How Bashar al-Assad Squandered His Father’s Legacy

When Riad al-Turk emerged from detention in September 2001 to November 2002, he recalled a statement made to him by Major General Adnan Badr Hassan, head of the Political Security Division, during his interrogation: “We are the ones who brought this boy, and we are the ones who rule behind him.” The author then reminded him that the general’s words were untrue, as evidenced by the fact that he had been dismissed from his position the previous June, and that most of the old staff from Hafez al-Assad’s era had also been removed by Bashar al-Assad.

In this context, during the early years of Bashar’s rule, the Syrian opposition largely subscribed to the theory of a conflict between the conservative faction of the old guard and the reformist faction within the palace. This theory was introduced by Michel Kilo, who articulated it in four articles published in Al-Nahar newspaper in the third decade of August 2000. At the deliberative conference of the Communist Party (Political Bureau) in March 2001, Riad al-Turk and the author were the only two attendees opposing this theory among the forty-five present, believing instead in the existence of a single regime that was not divided into factions, with Bashar as its head. This perspective seemed to reflect the reality of a quarter-century of rule by Hafez al-Assad’s son.

Bashar was unlike his father. In terms of political competence, he was akin to Yazid compared to Muawiya. He squandered the supportive front that had backed his succession, which extended from Washington to Paris, Riyadh, and naturally, Tel Aviv, crossing red lines that his father had avoided. It was astonishing when Pope Francis visited Damascus in 2001, and Bashar delivered a speech stating that “the Jews crucified Christ and tried to kill the Prophet Muhammad,” without any of his advisers warning him beforehand that the Vatican Council had exonerated the Jews and that they were considered “a red line for the West.” Shimon Peres, one of Israel’s most astute politicians, remarked that “he seems to have learned nothing from his time in Britain,” foreseeing the beginning of the withdrawal of international support for Bashar’s regime, which was solidified after he opposed the US invasion of Iraq.

This stance resulted in alienating Lebanon through Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2004, eliciting outrage from Damascus and others following the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the ensuing crisis with Washington, Paris, and Riyadh. Bashar responded by leaning toward Tehran at a time when the U.S. was beginning its confrontation with Iran after it resumed its uranium enrichment program in the summer of 2005. In practice, the disengagement of the Syrian regime from Tehran became a focal point of U.S.-French-Qatari policy between 2007 and 2010, with Turkey and Qatar serving as intermediaries. When they were unable to achieve their objectives, this quintet poured oil on the flames of the internal Syrian conflict that erupted in Daraa on March 18, 2011.

Within a decade of succeeding his father, Bashar lost the regional influence that Hafez had secured between 1976 and 2000, during which Damascus had rivaled Cairo and Baghdad and was comparable to Riyadh. In contrast, his son became a vassal of Iran, particularly in Lebanon from 2006 to 2010, while clashing with Washington and Riyadh. When the Syrian uprising unfolded, Bashar found himself with no option but to submit to the Iranian and subsequently Russian influence. It became a media narrative that Russian and Iranian officials, along with Hassan Nasrallah, repeatedly claimed they had saved the Syrian regime from collapse on several occasions.

In his first year in power, Bashar attempted to adopt a new rhetoric in his inaugural speech; however, it was limited to “modernization and development,” with no mention of “reform” or “change.” In practice, he did not modernize or develop any aspects of the power structure he inherited from his father nor alter the way he interacted with society. He was even worse than his father, who combined a policy of impoverishing the middle class and the poor with the monopoly of power and repression. Conversely, Bashar systematically integrated dictatorship with repression and impoverishment. He and his economic entourage—initially led by Rami Makhlouf and later by Asma al-Akhras after 2020—exploited circumstances created by international sanctions and blockades to ruthlessly plunder the resources of Syrians. Consequently, 95% of Syrians became impoverished due to their actions rather than due to the sanctions and blockades themselves. In stark contrast, leaders like Castro after 1961 and Khamenei after 1995 managed to build robust economies despite the sanctions and blockades.

Regarding his handling of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Bashar’s address twelve days after the protests began in Daraa, followed by his statements in Latakia the following week, echoed what Hafez Mohammed Makhlouf allegedly told an acquaintance on the last Friday of April 2011, who then relayed it to the author: “When you can’t defend your house, you blow it up and burn it down.” In this context, slogans like “Assad or we burn the country” and “Assad or no one” did not arise without cause. Bashar al-Assad was far removed from the policies advocated by Western scholars, who claimed that “Assad does not negotiate under fire, but afterward.” His understanding did not extend to recognizing the policies employed by Deng Xiaoping against students in Beijing in 1989, or by Khamenei against student protests in 1999 and the Green Revolution in Tehran in 2009. These strategies echo Friedrich Engels’ viewpoint expressed in 1890: “Any government that allows a hostile movement aiming to overthrow it to operate within the framework of the laws is doomed to defeat.”

Bashar systematically burned and destroyed the country, with barrel bombs as a prime example. However, he did not succeed in defeating the armed opposition, which received support from external forces just as he was supported by Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces, along with multinational Shiite militias. Had it not been for the Russians and Iranians, he would likely have fallen in 2015—and possibly even in the autumn of 2011.

He was unfamiliar with the “carrot and stick” policy that his father employed against the Muslim Brotherhood during the period of armed confrontation, where repression was mixed with the release of prisoners, including leaders, between June 1979 and February 1980. At that time, Amin Yakan, a former leader of the Brotherhood and negotiator, would meet with him at the Muhajireen Palace until the spring of 1980. Yakan had been the Brotherhood’s contact with Hafez al-Assad during the 1969-1970 period, when Hafez was in conflict with Salah Jadid. Eventually, he turned to a policy of iron and fire against the Brotherhood, exhausting any opportunities for compromise, including attempts to establish a legitimate Islamic party or group that did not bear the Brotherhood’s name. This included deploying the Third Division to Aleppo in April 1980, while a month prior, special forces carried out the Jisr al-Shughour massacre.

In summary, Bashar al-Assad’s rule collapsed on December 8, 2024, when his Russian and Iranian allies were unable to replicate the protective operation they had undertaken in 2015. At that time, they were strong, and both Washington and Tel Aviv did not want to see the Syrian regime toppled, which was also in a state of weakness, deterioration, and corruption.

By 2024, Iran had been defeated in two wars that emerged from the October 7, 2023 operations in Gaza and Lebanon, while Russia was weakened and exhausted from the ongoing war in Ukraine. Consequently, the Syrian regime fell easily within 11 days and appeared “weaker than a cobweb.” Although it found itself in a similar state in 2015, it was saved from collapse by external interventions—where allies and adversaries acted in concert.

However, the dynamics shifted in 2024, as Washington recognized an opportunity to execute a significant strike through Damascus, potentially transforming the entire Middle East landscape against Iran and striking Moscow in its sole foothold in warm waters. This would set the stage for Donald Trump’s upcoming negotiations with the Russians regarding Ukraine and possibly lead to discussions with the Iranians over a new nuclear deal.