The Impact of the 1925 Uprising in Syria: Elites, Mobilization, and Social Reorientation

The Sheikh Said uprising and the Azadi (freedom) Society represented the greatest challenge faced by the young Turkish republic after the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the severing of the last remaining supranational link between the Kurds and the Turks. This severing of the link automatically marginalized the Kurds from the nascent republican entity. However, before the abolition of the Caliphate, the nationalist elite, represented by members of the Azadi Society during the War of Independence—particularly after the Koçgiri events of 1921—feared the nationalist tendencies of Mustafa Kemal and his group. Their suspicions were confirmed by the disastrous outcomes of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Therefore, armed uprising became the only available option to confront the new direction of the republic and Mustafa Kemal’s abandonment of the promises he had made to Kurdish leaders during the War of Independence.

Kurdish alienation and fears of increasing policies of discrimination, national persecution, ethnic assimilation, and plans for forced displacement grew even more acute after the failure of the Sheikh Said uprising to achieve its goals. The Kemalist authorities no longer distinguished between Kurdish tribal leaders opposing their rule and those supporting it. All these ongoing developments in Turkey affected the Kurds under French Mandate rule in Syria. Despite Kemalist efforts to exploit Syrian Kurds on both sides of the border during the demarcation process between Syria and Turkey—aiming to control the route to Mosul via Upper Jazira—the Turks, who obstructed the border demarcation starting from Nusaybin and extending to the Syrian-Iraqi border, found themselves drifting toward a policy of closing the border and deterring the Kurdish movement in Mandatory Syria following the Sheikh Said uprising. Naturally, French and Turkish interests converged after Syria experienced a massive revolution in 1925. It was in the French interest to win over Turkey after their bitter experience in confronting Ibrahim Hananu’s rebellion, during which the Turks supported and supplied him with weapons.

Based on what was happening in Syria, the French allowed Turkish forces to cross Syrian territory using the Baghdad Railway to suppress the Kurdish uprising. The mandate authorities then pursued a policy of controlling the borders, removing the pioneers of the emerging Kurdish movement from the border area toward the interior of Syria, and halting any actions that might provoke the Turks. All of this occurred within the framework of a turbulent French policy towards the Kurds, which fluctuated between supporting them at certain times and restricting their activities at others. The lasting impact of the Sheikh Said uprising became evident shortly after efforts to suppress it. Perhaps an important aspect of the uprising’s influence in Mandatory Syria was demonstrated through the efforts of the Khoybun movement immediately following its founding in Hamdoun, Lebanon, in 1927. Khoybun was fully engaged in the mobilization, propaganda, and military activities related to the Agri/Ararat uprising (1930). Martin van Brunsen’s argument regarding the continuation of the Sheikh Said uprising offers some insight into its effect on the Kurds of Syria. Unlike the uprising of Ubayd Allah al-Nahri, for example, which ended with its leader’s death, with his followers continuing to fight in guerrilla warfare. Accordingly, the Agri uprising can be seen as “the direct continuation of the Sheikh Said revolt” (Brunsen 2008: 558). In this sense, the political and military developments in northern Kurdistan cast their shadows on the Kurds of Syria, with several factors influencing this process, including: the role of nationalist elites arriving from Turkey and northern Kurdistan; the dynamics of migration and border issues and their effects; the experimentation with new patterns of national mobilization and cultural revival; and attempts to integrate tribes into nationalist efforts, culminating in calls for self-governance (1932–1936).

The Elite and Mobilization

The migration of elites, part of a broader migration involving various social classes to Syria’s Jazira in particular, contributed to a process of national enlightenment. Syria and the Kurdish regions became a laboratory for new ideas and visions, including the development of regionalism demanding autonomy. A process of reviewing the mistakes that led to the Sheikh Said uprising took place. These new arrangements helped reshape Kurdish identity through the roles played by Khoybun and the Badrakhanis, as well as the integration of traditional elites into the new identity starting in 1927. According to Nilda Fuccaro, the growth of Kurdish (Kurdish) national consciousness among Syria’s Kurds “depended on these developments affecting Kurds living in Turkey, and ideas of national sentiment developed primarily among the community of immigrants from Turkey who arrived in Syria after 1925” (Nilda Fuccaro 2021: ).

The arrival of the Kurdish political class—whether immigrants or exiles from Turkey—to the French-controlled Jazira, especially the sheikhs and mullahs of Amuda, and the arrival of nationalist/religious cadres following the Sheikh Said uprising after 1925, can be considered a clear example of “national enlightenment” (Seda Altuğ 2011: 162). The influx of these figures accelerated the process of reshaping a Kurdish national identity, thus experimenting with models of national modernization, organizing political work, and establishing direct contact with colonial authorities. Most notably, a Kurdish regional movement emerged later, advocating for self-rule in alliance with the Christians of Jazira.

