It is well documented that the majority of those who are regarded as Iranians, both within the country and across the diaspora, oppose the current government due to decades of oppression, extremism, and systemic discrimination. However, even while resisting the regime, many Iranians, mainly from the dominant ethnicity—both inside the country and abroad—fail to embrace democratic values, such as respecting minority rights, promoting gender equality, and acknowledging diverse identities and basic human rights.
Unlike a cohesive and structured Iranian opposition, which remains fragmented and often personality-driven, Kurdish resistance movements have demonstrated better organization and stronger social legitimacy within their communities. In contrast, figures like Reza Pahlavi (son of the former king of Iran), Masih Alinejad (a known anti-hijab activist), Hamed Ismailion (representative of victims of the IRGC-downed Ukrainian flight), and many more activists and media organizations, who all have significant followings on social media and have influenced anti-regime protests in 2022-2023. Yet they have faced criticism for perpetuating Persian-centric perspectives, often disregarding the concerns of ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups.
The treatment of minorities by Iranian opposition groups is a complex and varied issue, shaped by differing ideologies, historical contexts, and political agendas. While some opposition factions have supported minority rights and advocated for federalism or autonomy, others have been less inclusive, reflecting nationalist or centralist perspectives similar to those of the Islamic Republic they oppose. However, what all these groups have in common is a red line, which is the territorial integrity of Iran and preserving the Iranian identity as it was produced and established during the past century based on the Persian identity.
This highlights the ongoing need for a more inclusive and democratic vision within the broader Iranian opposition.
Ethnic Minorities (Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turkmen, Azeris, etc.):
Some opposition groups, particularly leftist groups and those who claim to be progressive, have mentioned the cultural and political rights of ethnic minorities. They advocate for federalism or decentralization, seeing it as a solution to decades of systemic discrimination. Kurdish political groups (e.g., Komala and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, KDPI) have historically aligned with leftist opposition groups that recognize minority autonomy.
For example, in the 1940s, particularly during the formation of the 1946 Republic of Kurdistan, leftist groups like the Tudeh Party initially expressed solidarity with Kurdish aspirations, aligning with the KDPI’s goals of autonomy and social justice.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, both the KDPI and leftist groups like the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas and others faced repression by the newly established Islamic Republic.
This shared persecution led to temporary alliances in their opposition to the regime, including joint campaigns and coordination in certain regions.
In recent years, the relationships between the Kurds and Iranian leftists have been relatively dormant. Iranian leftist groups have weakened significantly and have strayed from their political stance, while the Kurdish groups and parties remain primarily focused on Kurdish issues and the broader Kurdish resistance in the region.
In the recent 2022-2023 protests, these Iranian leftist groups did not have much influence on the movement, and they were not seen as a force against the regime. With all these, many of the Iranian leftists residing in western countries adhered to the typical Iranian nationalist sentiments on social media, as many people from the minority groups were seriously discussing their rights and freedoms after the fall of the current regime.
Opposition Leaders and Anti-Kurdish Bias
Persian nationalists and right-wing factions within the opposition, including monarchists, secular nationalists, and liberals, often prioritize territorial integrity and a unified Iranian national identity primarily revolving around Persian culture, language, and identity. This approach frequently marginalizes other identities, particularly Kurdish and Balochi identities. Demands for autonomy or federalism are frequently viewed by these groups as threats to Iran’s sovereignty, intensifying conflicts with minority groups. Although opposition coalitions may occasionally incorporate minority representatives, their presence within leadership roles is often limited. In many instances, such inclusion seems largely symbolic, intended to convey an appearance of inclusivity, while the core strategies and actions continue to prioritize a predominantly Iranian nationalist agenda.
Decades of centralized policies under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic have fostered profound mistrust among minority groups. Many minorities are apprehensive that an opposition-led government might perpetuate similar patterns of cultural assimilation and political exclusion. To build trust, opposition groups need to demonstrate genuine commitments to federalism, equitable minority representation, and the resolution of historical grievances—areas in which they have thus far failed to make meaningful progress.
