The Rise of “Green” in the Syrian Scene

There is no doubt that the color green has infiltrated the Syrian landscape following the fall of the Assad regime, emerging as a dominant symbol. Social media has been filled with trending slogans such as “green is expanding,” referring to the need for opposition factions and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to control Syrian territory. The color green has transformed into a new visual identity that embodies change and victory. It has even been said, “Syria will become more beautiful when it is entirely dressed in green,” and “peace must be glorified through the color green.”

Amid this green tide, Ahmed al-Sharaa made his first official appearance in a formal jacket alongside Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, wearing a green tie and bidding farewell to the black turban, which symbolized the previous era during the civil war. As events unfolded, these transformations began to manifest in the features of the emerging state: the national team’s jerseys changed color, calls for the issuance of green passports surfaced, and the green color extended to the military uniforms and ranks, the badges of the security forces, and the backdrops of ceremonies. It was as if this represented an indirect declaration of the triumph of green over the darkness that symbolized the Assad era. I can imagine that if Eric Hobsbawm had witnessed these symbolic scenes, he would have remarked: This is precisely how the identity of the new nation-state takes shape.

This magical aura surrounding the color “green” is challenging to interpret within the context of colors in a romantic or simplistic manner, as the color here transcends mere visual hue; it represents a political and ideological expression par excellence. Not only is it part of the Syrian flag, which consists of three colors (green, white, and black) and is regarded by anti-Assad forces as a symbol of independence, but its significance also extends beyond historical coding. This is particularly evident in the association of green with the Rashidun Caliphate, while white embodies the symbolism of the Umayyad Caliphate, and black signifies the Abbasid Caliphate. The contradiction lies in the exclusive preference for green among supporters of the new regime, who glorify the Umayyads, without regard for the other dimensions of these colors; historically, green was also the flag of the Fatimid Ismaili state.

Similarly, the presence of green cannot be explained through the lens of mysticism, despite its long-standing association with paradise and immortality in Sufi literature, where Sufis adopted it as a primary color in their garments and in the adornments of the shrines of their saints. The conflict between Sufism and authoritarian Islamism, whether in its Salafi-jihadi or Muslim Brotherhood forms, is well-documented and deeply rooted. Therefore, it is implausible for fundamentalist Islamist factions to invoke the color green from Sufi heritage or to adopt its ritual symbolism.

Green and the Nation-State

It seems more logical to interpret color from the perspective of nation-state literature, where colors are no longer just aesthetic elements or cultural symbols with historical dimensions; they have become political tools par excellence, reflecting power, solidifying belonging, and granting legitimacy to the ruling regime. Since the emergence of the nation-state, colors have been consciously employed to formulate national narratives, whether through official flags, military and civilian uniforms, or even through the architectural and visual designs of state institutions. Therefore, the color green, which today dominates the surreal Syrian landscape, cannot be isolated from this framework. Instead, it should be interpreted within the context of reinforcing the identity of the nation-state first, and understanding its role in reproducing power structures and its Islamic identity second. In other words, the Islamic identity matrix is added to the nationalist matrix.

Syrians are now expressing their fears regarding Ahmad al-Sharaa’s authoritarian tendencies and his imposition of a ‘single color,’ as articulated by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri in his recent response to the constitutional declaration. This response reflects the position of the majority of parties that were excluded from the transition by the interim government in Damascus, especially after unilateral steps were taken, such as the constitutional declaration, the formation of the army and security forces, and the self-appointment of Al-Sharaa as president during the Victory Conference. Additionally, the institutions of the former regime were dissolved, and a unilateral government was formed, marked by the insistence on monopolizing violence in one hand, arbitrary prosecution of the ‘remnants of the regime,’ and the subsequent crimes of sectarian cleansing against Alawites in the coastal region. Ultimately, this approach reflects the idea of monopolizing power, and if we add the Islamist ideological dimension with its dominant color symbolism, it can be described as ‘green sultanism.’ This term undoubtedly contrasts with the social reality in Syria, which includes the diverse traditional Islamic fabric of the country across all its currents, whether Sufi, methodical, or sectarian.

