’s announcement—mediated and encouraged by Saudi Arabia—of the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions on Syria, marked a significant milestone. This was further reinforced when the European Union followed Washington’s lead and announced the lifting of its sanctions. Despite Trump’s statements about ‘consulting’ Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regarding the sanctions removal, Turkey perceived this effective Saudi move as a strong demonstration of the Kingdom and Arab influence in the Syrian scene, thus representing, at least on a psychological level, a decline in Turkey’s role in its neighboring country—that Turkey claims to have ‘liberated’ through its ‘covert and secret’ support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in its efforts to ‘deter aggression.’

More concerning from the Turkish perspective is the Arab (specifically Gulf) initiative to foster understanding, and perhaps peace and reconciliation, between the Syrian regime and Israel. This entails excluding Turkey from this process and activating the Arab project (notably the Abraham Accords) towards normalization with Israel, under U.S. supervision and encouragement. Such moves threaten to strip Turkey of valuable bargaining chips and weaken its influence and leverage in Syria and the broader region. It also makes Turkey’s economic and military presence more exposed to Israeli surveillance and intelligence activities present in Syrian territory.

In light of this, Turkey has rapidly moved to pass along information indicating that it has reached an agreement with Israel to avoid direct confrontation in Syria and to establish a direct communication line for coordination between the two countries. Additionally, recent reports from Tel Aviv have mentioned direct meetings between Israeli officials and their Syrian counterparts, mediated by Turkey, and of ‘flexibility’ and ‘gestures of good will’ from the Syrian authorities—such as the decision by the Syrian government to expel Palestinian armed factions from Syria, and the handing over of the ‘Syrian archive’ and certain possessions of the Israeli spy Eli Cohen to Israel.

It is more likely that Turkey has accepted the reality of Israeli influence and the Israeli will to keep Sweida, Quneitra, and Daraa as demilitarized zones where the new authority is prohibited from deploying military forces. Additionally, Turkey has abandoned the idea of establishing military bases and airports deep within Syrian territory, beyond the administrative borders of Aleppo and Idlib governorates.

Turkey is attempting to wrest the Syrian-Israeli relations file from the Arab side and play the role of guardian of the Syrian authority by providing Israel with the guarantees it seeks, in exchange for extracting gains from the Hebrew state that serve Ankara’s interests rather than those of the Syrian state. At this point, Ankara aims to communicate to Israel—and behind it, Washington and the European Union—that it holds the upper hand in Syria, possessing the presence, influence, and military militias, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to rehabilitate Syria and its regime based on economic and diplomatic means, through reconstruction projects and opening international political channels to Al-Sharaa and his team.

Turkey is deliberately emphasizing its ‘pivotal’ and “decisive” role in the Syrian scene, openly and without hesitation. It sends its intelligence chief to Damascus, raises its voice, and orders Damascus to accelerate the ‘dissolution of the SDF’ and establish a centralized state that rejects local administrations and societal particularities. Turkey desires a centralized, totalitarian state with a single identity and interpretation, following orders and directives from Ankara without regard for the interests of the Syrian nation or the specificities of the Syrian people’s components.

What Turkey is doing is draining the Arab role of its substance and blocking avenues to activate Syria’s role within the ‘axis of Arab moderation’ by rushing to open communication channels with Israel and agreeing to all its conditions. Moreover, it is attempting to hastily form a committee that includes Turkey, Syria, the United States, and Iraq to monitor the situation of ISIS detainees in Syrian prisons (the prisons managed by the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria). The goal is to impose all of this as a fait accompli—an undeniable reality—on everyone involved.

Turkey also continues to maintain the structure of the militias affiliated with it, particularly the so-called ‘Syrian National Army,’ which comprises tens of thousands of fighters loyal to the Turkish Ministry of Defense, receiving salaries from Ankara. Thousands of these fighters continue to operate as mercenaries (focused on external missions) in Libya, Niger, and Somalia, supporting militias and local authorities aligned with Turkey. The militias under Turkish control in northern and western Syria serve as a weapon wielded by Ankara against Damascus.

Furthermore, Turkey is rapidly building military bases and airports in those regions without any approval from Damascus or even informing the Syrian Ministry of Defense of Turkey’s military encroachment on Syrian territory. This is in addition to the increasing influence and presence of the ‘Syrian National Army’ militias, which operate independently of Damascus’s commands.

Turkey’s move to encircle recent Arab efforts and sever Syria’s ties with Arab countries—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—is progressing in multiple directions, with an explicit and authoritative tone aligned with Ankara’s official stance that considers all of Syria as a zone of influence, a backyard, and a mere warehouse of commodities.

The visit of Al-Sharaa to Istanbul reflects Ankara’s intense desire to stay informed about developments beyond its reach, possibly to supply him with instructions or demands that serve Turkey’s interests—interests that may not necessarily align with those of Syria or its Arab supporters.