Is the Republican Party Becoming the Representative of Workers and Farmers?

In the new American, and perhaps European world, it is not far-fetched to imagine that right-wing parties and traditional conservatives will become the leaders of the working class and workers. The middle class has been politically disintegrating for decades, and this process has accelerated in recent years.

This phenomenon is observed globally, not just in the United States. A crucial element in the reproduction of the middle class and the dismantling of the old one is the recent wave of technological revolution (the age of artificial intelligence) and the re-centering of capitalism around technological innovations. In this era, thanks to tech leaders like Elon Musk, those from rural and agricultural backgrounds have become more capable of forming their political and critical opinions, questioning authority, and seeking political representation that resonates with their experiences.

Since the views of these groups — newly exposed to the wider world through technology — are based on direct interests related to their daily lives, the conviction in court of Donald Trump — a person who rarely reads from prepared speeches, speaks in informal street language, and attacks the opponents of farmers, employees, and religious individuals — does not affect his image. This was evident in the recent elections when the majority of the American people voted against considering Trump as a criminal.

It is too early to determine the contours of new social formations. The uncertainty surrounding the definition of the middle class and the public is evident in the recent U.S. elections that culminated in Trump’s victory and the defeat of the liberals and leftists represented by Kamala Harris. Surprisingly, the Republican Party, which has been characterized as the party of capitalists and wealthy tax evaders, is transforming into the party of the working class par excellence. This shift toward labor may not be permanent and could be a reaction to disillusionment with the Democrats and their liberal proposals, which seem disconnected from the realities faced by those struggling to avoid falling into extreme poverty.

The defeat of the Democrats may signify a severe blow to the “classless liberal left.” The defeated left in this context is the “gender left,” whose most prominent moral issues have become intertwined with sexual freedom. One of this left’s grievances toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, for instance, is rooted in accusations of machismo.

These truly isolationist expressions dominate the discourses of prestigious liberal and leftist elites and academics in a world where approximately 700 million people live in extreme poverty and 56 wars are currently being fought. Therefore, accusing Trump of isolationism is not a foregone conclusion. The opposing side can easily counter this characterization and even accuse liberals and the gender left of being isolationist and disconnected from reality.

For many years, the political base of both parties has been centered around the middle class, with each party claiming to represent it better than its rival. This dynamic persisted throughout the 20th century as the utopia of the “American Dream” gained prominence, only to reach its nadir under President Joe Biden.

In September, a Wall Street Journal poll revealed further erosion of the American Dream, as growing economic difficulties make it increasingly challenging for Americans to achieve the basic elements promised by this dream: owning a home, raising a family, and looking forward to a comfortable retirement. Few believe that they can attain these goals easily. While 89 percent of respondents indicated that owning a home is either essential or important for their future, only 10 percent said that achieving home ownership is easy or possible. Similarly, financial security and a comfortable retirement were deemed essential or important by 96 percent and 95 percent, respectively, but only 9 percent and 8 percent rated achieving these goals as easy or somewhat easy. This gap returns the American Dream to its original state: a dream that has no place in reality.

What is the American Dream?

In 1931, American historian James Adams coined the term “the American Dream,” framing a pre-existing reality within this concept, which has since become an aspiration for tens of millions of people outside the United States. This dream breaks through all barriers to individual progress in what Adams referred to as the “old world” — that is, Europe, Asia, and Africa — where achievement is tied solely to merit and hard work. In this ideal, nothing stands in the way of the American citizen’s upward mobility, including the attainment of basic elements of social prosperity: owning a home, having a family and children, driving a car, securing a well-paid job, and enjoying a comfortable retirement in later life.

This is how the dream was theoretically defined. However, in practice, it was riddled with flaws, as African Americans and people of color found themselves excluded from this dream until the early 1970s, when a limited — perhaps selective — number began to ascend the economic and political ladders.

A survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal, involving 1,502 adults in the United States, revealed a significant gap between people’s desires and their expectations, affecting both males and females. This gap was particularly evident among younger generations who were increasingly unable to afford homes and are burdened by high interest rates and student debt.

Twelve years ago, when researchers asked 2,500 people whether the “American Dream” was still alive, more than half affirmed that it was. However, when the Wall Street Journal posed the same question in July 2024, that percentage had fallen to about a third of respondents.

Emerson Spreck, an economist at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, states, “Fundamental aspects of the American Dream seem out of reach in a way that they didn’t for previous generations.” Spreck highlights the steady decline in private-sector pensions, which have nearly disappeared, alongside the rising costs of home ownership as two of the most significant economic changes over the past decade.

Research conducted by MIT economics professor Nathaniel Hendren and Harvard economist Raj Chetty shows that while about 90 percent of children born in 1940 ended up being better off than their parents, only about half of those born in the 1980s could make the same claim. Hendren notes that younger age groups seem to share a similar fate concerning median income growth; however, they may have experienced a slight improvement after the COVID-19 pandemic, as wages for low-income Americans exceeded those of other income brackets.

Chetty examines the American Dream through the lens of the challenges faced by individuals starting from impoverished households in reaching the middle class. He points out that, particularly for white Americans, achieving this goal has become significantly more challenging over the past 15 years. People are justified in feeling that the American Dream has become more difficult to attain in terms of their chances of surpassing their parents’ achievements and overcoming poverty.

