Signals of Change in U.S. position on Iran

A senior European official informed a Syrian opposition group that the reason former U.S. President Barack Obama refrained from launching a major military strike against the Syrian regime following the chemical attack on Eastern Ghouta in August 2013 was due to Tehran’s threat to withdraw from negotiations over its nuclear program. In the summer of 2014, after ISIS captured Mosul, Washington drew closer to Tehran, to the point where Obama overlooked the formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq—forces clearly aligned with Iran. It appears that Obama’s strategic calculations regarding the Iranian nuclear deal were significant enough for him to dismiss objections from allies in Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

This American affinity for Iran did not start in 2013 but can be traced back to 2003, when the occupation of Iraq led to the rise of Iraqi Shiite forces loyal to Tehran in Baghdad. This was evident in the Transitional Governing Council (TGC) announced by U.S. administrator Paul Bremer in July 2003. Decision-makers in Washington understood that the post-Saddam Hussein political landscape in Iraq would likely result in these Shiite forces winning a majority of seats in the parliament elected in 2005, a trend that continued through the recent elections in 2022.

The second chapter of this affinity unfolded in Beirut when the Doha Conference, following Hezbollah’s swift military operation on May 7, 2008, which led to the occupation of Beirut, established a new Lebanese political equation that solidified Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanese politics with U.S.-Iranian acquiescence. The next chapter occurred in Sana’a in the autumn of 2014 when the Houthis seized control of the Yemeni capital amidst American indifference and Saudi anger. Even in the months after the October 7, 2023 attack, Israeli Minister Gadi Eisenkot publicly stated that the U.S. administration prevented Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from initiating a war front in Lebanon against Hezbollah during the second week of that month. Washington did not back the Israeli raid on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April of last year, nor did it support the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh three months later.

In various studies and articles from the early 1980s, Washington’s contrasting stance toward the Shah of Iran is noted compared to its actions in 1953, when it aided his return to power through a CIA-organized coup, only to allow him to fall to the Islamists in 1979. Those studies suggest that French President Giscard d’Estaing would not have permitted Khomeini to be hosted in Paris in the autumn of 1978 and to lead the revolution from there without Washington’s consent. At that time, Washington considered using Islam—both Sunni and Shia—as a tool against the Soviets, whose allies had taken power in Afghanistan and South Yemen in 1978 and in Ethiopia the year before, amidst a leftist wave that began in 1975 with the victory of communists in Vietnam and Moscow’s allies in Angola.

It was Khomeini who clashed with Washington when his followers occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran in the autumn of 1979. However, this did not prevent the flow of U.S. arms to Iran during its war with Iraq, a fact revealed by the Iran-Contra affair in 1986. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, interpretations suggest that American affection for Iran in the 21st century is influenced by its relationship with China, with Washington viewing Iran as a geographical barrier preventing Beijing’s access to the Middle East, much like Ukraine’s role in China’s Eurasian route.

Recent developments, particularly during the intensification of the Israeli war against Hezbollah last September until the ceasefire, indicate a shift in the U.S. position on Iran. One sign is the U.S. political support for that conflict, which included heavy bombing of Hezbollah strongholds in the southern suburbs, the Bekaa Valley, and southern cities, as well as plans to assassinate Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safieddine, and senior military leaders of the party. Such assassinations would be technically unfeasible without U.S.-made missiles and bombs capable of penetrating deep underground.

Secondly, the Israeli airstrikes on Iran on the night of October 26 are believed to have led to the destruction of Iran’s air defense capabilities, according to many studies published in specialized military journals. Thirdly, U.S. support for the changes in Syria that took place between November 27 and December 8 resulted in the dismantling of the Syrian bridge connecting the Iranian axis extending from Tehran to the southern suburbs of Beirut—a bridge that Nasrallah described to a Syrian dissident he met in 2013, stating that he “suffocates without it.” Lastly, the U.S. facilitated the election of General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon on January 9, during which another adversary of Hezbollah, Nawaf Salam, was appointed as Prime Minister.

During the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington, after President Donald Trump took office, reports leaked about discussions regarding a potential strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities—an issue that had been considered a U.S. taboo since the Obama administration. It is critical to recall Netanyahu’s numerous assertions that “striking and cutting off Iran’s arms is not enough; we must strike the head.” Evidence suggests that Trump’s position on Iran differs from that of Obama and Joe Biden. Although he is cautious in granting Tel Aviv the green light to attack Iran’s nuclear program, signals indicate he seeks a new nuclear agreement with Iran, one that diverges from the 2015 agreement, taking advantage of Tehran’s weakened state following the October 7 Gaza-Lebanon war and the collapse of the Syrian regime. Should he fail to secure this agreement, he may ultimately provide Israel with the green light.