The New Syria in the American Orbit

By Mohammad Sayed Rassas

In the spring of 2015, Jaish al-Fatah, a military coalition between Jabhat al-Nusra and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, took control of the entire Idlib province. In the summer of that year, they advanced south into the Al-Ghab Plain following the rapid retreat of the Syrian regime’s forces. Subsequent information confirmed that the objective of capturing Homs was to sever the Damascus-Coast route, while Jaish al-Islam seized control of several kilometers of the Damascus-Homs highway in the Adra area in September.

On September 30, 2015, Russia commenced its military intervention in Syria. Various indicators in the following months, including statements from the Vienna meetings, Resolution 2254, and the Geneva III conference, suggested a consensus between the US and Russia regarding the Syrian issue, focusing on preventing the imminent collapse of the Syrian regime. This became evident as Russian and Iranian efforts intensified during those months, particularly after they reached their nuclear agreement with Washington in the summer of 2015. Advisers to President Barack Obama remarked after he left the White House that this arrangement amounted to “a trade-off between limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities and Washington turning a blind eye to Tehran’s regional expansion.”

Now, nine years later, the Syrian regime has not been saved from collapse; instead, it was left isolated and fell within just 12 days to an armed movement led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from Idlib. It is also important to recall that, despite Obama’s statement on August 18, 2011 – “the Syrian president must go,” – he did not take practical steps to facilitate this, unlike his actions in Libya. The fear of a “Syrian vacuum” following the dictator’s downfall, similar to what occurred in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, likely caused concern among Syria’s neighbors, especially Israel, prompting Obama to hesitate in repeating the intervention scenario he and his allies undertook in Libya.

However, in 2024, the Syrian regime was allowed to collapse, despite Washington encouraging Arab nations to engage with it since 2021. In the summer of 2024, Turkish President Erdoğan and various officials extended numerous overtures of friendship to Bashar al-Assad. During the recent Lebanese war, the Syrian regime maintained a state of “disassociation” from the conflict, which pleased both Tel Aviv and Washington.

Therefore, the question that should be posed now is: Why did the Syrian regime fall in 2024, when it did not collapse in 2011 and 2015, when it received international protection that aided and defended it? The perspectives of Moscow and Tehran during this time differ from those two periods. Before its final downfall, the regime had become weak in terms of its internal foundations, and its own capabilities were insufficient to prevent its collapse, amid a covert conspiracy from Washington, Tel Aviv, and likely several Arab capitals.

Since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970, his acceptance of Resolution 242 for a peaceful solution (or coexistence) with Israel has been central to his ascent, while General Salah Jadid’s rejection of the same resolution contributed to the fall of the Baath regime on February 23, 1966.

The likely key to this situation lies in February 24, 2022, when Russia became embroiled in the war in Ukraine, coinciding with Washington’s strategy of exhausting Moscow through that conflict. This was closely followed by the outbreak of the Gaza war on October 7, 2023, which then led to the recent Lebanese war between September 17 and November 27. During this time, Iran’s two main proxies in the region, Hamas and Hezbollah, suffered significant setbacks, making Tehran appear weak both when it was attacked and when it attempted to retaliate against Israel.

It is crucial to note that the ceasefire for the Lebanese war was initially formulated in Moscow during the visit of Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer and was further developed in Washington. Those who followed the Israeli press last month would have noted that a decisive blow to Hezbollah could not be achieved through southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs alone. Rather, it required the closure of the Syrian route along the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon corridor. Furthermore, the ceasefire agreement could not take effect without closing this route, which Hassan Nasrallah had referenced to a Syrian opposition leader in 2013, stating that “he was suffocating without this passage.”

In this context, Bashar al-Assad’s reluctance to cooperate in preventing Iranian supplies to Hezbollah—as a crucial stipulation in the agreement—or his inability to make this decision due to Iranian influence within the Syrian regime may have contributed to the withdrawal of international support from him. This occurred amidst Russian weaknesses resulting from the ongoing Ukrainian war and Iran’s defeats in its proxy wars in Gaza and Lebanon.

Here, it appears that a Syrian entity, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, recognized this favorable political moment and launched its offensive on the very morning the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon began to take effect. This action was likely conducted with US-Turkish backing. From Washington’s perspective, especially that of its deep state, the strike in Damascus is not merely about Lebanon; rather, it serves as a fatal blow to Iranian influence in the region and marks the beginning of its retreat while simultaneously delivering a significant setback to Russia.

For Russia, this is particularly critical as Donald Trump prepares for negotiations regarding Ukraine, making the Russian president more vulnerable in the face of this Syrian offensive. Furthermore, as Iran retreats internally and loses its regional power, Trump could negotiate a “favorable” new nuclear agreement with Tehran. After such an arrangement, Iran could become a geographical barrier preventing China from accessing the Middle East through the Belt and Road Initiative. This reflects a strategy similar to Ukraine’s role as a US bulwark against that initiative since the upheaval of 2014, obstructing China’s access to the European continent along the Eurasian route of its project.

In summary: On December 8, 2024, Syria transitioned into the American orbit, having previously been aligned with Moscow and anti-Western forces since the 1950s, with the exception of the separatist regime period. The Syrian regime collapsed due to prolonged internal decay and a lack of fundamental internal structures and social pillars necessary for its survival. While external factors previously prevented its fall on two occasions, the third time proved decisive. Undoubtedly, the struggles of the Syrian people against the regime significantly contributed to its weakening and erosion. However, the post-2011 experience indicates that a regime like the Syrian one, which has been part of an “international system constructed since 1970,” cannot collapse solely due to internal Syrian forces.

Author

  • Mohammed Sayed Rassas, born in Latakia in 1956, holds a Bachelor's degree in English Language and Literature from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Aleppo. He has been an active journalist since 1998. His notable publications include: 1. After Moscow (1996), 2. The Collapse of Soviet Marxism (1997), 3. Knowledge and Politics in Islamic Thought (2010), and 4. The Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini-Khamenei Iran (first edition 2013, second edition 2021). Additionally, he translated Erich Fromm’s work titled The Concept of Man in Marx (1998).

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