Iran’s Pezeshkian Visits Iraqi Kurdistan: A New Strategy Towards Kurds?
By Shoresh Darwish
Iran’s purportedly ‘reformist’ President Masoud Pezeshkian inherited a multitude of internal and external challenges shortly after succeeding his late predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi. Additionally, he faced numerous border issues with neighboring countries. The water crisis caused by Turkish dams on the Aras River continues to trouble Tehran. Security concerns with the Republic of Azerbaijan, the strong alliance between Baku and Tel Aviv, and the rise of Turkish nationalism in Azerbaijan continue to cast a shadow over Iran’s domestic situation in their West Azerbaijan province. Furthermore, relations with Pakistan have deteriorated following mutual shelling incidents earlier this year, while connections with its Arab neighbors remain stagnant, marked by mutual suspicion and Gulf Arab fears regarding Iranian expansionism. This is despite the recent success of Chinese mediation between Tehran and Riyadh, which has helped to bridge some of the significant gaps between the two countries.
Among the border issues are Iran’s tensions with Iraqi Kurdistan (Southern Kurdistan) and military attacks by Iran, either from across the border or from within Iraq, utilizing factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and consistently employing ballistic missiles and drones. Tehran justifies its attacks by alleging that Erbil is harboring Israeli Mossad cells or argues that it is necessary to target the camps of Kurdish parties located in the Kurdish region to protect its national security. This comes despite a state of “armed peace” and a prevailing calm between the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Kurdish parties, which have recently undergone heavy disarmament and closed 77 of their headquarters. All these matters present direct challenges to both Kurdish and Iranian policies.
Although Tehran possesses sufficient experience to engage peacefully with Iraqi Kurdistan and maintains varying degrees of cordial relations with Kurdish parties, it has opted to resort to the language of weapons and threats, using the Kurdish region as a conduit for transmitting its messages to the United States.
In an atmosphere overshadowed by the repercussions of October 7th and the Gaza War, Tehran needed to demonstrate some flexibility both domestically and internationally, as well as to explore necessary reformist policies following a prolonged period of hardline governance. The level of external danger to the Islamic Republic remains high, while internal threats appear to be ever-present, particularly in light of the rise and sporadic emergence of protest movements.
There exists a clear relationship between external and internal dynamics in imperialist-oriented states like Iran. The increasing external threat motivates nationalist forces within the country—Kurdish, Azeri, Arab, and Baloch—to pursue some of their nationalist aspirations and compels opposition groups to intensify their activities within Iran. However, these forces and political groups distinguish between two matters: the genuine strength of the regime and its security and military cohesion in the face of internal dissent, contrasted with the fragility of ethnic and economic realities that indicate the weakness of the regime’s social structure.
There are optimistic Kurdish aspirations that Pezeshkian’s presidency will serve as a moment of relative harmony in the course of Kurdish-Iranian relations, paving the way for peace both inside and outside Iran. As a reformist president with a Kurdish family background on his mother’s side and born in Mahabad province, he has the potential to convey reassuring messages, particularly in the Kurdish language, which he speaks fluently. However, the celebration of a half-Kurdish, Kurdish-speaking president may clash with the strong conservative presence within the Islamic Republic.
It is insufficient for the president merely to attract the Kurds’ attention, appoint a Kurdish (Sunni) deputy for rural development and marginalized areas, or personally advocate “long live Kurdistan,” as he recently did. While these matters are significant, they do not point to a fundamental change in the Iranian regime’s doctrine. What is truly needed goes beyond this apparent atmosphere: the establishment of a genuine peace process between Iran and its Kurdish population on one hand, and a relationship with neighboring Kurds based on mutual respect rather than on the language of weapons and threats.
Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Erbil (Hewlêr) and Slemani added a distinctive dimension to his perspective on the relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, the visit also underscored Iran’s presence throughout Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, particularly in light of Turkey’s incursions and the establishment of dozens of military bases and checkpoints in KDP-controlled areas.
In this context, Pezeshkian’s meetings with KRG President Nechirvan Barzani and PUK President Pavel Talabani in Slemani conveyed a subtle message to Turkey, which is actively operating within the region: that Iranian interests must be protected, and that Tehran maintains connections that cannot easily be severed or undermined by Turkish tanks, drones, and military forces.
In discussing the nature of Iran’s policy towards them, Kurds often make simplistic comparisons between Iran and Turkey. Naturally, the Kurdish sentiment tends to slightly favor Iran over Turkey, based on narratives of shared ethnicity, common cultural and linguistic ties, and Iran’s relative insensitivity towards Kurdish identity compared to Turkey, as highlighted by Pezeshkian’s statements in Kurdish. Furthermore, Tehran has managed to implement assimilationist policies towards the Kurds by establishing diplomatic relations with all Kurdish parties. However, this Kurdish perspective is not entirely accurate; it may lack an objective analysis.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has inherited from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s Monarchy the capacity to cooperate with and support Kurds beyond its borders, while simultaneously insisting on suppressing their political movements at home and dealing with them with excessive brutality, as evidenced by the ongoing executions of Kurdish activists.
However, Pezeshkian has the opportunity to bring Kurdish forces closer to Tehran by adopting a new approach that respects the region’s sovereignty more than previous policies, contrasting with Ankara’s aggressive military incursions. Tehran should also take the pledges of the KRG president and PUK leader seriously, particularly their commitment not to use the region’s territory as a base to threaten “Iran’s national security,” unlike Turkey, which often disregards such Kurdish assurances.
More importantly, Slemani and Erbil should strive to create a feasible peace framework between Tehran and the Iranian Kurdish parties, steering clear of dismantling Iranian Kurdish camps in Iraqi Kurdistan, akin to how the Nouri al-Maliki government dismantled the MEK camps, and avoiding the one-off dialogue approach exemplified by the dialogue with Kurdish leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, which ended with his assassination.
In this context, it may be in the interest of Pavel Talabani and Nechirvan Barzani to pursue a new strategy that helps to mitigate Iran’s interventionist policies, which could lead to a renewal of the Qasr-e-Shirin treaty in an updated form between Turkey and Iran on the region’s territory. The presence of Pezeshkian within the spheres of Iranian power may represent a significant opportunity for Iran to reconsider its policies towards its Kurdish citizens and neighboring Kurds.
Any optimism remains contingent on the ability of Pezeshkian and the reformist forces in Iran to adopt a more open and understanding policy towards Kurdish demands. More importantly, these policies must endure against the official ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regime. There is considerable skepticism regarding this matter, as the current president’s tenure is likely to be viewed as a reformist interlude between two predominantly hardline eras, rather than representing a new Iranian approach towards the Kurds.
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