A Year After October 7: Looking Back

By Mohammed Sayed Rassas

Wars escalate gradually, often with pre-war tensions remaining invisible. In the 1956 Suez War, for instance, the escalation spanned twenty months, beginning on February 28, 1955, with an Israeli raid on Gaza that resulted in the deaths of forty Egyptian soldiers. From that day forward, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser contemplated turning eastward, away from the West, given his reflections since July 23, 1952, on how to leverage Washington’s interest in supplanting London in the Middle East to free Egypt from British influence.

A critical moment in this context was the Czech arms deal with Egypt, facilitated by Moscow, which represented a significant impetus for the withdrawal of U.S. funding for the High Dam project. This withdrawal prompted Abdel Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company just a week later, setting off a chain of events that led to war three months hence—even without the knowledge of Washington. While the parties involved—London, Paris, and Tel Aviv—had different objectives, they ultimately converged and allied against Nasser in that war.

In the war that began on October 7, 2023, with Hamas’s attack on Israel in the Gaza Strip, that expanded into Lebanon with the Israeli strike on September 17, 2024, we must search for the initial spark. This spark can be traced back to March 10, 2023, with the signing of the Saudi-Iranian agreement in Beijing. Observers in Washington felt a palpable sense of alarm for the implications of this agreement, especially for its alignment with Chinese interests. The agreement suggested that Prince Mohammed bin Salman could become a new version of Abdel Nasser, who had shifted towards Moscow, while Chinese President Xi Jinping would mirror Soviet leader Khrushchev, positioning his successors in the Kremlin as primary challengers to U.S. influence in the Middle East over the next three decades.

This Chinese rapprochement with Riyadh, driven by China’s oil needs, coincided with a strengthening of ties between Riyadh and Moscow, particularly in the wake of tensions following the Khashoggi incident in 2018. Washington further ignited tensions by sending National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Saudi Arabia in May, to unveil a two-pronged plan comprising Saudi-Israeli normalization and the so-called ‘Indian Corridor’ project, intended to create a land bridge between the Indian and European coasts via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

By the summer of 2023, additional details emerged, such as a Saudi nuclear reactor facilitated by Washington and the opening of U.S. arms depots for Riyadh. On September 9, the Indian Corridor Agreement was signed in New Delhi in the presence of U.S. President Joe Biden. This project positions Mumbai as a hub for goods from India and Southeast Asia, which would be transported by sea (as highlighted in Netanyahu’s speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27) to a harbor in Oman and then overland to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, flowing through the Negev and the Gaza Strip to Haifa port. From there, goods would be transported by sea to the Greek coast, accompanied by oil and gas pipelines and undersea fiber optic cables for two-way transport.

This corridor was a significant trigger, followed by another important moment when Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced in an interview with Fox News on September 21, 2023, that “normalization with Israel is getting closer day by day.”

Notably, U.S. President Joe Biden, in an article published on November 18 in the Washington Post, said that “one of the reasons Hamas triggered this crisis on October 7 was to extinguish hopes for a future in the Middle East fostered by the signing of the Corridor Economic Agreement.” However, he did not address another motive: Hamas’s desire to thwart Saudi-Israeli normalization. This perspective was less apparent in Netanyahu’s New York speech, where he stated that the attack aimed at striking “the normalization that was closer than ever between Saudi Arabia and Israel.”

In his article, President Biden targets only Hamas and Russian President Vladimir Putin, ignoring Iran and Hezbollah, both of whom stated they had no prior knowledge of the operation. Meanwhile, U.S. officials consistently maintained there was “no evidence of Iran’s involvement” for months, reflecting a goal to avoid a regional war extending beyond Gaza. This was especially true given Hezbollah’s claim that its involvement since October 8 has been limited to “support and engagement.” While the Houthis’ participation impacted international trade, Tehran’s desire—aligned with Washington’s intent to avoid a regional war—rendered the theory of “unity of arenas” ineffectual post-October 7, leaving Hamas effectively isolated.

