A Perspective on the World After October 7

The Ukrainian war in 2022 revealed a Sino-Russian alliance confronting a NATO-Japan-South Korea-Australia coalition. Ukraine was used as a battleground for this confrontation, and many still believe that Russian President Putin’s visit to Beijing three weeks before the war was meant to reassure the Chinese regarding their backing prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Following that invasion, analyses in the Western media recalled the Stalin-Mao Zedong alliance during the Korean War (1950-1953), suggesting that the Ukrainian war represents a revival of that alliance and evokes the atmosphere of the Cold War when the Korean War reached its fiery peak. This conflict epitomized the first confrontation between the two camps on specific Korean territory before the Cold War (1947-1989) expanded to a global arena. It was suggested at the time that February 24, 2022, marked a Chinese-Russian coup attempt against the American unipolar world order, which emerged after the American victory over the Soviets in the Cold War in 1989, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later.

In this context, one can assert that the Middle Eastern war of October 7, 2023 (and the events following it in the Gaza Strip, extending into Lebanon after September 17, with possibilities of broader geographical ramifications), has provided indications of the failure of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s coup attempts on February 24, 2022. It emphasizes the extent of the American presence in this Middle Eastern conflict, as well as the absence of China and Russia and the limits of their power. Notably, as highlighted by U.S. President Joe Biden in his Washington Post article on November 18, the October 7 operation was primarily aimed at countering the “economic corridor” between India and Europe via a Middle Eastern land bridge. This intent was clear from the signing of a memorandum just four weeks before October 7, targeting the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and aiming to create an energy alternative (natural gas and oil) in the Middle East for Europeans, thus providing them with a different option to Russian energy supplies in a post-Ukrainian war world.

Many argue that the 2009 Qatari-Turkish proposal to the Syrian government for a plan to provide an alternative to Russian gas via Qatar to Europe, through a pipeline running through Syria and Turkey, is one of the main reasons for the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011 after the Syrian government rejected that offer. This proposal contributed significantly to Qatari-Turkish investments that exacerbated an existing internal fire in Syria and is also a key reason for Moscow’s sustained support for the Syrian government since 2011, culminating in the Russian military presence in Syria beginning in 2015.

Ultimately, this Middle Eastern war has not only demonstrated the persistence of American unipolarity in the world but also the lack of movement toward multipolarity, despite Sino-Russian attempts. This continued dominance is evident from previous conflicts, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo War, and the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. After October 7, Washington showcased its ability to delineate the geographical boundaries of this conflict, restricting it to the Gaza Strip and preventing it from escalating into a comprehensive regional war—an outcome desired by Benjamin Netanyahu, Yahya Sinwar, and Hassan Nasrallah but opposed by Joe Biden.

Many signals indicate a green light from the United States for Tel Aviv to target Tehran’s strongest Lebanese ally after September 17, 2024. Furthermore, various indicators suggest that Washington is attempting to impose red, yellow, and green lines on Tel Aviv before the Israeli response to the Iranian strike on October 1.

What stands out in this context is the extent of Benjamin Netanyahu’s defiance toward Washington in the post-October 7 phase. His rebellious actions were evident in the “limits” that Washington tried to impose on him during the conflict in Gaza. While the Israeli Prime Minister managed to navigate around these constraints, he was unable to expand his objectives in the war on Lebanon between October 7 and September 17, nor could he strike Iran. Biden successfully restrained him concerning Lebanon before the specified date, but it remains uncertain how effectively he can limit Netanyahu regarding Iran—a situation that will clarify with the expected limits of the Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.

If the October 7 War is to be analyzed—a task that will engage researchers and historians in the future—one of its significant markers is the level of discord between Washington and Tel Aviv during the conflict. This discord exceeded that seen between U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during the 1956 war, as well as the disagreements between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during the 1982 war. This divergence challenges the Arab theories that have emerged regarding the nature of relations between Israel and the United States, typically categorized into two perspectives: the “Americanization of Israeli politics” and the “Israelization of American politics.”

From April 9, 2003, to October 7, 2023, Tehran has been the largest regional player alongside Tel Aviv in the Middle East. The events of October 7 showed that Iran’s strength lies in its proxy forces rather than its central authority. The strongest of these proxies is in Lebanon, with the second strongest among the Palestinians (Iran’s only Sunni ally). This positioning has made Iran a significant player in the Palestinian struggle against Israel, uplifting Hezbollah’s stature as a major actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Additionally, the involvement of Hamas and Hezbollah has transformed the conflict, through their ties with Iran, into one that transcends the traditional definition of the “Arab-Israeli conflict.”

The Iranian strike on Israel during the night of April 13-14 showcased the limitations of Iran’s military power. In contrast, the strike on October 1 demonstrated some enhanced Iranian capabilities; however, it was not significantly damaging in terms of human, material, or military cost, rather it indicated Iran’s relative ability to inflict harm.

In practice, both strikes demonstrated that Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis serve as three Iranian instruments that wield more influence than Iran’s own military capabilities. This may explain Khamenei’s avoidance of a regional war and the concept of “unity of the squares” after October 7. It is likely that this perception of Iranian weakness has emboldened Netanyahu to strike and provoke Iran, particularly through the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh at the Iranian official guesthouse in Tehran on July 31, followed by the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, which is considered Iranian territory under international law.

Khamenei’s promotion of a reformist president, coupled with the largely manufactured nature of Iranian elections, reflects his interpretation of this Iranian weakness. He seems to have acknowledged this weakness after October 7 and has revised his earlier perceptions of “American weakness”. These past beliefs contributed to his pragmatic alignment with the Sino-Russian alliance since fall 2022, including sending Iranian drones to Russia for use in their war against Ukraine.

