D’Alema: Abdullah Öcalan is right. Solving the Kurdish question is crucial for peace in the Middle East

This year marks the 26th anniversary of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the PKK, in Kenya. Since February 15, 1999, the Kurdish leader has been detained in the maximum-security prison island of İmralı.

Twenty-six years later, Öcalan continues to play an important role in solving the Kurdish issue, as evidenced by the Turkish government’s recent authorization for a delegation from the DEM party to visit İmralı, where Öcalan remains in total isolation. The delegation aims to re-establish dialogue between Öcalan and the outside world, but most importantly, to restart the peace process that the government itself interrupted in 2015.

Abdullah Öcalan arrived in Italy on 12 November 1998, hoping to bring the Kurdish issue to the European table.

At that time, Massimo D’Alema was the Prime Minister. The Center for Kurdish Studies visited D’Alema at the headquarters of the Italian European Foundation, which he established. In this interview the former Italian Prime Minister talked extensively about the arrival and permanence in Italy of Abdullah Öcalan. He then addressed the issue of the Middle East, and the possible scenarios after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, before giving a final assessment about the future actors in a new geopolitical balance.

President D’Alema, let’s start with Mr. Öcalan’s arrival in Italy, on 12 November 1998.

Mr. Öcalan arrival in Italy was quite unexpected for me. He clearly had been invited by some Italian parliamentarians, but I only found that out when he was already about to land in Italy. From the very first hours after his arrival, we found ourselves in a very complicated situation because there was an arrest warrant against him from the German judiciary, specifically from the Karlsruhe prosecutor’s office, for accessory to murder. The Schengen Agreement bound us, and thus we had to detain him. Mr. Öcalan was taken into custody, even though by the next morning [November 13, 1998], I had already contacted German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder by phone and clarified with him that Germany would not request extradition. Schröder was concerned that bringing Mr. Öcalan to trial could spark a conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish communities [both quite big] in Germany.

So Chancellor Schröder position gave you the possibility to avoid extraditing Mr. Abdullah Öcalan to Germany. Yet, pressures from Turkey and the United States continued.

Indeed. So I asked the ministerial committee if it was possible to grant Mr. Öcalan some form of political asylum. This was the committee for political asylum made up of officials and magistrates that dealt with these matters. However, the committee ruled out the possibility of granting asylum due to the serious charges against Mr. Öcalan within the European Union.

Additionally, almost immediately, we had received also an extradition request from Turkey, supported by the United States. Again, we immediately ruled out the possibility of handing Mr. Öcalan over to Turkey and explained to the U.S. and President Bill Clinton, that if Mr. Öcalan were extradited to Turkey, he would face the death penalty. I told President Clinton that we had a constitutional obligation to protect life. I told him that this prevented us from extraditing anyone to a country where the death penalty was in effect.

I therefore said no to both the U.S. and Turkey, which led to a major diplomatic crisis with significant economic repercussions. A series of collaboration agreements with Turkey were suspended, and there were violent demonstrations outside the Italian embassy in Ankara.

Meanwhile, Mr. Öcalan was placed under protection for security reasons and was hosted by the Italian government in a small villa [in an area called Infernetto] on the outskirts of Rome.

It was at that point that you initiated a dialogue with Mr. Öcalan to determine what to do?

As I said, it was a rather complicated situation due to the pressures we faced from Turkey, from the U.S., but also from some circles within Italy, namely Confindustria [the Italian employers’ federation] that was asking for the issue to be resolved to avoid damaging relations with Turkey.

For this reason, we intensified dialogue with Mr. Abdullah Öcalan himself. We asked for the help of key figures from the Palestinian resistance, who had connections with the Kurds and with whom I had long-standing friendships and political ties. We thus established a confidential channel of communication with Mr. Öcalan and the PKK through these Palestinian personalities.

In the meantime, outside the villa hosting Mr. Öcalan at the Infernetto, there was a more and more significant presence of journalists—many of whom I believe were possibly intelligence men. Mr. Öcalan had been meeting people at the villa, Kurds and other personalities. He was running his own dialogue, but the constant and crowded presence outside the villa limited his ability to act.

We then began talking about how to get him out of Italy safely.

I realized—because in fact they told me directly—that I couldn’t rely on Italian security agencies to ensure Mr. Öcalan’s safe departure. The same agencies told me explicitly that they couldn’t carry out such an operation without the American and Israeli intelligences finding out. And they were precisely the people who shouldn’t have known what was going on.

As a result, Italian security agencies only allowed the creation of a peaceful environment around an operation carried out by other ‘volunteers’. I remember that the Chief of Police told me, “President, you come from a party [The Comunist Party of Italy] that was very well organized—you’ll surely find someone willing to help.” And I did.

The operation to take Mr. Öcalan out of the villa he was staying in was somewhat adventurous.

Did you also have an agreement with others to ensure Mr. Öcalan’s safety once he had left Italy? 

I think after so many years I can say this. Yes, I had made an agreement with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov for Mr. Öcalan to be transported by private plane to Russia, to a Russian military base, and from there to South Africa.

