Russia Faces a “Saigon Moment” in Syria… and the World?
By The Kurdish Centre for Studies
There are many speculations outside the realms of politics and strategy regarding the recent offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria and the sudden collapse of the regime’s defenses and those of its allies. The naive perspective suggests that Moscow has grown weary of the regime and is punishing it until the crisis is resolved; however, this view neglects the significant negative implications for Russia’s standing in the Middle East and the end of its long and costly investment in the Mediterranean.
Sonne Engel Rasmussen and Thomas Grove recently published a report in the Wall Street Journal discussing what the regime’s collapse means for Russian strategy, suggesting that Moscow’s maneuvering against the regime is politically illogical given the scale of the losses and collapses being witnessed. The authors warned of a potential “Saigon Moment” in Russian strategy.
According to the report, the rapid offensive launched by the rebels threatens to displace Russia from a strategic axis that Moscow has relied on for a decade to assert its power in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Africa. It also challenges President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to portray Moscow as the standard-bearer of an alternative global order to counter Western liberalism, as well as his defense of the Syrian regime as evidence of his success in resisting American hegemony in the region.
The Russian Air Force is supporting Syrian government forces by conducting airstrikes on opposition positions. According to Russia’s TASS news agency, the Russian military is also planning to carry out naval exercises in the Mediterranean.
Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015 to support President Bashar al-Assad against the armed uprising, thereby establishing its role as an influential foreign power in the Middle East. Moscow sought to leverage its relationships with competing powers such as Iran and Israel, as well as Turkey and the Gulf states, to mediate conflicts and assert its status as a regional power broker. Moscow has co-sponsored discussions with Tehran and Ankara regarding the Syrian war, and, at Israel’s request, agreed to keep Iranian and Iran-backed forces away from the Syrian border with Israel.
Syria has partially become an ideological project for Putin. Nicole Grayevsky, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of an upcoming book on Russia’s relationship with Iran, including in Syria, indicated that the intervention has become a means for Russia to expand its vision of a multipolar world that opposes the Western liberal order. “Seeing Russian planes leave Syria as rebel forces advance toward their airbases, and witnessing the fall of their assets in Damascus, would be extremely damaging to Russia’s self-image. It would be akin to a ‘Saigon Moment’ for them,” she stated.
What is the Saigon Moment?
In April 1975, US-backed South Vietnamese forces collapsed in the face of advancing communist North Vietnamese forces. As the North approached Saigon, the United States hurriedly executed a chaotic evacuation of its embassy staff, American citizens, and some local allies.
The most iconic image was that of American helicopters taking off from the roof of the US embassy while hundreds of local Vietnamese desperately tried to climb aboard, seeking safety. This scene became a symbol of US military failure, humiliation, chaos, and the abandonment of local allies.
A former Russian official noted that Putin’s assistance was crucial for Assad’s survival and demonstrated to Moscow’s allies outside the Middle East that Russian intervention could help thwart popular uprisings. African leaders have begun reaching out to Russia, particularly appealing to contractors from the Wagner Group, which has also played a significant role in Syria, to assist in stabilizing their regimes.
Syria also holds considerable strategic value for Russia. The Hmeimim airbase, located near the coastal city of Latakia, serves as a logistics center for flights to Libya, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, where Russian contractors and soldiers have been operating for years.
The naval base in the coastal city of Tartus serves as the sole refurbishment and repair point for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean, facilitating large-scale shipments of cargo via the Black Sea. Tartus provides Putin access to a warm-water port—an objective that Russian leaders have sought for centuries in the Middle East. The port could also connect Russia to Libya—another Soviet-era ally—where it seeks to establish a naval base to extend its reach into sub-Saharan Africa. The capture of these coastal locations in Syria by opposition factions could jeopardize Russia’s global power projection.
Anna Borshchevskaya, a fellow at the Washington Institute and author of a book on Putin’s war in Syria, remarked, “Syria has provided many advantages at a low cost. Losing Syria would be a significant strategic defeat that would resonate beyond the Middle East. It would have global implications.”
However, despite Russia’s intervention, Putin has failed to compel Assad to reach a political settlement with parts of the country, leaving him vulnerable to renewed violence, according to Mikhail Barabanov, a senior researcher at the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow-based defense think tank.
Barabanov stated that Russia is fully invested in Ukraine, making it unlikely to provide more than symbolic support in Syria. “Conducting several airstrikes and cruise missile attacks daily will not fundamentally alter the situation. All players in Syria recognize the Kremlin’s deep involvement in Ukraine and have become convinced of the limits of Russian military power.”
The initial success that Russia achieved in Syria, secured through a formidable air force, has also influenced its strategic calculations in Ukraine by inflating the Kremlin’s confidence in its military capabilities—contributing to the failures it encountered in the first year of its invasion of Ukraine, according to a source close to the Russian defense establishment.
The Middle East has been a cornerstone of the competition between Russia and the Western superpowers. During the Cold War, Russia allied itself with Syria, supplying it with weapons and supporting it in its conflicts against Israel. After the Cold War ended, in the late 1990s, Putin sought to revive this strategy and rebuild Moscow’s Soviet-era relations in the region, deepening diplomatic and economic ties with Syria, Iraq, and Libya. He expanded energy and nuclear cooperation with Iran and exported arms to both Tehran and Damascus.
When Putin intervened in Syria in 2015, he joined a lineage of Russian leaders dating back to Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, who also sought to use the region to enhance Russia’s geopolitical and economic power.
Like his predecessors, Putin has found his campaign in the Middle East complicated by challenges in Russia’s own neighborhood, particularly in Ukraine.
Borshchevskaya remarked: “One way to view Putin’s ambitions in Syria is as part of his broader imperial vision. This is what Ukraine represents, this is what the 2008 invasion of Georgia was about, and to some extent, this is what Syria has become. Now, in 2024, Russia finds itself ultimately exhausted.”
The WSJ report added: Russia’s involvement in Syria has transformed its relationship with one of Washington’s primary adversaries, Iran, which has supported Assad since the uprising began. Despite pressure from the US and Israel to limit Iranian influence in the region, including in upcoming negotiations regarding Ukraine, analysts suggest that Moscow’s relationship with Tehran is likely to endure, especially if the opposition’s offensive continues.
The Russian intervention in the civil war has shifted the balance in favor of Assad and helped Iran consolidate its military foothold up to the Israeli border. Western attempts to isolate Moscow and Tehran through sanctions have, in turn, driven them closer together.
During the early years of the Syrian civil war, Russia was the world’s second-largest arms exporter, with Iran as its main recipient. Tehran has long been engaged in discussions to purchase two squadrons of Russian Su-35 fighter jets, along with radar and air defense systems, to complement the at least four existing S-300 missile systems that were recently damaged in Israeli airstrikes in Iran.
In return, Iran provided Shahid attack drones for use by Russia in Ukraine, becoming one of the few countries to openly side with Moscow in its offensive against Ukraine.
While Russia has often considered itself the senior partner in this relationship, the renewed conflict in Syria has reminded the Kremlin of Iran’s significance, according to analysts. Repelling the Syrian rebel offensive will necessitate the mobilization of ground forces, including Iranian-backed militias and Revolutionary Guard officers, rather than relying solely on airstrikes—which will increase Moscow’s dependency on Tehran, Grayevsky noted.
“Russia always believed it was superior to Iran, and I think it finds itself even more reliant on Iran now,” she concluded.
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