Turkey as a Model

In the context of power, the association of color with ideology becomes more nuanced, especially when considering the dimensions of a monolithic identity. The vast majority of power structures in the region continue to orbit around “fascism,” influenced by Nazi racial doctrines and the first three French republics, characterized by rigid centralism, artificial monocultures—both religious and national—and a colonial approach, both internally and externally. Consequently, most Middle Eastern countries have not transformed into states based on the principle of constitutional citizenship. Thus, fascism remains the dominant tendency in principle.

According to the prevailing political and social discourse, the Turkish political landscape provides key concepts for understanding the idea of ideological color in the context of “state monism.” The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is portrayed as an example of “White Turkism,” reflecting a belief in Turkish racial supremacy that opposes national, cultural, and sectarian diversity through a policy of assimilation, championing white male ideals against this diversity. In contrast, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) historically exemplifies “black fascism,” rooted in racial supremacy and fueled by Nazi ideology, venerating the myths of Turkmen heritage and the grandeur of the Ottoman Empire while promoting ideas of genocide and ethnic cleansing against social diversity. Meanwhile, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is classified as “Green Turkism.” Its policies emphasize Turkish nationalism interwoven with Sunni Islamism, aligning with the structure of a mono-nationalist state and employing both soft assimilation tactics and an iron fist to manage religious and national diversity.

Although these terms are not commonly used in Syria and the Arab world in general, they provide a relatively suitable framework for understanding Syria’s recent political history, which has witnessed periods of violence, massacres, and coups d’état. In this context, the influence of what is termed ‘White Arabism’ was predominant after independence; it sought to impose a singular national identity while excluding Syrian diversity, as evidenced by initiatives like the Arab Belt Project and the Arabization policy that stemmed from this mindset. Conversely, the ‘Black Arabism’ adopted by the Baath Party embodied the notion of Arab national superiority, employing total violence against any political or social dissent.

These policies resulted in the outbreak of a devastating civil war that lasted for a decade and a half, after which the phenomenon of ‘Green Arabism’ began to take hold in the country, adopting radical nationalism with a Sunni Islamist orientation. This trend was clearly reflected in the articles of the constitutional declaration issued a few weeks ago, increasing the likelihood of exacerbating conflicts surrounding Syrian diversity. Furthermore, this trend has manifested itself in the massacres committed in the coastal regions and the exclusion of the Druze, Kurds, and other national groups from their right to determine the country’s fate, despite a tacit understanding with the Syrian Democratic Forces established through a recently signed document between the two parties.

Undoubtedly, this green trend, characterized by its militant nature, seeks to achieve power by adopting a fundamentalist ideology grounded in the foundations of the nation-state. It draws inspiration for state-building from historical experiences in countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Essentially, this trend aims to integrate into the international system by controlling the apparatus of the nation-state, focusing on a monolithic green identity, and seeking to exploit mass religious tendencies to transcend secular nationalism, which has failed to mitigate socio-economic contradictions. At this point, the goal of this trend remains the monopolization of power, alongside attempts to impose a singular ideology on society through the constitution and instruments of violence.

Subsequently, clear signs of the empowerment of monolithic power have begun to emerge through the economic policies of the interim Sharia government. The paradox manifests in the interaction and overlap between neoliberalism and the Islamist vision, striving to maintain a moderate governance approach while utilizing a range of technical and administrative expertise operating under a veil of political secrecy.

These policies have capitalized on the social disintegration left by the Syrian civil war, reflecting Naomi Klein’s concept of the “shock doctrine.” Syrian society, marked by deep divisions, appears unable to resist the schemes of “green Islamism.” In fact, a significant portion may even be prepared to adapt to any model imposed upon it, especially following the abrupt collapse of the Assad regime and the subsequent gradual dismantling of the public sector and its exclusion from the state equation, paving the way for the privatization of vital sectors in the country. Here, “green Islamism” intersects with international interests, particularly if it opts to adopt the nation-state as a framework for governance.