Among the elites who influenced political life and engaged in experiences of national enlightenment—referred to by Jordi Gorgas as “the Turkish Kurdish movement in exile”—were the families of Bedirkhan and Cemil Pasha, who dominated Khoybun until its decline in 1944. Other notable figures include Hajo Agha, Mamduh Selim, Arif Abbas, Ahmed Nafiz Zaza, Osman Sabri, Cekerkhwin, and Nuri Dersmi (Dersmi was the only Alawite in the Khoyboun League after his arrival in Syria in 1937). Additionally, there were figures from the elite circles of Kurdish clubs active in Istanbul until 1921. “However, the entry of some outsiders, such as Osman Sabri, into the club of notables paved the way for new chapters of mobilization within the Kurdish movement” (Gorgas 2013: 149). These elites began experimenting with different approaches than those adopted by the Azadi Society during the 1925 uprising. The political activities of the Kurdish elites around the Khoyboun League manifested in open cooperation with the Tashnaks in Lebanon and Syria, leveraging their cross-border experience to establish a new Kurdish-Armenian policy, and utilizing the Tashnaks’ international relations. The Armenian organization played a significant mediating role between Khoyboun and major powers, financed Kurdish activities, and contributed to arming the 1930 Agri Revolution.

Khoyboun adopted a new language influenced by Armenian activists’ literature. This modernized mobilization language entered the Kurdish political lexicon, influenced by the rhetoric of Armenian parties, themselves influenced by Russian socialism and populism. New words emerged, such as “nation” (Millat), “revolution” (Shoresh), and “national” (walat Parez). This new language also emphasized the restoration and symbolization of figures. Sheikh Said, as a symbolic figure, received special attention in Khoyboun’s publications, with three booklets dedicated to him. In this context, Gorgas argues, “If Khoyboun aimed at mobilization, then this figure (Sheikh Said) must be created or reshaped by emphasizing the elevation of the martyr’s figure. The martyr must appear as a model distinct from his (Kurdish) society, and the cause for which he died must be clear (Kurdistan’s independence)” (Gorgas 2013: 206).

The Khoyboun movement not only established a complex relationship with the Armenians, which caused issues and misconceptions within traditional and nationalist Kurdish circles, but its pioneers also expanded their mobilization discourse to include religious aspects. The movement warned that the Turkish regime threatened “our religion and the honor of the Kurdish nation,” in an effort to win over sheikhs and tribal leaders unwilling to repeat the sacrifices made by Sheikh Said and his supporters.

The roles of Kurdish elites and actors in Syria can be understood through Stefan Winter’s study on the tribal roots of Kurdish nationalism in Syria. Under the French mandate, the Kurds became the center of an intellectual movement that profoundly influenced Kurdish culture beyond its borders, establishing figures as leaders in exile and attempting to develop an international effort to achieve an independent state (Winter 2020: 93).

Border, Tribe, and Reorientation 

Beyond the fragmented structure of Kurdish society in Syria between three regions: al-Jazira, Jarabulus, and Kobani, and Afrin, as enclaved Kurdish areas that formed a natural extension of the Kurdish regions in Turkey and Iraq, the loss of demographic weight by most tribes as a result of the successive border demarcation policies from 1921 until 1929 led to the emergence of two issues: First, the division of Kurdish tribes, whereby a single tribe had two leaders, south and north of the border in some cases. This division affected the effectiveness of tribal leaders, and consequently their roles and effectiveness declined with the emergence of new identity policies, especially with the Kemalists’ pursuit of a policy of fragmenting the traditional social structure and reshaping production relations between the center and the Kurdish regions. This was in addition to France’s policy of supporting the settlement of nomadic tribes and the establishment of new cities (al-Hasakah and al-Qamishli), which affected the decline of the cross-border nature of the tribe and the importance of traditional markets (Nusaybin and Mardin).

The second issue concerns the roles of the immigrant group and the nationalist elite arriving from northern Kurdistan after the 1925 uprising. Naturally, the numbers of immigrants were inflated with the growth of Syrian nationalism, indicating that the Kurdish problem in Syria was imposed on Syria by the Kemalist policies and the dual policies of the French, who supported the Kurdish movement at times and contained it at others.

The most important role played by immigration was not so much in shifting the demographic balance in favor of the Kurds, as claimed by anti-Kurdish propaganda, but rather in the roles and effectiveness of the exiled elites. It is worth noting a study by Nilda Fuccaro and the statistics she relies on to determine the proportion of immigrants. They accounted for only about 10 percent of the total number of Kurds within the nascent and incomplete Syrian entity, approximately 22,000 (Fuccaro 2021), based on 1943 statistics. In addition to this illustrative information that refutes claims of settlement in the Jazira, it is possible to demonstrate that Kurdish tribal leaders did not seize lands held by Arabs or Christians in the Jazira. For example, the growth of Hajo Agha’s feudal property came at the expense of the properties of members of other Kurdish clans. This means that the cycle of alternating ownership of property did not come at the expense of non-Kurdish owners. Regarding tribal roles, the experiences of the Ibrahim Pasha al-Milli and Hajo Agha families can be considered as examples of the diversity of tribal politics and the nature of their roles.

