The Anticipated Retirement of “Old Turkey”

At its twelfth congress, held from May 5 to 7, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) explained the reasons that led it to disband and end its armed struggle. In the final statement of the congress, the PKK reflected on the previous phase that drove Kurds in Turkey to adopt armed resistance and confront the Turkish state’s policies of denying Kurdish identity, relying instead on repression and military security measures. The statement also addressed the international context at that time, recalling socialist and national liberation movements that took up arms in response to the tyranny and brutality of totalitarian military regimes.

Now that this phase has concluded, and with Turkey inviting the Kurds and their leader Abdullah Öcalan to dialogue and negotiations, speaking of a ‘new phase’ that will solidify the thousand-year brotherhood (a phrase borrowed by Dolat Bahçeli from Öcalan during his speech before the Parliament at the end of October 2024), the PKK, known for its political flexibility and ongoing adaptation to changing circumstances, announced its historic decision to dissolve itself, abandon armed struggle, and dedicate its experience and influence to supporting peace and democracy in what is referred to as the ‘new Turkey.’

In his call for ‘Peace and a Democratic Society’ on 27 February 2025, Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan outlined the contours of a ‘New Turkey’ that must be rooted in the reality of a shared ancient history. He emphasized that this new framework should draw upon the spirit of Anatolia and Mesopotamia to establish a new social contract—one capable of uniting diverse identities and granting them the right to self-expression. As the beginning of this new phase and the foundation for drafting this social contract, Öcalan called on the PKK to dissolve itself and abandon armed struggle. This marked the start of a solely Kurdish phase, for which Öcalan developed a roadmap based on his previous ideas and visions.

The armed struggle that began in 1984 was aimed at defending the existence and identity of a people in the face of ultra-nationalist regimes and bloody military coups. It also served to galvanize Kurdish nationalism and stir the national spirit, in response to a strategy by the state that believed it had ‘buried Kurdish nationalism’ forever—through expanding and deepening policies of physical and cultural liquidation and turning them into major projects and policies. At that time, the state had no horizon for dialogue or solution, and there was no recognition of a Kurdish people with a history and a geographical space. The focus was on suppressing all manifestations of the ‘mountain Kurds’ identity and crushing the elite calls among them demanding rights for this people and acknowledging the existence of a land called Kurdistan.

The PKK launched its armed struggle to challenge and dismantle this policy, aiming to prove to Turkey and the world that there is indeed a Kurdish people and a land called Kurdistan, and that resistance is led by the youth of this people rising against official policies of denial and Turkification. Turkey was distracted by this ‘internal war,’ which delayed development projects, hindered economic prosperity, increased military spending significantly, and led the state to relinquish many issues to foreign entities in its effort to eliminate the ‘armed insurgency.’ According to Numan Kurtulmush, the speaker of the Turkish parliament and an economic expert, Turkey has spent up to $2 trillion in its war against the PKK.

The PKK was aware that the armed struggle, in addition to being a legitimate means of self-defense and a way to thwart the strategy of national assimilation, also aimed to bring the state to the negotiating table and seek a political solution to the Kurdish issue. Since its first announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in 1993, the PKK repeatedly called on the Turkish state to engage in dialogue and end armed confrontations, recognizing that the state would not succeed in eliminating the ‘revolutionary guerrilla warfare’ that the PKK had adopted as a method of resistance. However, successive Turkish governments’ reliance on military force, their pursuit of additional foreign support, their refusal to acknowledge the identity and existence of the Kurdish people, and their insistence on a monolithic nation-state with the triad of ‘one people, one language, and one flag’ have thwarted the initiatives and calls from the PKK and its leader, Öcalan, to open a political channel for a democratic solution and to silence the voice of arms.

The Kurdish and Turkish bloodshed continued for many more years. A succession of governments in Ankara, from those that pledged to develop new methods, mechanisms, and alliances to undermine the Kurdish armed struggle and impose eternal surrender on the Kurds in Turkey, to reinforce the official narrative of ‘Turkey for Turks only,’ persisted in their approach.

Turkey remained committed to the method of war, missing numerous opportunities for peace and resolution. It was only after the recent developments following the Palestinian Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, which sparked comprehensive confrontations across the region and ongoing threats to redraw current maps, that a shift became apparent.

Turkey observed the ferocity and resilience of the Israeli state, which fights on seven fronts, exposing its own helplessness. It became clear that Turkey is not the dominant regional power, nor capable of changing regimes, removing armed regional organizations from the equation, or weakening countries to threaten their regimes’ toppling and division. This was the moment when the long-standing ‘drunkenness,’ sustained by targeted official media and focused racist indoctrination, faded away.

The ‘idea’ emerged—common sense moved—and calls were made to Öcalan and the PKK to lay down their weapons and enter the parliament to practice politics. In this context, Ankara began to pick up the thread of the narrative of the ‘thousand-year brotherhood of Turks and Kurds,’ a story that Öcalan had devised and presented through his in-depth analysis of the region’s history and the future of its peoples and communities.

Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation, or ‘peace and democratic society,’ must be founded on radical changes in the nature, structure, and mentality of the Turkish state. To resolve a major and significant issue like the Kurdish question in Turkey, it is essential to implement structural constitutional reforms and a fundamental overhaul of the first six articles of the Turkish constitution. This would de-ethnicize the new republic and reflect the multi-ethnic reality of this geography.

The new foundation must acknowledge Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and the diverse mosaic of peoples across Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and what is now called New Turkey. As Kurdish journalist Hassan Hussein Deniz argued in an article published in the Kurdish-language newspaper ‘Xwebun’ in Amed/Diyarbakır on May 28, he stated that Turkey must dissolve itself and relinquish its old legacy and historical narratives before the current phase of peace. Instead, it should establish a new state and republic that guarantees the identity and rights of all components and truly consolidates the ‘thousand-year brotherhood between Turks and Kurds.’

According to Deniz, the process is not complete merely with the PKK dissolving itself, declaring the end of armed struggle, and initiating a phase of peaceful political engagement. Instead, Turkey itself must dissolve its old structures and undergo a transformation into a democratic, pluralistic state that recognizes all identities and particularities within a new social contract.

Öcalan and the PKK see peace as a strategic choice. They aim to build a genuine and correct democratic society based on this peace, fostering calm, understanding, and stability. There are ongoing calls to involve all civil society actors, trade unions, political parties, and segments of society in workshops and discussions to address everything related to the legacy and effects of the 41-year armed conflict. Additionally, these dialogues aim to define the contours of the new phase and the envisioned republic that will serve as the framework for a shared state of coexistence, acceptance, and recognition of identities and rights.

The appointment of a committee of 100 people from within parliament to identify necessary legal changes and constitutional reforms as part of the peace and reconciliation process, along with the establishment of a secretariat to assist Öcalan in monitoring the progress of this process, is an encouraging start to a long and arduous journey. This process began with the ‘Peace and Democratic Society’ initiative and the historic decision of the PKK to abandon armed struggle. It must ultimately culminate in the overdue recognition of the Kurds as a foundational component—something that has been delayed for a century—and in the birth of a new republic, following the dissolution of the old, unilateral, denialist republic.