Why Trump?

In the context of terms like “middle class,” “working class,” and “the American Dream,” who is the American citizen searching for, especially when they feel despair about the American Dream and have lost faith in the viability of “meritocracy” in a country where the government is expanding spending through borrowing? The data and the cultural and professional voting maps provide part of the answer, which is Donald Trump.

Trump has reshaped the Republican Party into the political representative of white, working-class Americans, as noted by Aaron Zinter in the Wall Street Journal. Initial figures indicate that this year, Trump has succeeded in realizing one of the Republican Party’s most significant ambitions: transforming into a party that appeals to working-class voters from various cultural and religious backgrounds.

The expanded base of non-college-educated voters has bolstered Trump’s position in the White House. This shift has important implications for the policy agendas of both parties, as Trump is running again on a platform that advocates for higher tariffs, stricter border security, and predominantly conservative social positions. In fact, white voters without a university degree — often referred to as working-class voters — are becoming a diminishing force as society becomes more diverse and educated. Today, rather than merely capturing more votes from a shrinking demographic, Republicans have demonstrated their ability to attract minority votes to supplement their base of white voters.

Black and Latino voters, especially men, were more favorable toward Trump this year compared to 2020, with black support nearly doubling to 15% and Latino support growing by 6 percentage points to 41%.

Among those surveyed, Trump outperformed non-college-educated voters of all racial backgrounds by 12 percentage points over his Democratic opponent, a significant shift toward the GOP in a group that accounted for nearly 60% of all voters, compared to just a 4-point lead in 2020. In contrast, Kamala Harris saw a drop of one point among college-educated voters compared to her party’s performance in 2020, winning them by 15 points.

The shift toward Trump among minority voters and non-college-educated voters from various ethnic groups signals an important change in political divisions in the U.S., according to Aaron Zinter. He notes, “As we become less divided along racial and ethnic lines, the distance between the urban professional class (employees) and the country’s working class is increasing.”

Micah Roberts, a Republican pollster, states, “What we’re seeing is a social realignment across the country and a move to the right among non-college voters.” He adds that this change “was largely driven by working-class white men, but now they’re also bringing in black and Latino men who don’t have a college degree.”

After Trump’s loss in the 2020 election, some Republicans saw a silver lining. By winning 11 million more votes than in 2016, he attracted a greater number of working-class voters to the party. In a memo titled “Establishing the Republican Party as the Party of the Working Class,” then-Representative Jim Banks of Indiana noted that 79% of mechanics and 59% of janitors donated to Trump, while 94% of university professors and 73% of bankers donated to Biden, who was the candidate at the time. Banks viewed this divide between what he referred to as the “institutionalized cultural elite” and the rest of the country as a “political gift” from Trump that the party can build upon.

Latino Voters Are Abandoning Their Traditions

Banks noted that Hispanic voters would favor Trump’s strict policies to stop illegal immigration and that both black and Latino voters oppose the pro-transgender policies associated with Democrats. He suggested that Trump’s agenda on these issues — along with trade policies aimed at protecting American jobs—would attract more of these voters.

On Tuesday, Banks won the Indiana Senate race. In his victory speech, he told supporters that his father was a retired factory worker, his mother a former nursing home cook, and that he spent the early years of his life in a trailer park. He stated that he would dedicate himself to fighting for the people living in that park now by pushing back against the “elites and Democrats” who are “sending our jobs overseas… to China and Mexico.”

Aaron Zinter argues that this shift, if it materializes, will have significant implications for the agendas of both parties. Democrats will need to decide whether the best course is to move to the political center on some progressive issues in an attempt to win back dissenting voters, or whether the better option is to reinvigorate the troubled liberal wing. Additionally, Democrats will have to examine why the party did not benefit from three major pieces of legislation passed early in Biden’s term, which resulted in investments in infrastructure, semiconductor plants, and other construction projects.

Republicans will need to consider conflicts within their own ranks between the traditional pro-business wing of the party, which is cautious about Trump’s proposals such as higher tariffs, and a growing faction of GOP leaders who argue that tariffs protect US jobs and assert that businesses should do more to empower workers and families.

There has been a dramatic shift among young voters under the age of 30. While young women have remained solidly Democratic, albeit to a much lesser degree than in 2020, young men have shifted significantly to the right. This change among young voters is likely to bolster support for some of Trump’s policies. Young men favor extending the tax cuts that Trump enacted, which are set to expire in 2025, while young women tend to oppose this, according to polling data. Moreover, young people, as a group, display less support for some transgender-related policies compared to women.

White, working-class men remain the core of Trump’s support, with 68% of his backing coming from this demographic.

The shift among Black and Latino voters has prompted significant changes in political trends across much of the country. In Pennsylvania, Trump appeared to benefit from an increase in Latino support. In Florida, the Latino-majority Miami-Dade County, which supported Democrat Hillary Clinton by a 30-point margin in 2016 and Biden by 7 points in 2020, experienced a dramatic shift towards Trump on Tuesday, as he won the county by 12 points. Additionally, Trump flipped the Latino-majority Osceola County, near Orlando, with a narrow victory after Biden had won it by 14 points.

Zinter concludes his report with a quote from Micah Roberts, a Republican pollster: “This is a major change regarding the racial makeup of the Republican Party. This is the age of Trump.”