The role of Ibrahim Pasha’s descendants, who lost their territories after the demarcation of the borders in October 1921, became prominent. This region was “directly divided, leaving a large portion of the ancestral lands of the Milliyin within the French Mandate of Syria” (Winter 2020: 89). Unlike Hajo, who found that tribal leadership provided them with broader roles within the growing nationalist framework provided by the Khoybun and their direct involvement in the efforts of the 1930 Agri Revolution, the Milliyin avoided contact with the Khoybun League and participation in the cultural and political activities led by the Badrakhanis. They also avoided contact with the Tashnaks, despite their ties to the Armenian community, and provided only symbolic support for the Agri Revolution” (Winter 2020: 91).

In the face of the Milliyin Union’s gradual acceptance of the fait accompli that emerged following the demarcation of the borders, the loss and division of the Milliyin’s traditional lands, and the desire to preserve what remained in their hands, Hajo’s experience stands out as distinct from that of the Ibrahim Pasha clan. Hajo’s first experience confirmed the transnational nature of the Kurdish issue and the ability to shift positions between the Turks and the French. His second experience was to integrate the tribe into nationalist action, restoring the status it had lost due to Kemalist policies and the decline in the importance and roles of the tribes after the suppression of Sheikh Said’s uprising. Then came his third experience: independence and the demand for self-rule in cooperation with the Christians of the Jazira and some Arab tribal leaders.

Unlike some tribal leaders who were not enthusiastic about self-rule, Hajo’s attempt at independence appears to be based on several pillars: taking advantage of the stage of national awareness that grew as a result of Sheikh Said’s revolution; and Hajo’s deep-rooted ties to the Christian community in northern Kurdistan and its tribal leadership. Following Sheikh Said’s uprising, “the sons of the Havirki tribe in the Tur Abdin region rose up, joined by a large number of Assyrians and other Christians from the region… The repression included ethnic minorities (Arabs and Assyrians)” (Mazhar 2001: 120).

In other words, the nature of the relationship between Hajo and the Christians, particularly the duo: Qamishli Mayor Michel Dom and Bishop Habbi, in their independence project, was built on the roots of the Kurdish-Christian relationship in Tur Abdin and the possibility of establishing a transnational coalition. This alliance also stemmed from shared concerns, as illustrated by the petitions submitted by the notables of the Jazira since 1932, demanding administrative autonomy and addressing the Mandate authorities and the League of Nations in 1936. Kurdish and Christian advocates of autonomy feared that “the establishment of an Arab nation-state would have consequences in the form of an aggressive policy against minorities, as had happened in Turkey and Iraq” (Gourgas 2013: 116).

An additional element in the independence efforts of Hajo and the Christians of the Jazira was that France adopted a policy of establishing mini-states in Syria, which provided a reasonable incentive given the inspiring experience of Mount Lebanon for the Christians of the Jazira.

Conclusion

The 1925 uprising can be considered the actual prelude that influenced the reshaping of “Kurdism” outside the context of borders. The transformation of the Kurdish regions in Syria, in addition to Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, into a backdrop for the Kurdish nationalist movement takes into account the various emerging factors that influenced the nationalist movement, such as the formation and control of borders, the transformations that occurred in traditional structures, the roles of tribes and sheikhs, the turbulence in the Kurdish-French relationship, and the attempts of Kurdish nationalists to address the major powers from Syria. And for all these reasons, Turkey was worried about the ongoing developments in the Syrian arena. Turkey’s longstanding fear is that “any successful Kurdish region would become an influential factor in all other regions, especially the Turkish ones, and that this region would become like the Kurdish Piedmont plain” (Dichenar 2014: 15). When the small Italian Piedmont in the 19th century transformed into a platform from which the Italian unification movement emerged, exactly this was the kind of effort being made on the other side of the Turkish border following Sheikh Said’s uprising and the Azadi Society.

Sources:

• Martin van Bruinessen – The Aga, the Sheikh, and the State, Iraqi Studies
• Nilda Fuccaro – The Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandate Syria: Politics, Culture, and Identity
  https://2h.ae/XQZp
• Stefan Winter – The Other Renaissance: The Badrkhans, the Milliyet, and the Tribal Roots of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria – Al-Hiwar Magazine, Issue 74/2020
• Seda Altuğ – Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, Land, and Violence in the Memories of World War I and the French Mandate (1915–1939) – Universiteit Utrecht
• Jordi Gorgas – The Turkish Kurdish Movement in Exile – Dar Aras/Al-Farabi
• Kamal Ahmed Maziar – The 1925 Uprising
• Gunther Dichenar – The Kurdish People Without a State; History and Hope – Dar Aras/Al-Farabi