How Shifting US Priorities Affect Security Calculations for SDF

The war between Hamas and Israel on October 7, 2023, established a new security environment for the entire region; it is likely to shift the association ‘east of the Euphrates’ in Syria from the war against ISIS to the region’s de facto transformation into part of a wider  international coalition environment led by Washington.

The Autonomous Administration region in north and east Syria (commonly called “Rojava”) is de facto becoming part of a broader international and regional equation within the war on terror. This has been facilitated by the Syrian regime’s inaccurate calculations in launching armed attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces and civilians along the Euphrates River during times of regional crisis, as well as attacks by Iraqi militias on US bases near the border.

In an interview with Al-Monitor in November 2023, Mazloum Abdi, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), discussed the situation in the region, especially after the October 7 attack carried out by Hamas and its repercussions on the neighbors, as well as the Kurdish position on what is going on. Around the same time, in an interview conducted on November 24 and transcribed in Arabic by the Kurdish Center for Studies, he expressed his opposition to allowing self-administration areas in northern and eastern Syria to become a battleground for settling scores between the US and Iranian-backed militias. Revealing that the Iran-backed groups began targeting the military sites of the Syrian Democratic Forces. He added that the failure to reach a fair and sustainable solution to both the Palestinian and Kurdish issues remain the largest source of instability in the Middle East, while also condemning Hamas’s attack against civilians. However, the commander of the SDF did not overlook the turning point that Hamas’s attack has created for the Middle East.

In light of that, in the closing months of 2024 and with a US election looming in November, the region is again left with a host of questions and potentialities that deserve analysis.

Uncertainty from Washington

Now the Autonomous Administration in Rojava is faced with the challenge of transitioning from a local anti-terrorism security equation to a high-risk critical geopolitical security situation.

Four years ago, there were intense arguments on the trajectory of US foreign policy in the Middle East based on the victor of the elections, with President Donald Trump facing Democratic challenger Joe Biden. Prior to the election results, political entities in the Middle East, including countries and parties, had expressed their wishes. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan was among those most affected by Biden’s triumph. Over the last four years, he has not sent a single soldier to invade Syria. If Trump had remained in the presidency until now, it is likely that the scene would have been different in Rojava and northern and eastern Syria.

Before Biden announced his withdrawal from the upcoming election, surveys indicated a landslide victory for Trump. Indeed, Middle Eastern entities that benefited from Trump’s previous term began to prepare for the next phase, including, of course, plans for future Turkish invasions that were ready to go and only needed the right person in the White House. Meanwhile, the powers most harmed by Trump held their breath, with Iran at the forefront.

However, the numbers shifted once the Democratic Party nominated Vice President Kamala Harris instead of Biden. American liberals breathed a sigh of relief when the indicators began to suggest that that Harris was had a better chance at victory. Along with this, Middle Eastern powers began to rethink their strategies in light of recent developments in the American arena.

Ankara Awaits Approval

Before October 7, the regional security environment revolved around the civil wars of the ‘Arab Spring,’ particularly the ISIS organization. In fact, all local, regional, and international political directions were built on this foundation—namely, the ‘Arab Spring’ and the widespread waves of terrorism emanating from states and organizations over the past 13 years. The Autonomous Administration was established, followed by the Syrian Democratic Forces, from the momentum of the conflict with these armed Islamic organizations. The Turkish intervention, as well as the three occupation campaigns (Jarabulus, Afrin, and Sere Kaniye), were launched in response to Islamic organizations’ failure to eradicate the People’s Protection Units (YPG) & Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Therefore, Turkey decided to carry out its aims directly through sequential military operations, which it is prepared to repeat at any time if conditions in Washington allow.

No decision about a new Turkish incursion will be made without Washington’s approval. As a result, the election of the next president of the United States has a significant impact on the Middle East’s trajectory.

Similarly, in Iraq, the formation of the local political map and regional influence was shaped by the outcomes of the war between Kurdish and Shiite forces and their Arab Sunni allies on one side, and ISIS and Islamist extremists along with Baathists on the other.

Now, there are indications that the political structures built on the alignments of the ‘Arab Spring’ faded away on October 7. The region is on the verge of a new era among the old powers, the pre-Arab Spring powers that have returned to occupy the scene once more, from Hamas to Hezbollah, through the Houthi movement and the Muslim Brotherhood organizations that are seeking a new lease on life by rallying around the issue of Palestine following the death of the ‘Arab Spring.’

From Regional Terrorists to Global Superpowers

In fact, the key determinant defining current and future US policy resides in the path chosen by the President in the White House to implement their American plan.

In August 2019, when the United States officially withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty it had signed with Russia, U.S. decision-makers were adjusting their tactics to conform with the ‘new world.’ The old world, to which the nuclear treaties with Russia belong, is based on Cold War conceptions, in which the world was divided into two major powers: the United States and the Soviet Union.

In this context, the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its urgent request for China to join the New START treaty, which was signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in April 2010 in Prague, can be understood.

Washington has gradually broadened its strategic vision on the axis of global security, having previously focused this policy on the European continent since the end of World War II in 1945. During Trump’s presidency, it began attempting to impose limitations on a new power, China, by incorporating it into bilateral strategic treaties with Washington and Moscow.

Trump had been trying hard to shift the main arena of priorities from the European and Middle Eastern continental space to East Asia, the South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. But developments have changed this direction. Trump was defeated in the 2020 elections, Russia invaded eastern Ukraine in 2022, Hamas attacked Israel in 2023, and Israel’s ongoing war on the Gaza Strip followed.

