Erdoğan and Netanyahu: Neo-Ottomanism or a New Middle East?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following his usual practice of seizing opportunities to convert developments into political gains that consolidate his power, is attempting to exploit the wars in Gaza and southern Lebanon by depicting them as a threat to Turkey’s very existence. This strategy serves to obscure the significant economic and social problems that citizens in Turkey face. Problems that voters have blamed on Erdoğan and his party after expressing dissatisfaction with him in local elections held in late March 2024. In those elections, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) won 37.7% of the vote, while the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won only 35.5%.

Erdoğan sees the conflicts in Gaza against Hamas and in Lebanon against Hezbollah as prime opportunities to halt the decline in his party’s popularity and prevent the CHP, which controls the most critical municipalities in the country, from making further gains. He is thus trying to rearrange priorities by referring to a potential “Israeli occupation of Turkey,” basing this on comments made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about a “rearrangement of the Middle East.”

Erdoğan perceives this major shift—the wars in Gaza and southern Lebanon, the confrontation with Iran and its militias in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, and the looming threats against the Syrian regime—as a lifeline to counter the rising internal challenges and to restrain his rival, the CHP, which is calling for early presidential elections in 2025 instead of the scheduled date in 2028, aiming to eliminate Erdoğan from the competition. This context presents an opportunity for his regime to reorganize its strategies, redefine alliances, and possibly amend specific laws. Erdoğan intends to leverage the ongoing regional conflict to influence the political landscape and convey his narrative to the public in Turkey.

Erdoğan has established communication with the opposition, acting as if the Israeli advance toward Anatolia has truly begun. In his speech to parliament in early October, he pointed out that the Yayladagi area on the Turkish-Syrian border is just 170 kilometers from the Lebanese border. Consequently, political parties in Turkey are urged to put aside their differences, while citizens are expected to ignore—or rise above—their dire living conditions, instead uniting behind Erdoğan to save Turkey from Israel’s alleged strategic plans.

Months ago, Erdoğan began escalating his rhetoric against the Israeli government, with which he maintains exceptionally strong economic relations. He compared Hamas’s resistance against the Israeli military incursion in Gaza to the resistance of the Turkish Qavi Milli forces against European armies during the so-called “War of Independence” in 1919, stating that “Hamas is defending Anatolia.” His coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, the head of the ultra-nationalist movement, further emphasized this by declaring that “the issue today is not Beirut but Ankara, and the ultimate goal is Anatolia,” calling for “the use of force to stop Israel.”

The Turkish government, keenly aware of its internal calculations and efforts to exploit current events to maintain its grip on power while containing the rising strength of the opposition, was surprised by the intensity of the Israeli response and the scale of the war against both Hamas and Hezbollah. It became clear that this military action follows a well-orchestrated plan aimed at eliminating both groups and drying up their support bases, alongside a sustained and prominent Israeli presence in both Gaza and southern Lebanon, ensuring the long-term absence of these organizations.

Turkey asserts openly that there are Israeli intentions to occupy Damascus and confront Iranian influence, aiming to expel it from Syrian territory.

On a regional level, Turkey has noticed Iran’s weakness and its inability to rescue its allies in Gaza and Lebanon. Tehran seems limited to ineffective responses and communications resembling pleas to contain the confrontation and reach diplomatic solutions with Tel Aviv and Washington. Ankara fears that this Israeli momentum could evolve into an expansionist strategy, extending beyond Gaza, the West Bank, and southern Lebanon to include other regions, particularly Syria, where Iran maintains a substantial military and administrative presence through its militias.

Turkey asserts openly that there are Israeli intentions to occupy Damascus and confront Iranian influence, aiming to expel it from Syrian territory. Turkish governmental, research, and media circles discuss how the removal of Iran from Syria might create an opportunity for the self-administration project in northern and eastern Syria (supported on the ground by international coalition forces against ISIS) to prosper and expand, thereby enveloping the “vacuum areas” that may emerge following the expulsion of Iranian militias.

Erdoğan openly stated during a press conference upon returning from visits to Albania and Serbia, “Israel will enter northern Syria the moment it occupies Damascus, which means Israeli soldiers will reach Turkey’s borders, resulting in the complete fragmentation of the Syrian map.” In a clear incitement, he suggested that this could lead to Israeli military support for what he referred to as “separatist activities.”

Turkey is hastening its efforts to prevent any developments in the Syrian landscape that could disrupt its plans for intervention and occupation, demographic change, and the empowerment of factions aligned with Ankara. This is aimed at weakening northern and eastern Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In this context, Ankara dispatched the commander of the Turkish army’s ground forces, General Selcuk Bayraktaroğlu, along with senior army officials, to the occupied region of Afrin to closely monitor developments “in light of the increasing Israeli aggression against Lebanon and Syria,” according to a spokesperson for the Turkish army.

