Fields, factories, and algorithms in international relations… What fate awaits Turkey and Kurdistan?

Months before former President Donald Trump imposed tariffs, the market valuation of Apple Inc. surpassed three trillion dollars, followed by Nvidia, a semiconductor manufacturer, achieving a market valuation exceeding three trillion as well. These newfound wealth valuations of companies far exceeded the empires based on oil and weaponry. This situation raises a question in modern political economy: whether there remains any credibility or need to continue the imperial method of building wealth and power that has prevailed for nearly five thousand years—namely, horizontal expansion, land seizure, conquering peoples, enslaving them, systematically plundering communities, and trafficking humans.

Take Nvidia, for instance—it is referred to as a “fabless” company. Its market valuation is three trillion dollars, which means that if its market value were liquidated, it would be sufficient to rebuild Syria (estimated at 300 billion dollars) ten times over.

This trend signifies a shift in the value within capitalism from heavy machinery, coal mines, and oil wells, to companies of relatively smaller scale. It represents a new pinnacle in capitalist competition, where technology has, for the first time in history, gained independent production stages and is not merely a supplement to traditional industries in a large portion of its operations.

Feudalism in International Relations

In any case, the discussion here is based on the assumption that the technological production model is a newer paradigm in capitalism compared to the classical agricultural and commercial formulas; it is expected to lead to a change in the nature of international relations, despite the resistance displayed, particularly by the “nation-state,” which has an aggressive pattern of controlling sciences and using them as a force of evil against adversaries.

Regardless, the nation-state continues to reconstruct itself but does not renew itself, and this is an important distinction in assuming that reconstruction does not entail renewal. The national pattern in state-building is haunted by the idea of agricultural feudalism in international relations, which is particularly evident in Russia, Turkey, the United States, and China. For instance, in the geopolitical discourse of capitalism, a question arises about the backward content of Russian imperialism that seeks control over lands in Ukraine, laden with rhetoric about sovereignty and “saving the brothers in Donetsk.” Russia’s war in Ukraine is a process from the era of feudalism in the twenty-first century, governed by the appetite for imperial conquests of new territories, and exemplifies a feudal mentality, where power is still measured by the kilometers added to the state map, rather than by innovations, patents, or global market share in technology.

In the Middle East, the spirit of fever and speculation has not calmed in the structure of the nation-state, which has a necessarily eradicationist-criminal imprint. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the map of the “Mili Charter” has been the most circulated geographical form in Turkey via mass media. The republic itself has rushed toward the fantasies of feudal rule and conquered Kurdish lands in Syria and Iraq as part of its tribal pursuits of the “Kurdish tribe” beyond its borders, where land—in the ruling Turkish mentality—is not only a symbol of control but the very spirit of the threatened nation-state.

In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the genocidal struggle over land continues to favor Israel for now. From Russia to Israel, passing through Turkey, this part of the world has been recycling the historical Sasanian system. Suddenly, a leader came from the newest and strongest empire in history, an empire built in contrast to the invading British and French empires of the nineteenth century; it was constructed on the basis of hegemony and conflict management with modern tools: Donald Trump, who seeks to seize Greenland, the Panama Canal, Canada, and potentially other lands that have yet to be announced. Trump’s political theory is incredibly simple: “business management-land” rather than “world organization.”

However, this appetite for imperial conquests is not merely a moral value aligning the historical shape of the empire with the current reality; in the Russian case, Kyiv is the spirit of the first Russian empire, while in Turkey, the “Mili Charter” represents the most modest form of the Turkish imperial state.

Here, it is important to differentiate between resources and wealth. Wealth can be built through a fabless company valued at three trillion dollars. However, the state still relies on resources and not just on wealth. This means that wealth does not solve Turkey’s energy problem forever. This country spends between 70 to 80 billion dollars annually on energy imports of gas and oil. Therefore, it is still premature to assume that international relations are on the verge of changing under the impact of shock technology capitalism (the AI era). Instead, it is expected that the nation-state, hostile to globalization in terms of rights and humanitarian aspects, will become more resilient by using the latest technological products to resist change in content, even if it concedes or relaxes some features related to form (expanding parliamentary representation, signing international charters, changing treason and execution provisions, etc.).