Certain coalitions, such as those centered around figures like Reza Pahlavi and activists like Masih Alinejad, have made efforts to appear inclusive by engaging with minority leaders, mainly with the Komala’s Abdullah Mohtadi, and addressing minority rights on their platforms. However, these efforts often seem driven by populist motives rather than genuine commitment. Their approach toward minorities has frequently been marked by a lack of clarity and sincerity, with undertones of hostility and discrimination.
For instance, some of Reza Pahlavi’s followers and senior advisers have openly expressed racist and anti-minority comments, including issuing threats of violence and even massacres against minority groups for demanding rights such as the right to mother tongues or self-determination. For example, One of Reza Pahlavi’s senior advisers, Hojjat Kalashi has openly threatened to launch missile attacks on South Kurdistan if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) interferes with what he refers to as “Iran’s Unity,” a term used to emphasize Iran’s territorial integrity. He has even suggested the annexation of South Kurdistan into Iran.
At the same time, Reza Pahlavi’s expressions of support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and his apparent empathy towards them raise concerns about his transparency regarding his stance within the opposition.
Similarly, Masih Alinejad has faced significant criticism from the Kurdish community for censoring the realities of Kurds and Kurdistan on multiple occasions. Example For example, during the Oslo Freedom Forum 2024, she systematically censored and misrepresented Zaniyar Tondro’s speech, in which he spoke about Kurdistan and his cousin, a Kolbar who had recently been shot by Iranian border guards in their hometown. Zaniyar himself was just 18 years old when he was shot in the eyes by Iranian forces in Piranshahr in November 2022.
In recent developments in Kurdistan, following the issuance of death sentences for two Kurdish political prisoners, Varisheh Muradi and Pakhshan Azizi, and the subsequent announcement of a general strike by Kurdish political parties in protest, 13 cities participated in the strike. However, this significant act of resistance was entirely ignored by activists like Masih Alinejad and the broader Persian media.
Their anti-Kurdish stance is not limited to the Kurds within Iran’s borders; the same sentiment extends to Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan. For instance, Lawdan Bazargan, a so-called “prominent” activist and member of the justice-seeking families, falsely claimed that the slogan “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (the Persian translation of “Woman, Life, Freedom”) gained global recognition only after the uprisings in Iran and that “Syrian women” were inspired by “Iranian women,” while this slogan has existed in Kurdistan for over four decades and was one of the main slogans used by Kurdish women fighters of the Women’s Defense Units (YPJ) in the fights against ISIS in West Kurdistan.
These are just a few examples of how the Iranian opposition disregards the struggles of Kurds and other minorities in Iran. A deeper analysis of their approach towards various ethnic groups could further expose this pattern.
It is also important to note that whenever a significant development occurs in Kurdistan, both pro-regime and anti-regime Iranian figures often launch online campaigns against Kurds on social media. While one might expect opposition groups to show solidarity with marginalized communities, given that their struggle is against the same authoritarian regime, they instead choose either silence or outright hostility—accusing Kurds of “separatism” and “terrorism,” labels frequently used by both the regime and opposition against ethnic minorities. Such actions deepen skepticism among minority communities, raising serious doubts about whether their rights would be genuinely upheld under a new regime led by these figures or their affiliates.
The anti-Kurdish sentiment among Persian-Iranian figures like Reza Pahlavi and Masih Alinejad manifests in their reluctance to embrace demands of minority groups for basic human rights and recognition, often raising a centralized, Persian-Iranian identity. This is against the minorities and undermines unity against the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, Reza Pahlavi usually emphasizes national unity over ethnic diversity, sidestepping questions about federalism, a key demand of minority groups. His supporters on platforms like X and Instagram label Kurds as separatists, echoing the regime’s rhetoric. In another example, during the 2023 protests, Pahlavi’s statements focused on a unified Iran without addressing minority-specific grievances such as the regime’s crackdowns in Kurdistan and Baluchistan. Alinejad, on the other hand, while championing women’s rights, has also faced criticism for not instrumentalizing Kurds while adhering to the same Persian-Iranian rhetoric. In 2023, on a post on X, she also called for “one Iran” to counter the regime while keeping silence on incidents in Kurdistan and Baluchistan.
