The Surge of Turkish Influence in Syria: Gains, Risks, and Challenges

Since the Hamas offensive a year and a half ago, the Middle East has been witnessing events of utmost importance in terms of their results achieved thus far and their repercussions on the region as a whole, as well as on international issues such as the Iranian nuclear file and the Ukraine crisis.

With the intensification of the Israeli war in Gaza and the severe blow dealt to Hezbollah and its support base in Lebanon, the most prominent, dangerous, and influential event was the fall of the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Syria on December 8, 2024.

This event cannot be viewed through the lens of partial gains for some parties. What has been achieved represents a powerful momentum and the pinnacle of the project that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has championed since coming to power in 2002, and it has subsequently posed the greatest threat to the opponents of this project.

The rise of the AKP to power was not merely a routine transition among political parties, which had previously represented secularism supported by the military and the deep state of the media. The AKP brought with it a comprehensive ideological project based on the concept of political Islam, supported by the West, which aimed to establish a model for Muslim countries, particularly in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

From Secular Atlanticism to Ottoman Atlanticism

The project of the AKP represents the Atlanticist version of political Islam, transitioning Turkey from the era of secular Atlanticism to Islamic Atlanticism, or more precisely, Ottoman Atlanticism.

Throughout the Cold War and up until 2002, Turkey’s secular Atlanticism aligned completely with the West. However, it established boundaries and controls for its relations with the Arab and Islamic world. It viewed the relationship with these countries as a geographical fate that could not be altered. While maintaining relations of necessity, it often turned its back on them from all angles. Secularists perceived Arabs and Muslims as mere traitors to the state after Sharif Hussein’s revolution in 1916, viewing them as sources of a religious tendency that risked spreading and endangering the secular model. Despite this, secularists in Turkey were, at their core, religious-nationalists when it came to non-Turkish ethnicities, non-Sunni sects, and non-Muslim religions.

The secularists engaged with Arabs and Muslims on a government-to-government basis. In the event of a serious crisis, such as the request for the extradition of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria in 1998, the crisis was resolved with his departure, allowing for normal relations between the two countries. Notably, the newly elected Turkish president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, personally attended the funeral of the late Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in Latakia in the summer of 2000, following the Adana Agreement of autumn 1998, which regulated relations between the two countries.

However, with the AKP, the situation changed radically. Syria was no longer viewed merely as a neighboring country, and its issues were no longer considered extraterritorial. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Syria became an internal Turkish matter and implicitly the 82nd province. Turkey aligned itself with the opposition when protests erupted in 2011 against the regime, raising the slogan of toppling the regime (Erdoğan stated in 2016: “We only entered Syria to overthrow the oppressive regime of Bashar al-Assad”), praying at the Umayyad Mosque, and facilitating the entry of thousands of militants from around the world through its territory. Turkey trained, funded, armed, and fought alongside these militants against the Syrian army and the Kurds, deploying them wherever necessary.

This approach aligns with what Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu described in December 2010 as “New Ottomanism,” when he suggested that “just as Britain has an English Commonwealth led by it, why not establish an Ottoman Commonwealth from the countries that were once under Ottoman control, with Turkey as its leader?”

In pursuit of that New Ottomanism, Turkey outlined its future role: toppling regimes and replacing them with loyalist ones, as seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco; occupying parts of other countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya; establishing military bases in Qatar, Somalia, and Djibouti; supporting regimes against the opposition, as it did in Sudan in the past and currently; and engaging in direct military involvement in Azerbaijan’s conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.The new Ottoman tendency was aligned with Turkey’s Atlantic affiliation. This sacred Atlantic-Ottoman bond was not altered by disagreements here or there between Ankara and some allied capitals in Washington, London, or Tel Aviv.

The fall of the regime in Syria represented the last link in a series of strikes by Washington via Israel against the pillars of what is called the “Axis of Resistance,” from Gaza to Lebanon, while also undermining Iran. However, Turkey’s hold on Syria was different from others.

Since 2011, Turkey has worked, within the context of its new Ottoman goal, to raise the banner of the “National Pact” (Mîsāk-ı Millî), which calls for the restoration of the borders that the Ottoman Parliament outlined on January 28, 1920, to define the new borders of Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The pact included nearly all of Turkey’s current borders, in addition to all of northern Syria and northern Iraq. The Turks aimed to annex the regions rich in resources and oil, where the Kurds are located, to keep them under Ankara’s watch, as any other solution would mean that the Kurds in Iraq and Syria could pose a future threat to the Turkish state.