The Logic of “Conquests”

In any case, the notion of “classical conquests” as understood by Trump does not carry the same meanings for Putin, Erdoğan, and others like them. Trump’s perspective emerges from the British legacy in defining territories, serving as a source for accumulating wealth and building power against adversaries. In both the Russian and Turkish contexts, the idea of reclaiming land appears more emotional and rooted in feudal values, even if it does not generate financial returns. In fact, it may cost the treasury— as in the Turkish case— multiples of what could be gained from the orchards of Afrin, which are ravaged by factions working as mercenaries for Ankara. In this context, the activation of the logic of “conquests” as a means of producing power and wealth seems like a newer version of feudalism, this time “national feudalism” derived from “imperial feudalism.” At first glance, it may appear as a form of collective denial of the transformations of the era, yet it is essential in shaping the era itself, an era of trillions generated from offices no larger than the headquarters of the commanders of Turkish, Russian, and Chinese armies of conquest.

Great powers are reproducing an imperial model using modern methods, yet they still draw from a mentality of conquest, annexation, and subjugation. Hence, we arrive at a profound paradox: in a world where economic value has transcended geographical boundaries, and where great wealth is not merely extracted from beneath the earth or produced through farming but also accumulates through artificial intelligence, international relations are still governed by mental models from the age of empires.

This contradiction between the profound transformation in the structure of production and the stagnation in the logic of control is what keeps the global system in a state of constant conflict between two models: a dying imperial model that has not yet passed away, and a new model forming without yet possessing political power commensurate with its economic strength. In this context, the question may not only be about the credibility of the traditional imperial model, but also about the ability of the global system—political, legal, and intellectual—to adapt to a moment when wealth is no longer measured in square meters but in bytes, and is no longer built with tanks, but with lines of code.

The relationships born from an expansionist state are undoubtedly bloody and revive a fabricated past surrounding property ownership. These claims, propagated by agitated elites and official propaganda apparatuses, lead people to become preoccupied with the obsession over collective ownership of a state that is being plundered by an external enemy, which could even be internal!

Despite this, there appears to be a pressing need on the horizon that may restore the expansive nation-state to a dominant model in international relations for future eras. Last month, “Foreign Affairs” magazine discussed the return of the expansionist state to the geopolitical landscape as an unexceptional phenomenon in two articles, the first by Michael Albertus, a political science professor at the University of Chicago and author of the book “The Power of Land: Who Owns It and Who Doesn’t, and How It Shapes the Fate of Societies.”

Albertus begins his thesis by returning to the mid-twentieth century when the dynamics of power and the system of alliances that shaped the post-World War II global system strongly curtailed territorial conquests and acquisitions— a persistent feature of human history. However, rather than representing a definitive break with past aggression, this era of relative restraint now seems merely a temporary deviation from the historical pattern. From Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to Trump’s declared interest in acquiring Greenland, international land grabs have resurfaced. Threats of territorial acquisition have once again become an essential part of geopolitics, driven by a new phase of competition among great powers, increasing population pressures, technological transformations, and perhaps most importantly, climate change.

The case of Greenland embodies how climate change can stimulate global conflict over land. Trump’s interest in the territory seemingly arises from its strategic location as a buffer zone between the United States and its great power adversaries. However, with rising global temperatures, the retreat of ice caps and the melting of sea ice will make Greenland significant for other reasons, as its vast expanses of formerly inhospitable land become attractive to opportunists.

Although the ice cover has so far limited the exploration of mineral deposits in Greenland, scientists believe it may contain large quantities of iron ore, lead, gold, uranium, oil, and other valuable resources, including the minerals needed for the shift to clean energy. In recent years, Greenland has experienced its highest average temperatures in a millennium, approximately 1.5 degrees Celsius higher than the twentieth-century average. Further increases in temperatures will boost the growth of new plants and even agriculture. According to Albertus, Washington’s pursuit of Greenland is just the beginning of a new global competition for land. There are many attributes that make land valuable, such as access to resources, human habitability, agricultural productivity, and proximity to trade routes.

Climate change will create insurmountable problems for some countries while opening new opportunities for others, encouraging competition for land. Countries with vast tracts of land that will soon become desirable will benefit if they act wisely. Canada and Russia, the two largest northern countries in the world, are in an ideal position. They could witness tremendous growth in agriculture as a result of longer growing seasons, rising temperatures, and thawing permafrost. A recent climate model has shown that Canada will gain 1.6 million square miles of arable land suitable for growing crops like wheat, corn, and potatoes by 2080, which is a fourfold increase from the current available agricultural area. Russia will similarly acquire a comparable area of newly arable land in the coming decades.

Other northern regions are likely to experience similar changes to those observed in Canada and Russia: Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. state of Alaska will see growth in arable land in the coming decades. In contrast, the United States and China will face decreases in crop yields and increases in migration from their hottest and most disaster-prone regions, leading to declines in productivity. Both may experience a reduction in strength and influence unless they manage to compensate for these shortfalls with investments in cheap renewable energy and plans to ultimately relocate vulnerable populations to more habitable areas.

