The term “Kakistocracy” is highly problematic in modern political discourse, and it is perhaps less of a disciplined concept in political science and closer to rhetorical argumentation and journalistic critique; its arenas are parliaments and newspapers rather than academia. Simply put, its meaning is the opposite of aristocracy (rule of the best): it is “rule of the worst,” meaning governance by the most degraded factions, or the “riffraff” in the eyes of their opponents. It is distinct from ochlocracy (mob rule), as the latter term refers to the broad masses of the populace—against whom some of the greatest orators have warned since the Greek era, a term often used to disparage democracy itself. “Kakistocracy,” on the other hand, does not refer to the public or the crowds as much as it points to ruling juntas and their degraded networks that sabotage institutions and the public sphere, trespass even into the private sphere, and destroy public morals and civic integrity. The kakistocrat cares nothing for glory and honor in the public square, in the Greek or Roman sense of these two values; they appear neither dignified, elegant, nor prestigious, and under their rule, all civic values, standards, and aesthetics deteriorate. Proponents of democracy and its enemies have hurled accusations of kakistocracy at one another to indicate the degradation of the ruling elite or the seizure of power by new factions—unlike the term ochlocracy, which aristocrats historically deployed against advocates of popular rule.
The first documented use of the term occurred in seventeenth-century Britain, specifically in 1644, at the height of the English Civil War between the Royalists and Parliamentarians. At that time, Paul Gosnold, a clergyman loyal to King Charles I, delivered a sermon in Oxford describing supporters of Parliament as kakistocrats, characterizing theirs as the rule of the worst in the face of the rule of the best. The first round of the war ended with the victory of the Parliamentarians and the execution of Charles I, and the second with the exile of his son, Charles II. Thus, from the perspective of the Royalists, “kakistocracy” triumphed, while from the perspective of the Parliamentarians, it was defeated. The term signifies nothing when it comes to identifying the precise nature of the conflicting factions, their actual style of governance, or the character of their interests.
However, the term can be more than a mere insult or an expression of condescension toward a political adversary. This is especially true in cases where it becomes an expression of power relations, a social and moral pattern, and an ideological discourse that cannot be described as anything but the worst by any standard—whether democratic or aristocratic, conservative or progressive, right-wing or left-wing. There are historical periods characterized by chaos, the collapse of civilized institutions, rampant violence, and the spread of a logic of pillage and plunder, without the ruling authorities offering any historical horizon for what is transpiring or formulating a narrative possessing a modicum of consistency. This is fundamentally due to their failure, the baseline vulgarity of their ambitions, and their preoccupation with plundering and dividing revenues in a manner akin to gangs. These gangs do not care to acquire even the appearance of a state, establish any serious social coalition, build any form of institution, or even monopolize violence to subsequently produce a domain of legitimacy or law. That is kakistocracy, and it has no other name; under such conditions, the term becomes an accurate descriptor carrying methodologically useful dimensions for understanding the structures and networks of prevailing authorities. Indeed, a more colloquial language might be more apt in expressing the nature of the phenomenon and truer in its description.
Many social revolutions have witnessed phases of chaos and the collapse of institutions as a result of historical explosions or the grand ambitions of revolutionary elites. Yet, this was always bound to some historical vision, a conscious endeavor for a radical alteration of social relations, or at the very least, a representation of the interests of a class or a people—which in many instances allowed for the rebuilding of stable institutions and the formulation of new forms of political legitimacy. Kakistocracy, meanwhile, is unconcerned with any of this; rather, it tends to produce a junta that carves up benefits among themselves through networks of loyalty and subordination, as if dividing spoils. Despite emerging from lower social backgrounds and classes, this junta cares nothing for delivering a minimum of benefits to its own environments; it detaches itself from them to form an independent caste, contributing to the destruction of the foundations of life even in the very villages and neighborhoods from which it came. Consequently, the description “rule of the worst” here does not carry the character of class or cultural condescension; rather, it points to a profoundly grotesque form of exploitation and assault against the lower classes—exactly as the famous expression “lumpenproletariat” was used by labor militants and trade unionists who dedicated their lives to defending the “proletariat.”