I had discussed the situation also with South African President Thabo Mbeki, who was willing to welcome him to his country. We had arranged everything, so that all of this would have done in a safe way. The operation to take Mr. Öcalan out of the villa he was staying in was somewhat adventurous. We had found someone who resembled him, and this person took his place. At the time agreed, [16 January 1999] Mr. Öcalan left dressed as a policeman during a sort of guard change and disappeared without anyone noticing.

The American ambassador called me the next day to congratulate me, adding that nothing like this had ever happened without them notice. They did not realize what was happening.

What happened when Mr. Öcalan arrived in Russia?

He decided not to follow our plan but rather accepted an invitation from Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos to seek protection under Greece.

It is worth noting that, in the Greek system, the foreign intelligence service was under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For historical reasons—hostility toward Turkey and solidarity with the Kurds—the Greeks were very receptive. The Greek foreign minister was a leftist but somewhat adventurous figure.

Mr. Öcalan thanked Italy for hosting, protecting, and safely helping him leave, but he declined our proposal. He stated that the new option allowed him to stay closer to his people, and he entrusted himself to the Greeks.

Unfortunately, things didn’t turn out well…

I pieced together later what happened after Öcalan’s arrival in Russia, after speaking with Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis. He told me that the Greek government knew nothing about that operation. He said that it was handled by the foreign minister without the government’s knowledge. So much so that, when the situation escalated, Pangalos resigned, causing a government crisis.

According to what I was told, after he left Russia [29 January 1999] Öcalan was first hosted on an island in the Aegean and then in some Greek embassies in Africa—again, under the Foreign Ministry’s control. In one of these Greek embassies in Africa [in Kenya], a Greek intelligence officer told Öcalan that a European country, the Netherlands, was willing to grant him political asylum. This was false. On his way to the airport [in Nairobi on February 15, 1999], he was handed over—not to the Turks but, according to what I was told, to the Israelis, who then handed him over to the Turks.

We have a clear conscience. We protected Öcalan; we did not hand him over to anyone. And I insist on saying this because many legends have circulated after his capture.

We did not send him to Greece; he chose to go to Greece. We acted according to our principles. We had devised another proposal to ensure his freedom and had found other countries willing to take him in. But at one point, he decided to accept the Greek invitation and protection.

It should be in President Erdoğan and Turkey’s interest to address the Kurdish Question in a more constructive manner.

Today, the Kurdish question remains unresolved. And today, once again, Öcalan could play an important role in resolving this issue.

The Kurds, in the context in which they operate, have ended up closely aligning their national struggle with the Western anti-Islamist position. This is understandable—Islamist nationalism from various quarters is the main enemy of the Kurdish national cause. But the Kurds have paid and are still paying a high price for this.

In Iraq, the Kurds carved out a space during the war against Saddam Hussein and later in the new political arrangement. Despite the strong influence of both Sunni and Shia Arabs, the Kurdish community continues to hold a significant position, at times serving as a key balancing force in the political landscape, particularly in the Arab Shia-Sunni divide.

In other countries, however, the Kurds face very challenging circumstances.

At this point, it should even be in Erdoğan and Turkey’s interest to address the issue in a more constructive manner, especially given Turkey’s aspirations to play a leading regional role—a role heightened by developments in Syria.

Yet Turkish Presidente Erdoğan continues to wage war against the Kurds and seeks to occupy parts of Syria.

Erdoğan has two faces: he is the president of Turkey, but he is also a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It would actually be reasonable for him to seek an appeasement with the Kurds—a resolution based on respecting human and national rights. The solution lies in providing the Kurds with autonomy within national states, along with respect for linguistic, human, and associative rights—fundamental rights.

Turkey is the key. If an agreement is reached in Turkey, it would automatically pave the way for a solution in Syria as well, given the current context. What is needed is someone capable of promoting a Middle East peace program, a framework for coexistence that can prevent conflicts. That’s why, as Öcalan also says solving the Kurdish question would be a crucial piece of such a plan.

At the moment, I don’t see who could support and accompany such a peace process in the Middle East. The United States has proven completely unreliable under the Democratic administration, and this unreliability seems likely to worsen in many respects under the new Trump administration. As for other actors, I don’t see them. The European Union? Let’s draw a veil over that.

Looking at the situation in the Middle East, it is painfully to say that there are no actors capable of playing a regulatory role or advancing a peace plan.

We are in a situation marked by dramatic conflicts, with no actors capable of taking on this role—unlike in other times when it was possible.

In the Balkans, for instance, despite many mistakes, a framework was eventually built to stop the wars. In the Middle East, this goal still feels out of reach because two enormous issues remain unresolved, creating only a false sense of stability. One is the Palestinian issue; the other is the Kurdish issue. If these two peoples are not given a perspective and allowed to exercise their fundamental rights, there will be no stability or peace.

Any solution that ignores these two questions is a false solution, just as the so-called Abraham Accords were a false solution. Instead of peace, they have led to one of the most horrifying wars we have seen in recent years.

