Kurdistan Revolution of 1925: When Fethi Okyar Chose Defeat Against İnonu

The Kurdish Center for Studies published a series of readings from the memoirs of the Ottoman physician Rıza Nur, one of the first ministers in Mustafa Kemal’s initial government from 1920 onward, working on education and health. He was part of Mustafa Kemal’s first government before defecting and writing one of the most critical documents against the “invader” in his memoirs, titled “My Life and Memories”. We examined the circumstances surrounding the publication of the book years after Rıza Nur’s death, first in Turkish, followed by a selective Arabic translation under the title “Atatürk and His Companions and the End of the Ottomans,” published by Dar Al-Bashir in Cairo in 2020.

In previous episodes, we did not address the section in which Rıza Nur comments on the Azadi Society’s uprising led by Sheikh Said in 1925, as earlier readings focused on the Treaty of Lausanne. On the hundredth anniversary of the execution of Sheikh Said and his companions, we present this analysis of Rıza Nur’s perspective on Sheikh Said’s revolt.

After Lausanne in 1923, Rıza Nur tried to distance himself from Mustafa Kemal. However, Mustafa Kemal also did not want him; he appointed him ambassador to Berlin without consulting Nur, who immediately refused. Nur spoke about the efforts of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü to turn the parliament into a puppet show, manipulated as they pleased.

He then reached the point concerning Sheikh Said’s uprising in Kurdistan, which occurred on February 14, 1925. He wrote:
“The Jazira front is not going well. There is unrest among the Kurds, and there is a dispute between Recep Bakir, the Minister of the Interior, and Zahni. Zahni had gone from the Sinop Governorship to Bitlis, where the Kurds are. He is an honorable and knowledgeable man.” (p. 421)

Rıza Nur documented Zahni’s opinion, which he did not specify by name, as was often the case with many figures mentioned in his memoirs; sometimes he only used their first names without further introduction. In any event, Zahni wrote in a memo that Rıza Nur had seen prior to the revolt:
“The Kurdish tribal chiefs are gathering and discussing actions against the government. I want them arrested; otherwise, there will be sedition.” (p. 421)

Minister of the Interior Recep Bakir paid no attention to Zahni’s statements. He warned Zahni against arresting Kurdish tribal leaders, except for bandits and thieves. In response, Zahni resigned, and then Sheikh Said’s revolt broke out. Spreading terror provided an opportunity for Mustafa Kemal. According to Nur, the opportunity came swiftly—indeed, the Kurdish uprising emerged under the leadership of Sheikh Said.

“How great an opportunity this revolution was for Mustafa Kemal. Sheikh Said was a deeply religious man. Mustafa Kemal’s abolition of religious schools and Zawiyas, as well as the imposition of the hat, all enraged Sheikh Said, leading him to disobey. Mustafa Kemal interpreted this movement as a Kurdish nationalist rebellion.” (p. 329)

During the revolution, Rıza Nur was not in any position of authority. His understanding of the structure of the revolution was derived from friends and what he heard in the newspapers, such as the assertion that it was not a nationalist uprising. He also relied on his own analytical weakness: his opinion of Mustafa Kemal. He sought to counter any stance taken by Mustafa Kemal. In his commentary on the Kurdish uprising, Rıza Nur adds:
“I asked Saib, a member of the Court of Independence who presided over it, and he told me: ‘There is no Kurdish tendency in this matter. This movement was purely motivated by religion.'” (p. 420)

This view may seem plausible based on the evidence and speeches. However, it reflects a Turkish failure to understand the true nature of politics within Kurdish society at that time, despite the numerous studies conducted under the “Eastern Reform” movement, including Ziya Gokalp’s research on Kurdish tribes. This study was commissioned by Rıza Nur himself. Nevertheless, the dynamics of Kurdish society remained obscure to decision-making centers in Istanbul and Ankara, and Turkish leaders were not aware that the Naqshbandi Order represented the other face of Kurdish nationalism at that time, before their eventual separation.

Mustafa Kemal exploited the events of the uprising to eliminate the newly formed opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party. At that time, Ökyar was both Prime Minister and party leader. Mustafa Kemal asked him to enact a law called the “Law of Determining Calmness” (or “Law of Tranquility”). He intended for this law to extend beyond the Kurdish revolt to cover the entire country, including Istanbul. According to Rıza Nur’s testimony, Mustafa Kemal believed that the Istanbul press was the cause of this rebellion and that it supported Sheikh Said. This claim warrants broader examination and analysis by reviewing the Istanbul press of that period, as there was already a faint positive response to the revolt in Istanbul, which had been marginalized by the new Kemalist regime.

Fethi Okyar resigned on March 3, 1925, three weeks after the outbreak of the revolt in Kurdistan, before any countermeasures were implemented. Rıza Nur makes no mention of Okyar’s objections to Kemal’s approach to the uprising. The Law of Tranquility was actually enacted one day after Okyar’s resignation, signed by İsmet İnönü, who had returned to prominence as Prime Minister. Rıza Nur writes:

Mustafa Kemal asked Fathi to resign. He told Fathi’s wife: “I have given you the Paris embassy, so go.” During Sheikh Said’s uprising, Mustafa Kemal sent an army into Kurdistan, leaving no place untouched. The army burned villages and killed people. This was followed by the Independence Court, which hanged Sheikh Said and many of his leaders, and eliminated all members of the new party (the Progressive Republican Party). They called this movement the Kurdish Revolution. The new party was officially dissolved, and all its documents were confiscated.” (p. 431)

Rıza Nur discusses the aftermath of the 1925 Revolution, specifically the AgriRevolution, also known as the “Ararat Revolution” led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha and organized by the Khoybun Association in Beirut and Damascus:

“The Kurds are revolting fiercely. Their uprising is the result of the severe repression previously inflicted by Mustafa Kemal’s forces against Sheikh Said the Kurd. A number of our officers, including some holding the rank of Pasha, joined the revolutionaries.”  

Rıza Nur lacks a solid knowledge base, or even adequate information, about the Kurdish issue. The Agri Revolt’s program was the clearest ever regarding the establishment of a Kurdish state; indeed, the revolutionaries declared it a republic that lasted for three years, from 1927 until the end of 1930. Therefore, Rıza Nur’s memoirs regarding the actual situation on the ground in Kurdistan are of limited value.

Perhaps another reason for his downplaying the nationalist aspect of the Kurdish revolts was his intense preoccupation with framing everything as opposition to Mustafa Kemal, even the Kurdish rebellions against the republic.

Later, Mustafa Kemal would perceive the growing influence and dominance of İsmet İnonu over decision-making. He summoned his expelled friend Fethi Okyar from Paris and asked him, along with Rauf Orbay, to establish the Free Republican Party in August 1930. However, the public’s resentment toward Mustafa Kemal increased, especially after chants against him were heard at a party rally. Fearing this, Mustafa Kemal ordered Okyar to close the party in November 1930.

It is noteworthy that with the collapse of the Kurdish Revolution in 1925, what could be called the democratic movement in Anatolia also declined—a fact that would become evident in the events following the overthrow of Okyar and his colleagues. Rıza Nur subtly expresses his nostalgia for the Ottoman era, concluding the political section of his memoirs with a question he heard from an Iraqi official: “Where is the Ottoman era? We miss it.”