The Israeli raid on Qatar cannot be considered a marginal event in relation to Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, because since the defeat of Hezbollah and then Iran, the October 7 attack has become an “Israeli thesis” in regional relations. It is an “experimental thesis,” meaning that it does not follow previous rules that might help predict or set limits on Israeli action. And although an attack on Iran has been on Israel’s declared agenda for years, the raid on Qatar belongs to the realm of the “politically inconceivable” according to the diplomatic and security rules of the Middle East.
Although an offensive against Iran has long been on Israel’s declared agenda, the strike on Qatar falls within what can be described as “political irrationality” by the standards of traditional diplomatic and security norms in the Middle East.
Following the airstrike that targeted a Hamas leadership meeting in Doha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter stated bluntly, “If Israel doesn’t succeed in killing Hamas leaders this time, it will next time.” With Israel’s new doctrine now firmly grounded in the October 7 paradigm, such a statement—direct and uncompromising—goes beyond traditional deterrence. It reflects the logic of an “all or nothing” strategy that currently defines Israel’s conduct in the ongoing war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed the same sentiment immediately after the Doha strike: “It’s all or nothing.” In Israel’s view, “all” means resolving the conflict decisively—securing the release of all hostages at once, and avoiding any entanglement in drawn-out negotiations.
The “All or Nothing” Strategy Faces Three Tests:
– FIRST, Diplomatic Timing: Israel’s ability to endure waves of international pressure until bureaucratic systems lose momentum, as implied by Leiter
– SECOND, Operational Scope: Maintaining the intensity and pace of strikes without exposing itself to security setbacks or surprise retaliation on multiple fronts.
– THIRD- Political Translation: Converting military achievements into a sustainable post-conflict framework without Hamas, while managing the costs of administration, legitimacy, and containment.
A Regional Superpower?
Can Israel assert itself as a dominant regional power without triggering a counter-axis made up of influential Arab capitals and affected partners? The “all or nothing” policy represents a shift from a survival-focused strategy to one of full regional dominance, positioning Israel as an emerging regional superpower.
Israel may currently appear to be in a phase of strategic overreach, yet the vacuum created by pushing Iran back into its “smaller Iran” confines is significant. If left unaddressed, this vacuum could become the very kind of “empty space” that Henry Kissinger warned about in 2013—territories devoid of governance, becoming hotbeds of instability. Thus, Israel’s current trajectory can be viewed as a war over regional vacuum—over who gets to fill the power void.
Ambassador Leiter firmly rejected any suggestion that Israel should apologize or walk back its actions, asserting that “critics will get over it in time, and Israel is changing for the better.” With this rhetoric, Tel Aviv places itself in the position of pursuing total resolution, not partial settlements—even at the expense of long-standing diplomatic balances that was surrounding its military movment.
Expanding the Battlefield
Netanyahu has broadened the scope of conflict beyond Gaza, targeting what he and his officials call the “seven fronts working to destroy the State of Israel.” This included the targeted killing of most of the Houthi leadership. Israel’s message has been clear since it moved beyond Gaza into southern Lebanon and launched Operation “Beiger,” and beyond.
Few believed Tel Aviv would actually venture into such “irrational” territory. Now, free from the traditional limitations of the “Ring States” (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon), Israel is acting across the Arab sphere as an assertive, rising power—redefining the rules of engagement, including with Turkey. Should Turkey retreat from key agreements such as the Öcalan–Bahçeli pact, it could find itself the weakest party in a broader regional confrontation.
Netanyahu insists on a negotiation framework that demands: either the simultaneous release of all hostages and Hamas’s unconditional surrender, or no deal at all. This uncompromising formula is the diplomatic face of the “all or nothing” doctrine—one that leaves no room for compromise or phased solutions. From Israel’s perspective, it’s an attempt to eliminate the threat at its roots, not to manage or contain it as was done in past decades. Historically, it’s also viewed as an effort to rectify what some in Israel consider David Ben-Gurion’s “historical mistake” in allowing some Arabs to remain in what they define as Israel’s “historical land”—a phrase borrowed from Lebanese writer Rabih Jameel.
The Doctrine of Total Resolution
In private meetings, Netanyahu has compared himself to a leader haunted by the “possible disappearance of Israel” since October 7. Thus, he has adopted a doctrine that rules out any return to the pre-war status quo: no negotiations from a position of weakness, no temporary truces—only decisive outcomes that open the door to a new phase in Israel’s history.
What’s most striking in the regional discourse is the failure of Middle Eastern commentators to read Israel’s new thesis outside the usual activist narratives—focusing solely on violations of international law and ethics. This is despite the fact that the region’s conflicts are themselves devoid of moral clarity. At the height of the previous decade’s chaos, for example, no major religious institution condemned the abduction and enslavement of women and children during ISIS’s attack on Sinjar.
Israel’s “all or nothing” doctrine shifts it from a state fighting for survival to a power imposing its will. While this transformation comes with serious risks—from international isolation to the emergence of a hostile regional axis—Israeli decision-makers view this moment as a “historic opportunity” that may not come again.
Israel’s current behavior reflects a deep confidence in “change by force” as a tool to reshape the region: assassinating leaders of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; striking Iran; then hitting Qatar—and the campaign may not end there. This is not about tactical deterrence, but about dismantling the “structures of threat production” wherever they exist—now and in the future—under the paradigm of the October 7 thesis.
