Understanding Iran’s ‘Surplus of Power’

Four months after Ruhollah Khomeini came to power on February 11, 1979, two delegations from the global organization of the Muslim Brotherhood arrived in Iran. According to oral accounts from Syrian opposition circles at the time, the group offered to pledge allegiance to Khomeini as the caliph of Muslims in exchange for his declaration that “the differences among the Brothers regarding the caliphate and the imamate are political and not theological.” It is said that Khomeini delayed his response, and the answer came later that year with the publication of the new Iranian constitution, which stated in its twelfth article that “the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Jafari Twelver school.”

From the outset, Khomeini chose a Shiite identity for his regime, despite his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which shares some ideological commonalities. He seemed to understand that the “export of the Islamic revolution,” a phrase that signified the expansion of Iranian influence, would only find fertile ground among the Shiite population. In practice, both Khomeini and his successor, Ali Khamenei, have succeeded in this regard, particularly considering Iran’s expansion of influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, especially among the Houthis, who do not adhere to Imam Zaid’s position of moderation between Sunnis and Shiites.

Iran’s expansion has relied on political organizations that ideologically support “Wilayat al-Faqih” and have strong social ties within the local Shiite community. Additionally, Iran has extended its influence through alliances, such as those with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine. These partnerships have given Iran a significant presence in the Palestinian arena, providing it with crucial leverage in the Palestinian issue, which has been a primary driving force in the Middle East and the internal affairs of many countries since 1948. This regional expansion has positioned Iran as a competitor to Israel in the struggle for regional dominance. Benjamin Netanyahu’s intense focus on delivering a decisive blow to Iran seems to stem from this context, with the nuclear program representing only the tip of the iceberg.

However, Iran has not yet established itself as a “regional superpower,” as noted by General Rahim Safavi, the former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a current advisor in Khamenei’s office. Shiites represent a minority among Muslims. According to The World Almanac 2020, a statistical publication issued since 1868 in New York, the number of Muslims worldwide as of July 2019 was approximately one billion eight hundred ninety-three million (1.893 billion), of whom 1.687 billion Sunnis (p. 698). Besides, Persians are the smallest of the four major ethnic groups in the region—Arabs, Turks, Kurds, and Persians—and they constitute a minority in Iran, where they are the largest minority. In this context, attempts to project an Islamic face for Iran have not succeeded; the realities following February 11, 1979, suggest that a Shiite-Persian identity is the dominant one in Khomeini-Khamenei’s Iran.

It is noteworthy that Iran’s regional expansion has ignited sectarian tensions throughout the area, particularly following its control over Iraq after April 3, 2003, and Lebanon after May 7, 2008, through its local proxies. However, this expansion has resulted in considerable tension in both countries, rendering the influence of these proxies fragile and susceptible to instability. Lebanon’s internal disagreements regarding Hezbollah serve as a prominent example of this phenomenon. Similarly, there are divisions among Yemenis concerning the Houthis and among Iraqis regarding entities like the “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF).

The lack of consensus among Lebanese regarding the “war of distraction and support for Gaza,” which Hassan Nasrallah announced on October 8, 2023, became particularly evident during the conflict following September 17, 2024, in Lebanon. Comparing this to historical conflicts since 1948, the war after September 17, 2024, stands out as the most divisive within the local social fabric of an Arab country during wartime with Israel. In contrast, there was less internal dispute among the Palestinians regarding the events of October 7, 2023, despite past grievances stemming from Hamas’s actions toward Fatah since it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, and despite Fatah’s criticisms of Yahya Sinwar’s actions on October 7, 2023.

In both Lebanon on September 17, 2024, and partially in Palestine on October 7, 2023, Mao Zedong’s notion of the “main contradiction” seems less applicable, particularly in light of his call to overlook past hostilities between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during Japan’s invasion of China in 1937. Currently, the Lebanese lack the consensus they once demonstrated during the liberation of the south in 2000 and were less divided during the 2006 war. In this context, one might argue that Palestinians are more divided regarding the October 7 conflict than in any previous confrontation with Israel, although they have not reached the same level of division as the Lebanese have experienced in the meantime.

This disagreement regarding the war arises from the Lebanese attitude toward Iranian influence in their country and towards Iran’s local proxy, rather than stemming from a position against Israel itself. This was evident during the conflict, which served as a reckoning for Hezbollah concerning its actions since May 7, 2008, against Lebanon and the Lebanese people. It is also important to remember that in the demonstrations following October 17, 2019, some social sentiment toward Hezbollah, its ally Michel Aoun, and Iran became apparent.

Moreover, the Iranian influence in Lebanon has led to the largest Arab controversy surrounding a war involving an Arab country and Israel since 1948, illustrated by the ongoing conflict in Lebanon. This situation stems from the roles Iran has played throughout the region and the actions of Hezbollah in support of Tehran in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

All of the above creates a weakness in Iranian power throughout the region, causing it to possess a surplus of power that it cannot effectively utilize or translate, rendering this power easily undermined and fragile. Conversely, there are countries that possess power and a counterbalance to that power, such as the United States after 1945. At that time, the U.S. embraced a liberal ideology to counter the Marxism of the Soviet Kremlin and found in most Western European societies a cultural and social foundation that accepted its hegemony, thus making its technological and military superiority translatable into political and cultural influence.

This acceptance facilitated Washington’s ability to gain both official and social recognition in Western Europe during its confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War (1947-1989). This dynamic was likely one of the factors contributing to Washington’s victory over Moscow in that conflict, with the European continent serving as a primary battleground.