The American decision-making circles did not rely on broadening the comprehensive vision to make China one of the pillars of the ‘hostile world’ alongside Russia; instead, it replaced Russia itself as the priority of confrontation for Trump’s former team. This is the essence of a widespread belief among observers that American policies lost their equilibrium during Trump’s tenure. This is likely to occur again if he wins the elections against Harris.

Revisiting the foundations of the U.S. National Security Strategy serves to clarify this issue. At the end of 2017, the United States announced its new national security strategy, thus closing the chapter on 15 years of the ‘War on Terror,’ during which both Russia and China built their own expansive spheres of influence, each in its own way. Thus, the new U.S. Defense Strategy document stated that “strategic competition between states, not terrorism, is now the main concern of national security in the United States.”

The American document, which underwent extensive discussions later, was announced by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in March 2018, and it identified two strategic adversaries seeking to undermine Washington’s status as the world’s leading superpower: Russia and China. However, for reasons that have not been publicly explained, there are two American options for implementing the National Security document, both of which involve choosing one adversary from the two (China or Russia) specified in the strategic document.

Trump has reoriented all of American policy toward stopping Chinese expansion, both hard and soft, military and technological, while Biden’s Democrats and Washington’s traditional allies in Europe have focused on Russia.

As U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated in a fall 2023 Foreign Affairs article: “However, Washington and Beijing must figure out how to manage competition to reduce tensions and find a way to move forward in addressing shared challenges.” That is why the Biden administration is striving to strengthen US diplomacy with China, both through current communication channels and the establishment of new ones.

The US Chess Board with China & Russia

In the summer of 2021, the U.S. research and development organization RAND published an analysis titled ‘China’s Quest for Global Dominance.’ The 253-page report examined the Middle East in the perspective of competitiveness with China. The report emphasized the relevance of the Middle East as a region deserving of attention, even as the United States shifts its strategic power centers to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The researchers cautioned that China’s investments in Middle Eastern partner countries could have an influence on the US capacity to compete in the Indian and Pacific regions, as well as globally. In this context, the research advises that the Department of Defense, counter current analytical and political trends by, “investing in maintaining a significant presence in the Middle East and Africa to complement competition in the Indian and Pacific regions.”

In any case, Trump’s negative role in empowering America’s opponents against its allies cannot be overlooked. This was evident in Russia’s boldness to invade Ukraine, even though Trump claims that Biden’s policies are responsible for this security collapse on NATO’s eastern flank. Similarly, Hamas’ attack on Israel is inextricably linked to Trump’s approach regarding the Palestinian issue, which has faded in importance in comparison to any new regional crisis. The Republican Party’s “clearing the squares” policies have benefited numerous countries and groups, most notably Washington’s regional allies or non-wealthy players, such as the Kurds, who saw themselves as close to Washington.

Instead of building broad alliances to reduce Russia’s strategic margin in the Middle East and Europe, Trump took the opposite steps, such as the sudden and incomplete withdrawal from eastern Syria and Russia’s entry into the American bases that Washington had built around the city of Raqqa, in addition to allowing Turkey to occupy a wide border strip that had been under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Additionally, Ankara will have access to the primary international road connecting western and eastern Syria. Trump’s former government accepted Turkey’s shift to Russia and the purchase of the S-400 system as the administration began pursuing a policy of “clearing the squares” in Syria and the Middle East, and they were evacuated in favor of Turkey and Russia, similar to the model used in eastern Syria.

All of these factors were justified by Trump, who stated that his priority was to combat China, not waste money on Syria, and safeguard Europe. As a result, the American national security strategy lost one of its wings, the Russian wing, as the stage was set for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Syria, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, while also increasing Russia’s grasp on its previous crucial region in Central Asia and even Afghanistan.

Given this style of management, Russia feels more comfortable if Trump continues this policy. Therefore, it is in its interest to have a president who will clear American arenas for Russia, which is exactly what Trump says he will do again if he wins the election.

This posturing against China and downplaying of Russia provides a more compelling explanation for a report issued by US intelligence on August 7, 2020, on its early view of foreign nations’ attempts to interfere in US elections and their propensity to support or oppose any of the candidates. William Evanina, head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, believes three suspicious countries attempted to interfere: Russia, China, and Iran. He presented a brief, but stunning, peek into Russia and China’s apparent disagreement on this issue, which is also occurring in the current presidential campaign between Harris and Trump, according to leaks and intelligence sources.

The intelligence conclusion is that Iran attempted to undercut Trump in 2020, while Russia is using a variety of tactics to discredit Biden. Given Tehran’s smaller strategic scope on the international stage than Moscow’s, it is not unexpected that Russian and Iranian strategic calculations differ. According to the US intelligence assessment, it was unusual for China to “prefer Trump’s defeat.” In truth, Russia and China’s support for rival candidates in the 2020 and 2024 elections is not a straightforward distinction. The next president is responsible for establishing America’s strategic orientation abroad. The choices of American voters have a direct impact on large countries like as China and Russia, either positively or negatively.

Likewise, the US commitment to security partners in northern and eastern Syria is linked to whether the United States will redefine this partnership beyond the fight against the terrorist organization ISIS and bring it into a new security framework in parallel with the US efforts to transfer its strategic weight to the Pacific region, which faces major obstacles due to the threats facing Israel and the need for the United States to have a strong military presence in Israel’s vicinity. In this capacity, the US may have to reevaluate all of its long-term plans for exiting the Middle East, including reframing its presence in northern and eastern Syria, in order to create a comprehensive framework that is not limited to battling ISIS alone. Such a move is difficult to achieve legislatively in the United States, and it requires Congress to renew its permission to make northern and eastern Syria (the Autonomous Administration) a strategic asset for stability alongside US allies such as the Gulf States and Jordan.