The Syrian Interior After the Fall of Assad

The emergence of Hafez al-Assad’s dictatorship in 1970 was based on an international factor, namely the Soviet-American approval to remove a regime that rejected Resolution 242, which defined the contours and course of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the 1967 war. Additionally, there was a regional factor involving the new Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, who proposed a project that contradicted Nasserist Arab leftism. Furthermore, an internal factor was at play: social discontent among the wealthy and middle classes in major cities due to the leftist economic, social, cultural, and political measures enacted by the regime established on February 23, 1966. Consequently, Assad found an international-regional-internal basis, allowing him to solidify his rule over Syria with the approval of these three spheres. His dictatorship was further supported by a favorable economic situation, in addition to these factors.

The new Syrian president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, lacks these four factors if he wishes to establish a new dictatorship in Syria – assuming he desires to do so, which is likely not the case. The overthrow of the Syrian regime was an international decision – not a regional initiative by neighboring countries like Turkey – nor was it an internal process culminating in a victory on December 8, following a revolution that began on March 15 or 18, 2011. The goal of this international decision was to establish a new global balance through the Damascus gateway, aimed at weakening Russia before Washington’s negotiations regarding Ukraine and diminishing Iran’s position ahead of Donald Trump’s negotiations for a new nuclear agreement. This also sought to place Iran in a position of vulnerability, where failing to comply with U.S. negotiating conditions would leave it unable to withstand a devastating Israeli strike against its nuclear program.

What HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) did was a military uprising against a regime that was on the brink of collapse between 2011 and 2015, but whose fall was prevented by agreements between the United States, Russia, and Iran. However, by 2024, Russia was entrenched in the Ukrainian conflict, and Iran was reeling from defeats in Gaza and Lebanon. This new context enabled HTS to succeed in 2024, under American cover—something Washington previously blocked in 2015 when it pressured Moscow to intervene militarily against the advances of Islamist factions in central Syria, moving from Idlib and, in parallel, from Ghouta toward cutting off the Damascus-Homs road. What occurred in Damascus two months ago fell within these parameters, and no one can claim that it represents a genuine change in Syria, even if the regime’s collapse has significant popular support. To suggest that it was a change orchestrated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan oversimplifies the situation. Damascus is deemed too important for its fate to be decided by the Syrians or by regional powers.

We must acknowledge that the British were instrumental in facilitating the French withdrawal from Syria in 1946 and that the coups led by Hosni al-Zaim, Sami al-Hinnawi, and Adib al-Shishakli were driven by external forces, without even mentioning the developments during the 1954-1970 period.

Through the visits of American, British, German, and French officials to Damascus, along with the statements made openly by Saudi Arabia and the silence of Jordan and Egypt on the matter, it is evident that an Islamist regime in Damascus is undesirable for all these parties. A sentiment expressed at the Aqaba conference and reiterated at the Riyadh and Paris conferences by these stakeholders indicates that what is sought is an “inclusive and comprehensive Syrian transition.”

Days after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz stated that “an Islamist rule in Damascus sponsored by Erdogan is more dangerous for Israel than an Islamist rule in Gaza backed by Khamenei.” It is clear that the recognition of the new rulers, the lifting of sanctions, and the reconstruction of Syria are conditions for an “inclusive and comprehensive Syrian transition.” This suggests that the international and regional powers do not desire a dictatorship akin to that of Hafez al-Assad or an Islamist regime in the post-September 2001 and October 2023 world – even if the operation carried out between November 27 and December 8 was executed by an Islamist faction that the international community saw as the only viable option to accomplish such a task.

It is likely that regional players, such as Turkey, which seeks an Islamist regime or aims to make Damascus subordinate to Ankara just as Baghdad is to Tehran under the rule of the Iraqi Shiite parties, will not succeed in this endeavor due to the international constraints set by Washington, as well as the objections from Riyadh, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. The current situation in Syria does not permit the new rulers of Damascus to dictate the future based on their Islamic ideological visions. Since their governance in Idlib, they have demonstrated pragmatism and an ability to comprehend existing realities and power dynamics; otherwise, we would not find the following observation from a study presented in 2021 at the European University Institute in Rome: “HTS appears to be the only force capable of developing and implementing an operational strategy against the forces of global jihad, including remnants of al-Qaeda and ISIS networks…. HTS, in its pursuit of its goals, has come to align with Western interests in many ways” (p. 31, from Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haynie: ‘How and Where the Process of Global Jihadisation is Taking Place: The Case of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Former al-Qaeda Affiliate in Syria’, research paper, PDF, 36 pages, European University Institute – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Middle East Trends Programme).

In summary, the Syrian landscape will not be shaped from an internal perspective but rather from an external one. It is likely that the elements that characterized Hafez al-Assad’s dictatorship are not present today. Furthermore, the existence of international economic projects that consider Syrian geography a key region necessitates internal stability, which will not be guaranteed by the monopolization of power by Islamist factions or by control exerted by a single individual.