In his assessment of the general political landscape in Turkey, Kurdish university professor Abbas Veli called on the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, and subsequently the entire country, to deal more seriously with the Kurdish issue and the ongoing peace process, and to stop linking it to developments and changes in the Middle East. In an interview with the Firat News Agency, Veli highlighted the “zero-sum equation” in the armed conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state. This conflict has not tipped the balance in favor of one side over the other, but has exhausted everyone, intensified resentments, and created further obstacles to the prospects of democratic transformation in Turkey. As a result, the status quo has been maintained, with the state resorting to increased brutality and repression whenever circumstances seem favorable to undermine the Kurds and eliminate their political and military presence in Turkey and abroad.
Veli considered the “Peace and Democratic Solution” phase launched by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan at the end of last February, along with the 12th PKK Congress held last May, and the decision to end the armed struggle and dissolve the party, to be a major shift and an unparalleled opportunity to break the political deadlock and bring about structural change in Turkey. Such change would transform the state from a totalitarian, monolithic institution into a democratic, citizen-based state capable of achieving prosperity and addressing the demands of all its components. The Kurdish thinker and professor of political thought reminded Ankara that a major and influential issue with regional and international dimensions, such as the Kurdish question, cannot be resolved without a national program involving all stakeholders in the country. This program, enacted through parliament, would be translated into laws and constitutional provisions that recognize the identity and rights of the Kurds, and fundamentally alter the face and structure of the republic. By the end of this process, a new state for all its citizens would emerge, with a new structure and orientation reflecting all identities and particularities.
The Turkish state is distracted from fulfilling its promises regarding the peace process by other regional matters and developments that it considers more urgent. According to the agreement with Öcalan, a committee of 100 parliamentarians from all political blocs was to be formed (the names of the members are expected to be discussed during the upcoming meeting between the Imrali delegation and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on July 9). This committee would work on drafting new laws to replace the old ones and outline the contours of constitutional reforms. If the desired changes are implemented—as demanded by Öcalan and the Kurdish side—doors would open to pluralism and political participation, and the persecution of ideas and freedoms would cease. Additionally, the legal grounds used to imprison activists, ban parties, and shut down media outlets would be removed. However, there is reluctance on the part of the Turkish government, directly linked to regional circumstances and perceived threats to its sovereignty or territorial integrity. When crises or confrontations occur in the region—such as the Israeli-Iranian conflict, or talk of a “New Middle East” or redrawing the regional map—Turkey’s authorities tend to recall internal issues and emphasize the importance of maintaining the “unity of the internal front.” Consequently, discussions about resolving Turkey’s problems, especially the Kurdish issue, tend to be postponed. Once regional tensions subside and military actions—bombing campaigns, missile strikes, drone incursions—cease, Turkish politicians feel a sense of relief and a false sense of strength and importance. They then revert to denying problems or attributing them to fabricated causes, often linking them to foreign and external agendas.
Public opinion is awaiting the upcoming meeting between the Imrali delegation and President Erdoğan on July 9, before the delegation travels to Imrali Island to meet with Öcalan and relay developments in the peace process. A symbolic step has been announced in the “practical realm”: the disarmament of a group from the PKK during a ceremony attended by media near Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region, before returning to their positions in the Qandil Mountains. These developments represent clear progress and a move forward in resolving the Kurdish issue after weeks of stagnation—possibly due, in part, to Turkey’s preoccupation with the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Ankara’s efforts across various levels aim to halt hostilities and prevent the Iranian regime from collapsing—a collapse that could trigger chaos (“the gates of hell”), which Turkey fears. The emergence of a democratic regime in Iran, ending dictatorship and repression, and accepting decentralization and autonomy for Iran’s ethnic groups, would likely lead to the creation of an Iranian Kurdistan (East Kurdistan), which would be larger geographically and demographically than the current Iraqi Kurdistan (South Kurdistan), recognized constitutionally in Iraq. Turkey fears such a scenario, as it could influence internal dynamics and revive Kurdish and other ethnic demands for federalism within Turkey, returning to the top of the Kurdish movement’s agenda.
Ekrem İmamoğlu, Istanbul’s mayor and the most prominent rival of President Erdoğan—who is currently imprisoned on corruption charges in Marmara Prison—called for accelerating efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue primarily through parliamentary means and the formation of the 100-member committee. His remarks came during a visit by Tülay Hatimoğlu and Tuncer Bakrahan, co-chairs of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, on June 19. İmamoğlu viewed the PKK’s dissolution and renunciation of armed struggle as a genuine opportunity, emphasizing that democracy and the brotherhood between Kurds and Turks are the foundation for resolving the Kurdish issue, creating a new beginning, and overcoming the legacy of the past.
Öcalan is working to create a broader foundation for the success of the Kurdish issue resolution process by forming a wide, democratic, and popular front that includes politicians, human rights activists, intellectuals, professional unions, women’s associations, civil society organizations, and all Kurdish and Turkish social forces. This front aims to operate alongside official efforts, monitor ongoing discussions between the state and the Kurdish side, and oversee mechanisms for democratic change, including the enactment of laws and constitutional reforms. Öcalan emphasizes the importance of involving all segments of the populace in the process, listening to their opinions, and considering their suggestions and remarks. The goal is to develop a mutually agreed-upon solution from the grassroots level, rather than merely having it imposed from the top—i.e., from the state and representatives of the Kurdish political movement.
Öcalan believes that resolving the Kurdish issue is the antidote that will save Turkey from its internal threats and strengthen it from within. This entails opening pathways toward democracy and economic prosperity, freeing the country from external dependence and the fear of division, and eradicating the nightmare of shrinking into a narrow geographical space within Anatolia. Turkey’s retreat and isolation into Anatolia is what Öcalan warned the ruling authorities in Ankara about, long before the Israeli bombing of Iran began, which threatened its totalitarian regime. That bombing created fear in Ankara of suffering a similar fate at the hands of the region’s most lethal force.
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