Donald Trump will enter the White House. Will Ukraine be the first issue he will address?

The new American administration seems clearly oriented towards seeking appeasement with Russia, also because Trump has much more affinity with Putin than with the Palestinians, in a logic of power. It will not be very easy, however, to achieve this appeasement, because the American military apparatus, the deep state, will not be happy to give in to Putin and will do everything to avoid an appeasement that is too concessionary towards Russia.

Finding a solution to the war in Ukraine, a war that could have been avoided, will be quite complicated. It is credible to think that Trump will try, but it will also depend on the degree of flexibility of the Russians. The one who seems to be looking for a way out is Zelensky.

The situation in the Middle East is more complicated.

Yes, because the only idea of ​​the new US administration is to give Israel a free hand, more than has already happened. The attempt at ethnic cleansing, at colonization is a plan that necessarily leads to a prospect of instability and calls into question the very idea of ​​the Jewish state because it can only hold up in an apartheid regime that will become unsustainable internationally in the long run. It is true that Israel has the protection of the Americans, but not of the rest of the world. There is the risk that Israel will become a rogue state, a pariah state.

So what solution?

The European Union’s goal should be to work to help isolate the current fascist government of Israel internationally and promote a democratic alternative that reopens some political perspective. The EU could exert greater pressure on Israel. A difficult task because the weakness of the current European ruling class from this point of view is truly impressive.

It is difficult for the Arab world, after what has happened, to get back on the path of Abraham’s peace without obtaining significant compensation for the Palestinians.

Either there is some signal and a concrete hope is reopened and therefore a change in the Israeli ruling class, or I think that the situation will become very difficult, even for Europe, which is at the forefront from this point of view. After all, there are something like 30 million Muslims living in the EU. It’s not like we can think of living together like this here. We would need strong action.

Like the one led by Italy on Lebanon in 2006?

After Resolution 1701 of the UN Security Council. In that case we did not hide behind the hypocrisy of saying that it was the parties that had to come to an agreement among themselves, which was the great hypocritical lie in front of the Palestinians.

But which parties? On one side there is a great military and technological power, on the other side there is a dispersed people, without a credible leadership. It is the international community that must build a solution and impose it with the force of law. In Lebanon the war stopped with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and the deployment of an international military force not because Israel and Hezbollah had reached an agreement.

In 2006, Italy operated with a mandate from the European Union and finally with the agreement of the Americans who put pressure on Israel. I proposed that the resolution include the deployment of 3000 United Nations observers in Gaza to prevent the conflict. There was opposition from Hamas and the Israeli government. The Palestinian National Authority agreed. It was not possible to include a deployment in Gaza in the international mission. It was difficult to have an interposition force but international monitoring could be had.

The only model is this: an international peace conference that defines the parameters and implements them through measures that the international community guarantees, otherwise there will be no solution.

Going across the Ocean, how do you see the situation?

In Latin America there is an element of hope because Lula’s Brazil is still making it, despite a thousand difficulties. Brazil is an extraordinary country in terms of human and intellectual resources. But there too there is this aggressive, violent right that will find support in the Trump administration.

And then there too the new right appears, that of Miley in Argentina. There are various forms of populism, some more left-wing, as we could define Mexico, and some in the form of right-wing nationalism. In my opinion it is positive that after so much time Europe has finally decided to sign the agreement with Mercosur, it took twenty years of resistance, of French protectionism.

Finally, Russia…

Russia is a country in inexorable decline, demographically, and not only. It is a prisoner of this nationalistic dream, of imperial restoration, which has no basis in realism. I do not see it as a main player in the future, frankly. The really important players are China and India.

A Goldman Sachs report says that in 2075, the first economy will be China, the second India, the third the United States and the fourth Indonesia. Russia is not in these rankings.

This is the world. The new world.

How the relationship between China and India will evolve will matter much more on the future balances. Everything else is secondary. The Americans will obviously try to accentuate hostility and nationalistic conflicts in Asia, but if China and India find an appeasement and a form of collaboration, the world will change. Because China and India are, among other things in a complementary way, also two great technological powers. The development of Africa can find in the great Asian powers not only financial resources but also technological resources. In other words: the West will become useless. This was basically the idea of ​​the great south, that is, of a world that can do without us. Just think that already this year the BRICS produce 37% of the world’s wealth and the G7 29%. The overtaking has already happened.

If these countries find a way to collaborate with each other, to overcome ancient nationalistic oppositions, then the world will find a new center of gravity. It would be a reasonable prospect. And Russia will not be there. Brazil, on the other hand, is certainly projected to be part of the leading group. Let’s hope that it maintains a democratic leadership. Brazil is certainly one of the first 7-8 economies in the world, as Nigeria will be in Africa.

More than South Africa, Nigeria will become a key country.

We must look very carefully at the new balances that are growing. On the other side there are the powers of the last century in decline, including the West. We must hope that in their decline they do not cause too much damage, because declining powers tend to make war.

And this applies to both America and Russia in this sense they are very dissimilar.