Faced with severe economic and demographic challenges linked to climate, states will strive to acquire any possible advantage. There are dozens of regions around the world that resemble sparsely populated Greenland. These areas are likely to become more habitable in the coming decades or home to valuable resources with weak, ambiguous, or transitional sovereignty. Countries that possess vital resources for transitioning to renewable energy will also become focal points of competition. The recent invasion of the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of Congo by the “M23” group, backed by Rwanda, can be interpreted as a means for the group, and thus Rwanda, to access precious minerals in eastern Congo, which are used to produce batteries for electric vehicles and mobile phones.

Researcher Michael Albertus comments: “The changes brought about by global warming in productivity and habitability will create new paths for economic output and migration. For example, migration from North Africa, the Sahel region, and the Middle East will increase as temperatures rise and agricultural productivity declines in those areas.”

The Culture of Westphalian Invasion

In the second article in “Foreign Affairs,” Tanisha Fazal, a political science professor at the University of Minnesota and author of the book “The Death of the State: Politics and Geography of Invasion and Occupation,” recalled several examples regarding the international red line concerning one state invading another’s territories, based on the post-1945 world order designed to prevent the repetition of Nazi Germany completely swallowing other countries. However, she overlooked a glaring example where the international community failed: Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and its occupation of a third of the island to this day.

Fazal believes that if states cease to adhere to the principle opposing territorial invasion or justify their actions in ways that at least suggest a superficial commitment to it, this principle will wither away. This could lead to bolder and more frequent regional aggression. However, any movement toward a diluted or distorted version of the current standard against regional invasions would likely escalate land conflicts. Since World War II, many countries have grown accustomed to the relative stability of the U.S.-led order, benefiting greatly from it, and to the respect for territorial sovereignty that it enforces. It is difficult to determine the extent of the system’s decomposition if current restrictions on regional invasion continue to erode. The weakening of the anti-invasion principle could accelerate a broader shift in the international system based on relations between sovereign states. If state sovereignty becomes widely threatened, it is unclear how open markets, which form the basis of the globalized system, would function. Furthermore, invasion is inherently incompatible with democracy.

In summary, many principles of the liberal international order cannot survive in the absence of an anti-invasion rule. Perhaps this is the intended goal: to dismantle the liberal international order and revert to the violations of “Westphalia”; the treaty that sanctified the sovereignty of European states and paved the way for directing invasions outside the continent.

Two Options in the Middle East

Indicators in the Middle East suggest a trajectory of demographic, agricultural, and sovereign imbalances, which could reshape urban centers and exacerbate civil disturbances. This means the region is poised to enter another era of conflicts that will not be any less horrific than the previous genocides of historical communities, whether through direct extermination via mass killings (and the tools to favor this model are not lacking) or indirectly by paving the way for their displacement to save themselves. This positions the Middle Eastern state at a crossroads as it approaches a new era; the nation-state (which is necessarily criminal in the Middle East) will lead to a new phase of genocides and civil wars, thereby fragmenting the already fragile national entities burdened with excess criminality. The agricultural crisis is preparing waves of migration from economically struggling rural areas to cities worn down by agricultural production, resulting in a decrease in their resilience against any dictatorship or political and religious scams!

The alternative option is to rebuild the state towards a clear and honest social consensus that is reconciled with equality. The rejection of equality— as Maurice Ayak noted in one of his articles— is an ideology of discrimination and superiority against equality, and not merely a manifestation of oppression and persecution. What is currently happening in Syria appears to be a re-entry of society into this closed box.

Overall, the Middle East is a place with no promising agricultural prospects or advanced technology, except for some Gulf attempts. Even the territories involved in plans of invasion or those that have already been invaded, like the part occupied by Turkey along the international highway from Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain) to Tal Abyad, are agriculturally degraded lands. They have lost their prosperous era, which ended about half a century ago, and hold different future prospects compared to those envisioned by the United States in Canada and Greenland.

In any case, states are searching for what they lack. In Turkey’s case, what it lacks is oil and gas, which costs its budget approximately $70 billion annually, a figure that continues to rise with the expansion of factories and increasing population. This need may become the foremost driver for two possible scenarios: a lasting Kurdish-Turkish peace based on mutual interests in political recognition and economic resources, or a more brutal phase of war that will involve other regional parties. The era of the “closed box” regarding the Kurdish situation in Turkish politics has ended, and it has become, at the very least, an open box. In any case, the Kurdish situation and Turkey have become interconnected in the consciousness of leaders from both sides; Abdullah Öcalan and Devlet Bahçeli are examples of this interconnection—either survival together or destruction together.

As for Syria, it seems to be reclaiming the era of “protest against equality” from the mid-nineteenth century, preferring to destroy itself rather than acknowledging political participation.