In response to recent developments and the demonstrated military capabilities of Israel that have diminished Iran and its allies, discussions in Tel Aviv about “reorganizing the region” have made Ankara feel that the rug has been pulled out from under it. It is no longer at the center of the unfolding events as a regional power that possesses the upper hand in shaping changes and arrangements. As Ankara has increasingly become sidelined, discussions of the “Neo Ottoman” project have faded, while Netanyahu’s rhetoric about a “new Middle East” gains prominence, buoyed by military victories and gains on the ground.

A powerful entity has emerged, demonstrating significant achievements, changing the equations on the ground, and discussing new territorial blueprints. This power possesses a nuclear arsenal, enjoys substantial advantages in cutting-edge military technology, and boasts notable intelligence capabilities. It is evident that there is a force in the region stronger than Turkey, with its own agendas, while the world increasingly focuses on its projects rather than those of Erdoğan’s Turkey.

Turkey feels both envious and fearful. There is a power in the Middle East that is currently engaged in combat on seven fronts, preparing its operations through technological and intelligence breakthroughs and striking from both land and air. It is bombarding Iran in its territory and threatening to invade Beirut and Damascus. This reality has relegated Turkey to a marginal role. In light of this, Erdoğan does not hesitate to reach out to Russia and Iran once again, urging them to act to prevent shifts in the balance of power in Syria, while continuing to assert the right to occupy, bomb, and disrupt areas under self-administration.

Amid these events, and to imply that it is moving towards a process of “internal housekeeping” and thus has a desire for peace and reconciliation, the Turkish government has reopened the “Kurdish file.” This was exemplified when Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with parliamentarians from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (HDP) and spoke about “internal peace and the historical relationship that spans a thousand years.”

Regardless of the reduction of a significant issue like the Kurdish question to a mere handshake and a few words, and despite claims from some sources regarding contacts between the Turkish government and the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan (who has been imprisoned in İmralı since 1999, with his lawyers and family barred from meeting him for over 40 months), aimed at reviving dialogue and negotiation, one undeniable fact remains: the Turkish army continues its military operations against PKK forces in southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan). Moreover, it conducts daily bombardments using drones and artillery against the Syrian Democratic Forces and various civil and military targets in northern and eastern Syria.

Senior PKK official Murat Karayılan addressed rumors regarding potential dialogue, urging not to take them seriously. He emphasized that the Turkish government’s actions are meant to distract from the dire situation within Turkey, diverting citizens’ attention from pressing issues such as the deteriorating economy, declining living standards, and rising military expenditures due to the war against the Kurdish people and their movement. He also highlighted the ongoing grim social and political crises.

Karayılan further noted that the Turkish state continues military operations against the Kurdish movement both within Turkey and beyond its borders. He pointed to the ongoing isolation of Abdullah Öcalan, the persecution of Kurdish politicians, and the suppression of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (HDP), along with all manifestations of Kurdish culture and identity in Turkey. He remarked that for over a decade, the alliance between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has established a well-funded army of 100,000 mercenary fighters to combat the PKK, alongside the regular military and intelligence operations that cost the state billions of dollars.

Erdoğan and Bahçeli aim to maintain their grip on power, distract the opposition, and redirect citizens’ focus away from their realities to what they label a “threat to Turkey’s very existence”, should Israel advance towards Beirut and Damascus and weaken Iran and its proxies.

Karayılan explained that in the past nine months, the Turkish army has carried out 3,318 air attacks using warplanes and helicopters, in addition to over 71,000 shelling operations with tanks, artillery, and mortars, all targeting mountainous areas in the Kurdistan region as part of military operations against the PKK. He stated that the Turkish government’s expenditures on military operations targeting the Kurdish people run into tens of billions of dollars, significantly contributing to the economic decline and the deteriorating living standards of citizens, alongside clear neglect of essential services.

It is evident that the Turkish government has no intention or plan to initiate a genuine and serious dialogue with Öcalan and the PKK. The recent developments, including Bahçeli’s statements and contacts with Öcalan, are calculated actions within Turkey’s “emergency plan,” hastily devised in response to recent regional events. Erdoğan and Bahçeli aim to maintain their grip on power, distract the opposition, and redirect citizens’ focus away from their realities to what they label a “threat to Turkey’s very existence”, should Israel advance towards Beirut and Damascus and weaken Iran and its proxies. This new narrative seeks to impede the political progress of the opposition, divert attention from the dire economic situation, and once again evoke the notion of the “Kurdish threat,” which is poised to gain traction in the Turkish public’s imagination, particularly with the curtailing of Tehran’s militias and the advancements of the Israeli military.