Mar Elias Attack and Disregard for Syrian Blood

The attack, followed by a suicide bombing, on the Mar Elias Church in the Douweila neighborhood of Damascus on June 22, resulted in the deaths of 26 people and injuries to dozens. Once again, this incident exposes the regime’s inability in Damascus to protect its citizens. It also highlights the regime’s persistent use of rhetoric involving treason, accusations, and collective blame—tactics employed by the regime, its writers, and its online trolls to cover up crimes, violations, evade responsibility, and shirk the obligation to safeguard civilians and preserve their lives and property.

The state of confusion and helplessness that afflicted the authorities, causing them to stumble in covering the event, explaining its circumstances, and clarifying the facts, along with legitimate questions about the identity of the perpetrators and their motives, as well as the subsequent fabrications of accusations against rival and opposition factions, evoke the methods of the previous regime—covering up, evading, and then concealing, followed by blaming “external parties” in an attempt to close the case and leave it unresolved. This mentality and culture of recklessness remain unchanged. A modified version, but more distorted than the approach used by the former regime when dealing with major incidents targeting people’s lives and security.

What was most notable was not only the failure to implement protective and follow-up measures that could have prevented the attack, but also the attempt to conceal this negligence and failure through various methods and tactics. The authorities should have increased security around churches, especially given the ongoing media incitement and the rising threat posed by ISIS, as the regime itself claims and promotes (despite another group, Ansar al-Sunna, claiming responsibility for the attack). Instead, accusations were hurled recklessly, hysterically, and fanatically, reflecting the regime’s incapacity, bankruptcy, and its absorption of the state apparatus.

Once again, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) became the target of the regime and the scapegoat upon which they pinned their security failures. Interior Ministry spokesman Noureddine al-Baba—known for his frequent attacks on the SDF and the NES Autonomous Administration, and for accusing the Kurdish component of treason during his regular appearances on Arab satellite channels before being promoted to spokesman for the regime’s Interior Ministry—quickly claimed that the suicide bombers came from al-Hawl camp in northeastern Syria, which is controlled by the SDF. This is an implicit accusation against the SDF, as well as an attempt to evade responsibility or even absolve them, given that the two perpetrators came from an area with which the SDF has signed an agreement and with which it continues dialogue.

Furthermore, the accusation is once again aimed at pleasing Turkey and the hostile circles against the Autonomous Administration, the SDF, and the Kurds in general. As usual, the claim was made without any evidence. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) responded in a statement to the allegations made by the Syrian Interior Ministry and its spokesperson. They stated that their security agencies, following the accusations, “began examining and investigating the records of the residents of al-Hawl camp and those who left it during recent times. It was confirmed that no one had left the camp except for those who departed for Syria at the request of the Damascus government in recent times—all of whom are Syrians—as well as the Iraqis who were deported to Iraqi territory according to records provided by the Iraqi side, which guaranteed their transfer to al-Jad’ah camp. Additionally, al-Hawl camp houses ISIS families, both Syrians and foreigners, most of whom are women and children, and does not host foreign terrorists. This refutes the hypothesis put forward by the Interior Ministry spokesperson regarding the transfer of two non-Syrian terrorists from al-Hawl camp.”

The Syrian government’s Interior Ministry has yet to comment on the statement. It is expected that they will not apologize for the accusations against the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, and the Kurds once the facts and circumstances of the treacherous attack on the church become clearer, along with the identities, backgrounds, and motives of the killers—who originate from the “ideological heartland” associated with the organization that governs the regime.

In parallel with the discourse of fabricating and staging a “farce” intended to dramatize the event, evade responsibility, and make accusations without evidence—while inciting, mobilizing, and attacking the victim to silence them and prevent them from crying out and complaining—another narrative has emerged. This narrative reflects one of the facets and manifestations of the Syrian reality after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime: it criminalizes minorities, attacks them, and accuses them of collaboration, treason, and separatism.

An example of this (as unpatriotic as it is exclusionary and bordering on fascism) was voiced by Nawar Najma, a Syrian Christian recently appointed by the regime as a member of the Higher Committee for the People’s Assembly elections. During a live broadcast on Al-Akhbariya TV, the official station of the regime, Najma described the church bombing as “punishment for Christians for their refusal to join the minority alliance.” As an intellectual and “son of a minority” on demand, Najma knew how to appeal to both the intellect and emotions of the regime. He aligned himself with the moment and place, using a phrase he knew was appropriate for the occasion.

As much as his statement seeks to absolve the regime of spreading the poison of incitement and hatred against dissenters, it also carries Baathist-Assadist accusations against opposition factions among the Syrian people, whom he labels here as minorities. Had the context been different—say, pre-December 2014 in Damascus—we would have seen Najma accusing “the Zionist entity and armed terrorist groups associated with it” of responsibility for the attack on Syrian Christians due to their “patriotic positions rejecting terrorism and supporting the state and its leader, Bashar al-Assad.”

Six months have passed since this regime came to power. An objective review can be made to reveal the extent of failure and disarray in managing the country and protecting citizens’ lives. From the massacres along the coast targeting the Alawite community, to incidents in Sahnaya and elsewhere targeting the Druze, and to hundreds of “individual” violations against people based on their religious, sectarian, or ethnic backgrounds across Syria—each time, there has been no impartial investigation leading to the prosecution and arrest of the perpetrators, aimed at creating reassurance, deterrence, and progress toward the rule of law and institutions.

What the regime has achieved, for itself and not for Syria, the homeland, or the people, is gaining international acceptance—not because of its good record or exemplary experience but because of regional interactions and balances. It has engaged in channels of communication and coordination with Israel, which have been effective in thwarting threats from the Israeli military machine, while completely concealing the Israeli incursions into the south of the country.

Domestically, consolidation is ongoing. Frantic efforts are underway to infiltrate the Sunni community, aiming to eliminate opponents and rivals over matters of faith, interpretation, and ideological disputes. Additionally, the regime seeks to stifle and marginalize national political forces opposing sectarian discourse within the Sunni majority.

Simultaneously, minorities and components are being collectively accused and criminalized, in an effort to minimize the seriousness of their suffering from liquidation and displacement. This is portrayed as punishment and a natural consequence of their positions and policies regarding the regime and the “new Syria” they seek to impose—one built solely to their specifications.

In essence, the regime—drawing from the thoughts of Moroccan intellectual Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (“the Arab political mind”)—continues to consolidate its “spoils,” eliminate its “doctrine,” and strengthen tribal loyalties. Through this process, it erodes Syrian patriotism, alienates many Syrians whom it no longer considers followers or supporters, and replaces them with obscurantist structures staffed by racist individuals and groups whose loyalties lie beyond borders, along with opportunistic, paid intellectuals and veteran thugs offering their services to suppress, terrorize, intimidate, and domesticate dissenting citizens.