The concept of the National Pact penetrated Turkish consciousness to the extent that former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu distinguished the number of refugees coming from Syria based on areas within the pact and others outside of it. Erdoğan stated, “Those who do not understand what we are doing in northern Syria and Iraq should read the National Pact to understand what we are doing here

Turkey and Its Control Over Syria

The fall of the Syrian regime resulted in the following for Turkey:

1. The area occupied in Syria now exceeds the area defined in the “Milli Pact” and includes almost all of Syria, except for the eastern Euphrates and southern Syria. Here, a formal distinction can be made between the area of direct occupation by the Turkish army in northwestern Syria (and some areas east of the Euphrates) and the areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who has proclaimed himself the president of Syria in the name of Ahmad al-Shara. These are armed groups that belong to and operate under Ankara’s commands.
2. Consequently, Turkey’s geographical borders have practically expanded to make it a direct neighbor to Jordan, the Israeli-occupied territories in Syria and Lebanon, and the southeastern part of Iraq, thereby increasing Turkey’s influence in regional and international equations.
3. Turkey’s dominance over Syria means it controls the Syrian coast and can delineate maritime borders with Syria according to its interests. Additionally, Turkey pressures Lebanon to define the maritime borders between Lebanon and Syria based on Turkish interests, positioning itself as an additional neighbor to Lebanon, Southern Cyprus, and Egypt. This establishment makes Turkey a formidable competitor in the struggle for influence over energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean.
4. Turkey is working to shape the Syrian administration to align as closely as possible with its model and mentality. We can understand the nature of the new administration in Syria, consisting of elements closely associated with HTS and Turkey, while real representation of other Syrian components is notably lacking. This understanding extends to the “constitutional declaration” that is unprecedented in history in terms of irresponsible absolutism, exceeding even Erdoğan’s past aspirations in Turkey.
5. Turkey aims to reshape Syrian society to be dominated by a homogeneous majority. However, it is noteworthy that Turkey, through the “SDF” agreement, has lost some of its objectives, as the Kurds in the eastern Euphrates have managed to secure gains in terms of recognition of the Kurdish people as an indigenous element, particularly regarding administrative specifics and military distinctiveness, despite discussions about integrating “SDF” forces into the Syrian army. Factors influencing this agreement, including the American factor, as well as the practicability of moving forward with such arrangements, have further complicated matters.

Also, the Druze in the south not surrendering their weapons and remaining practically outside the control of Damascus is seen as a failure for Turkey, regardless of the influences involved, including the Israeli factor.

Yet when it comes to the Alawite group, several observations can be made:

– The Alawites surrendered their weapons without obtaining guarantees from Damascus and lacked external protection. This situation made it easy for Damascus to enact revenge on the assumption they were a base for the former regime.

– The operations against them aimed to prevent any claims for geographical or political specificity, unlike the situation with the Kurds and Druze.

– Additionally, the operations attempted to prevent their control over the Syrian coast, the sole maritime outlet for Syria.

6- From a Turkish perspective, it is believed that the actions taken were driven by the ruling authority in Ankara’s reluctance to see the emergence of an “Alawite entity” on its southern border in the Hatay province, especially with the rising voices of Alawites in Turkey expressing solidarity with their counterparts in Syria. Thus, the control of the Syrian coast remains under Turkish dominance amid the ongoing struggle for influence in the eastern Mediterranean, alongside the historical context of hostility toward Alawites, which is part of the mentality denying their existence in the Ottoman Empire, which inflicted massacres against them in the 16th century, the 1930s, and again in Turkey in 1978 and 1993.

As for Israel, its ongoing occupation of additional Syrian territories and its prevention of Turkey from establishing military bases in specific areas open the door for competition between two rival projects in the same geographic space, raising the question of whether a confrontation between them is likely.