Perhaps the clearest expression of kakistocracy is the rule of militias, which suppress their societies by force of arms under various pretexts, including religion, patriotism, and liberation, creating war emirates where the most criminal practices prevail—such as human trafficking, forced labor, extortion of producers, control of crossings, asset theft, and expropriation of property. When such militias seize control of vast territories or entire states, we find ourselves in need of a serious theory of kakistocracy.
It is difficult to find a clearer model of kakistocracy than the current rule of Islamic militias in Syria. These militias, which callously destroy the livelihoods of wheat farmers and cause natural disasters through their negligence and incompetence in the very regions from which many of their own fighters hail, leave those who are supposed to be their base under the harshest living conditions, bordering on starvation. They constitute an independent class of “the worst,” caring only for their own private, highly narrow, and sordid benefits, despite their regional, tribal, and sectarian ties, and their efforts to exploit these ties to construct an ideology to justify their practices. These factions seem incapable of building even a consistent ideology possessing a minimum of persuasiveness, relying solely on emotional mobilization that is unable to produce actual hegemony. Their ties do not yield permanent coalitions or function to perform any type of social service; rather, they are chaotic, shifting alignments susceptible to collapse and to entering into bloody confrontations at any moment. Ultimately, the warlord cares only for his survival, his ability to collect revenues, and playing all sides to achieve that. Therefore, observing some of the most prominent phenomena of the Syrian kakistocracy could serve as a starting point for developing the term and imbuing it with conceptual traits, especially since it can be generalized to other regions and countries—such as Libya, Iraq, and Yemen—and multiple nations threatened with falling sequentially under the authority of militias that succeed in building relationships with regional and international powers willing to unleash them over the peoples of various areas in exchange for executing specific functions and tasks.
Militia conflicts and the fall of certain regions under militia rule are nothing new, but the transformation of these militias into internationally recognized authorities governing entire countries is the most alarming development, the early signs of which began in Afghanistan and Libya and reached their highest stages in Syria. The American envoy Tom Barrack stated that authoritarian regimes are more efficient in the region than democracies. It is clear that he does not mean robust and stable dictatorial states except when speaking of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, for instance; in the case of the remaining states of the Levant, he means the rule of functional militias capable of domination, suppression, and executing the tasks demanded of them internationally, regardless of their capacity to build an actual state on the territory under their control. This aligns with his evaluation of the peoples of the region as a collection of warring tribes and villages. This may be ironical, but Barrack expresses a concept closer to “decolonization”—that is, acquiescing to the failure of building states on the Western model, and subsequently surrendering the region to militias, which are seen as closer to its non-colonial essence, while seeking to rehabilitate these militias internationally. Regardless of the contradiction inherent in this concept and its blindness to the colonial nature of the “decolonization” perspectives currently fashionable among both the Western right and left, kakistocracy appears to be gradually turning into the accepted paradigm for governing vast regions inhabited by tens of millions of people.
We can pose two fundamental questions here in an attempt to further refine the concept: What are the primary groups and mechanisms of kakistocracy? And what is the pattern of politics under its rule?
The Emir, the Sheikh, and the Activist
It is difficult to identify any institution carrying referenced authority inside Syria today, including the security and military institutions, which any repressive regime would presumably care to centralize to the utmost degree. What are called the “Ministry of Interior” and the “Ministry of Defense” in Syria are nothing more than a conglomeration of militias that recognize the primacy of the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” militia. All announcements regarding the dissolution of the “Hay’at” or the “merger of factions” cannot be taken seriously; on the contrary, this factional power-sharing and decentralization serve important functions for the authority. It allows it a flexible mode of maneuver, the utilization of multiple auxiliary forces while simultaneously disavowing responsibility for comprehensive operations of terrorizing societies, and ensures alternative plans for the authority in the event of its retreat or its sustaining of painful blows at the center should some of its external backers turn against it. Consequently, the failure to complete the “merger” is not an error or a shortcoming on the part of the existing authority that can be rectified later; rather, it is a structural component of it. What is meant by the current “merger” is usually an declaration of loyalty to the ruling authority in Damascus, not the dissolution of the faction. This places us before the first and foundational archetype in the Syrian kakistocracy: the “Emir,” by which we mean the head of the Islamic militia who moves flexibly, producing his own war fiefdom that may reach the level of a semi-independent Islamic emirate (as in the case of certain areas in the Damascus countryside) within a relationship of loyalty and subordination to the center.
