Hafez al-Assad: An Analysis of His Rule and Political Legacy
By Mohammad Sayed Rassas
In Muhammad Haidar’s book “The Baath and the Great Apostasy” (1998 edition, publisher unspecified), we can read the following statement about the Baath Party Congress’s decision to remove Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad and Chief of Staff Mustafa Tlass from their positions:
“I believe that General Salah Jadid was fully aware that the Defense Minister and those with him would not implement the aforementioned decision, and that they would be forced to take actions pushing them to confront the authority, thereby compelling them to appear in an illegitimate position from the party’s perspective. It seems he was under the illusion that the Defense Minister was incapable of leading the country. This view may have originated in 1964 when he opposed Muhammad Umran’s refusal to promote Hafez al-Assad to the rank of general, as well as when he appointed him Minister of Defense after the February 23, 1966 movement. This decision drew the anger of Salim Hatoum and other Druze officers who played a key role in that movement.”
It appears that this view was reinforced by Hafez al-Assad’s three-page intervention at the conference (pages 197-198-199 of Haidar’s book), which depicted al-Assad as having shifted power as he moved between various positions (Assistant Director of Officer Affairs, Chief of Staff, National Command, Qatari Command, Deputy Secretary General of the Party)—a narrative that mingled admiration, envy, awe, and hatred.
It is difficult to explain how, just days after this speech, he incarcerated General Salah for twenty-three years until his death in 1993.
It is unclear whether General Salah Jadid recognized the error in his assessment of Hafez al-Assad when, on the morning of November 13, 1970—the day after the end of the conference—he met with Soviet Ambassador Nureddin Mohiddinov, who proposed “recognition of Resolution 242 in exchange for pressure to stop the coup measures that General Hafez al-Assad had begun to implement” (Marwan Habash: “Lights and Facts from an Eyewitness about the Tashrini Apostasy,” Episode 1, published on his Facebook page). Jadid was arrested later that afternoon after refusing the ambassador’s offer. He may not have recognized the international dimensions, reaching as far as Washington and Tel Aviv, regarding the Syrian Defense Minister’s decision not to provide air cover for the Syrian forces that had entered two months earlier to assist the Palestinian resistance against the Jordanian army. It is likely he was unaware that Amin Yakan, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, had been in contact with Hafez al-Assad since 1969, in addition to his connections with Damascus merchants. These factors may explain the ease with which the November 13-16, 1970 coup unfolded.
The longevity and stability of Hafez al-Assad’s rule until 2000 can be symbolized by a photograph of him exiting Eid prayers, flanked by the head of Damascus merchants’ union, Haj Badr al-Din al-Shalah, and Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaro, the Grand Mufti of the Republic and Sheikh of the Naqshbandi order.
Hafez al-Assad’s ruling approach can be summarized through Dr. Jamal al-Atassi’s account from 1996 regarding his final conversation with al-Assad in early 1973. During this dialogue, al-Atassi objected to Article 8 of the draft constitution, which stated that “the Baath Party is the leader of the state and society,” calling for an expansion of freedoms. Hafez al-Assad responded that people did not desire freedom but were divided into three categories: “Ninety percent of Syrians want to eat, drink, and provide a good education for their children, and we will satisfy them; the second group, which opposes the ruler, can be softened with positions and material inducements, comprising five percent of Syrians. The remaining five percent are stubborn opponents who will end up in prison.”
His image alongside al-Shalah and Kaftaro delineates the three internal pillars of his regime: a military-security establishment dominated by Alawite officers in alliance with merchants, businessmen, and industrialists—most of whom are Sunni from major cities—alongside an official Sunni Islamic institution represented by the Mashaykhah, with its Ifta’i and Waqf branches, including offshoots from Sufi orders and organizations like the Qubaisiyat. Additionally, the Salafi Dawa movement, which supported the government against the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1979-1982 confrontations, adhered to the notion of advising the ruler and refraining from insurrection, considering that “rebellion is fitna,” similar to the views held by Sheikh Kaftaro and the Ash’arite Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti.
Domestically, Hafez al-Assad enjoyed significant popularity, evidenced by the warm receptions he received from Damascus merchants and the general populace. Upon his candidacy for the presidency in 1971, both Hama and Aleppo welcomed him with public receptions comparable only to those given to Gamal Abdel Nasser in these cities during the era of unity. This may reflect the urban residents’ dissatisfaction with the leftist tendencies of the February 23 regime, but more likely, it indicated approval of the political, economic, and social openness presented by the regime established from November 13-16 onward.