In reality, both sides are operating under the same American influence, which recognizes its need for both Turkey and Israel and will not permit the two nations to reach a point of confrontation. What appears to be tense situations are but divisions of spheres of influence in Syria. Relations between Turkey and Israel have been excellent since 1949. Notably, Turkey continued to supply Israel with various products daily during the Gaza conflict, did not sever or reduce diplomatic relations, and did not publicly denounce Israel despite Erdoğan’s previous threats. Moreover, Turkey did not halt the export of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its territory. Therefore, these strong relations indicate a practical exclusion of any potential military confrontation between them. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s mediation to facilitate a joint meeting in Baku in early April signifies that some disagreements do not sour friendly ties. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has indicated that Turkey does not seek confrontation with Israel in Syria, hinting at the potential facilitation—or even encouragement—of normalization between Damascus and Tel Aviv, commenting, “If Damascus reaches an agreement with Israel, that’s their concern,” as if inviting Al-Shara to pursue such an agreement.

7- Undoubtedly, by occupying Syria and toppling the Assad regime, Turkey has dealt a significant blow to Iranian influence in the region, leading to complete American and Israeli satisfaction with Erdoğan’s policies.

8- Moreover, the success of the Ottoman Islamist model of the Justice and Development Party dealt a substantial blow to both Wahhabi and Azharite Islam, affecting Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, and what can be termed the Arab role in Syria—even though this role has not been particularly effective in recent years. Nevertheless, Turkey’s advance at the expense of the Arab role will undoubtedly incite a competitive struggle for Syria and Lebanon between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt against Turkish expansion.

9- Erdoğan has also capitalized on the situation in Syria to bolster his internal political calculations. Control over Syria has been an important card, prompting the newly-elected U.S. President Donald Trump to commend him and endorse a collaborative vision for Syria. This scenario emboldened Erdoğan to expedite his efforts to eliminate his main rival in the 2028 presidential elections, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, should Erdoğan succeed in amending the constitution to allow himself to run again. İmamoğlu’s arrest on March 19, 2023, on various charges, represented what many see as a political coup against Erdoğan’s most notable political rival in Turkey. This response aligned with Erdoğan’s expectations of facing no considerable American or European pressure as a result, reflected in the muted reactions from the West. In fact, the leader of the Republican People’s Party, Özgür Özel, suggested Erdoğan secured prior approval from Trump for İmamoğlu’s arrest.

10- In the same context, speculation ties the call from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Öcalan on February 27 for peace with Erdoğan’s hopes to gain the support of deputies from the Peoples’ Democratic Party for amending the constitution in parliament. The party’s votes are seen as necessary for achieving the two-thirds majority required for such amendments, which Erdoğan and his ally, the Nationalist Movement Party, currently lack.

However, doubts linger around this scenario—especially given that the government’s commitment to meeting the Kurdish movement’s demands in Turkey regarding recognition of Kurdish identity in the constitution, education in the mother tongue, and other rights related to cultural recognition, administration in Kurdish areas, and even the release of Öcalan—remains unclear. The leaders of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party connect convening a party conference for a resolution to end armed struggle with Öcalan’s freedom and his leadership during the conference’s proceedings.

It remains uncertain how linked the agreement between the “SDF” and Al-Shara on March 10 is to Öcalan’s previous call and any potential resolution regarding the Kurdish issue in Syria.

Challenges Facing the Turkish Role:

From what precedes, Turkey has transformed, particularly after the fall of the Syrian regime, into a key player alongside the significant escalation of the Israeli role. However, this expansion is not a predetermined outcome or a foregone conclusion. Turkey faces numerous challenges, including:

1. The diversity of the Syrian social and political structure, which contradicts the intellectual and ideological framework of the newly established Syrian regime, dominated by Islamic extremism ideologies that have yet to achieve any popular legitimacy. This situation may potentially lead to protests and uprisings against the regime and its Turkish backer.
2. The opposition from Arab and Israeli parties to the expansion of the Turkish influence in Syria.
3. A divergence between Turkish interests and those of Europe and the United States regarding control over Syria.
4. The extent of Turkey’s financial capacity to commit to supporting the Syrian regime in rebuilding efforts, especially given the West’s ongoing reluctance to fully lift sanctions against Syria and hesitations regarding broader engagement with Damascus.
5. Developments within Turkey itself—including the opposition’s reservations towards Turkish involvement in Syria—and the potential stalling of solutions concerning the Kurdish issue if Ankara does not take sufficient measures to dissolve the PKK and discontinue armed struggle, so that the Kurds feel they have achieved satisfactory gains. Additionally, the potential repercussions of an economic collapse in Turkey and public discontent towards Erdoğan’s economic policies contribute further challenges.