Administratively, what remains of Syrian institutions does not function according to any respected law, procedure, or tradition; rather, it is subject to a network of clerics whose presence secures two functions: ensuring the control of the authority and gradual Islamization according to their own interpretations and rulings. This archetype operates in a manner divergent from traditional law, which organizes responsibilities, obligations, and frameworks that the ruling militia/religious structures cannot tolerate and do not desire. These structures prefer verbal orders, unrecorded communications, and religious interpretations unburdened by constitutional obligations, as well as the division of influence among militias, represented administratively by their مشايخ (sheikhs). It is worth noting that these sheikhs emerged amid the conditions of the civil war and do not enjoy a respected status among the traditional clerical class; they received their religious education mostly within jihadist groups and through marginal, incomplete curricula often distributed over the internet—meaning they are “the worst” even by the standards of clerics. Here we confront the second archetype of the Syrian kakistocracy: the “Sheikh” or the “Sharia Jurist,” meaning the cleric controlling an institution or a court in accordance with the aforementioned militia power-sharing.
The ruling militias show no interest in traditional social functions, such as health, education, and mass culture, and tend either to privatize them for the benefit of companies reflecting regional influence—as appears in the case of the health system and certain basic services and infrastructure—or to delegate them to so-called “non-governmental organizations” (NGOs) that procure aid and funding from abroad through the channels of what is called the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.” This tracking through the “Ministry” is important for the militias so they can extract the “lion’s share” of that aid and utilize it for their benefit, while the remainder goes to the “civil activists” and their organizations, who manage it according to their own understanding and without any serious possibility of accountability; the baseline here is the relationship with power networks, not the law or institutional oversight. On the other hand, “influencers” on social media networks like TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram play an important role in what might be termed the militias’ “media.” They generate the appropriate “trend” for them at a given period, which serves functions such as incitement, justification, covering up crimes (as in the case of kidnapping Alawite women), and showcasing the militias’ “tolerance” at times and their strength at others. The networks of unaccountable organizations complicit with the militias, along with the media functions of influencers, can be considered a representation of “the worst” at a social, financial, and cultural level, forming the third archetype of the Syrian kakistocracy: the “Activist,” meaning the member of the unaccountable, undemocratically managed NGO playing social roles that are not its purview but are supposed to be public services subject to popular oversight, as well as the “Influencer,” the inciter and trend-maker.
Today, the “Emir,” the “Sheikh,” and the “Activist” form an independent class, conscious of its privilege, working to benefit from the status quo, which allows them to thrive the worse things become for the general populace in Syria. Once again, their existence and authority are not a “mistake,” a “transitional phase,” or mere corruption, but the foundational architecture of power. It can be said that this authority approaches being a full kleptocracy (rule of thieves), standing in fundamental contradiction to the vital activities of working people in Syria across their various fields of labor. Yet, it is capable of mobilizing from time to time through mechanisms like the faz’ah (tribal rallying call) and al-nafeer al-amm(general mobilization), which tighten sectarian and tribal nerves and produce new trends of victimhood (such as exposing old crimes of the Assad regime at moments of the authority’s crisis, or the disasters it causes and the massacres it commits). These are mechanisms that have limits and mostly lack sustainability, falling short of the designation of a “system,” as mounting impoverishment, social destruction, and institutional decay may make it difficult in the future to launch any faz’ah for the benefit of the authority.