Hafez al-Assad’s systematic repression predominantly targeted the civilian and military organizations of the Shabatsis (the February 23 group) and later the Iraqi Baath, which had a significant organization in the spring of 1975 under Marwan al-Hamawi, director of SANA. When the Muslim Brotherhood held protests in 1973 against the constitution in Hama and Latakia, arrests were minimal, and detainees were mostly released by 1975, with the exception of Sheikh Said Hawi, who was released just before the presidential referendum in February 1978. However, after the Islamists initiated armed confrontation in the summer of 1979 and the leftist forces seized the opportunity to promote their programs through the National Democratic Rally or the Communist Action League, al-Assad launched a violent crackdown on all dissent. This wave of repression subsided only after his regime stabilized following its entry into the international coalition against Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990.
Economically, Hafez al-Assad’s regime fostered the emergence of new capitalism, following the decline of old capitalism post-March 8, 1963. This new capitalism arose from the confluence of wealthy newcomers profiting through their governmental positions, as well as capitalists who gained wealth through partnerships with officials in power. This process unfolded in two phases: the first being the contractor system utilized by state institutions to execute projects starting in 1974; the second phase began in 1991 with Decree 10, allowing capital owners to invest. Despite the economic crisis emerging between 1985 and 1990, Hafez al-Assad’s repression and monopolization of power did not occur alongside the impoverishment policies enacted by his son against the middle classes, which had been the economic drivers for three decades.
Regarding foreign policy, there was a clear sense of international satisfaction within both camps of the Cold War concerning Hafez al-Assad’s regime, which accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 following the 1967 war. He came to power as a result of an understanding between the Kremlin and the White House regarding the Middle East, with both powers pleased by the removal of a regime that did not adhere to international red lines, as demonstrated by the Syrian military intervention in Jordan in September 1970. This sentiment was shared by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. During the 1973 war, when they cooperated with Hafez al-Assad, their intention was to “mobilize” rather than “liberate,” aiming for a settlement based on Resolution 242 concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Tensions between Assad and Sadat surfaced when Sadat opted for a unilateral settlement during the separation of forces at “Kilo 101” in 1974 and later with the Sinai Agreement in 1975. The estrangement intensified after Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977 and the Camp David Accords.
Notably, Hafez al-Assad did not have disagreements with Saudi Arabia throughout his rule. His conflict with Egypt arose from Sadat’s unilateralism rather than any initiative of his own. With Iraq, a chronic dispute existed, which Damascus sought to resolve by improving ties with Baghdad following the Camp David Accords in the autumn of 1978. This effort, however, ended with Saddam Hussein’s overthrow of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in the summer of 1979.
Regarding relations with Moscow, the only significant disagreement surfaced during the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon in 1976 against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left. This intervention marked the beginning of Hafez al-Assad’s understanding with Washington. This understanding lasted until his death, interrupted only by Washington’s support for Israel during its invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982. The understanding remained in place until the autumn of 1989, when the Syrian-American accord regarding Lebanon was revived through the Taif Agreement.
This understanding was further consolidated through the international coalition against Iraq, one of the outcomes of which was the removal of Michel Aoun from Baabda Palace in October 1990, solidifying American acknowledgment of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. Hafez al-Assad’s rapprochement with Washington likely reflected a recognition of the decline of Soviet global power and the emergence of a new American unipolarity. His decision to introduce Iranians into Lebanon in the summer of 1982 was probably a reaction to U.S. support for the Israeli invasion.
When negotiating with Tel Aviv in the 1990s for a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement, he relied on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon as leverage against the Israelis, even though he could not utilize the Golan Heights for this purpose. He remained a cautious ally of Tehran and did not become a follower, unlike his son.
In summary, Hafez al-Assad was a significant player in regional politics, both with neighboring countries and major global powers influencing the Middle East. He was an astute analyst of the geopolitical landscape and its transformations. From 1976 to 2000, he successfully established Syria as a powerful player in the region, shifting its position from a battleground for external and internal conflicts. He demonstrated a deep understanding of internal dynamics within Syria but was primarily a figure of power who knew how to consolidate and uphold it, preventing any potential overthrow. However, he was not a statesman who established institutions capable of enduring beyond his rule. Most likely, the seeds of destruction evident between 2011 and 2024 were a direct result of his actions.
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