The Alliance for Democracy and Freedom in Iran (ADFI), formed in 2022 with Palavi, Alinejad, and the leader of Komala, Abdullah Mohtadi, collapsed within months due to the refusal of the Persian-Iranian sides to commit to recognizing the minorities and their sufferings. These examples highlight a Persian-centering bias that marginalizes not only Kurds but the entire non-Persian population inside Iran.
Cyber Harassment and Disinformation
In addition to the anti-Kurdish and anti-minority sentiment promoted by the known Iranian activists, the Kurdish activists, politicians, and human rights organizations are increasingly subjected to large-scale cyberattacks orchestrated by the Iranian accounts, which frequently issue threats against Kurds and other communities and promote racist and fascist ideologies targeting minorities on social media. These are often connected either to the Iranian regime or to opposition groups operating abroad with ties to the individuals mentioned earlier. Their tactics typically involve spamming Kurdish accounts, conducting online harassment and bullying campaigns, and spreading disinformation.
Racist sentiments towards other groups of people living in the west
This racist sentiment is not only against minorities but also extends toward other migrant communities in western countries, including Africans, Afghans, Indians, and others. For example, the Iranian actor Muhammad Sadeghi, who identifies as queer and opposes the Iranian regime and resides in Europe, recently sparked outrage on social media after posting an Instagram post in which he referred to the genocide in Gaza as “pest control,” and he also referred to the people without natural resources, a proper place to live, access to a decent level of education, and a job as “pests to nature.” Niyak Ghorbani, based in London and closely affiliated with Reza Pahlavi, also goes to anti-genocide demonstrations in the city, where he provokes protesters while making openly racist remarks against migrants in the UK. Iman Sefati, a journalist from the German media, Bild, also close to Reza Pahlavi, engages in similar behavior. He attends anti-genocide demonstrations to provoke participants while simultaneously using his social media platforms, particularly to promote anti-Kurdish, anti-Afghan, and anti-Baloch narratives. These examples represent only a fraction of the countless individuals and incidents that illustrate how these so-called anti-Iranian regime groups operate.
The Need for an Inclusive Vision
In summary, it can be said that the Iranian opposition groups, despite their widespread rejection of the Islamic Republic, often struggle with their own contradictions. While many Iranians opposed the regime of terrorism and systematic discrimination, large segments of the opposition, particularly those influenced by Persian nationalism, failed to embrace democratic principles such as minority rights, gender equality, and cultural inclusivity. Unlike the fragmented and personality-driven opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi and Masih Alinejad, the Kurdish resistance movements have historically demonstrated stronger organization and social legitimacy. Yet their demands for federalism, autonomy, and basic human rights remain marginalized or dismissed by the mainstream Iranian opposition circles.
A central issue lies in the treatment of the ethnicities, such as Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turkmen, Azeris, etc. Although some leftist and progressive groups have recognized minority rights and historically cooperated with Kurdish movements, their influence has waned, especially in recent years. In contrast, Persian nationalist and monarchist factions tend to prioritize territorial integrity and Persian-centric identity, often excluding minorities from meaningful participation, while symbolic gestures of inclusivity are occasionally made. They are overshadowed by patterns of discrimination, hostility, and rhetoric that echoes the regime’s own accusation of sexism and terrorism against minorities.
This inclusion is particularly evident in the anti-Kurdish attitudes of the influential figures and organizations within the opposition, from Palavi’s advisors issuing violent threats against Kurdish people to Alinejad’s silencing of Kurdish voices in international forums.
Minority concerns are frequently censored or dismissed. Moreover, cyber harassment, racist rhetoric against migrants, and openly hostile statements by position-affiliated figures further reinforce fears that a post-regime Iran led by these groups may replicate authoritarian and exclusionary policies.
Ultimately the Iranian opposition paradox lies in its fight against dictatorship while perpetuating its own undemocratic, racist, and ultra-nationalistic tendencies, raising deep concerns among minorities about their future in any new political order within Iran.