Functionality, Politics, and Existentialism
The pattern of politics in a kakistocracy cannot be framed politically, institutionally, or legally, as there is no place for these frameworks within the general degradation. As for thinking of presenting demands to the authority of the worst, or participating in it, this indicates, at best, nothing but naivety and an inability to characterize reality. Politics under such a condition is functional externally and existential internally. Functionality intersects with existentialism in many cases to form a difficult, unreliable, and explosive mixture, leading to bloody conflicts or even wars of extermination.
In terms of external functionality, the ruling militias do not care for the principle of “internal legitimacy” in any of its forms, nor do they consider it one of their concepts; rather, they view it as non-“pragmatic” nonsense. They believe that the basis of their continuation in power is external endorsement and empowerment, both regional and international. This can be guaranteed through multiple mechanisms, most notably demonstrating a readiness to operate as functional militias for a powerful external actor—that is, placing militia combat capabilities at the service of some external project. In the Syrian case, striking the Iranian axis and severing its supply lines along the vital route between Iraq and Lebanon was the most prominent function of the ruling militias. There is also maneuvering between regional powers and the constant offering of services in exchange for international legitimization, as we have seen in the militia authority’s dealings with countries like Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. There is also the sale of sovereign assets to grant a strategic advantage to this state or that, alongside blackmail using the card of chaos, returning to overt extremism, and flooding the region and the other side of the Mediterranean with terrorists and refugees.
This functionality makes the ruling militias akin to agents of medium-power regional actors, which can be considered a type of sub-colonialism, while constantly attempting to guarantee the satisfaction of the larger powers, particularly the United States. This, of course, passes through satisfying the regional powers, spearheaded by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. However, this functionality has its limits; playing on contradictions for the sake of external legitimization may trap the militia authority in embarrassing situations with some of its handlers and arouse their indignation toward it. Here, the final strategy may come into play: returning to the classic jihadist stance and searching for an external backer among “rogue” states.
As for internal existentialism, the various Syrian groups—whether sects, ethnicities, or regions—realize full well that they possess no legal or humanitarian guarantee for their continued existence under the rule of Islamic militias. Therefore, they form their positions based on their sense of threat and the possibility of being subjected to wars of ethnic cleansing or genocide, especially under the condition of external endorsement, which does not appear threatened at the present time and which might overlook any massacre committed by the authority without actual consequences.
Therefore, the demands of groups and the extent of their opposition or rejection of the authority fluctuate according to the existential pressure they endure: those who realize they are not threatened with extermination adopt a conciliatory stance or convince themselves of the possibility of conditions improving. They may even deliberately deceive themselves, claiming to believe the militias’ promises of economic prosperity coming with the sales of sovereign assets. On the other hand, groups that are actually threatened existentially adopt entirely antagonistic positions toward the authority, or some of their activists adopt a consciously subservient stance characterized by rhetorical hypocrisy, hoping to save their communities from a new massacre.
External functionality intersects with internal existentialism for the militia authority when it sees itself capable of crushing and eradicating as long as it executes its external functions. It also intersects for a number of its opponents whose political endeavor centers on finding an external party that will accept them as agents performing functions for it. Since this appears difficult for the majority of factions opposed to the authority in the current circumstance, many prefer a stance of submission until conditions change, hoping not to be dragged into a final, losing battle that might destroy their social existence in an irreparable manner.
That is politics in a kakistocracy, and the situation of Syria under the “rule of the worst.” Perhaps it is possible to produce conditions for a politics that preserves existence and secures the continuity of threatened and impoverished groups and their solidarity, away from waiting for an external savior. However, this necessitates political and social action and requires elites and an awareness that may not be available in a condition that supports nothing but the rise of the worst. In any case, one cannot submit to kakistocracy even if people wished to do so; it will force them to resist because it offers them no institutions or social functions that achieve for them the bare minimum of life’s continuity. This “resistance” may take the form of further chaos, de-civilization, and bloody realities. Yet, understanding the structures of power and providing the correct description of them may be a first step toward changing this “worst” situation.