Green in the Balance of International Conflict

Functionally and strategically, Western powers have relied on Islamic Orientalism, whether moderate or radical, as a backup option to address international crises and conflicts. At times, it has been utilized as a tool to counter Soviet expansionism and, at other times, to confront anti-Western nationalist regimes. However, this policy primarily targeted liberal democratic movements and local leftist factions, transforming it into a means of preserving the interests of foreign colonial powers while simultaneously serving as an obstacle to democratization.

In 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski introduced the concept of a ‘green belt’ to contain the new Soviet expansion. Brzezinski argued that the emergence of Islamic regimes in the Middle East, supported by the U.S., could provide genuine alternatives to existing authoritarian regimes, mitigate the influence of leftist and communist movements backed by the Soviet Union, and help contain Iran.

The Syrian situation seems to have revived the necessity of renewing the concept of a ‘green belt’ within Syria, initially aimed at confronting Assad and Iran, and later, Russia. According to global economist Jeffrey Sachs, the Obama-Hillary Clinton team did not hesitate to reactivate this strategy. The U.S. contributed to the establishment of Project Timber Sycamore, a covert program launched by the CIA in 2012 to support and arm opposition factions, including Islamist groups. This project continued until 2017 when President Trump decided to halt it.

Despite the relative decline of the U.S. role, Britain, Turkey, and some of Washington’s allies have continued to support those Islamist movements that emerged from ISIS. In this context, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emerged after splitting from ISIS and al-Qaeda to become a pressure card against the Assad regime. With changing circumstances, especially following the events of October 7, the region witnessed profound shifts in the priorities of key actors, prompting some parties to reassess their strategies regarding the use of Islamist groups as a regional leverage tool. Specifically, the three centers—London, Ankara, and Doha—have exchanged roles in rehabilitating the ‘green Islamist’ presence in Syria.

Al-Sharaa as a Symbol of Green Islamism

In light of these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, with the backing of its supporting powers, leveraged its control over areas of influence, allowing ‘green Islamism’ to begin surpassing Assad’s black fascism, establishing itself on the ruins of the past. This all occurred under a charismatic leadership model, where the leader is granted near-absolute power and the populace is expected to show complete loyalty. This model was exemplified by the figure of Ahmed al-Sharaa, who emerged as a charismatic leader, thereby enabling the green ideology to persist and expand amid the shifting regional landscape.

The irony is that Donald Trump, Netanyahu, and Putin have clashed with what is known as the ‘globalist movement,’ which previously supported the idea of green Islamism. However, some European powers continue to resist this trend on several fronts. For example, in the Syrian context, these powers seek to provide diplomatic, financial, and political support to the Damascus Interim Authority. Still, they are struggling to implement their vision, which once supported Islamist radicalism and is now attempting to rehabilitate it under the banner of a ‘moderate Islamist force.’ Critics of this project often refer to it as ‘jihadi governance,’ aimed at accommodating Syrian diversity and contributing to the establishment of an inclusive constitutional state. Nevertheless, these Islamist forces have not engaged in a genuine ideological review; instead, they have merely presented their transformation as a form of marketing, making the contradiction between rhetoric and practice evident in the details of the daily Syrian scene.

Despite this, some European and regional actors remain optimistic about green Sunni Islamism as a pivotal force in the power equation. The attendance of al-Shibani at the recent Brussels conference following the Sahel massacres illustrates the commitment of these powers to the same approach, which seeks to reproduce Islamism as a political tool in the Syrian landscape.

Amid this turmoil, and in a state that has yet to stabilize, the ‘green color’ is firmly consolidating its presence in the country, capitalizing on the departure of ‘black fascism.’ On the other hand, Syrian diversity is striving to resist this trend and reclaim its right to a pluralistic national state. The question is: Will a monochromatic green color dominate the country and render Syrian diversity obsolete, or will there emerge a political formula capable of offering compromises that can save the country from devastating consequences?