Furthermore, when the Israeli defense minister noted on September 18, that “the weight of the war is shifting north,” he effectively signaled an Israeli decision to initiate conflict in Lebanon once Hamas’s military capacity in Gaza was deemed exhausted. This decision was compounded by an Iranian strike on Israel on April 13-14, which revealed cracks in Iranian capabilities. This scenario motivated Netanyahu to provoke Tehran, hoping to draw it into confrontation, despite U.S. opposition, by targeting Ismail Haniyeh at the Iranian guest house in Tehran on July 31.

It is evident that the Indian Corridor project primarily aims to counter the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative promoted by China since 2013. This initiative seeks to connect Asia and Europe via two significant Middle Eastern routes: one through Pakistan-Iran-Iraq-Syria and then by sea to Europe, and another through Syria to Turkey. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine, suggested to be fueled by U.S. involvement since 2013, has effectively blocked the European route for the Chinese project.

Moreover, Washington’s earlier strategy to engage Iran through the 2015 nuclear deal, which involved overlooking Tehran’s regional expansion, was ostensibly aimed at preventing China from accessing the Middle East. However, following former President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, there was a notable deepening of ties between China and Tehran, subsequently joined by Iranian ties with Russia, which capitalized on Iranian drones in its conflict with Ukraine. Ali Khamenei subsequently derailed the negotiations to revive the nuclear deal in Vienna between April 2021 and August 2022 by appointing his brother-in-law, Ali Bagheri Kani—an opponent of the deal during its initial signing—to lead the negotiations.

In the past six years, China has modernized and diversified the railway network between Pakistan and Iran, and subsequently, introduced a rail link between Iran and Iraq, which began construction just before the launch of the Indian Corridor project. In March 2023, during the Iraqi Prime Minister’s visit to Ankara, the ‘Dry Canal: Development Road’ project was proposed to connect the ports of Fao and Mersin via road and rail. Following this, there were discussions about establishing a rail link between Iraq and Syria, extending the railway from al-Qaim to Deir Ezzor.

This context suggests that the Indian Corridor was conceived as a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative and an offer to Europe to get oil and gas from the Middle East as an alternative to Russian supplies. It also positions India as a key Asian ally of the West against China. President Erdoğan’s rapprochement with Russia, China, and Iran further explains Turkey’s exclusion from the Indian Corridor. Additionally, the U.S.-Iranian divergence sheds light on the corridor’s implications, excluding Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, and Egypt from the benefits.

In his Friday sermon on October 4, Khamenei stated that “there is a goal to make Israel a gateway for exporting energy from the region to Europe,” a clear reference to the Indian Corridor. While there may not be a direct Iranian link to the October 7 attack, Tehran was pleased with Yahya Sinwar’s actions, as the attack demonstrated that the Gaza border area is insecure and also impeded the process of Saudi-Israeli normalization. This may explain Khamenei’s assertion on June 3, the anniversary of Khomeini’s death, that “Hamas’s attack came at the right time for the region.”

Khamenei’s vision—articulated in a 2021 speech and reiterated on September 11, 2023—regarding “American weakness” aligns with Putin’s perspective during his 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It seems this view is shared by both Sinwar and Nasrallah, the latter of whom claimed that “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web.” Absent this belief, the Gazan attack on October 7 and the subsequent Lebanese attack might not have occurred. However, the question remains: to what extent has the post-October 7 world revealed the opposite?

Author

  • Mohammad Sayed Rassas

    Mohammed Sayed Rassas, born in Latakia in 1956, holds a Bachelor's degree in English Language and Literature from the Faculty of Arts at the University of Aleppo. He has been an active journalist since 1998. His notable publications include: 1. After Moscow (1996), 2. The Collapse of Soviet Marxism (1997), 3. Knowledge and Politics in Islamic Thought (2010), and 4. The Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini-Khamenei Iran (first edition 2013, second edition 2021). Additionally, he translated Erich Fromm’s work titled The Concept of Man in Marx (1998).

    View all posts
You might also like

Comments are closed.