In this context, Khamenei appears eager to entice Biden (and potentially Harris if she wins the election) with a new Iranian-American agreement, reminiscent of the “Masoud Pezeshkian-Javad Zarif dessert” approach, similar to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that Zarif signed. It is likely that Netanyahu, through his attempts to target Iran, seeks to undermine this potential agreement before it materializes. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to establish red lines for Netanyahu regarding strikes on Iran are aimed at preventing Israeli sabotage of those negotiations. Washington’s hesitance to eliminate Tehran’s strongest Lebanese arm, alongside its Palestinian and Sunni factions, may be focused on bringing a weakened Iran to future U.S.-Iran negotiations, while Netanyahu aims to deliver a definitive blow to Iran.

In this context, if current trends persist indicating that Iran and its proxies may emerge losers from this ongoing conflict, Pezeshkian could become Iran’s Gorbachev. Gorbachev, who rose to power in 1985 after the collapse of the Cold War balance between the American and Soviet giants, introduced new Soviet foreign policies to adapt to this geopolitical shift. Following the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) in 1983—which suggested the possibility of overcoming mutual nuclear annihilation—he advocated for internal reforms through “perestroika” and “glasnost.” This new strategy aimed to reflect the changing international landscape in domestic policy. Gorbachev inherited the legacies of Brezhnev and Andropov—before a brief period under Chernenko—where successes in foreign policy coincided with economic crises and widespread public discontent, paralleling the current situation in Iran under Khamenei’s regime.

In the Arab world, it is significant that Fatah in Palestine was the first to claim that the October 7 operation was an adventure that would lead the Palestinian people to a new Nakba, at a time when no other Arab voice dared to express this sentiment. To date, aside from Yassin al-Hafez and Elias Morcos in the 1960s, there has been a dearth of intellectual and political critiques among Arabs against tendencies toward “military adventurism,” which fail to consider and assess wars relative to the balance of power before and after their initiation.

This lack of critical assessment embarrassed President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who faced criticism for permitting freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and for the presence of international emergency forces in the Sinai Peninsula and Sharm el-Sheikh—conditions that were part of the price for Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip following the 1956 war. These criticisms were voiced by all of Nasser’s adversaries, including Akram al-Hourani, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

In the wake of the 1967 defeat, Hafez and Morcos stood alone in their opposition to the idea of a “popular liberation war” and the slogan of turning “Amman into a second Hanoi.” They supported Nasser in his agreement to Resolution 242 and the Rogers Plan.

Conversely, during the October 7 war, an Arab division arose regarding Hamas and Hezbollah, a divide that encompassed both Arab regimes and societies. This situation contrasts with the events of the 1967 war, when even rival factions rallied around Nasser in wartime, later reconciling, as evidenced by King Faisal bin Abdulaziz’s actions at the Khartoum summit, which ended a long-standing rivalry between Riyadh and Cairo stemming from the Yemen war.

The root of this contemporary division appears to be the connections between Hamas and Hezbollah with Tehran, alongside Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It seems that Mao Zedong’s assertion in 1937 regarding the “main contradiction” uniting the Chinese against Japanese occupiers is no longer relevant in the Arab context. Many Arabs express frustration over Tehran’s role and its proxies in the region, viewing Iran as leveraging the Palestinian issue against Washington to gain recognition as a “regional superpower.” This perspective sheds light on Netanyahu’s urgent desire to deliver a decisive blow to Iran and explains why Washington is preventing him from doing so.

In short: Just two days after the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Netanyahu stated, “We are now changing the strategic reality in the Middle East… This shift in the balance of power opens the door to a new alliance in the region.” He appears to be focusing on Saudi Arabia. In his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 27, delivered following the order for Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, he called for “a shift in history… towards reconciliation between the Arab world and Israel, between Islam and Judaism, between Mecca and Jerusalem.”

However, Netanyahu’s ideological beliefs blind him to the fact that Israel cannot translate its military strength into political acceptability in the Middle East without addressing the Palestinian issue and the status of the occupied Syrian territories in the Golan Heights. Although Israel possesses significant military and technological power, it struggles to convert this into political and cultural acceptance from the average Arab individual. This is different from the issue of regimes or some intellectuals who have advocated for normalization since Camp David and Oslo. For instance, Saudi Arabia has explicitly stated that it will not establish relations with Israel without a Palestinian state. This understanding is also recognized by Israeli President Herzog, who recently called for a “NATO-like structure in the region,” suggesting a more pragmatic approach than Netanyahu’s.

Here, One can draw a comparison between Netanyahu’s recent cordial approaches to certain Arab nations, fueled by concerns over the Iranian threat, and David Ben-Gurion’s strategy during the rise of Abdel Nasser when he contemplated alliances with the Shah of Iran, Adnan Menderes, and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. This strategic shift implies that Netanyahu perceives a decline in Iranian power, coinciding with signs of weakening Turkish influence.

Emerging from Washington—rather than Tel Aviv—there appears to be an international consensus favoring the rise of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The historical power vacuum in the Arab world, previously occupied by Tehran and Ankara in the past quarter-century of the 21st century, may now allow for a resurgence of Arab and Kurdish power in the region. Herzog’s remarks about a “Middle East NATO” reflect this potential, not due to Israel’s strength, but as a result of Washington moving away from Obama’s withdrawal strategy in the region. Instead, the U.S. appears to be returning to the Middle East to apply pressure on both Beijing, which relies heavily on Middle Eastern oil, and Moscow, which seeks to extend its influence through Iran and the Mediterranean.