Tishreen Dam: The Frontline Defense of the “New Syria”

Since the end of November 2024, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been countering attacks launched by factions of the so-called “Syrian National Army,” with continuous Turkish air and artillery support. The SDF has successfully prevented these factions from advancing and capturing the strategic Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge, thereby imposing new dynamics on the north and east Syrian region that hinder the influence and future role of these factions in a “new Syria.”

The SDF’s strategy involves maintaining their positions and repelling waves of faction attacks by utilizing new defense techniques, including launching rapid strikes with BRDM vehicles and employing a complex network of tunnels to ambush Turkish-backed forces deployed in the battles.

Following the initiation of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on November 27, 2024, and the entry into Aleppo alongside the collapse of the Syrian regular army’s defenses, Turkey quickly intervened to capitalize on the situation and target the SDF while attempting to gain control over more cities and regions. This led to Operation “Freedom Dawn,” where Turkey allocated significant resources to occupy additional Syrian territories.

In an effort to avoid confrontation with the Military Operations Command Room, the SDF withdrew from Tal Rifaat, Manbij, and the Shehba region, later withdrawing from Deir Ezzor, Al-Mayadeen, and Al-Bukamal, where they hoped the “new transitional authority” would take over. This was successfully implemented in the latter three cities of Deir Ezzor province, but not in the initial three cities of Aleppo province, which Turkey swiftly sought to control through its affiliated factions.

The SDF’s withdrawal from Manbij, Tal Rifaat, and Shehba was the result of consultations with the international coalition and agreements facilitated by the coalition and the United States, aimed at pulling back military presences and handing over these areas to a civilian administration made up of local residents. However, Turkey did not adhere to the agreement and insisted on transferring these regions to its affiliated factions, which subsequently committed acts of looting and identity-based killings. In Manbij, specifically, these factions executed civilians accused of working with the Autonomous Administration, a common tactic during their occupations.

Believing that military advances would be manageable, Turkey aimed to proceed with the occupation of areas east of the Euphrates and discussed plans to capture the city of Kobanê and control strategically significant locales like Tishreen Dam and Qara Kozak Bridge.

A significant development occurred on December 8, 2024, when HTS forces entered Damascus following the collapse of the previous regime and the escape of its leader, Bashar al-Assad. HTS expressed positions regarding the Kurds in the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo, avoiding conflicts with local Kurdish forces while discussing a “new Syria” and establishing communications with the SDF, which had already withdrawn from the cities of Deir Ezzor and handed them over to the “Military Operations Administration.”

Despite these developments, Turkey and its allied factions refused to relinquish control over the occupied areas to the Military Operations Administration or the new authority in Damascus. In response, the SDF fortified its doctrine of robust defense and resilience, successfully maintaining control over significant territories amid ongoing attacks from Turkish-backed factions. The SDF unveiled a comprehensive military strategy aimed at resisting and countering the continuous assaults supported by Turkish air and artillery strikes.

By employing innovative tactics and new weaponry, the SDF effectively targeted the vehicles and fighters belonging to the Turkish-backed factions, achieving considerable success and thereby shifting the dynamics on the battlefield. The pro-Turkish factions encountered substantial losses, with hundreds of their fighters killed or injured and the destruction of numerous military vehicles predominantly carried out through documented aerial strikes by ProSec drones.

The SDF states unequivocally that it will not retreat in the face of the factions and the Turkish military machine under any circumstances, framing their struggle as a “people’s revolutionary war.” Notably, the pro-Turkish factions have failed to achieve significant territorial gains despite substantial military support from Turkey.

With ongoing resistance at Tishreen Dam and in the countryside of Manbij, the SDF has emerged as a significant and influential actor in the Syrian landscape. This development was politically reflected in discussions between Ahmed al-Sharaa, head of the Military Operations Administration, and General Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, which Abdi characterized as positive.

Despite the strategic importance of Tishreen Dam as a vital source of energy, water, and food security in the eastern region, it is unlikely that the SDF will retreat in the face of pro-Turkish factions. It remains committed to defending its positions and employing “new military techniques that are stronger and more deterrent,” according to its leaders. This determination will hold firm should Turkey undertake a military incursion into Kobanê, which has come to symbolize the legendary Kurdish resistance against ISIS.

The sacrifices of Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and Armenian fighters are shaping a new reality. Unprecedented international support has emerged, highlighted by high-level endorsements of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, and the Kurdish struggle from prominent leaders, including the French President, the German Foreign Minister, and U.S. officials.

This reinforces an undeniable presence for the SDF, which has liberated territories in northern and eastern Syria from ISIS and built a military force of over 100,000 fighters encompassing all communities. The SDF is currently engaged in negotiations with the central government on issues such as joining the new Syrian army, decentralization, and wealth distribution. Its qualitative resistance has elevated its status as a key player in the Syrian theater and a center of gravity, attracting consolidated international support. Many influential regional and international states consider the SDF a stabilizing force due to its ethical and humanitarian stance, its defense of all components and resources of northern and eastern Syria, and its management of detention centers housing ISIS fighters.

The resilience demonstrated in the SDF’s defense, coupled with the evolution of military capabilities and international pressures rooted in national interests, a consensus on combating terrorism, and emotional and professional respect from world leaders, have solidified the belief in the just cause defended by the SDF. This shift has urged the transitional authority in Damascus to engage in dialogue and negotiations within a framework of Syrian national unity. Consequently, Turkish Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan found himself compelled to shift his rhetoric on January 10, asserting that “Ankara will give the new Syrian administration a chance to resolve the issue of the presence of Kurdish militants.”