Limits of Effectiveness: Iran and Trump’s Maximum Pressure Strategy

The recent decisive strikes by Israel, supported by the United States, against Iran and its proxies in the Middle East have significantly weakened Tehran’s regional influence, particularly as these strikes targeted many of Iran’s air defense capabilities, resulting in a state of strategic vulnerability for Iran. However, this weakening appears separate from Iran’s efforts to develop its nuclear program; Tehran has intensified its uranium enrichment activities since U.S. President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal from the nuclear deal negotiated by the administration of former President Barack Obama in 2015.

Recent reports suggest that Iran could potentially build several nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks. While the accuracy of these estimates remains uncertain, it is evident that Iran has approached the nuclear deal with a high degree of pragmatism. As the U.S. adhered to the agreement during Obama’s presidency, the Iranian economy experienced a degree of relaxation as pressures eased, particularly due to financial benefits Tehran gained from the lifting of restrictions on its frozen assets abroad. Conversely, when Trump announced the withdrawal from the agreement during his first term (2017-2021), it compelled the Iranian government to mobilize and return to nuclear activities as a reaction that reflected a degree of defiance. A report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in November 2024 indicated that Iran was “dangerously close to enriching uranium to levels suitable for weapons.” The report also revealed that Iran plans to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to further enrich uranium.

The New American Elite and the Iranian Nuclear File

These developments coincided with Trump’s victory for another presidential term, raising significant questions about how the Trump administration will address Iran regarding its concerning nuclear program, especially for its most important ally in the Middle East, Israel. This issue is intricately tied to the structural transformations occurring in the regional environment, in which Tehran appears to be the most affected.

To examine this situation more objectively, it is beneficial to gain insight into the mindset of the elite influencing U.S. decision-making concerning Iran—specifically, Trump and his key aides and advisors on Middle Eastern affairs.

Regarding Trump, based on experiences during his first presidential term, his stance is quite clear. Trump adopted the “maximum pressure” strategy that led to the freezing of the 2015 agreement. He also ordered the assassination of Major General Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in Iraq in 2020. Furthermore, during his latest election campaign, he spoke about “blowing Iran to pieces” and stated that “Israel must strike Iran’s nuclear sites.”

However, considering that these recent statements were made in an electoral context—similar to many of Trump’s other sensational remarks—it appears that the U.S. president does not fundamentally oppose negotiating a deal but instead supports it, albeit with more restrictive terms for Tehran. In a recent speech, he stated, “Iran must come to the table, but this time the negotiations will be better for America and its allies.” The Trump administration has insisted that Iran must first halt its missile development program and cease its regional activities, particularly in Syria and Yemen.

Thus, we see an attempt by Trump to diversify the tools employed in dealing with this issue, shifting between economic pressure and diplomatic engagement. He aims to maintain a balance between hardliners (hawks) and those who are more flexible regarding foreign policy issues within his administration.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio is known for advocating policies aimed at aggressively containing Iran’s nuclear program since his days as a Republican senator from Florida. He supports imposing further economic sanctions on Tehran to curb its influence in the Middle East and West Asia. During his confirmation hearing, Rubio expressed a stringent stance towards Iran, aligning with Trump’s vision, although he adds an emphasis on partnerships with regional powers that share Israel’s sense of threat from Iran, such as Gulf states, with the ultimate goal of isolating Tehran.

Michael Waltz, the National Security Advisor, who has a military background, has consistently described Iran as a destabilizing force and has called for a more robust U.S. strategy based on military deterrence and economic sanctions. He shares similar views to Scott Besant, whom Trump appointed as Secretary of the Treasury. Besant has long supported the “maximum pressure” campaign and has sought to ensure that U.S. financial institutions avoid dealings with entities linked to the Iranian government. In a 2024 television interview, he stated that “Iran is a major threat” and emphasized that the best way to confront it is to make the Iranian regime “bankrupt” again. He has also openly criticized the Obama administration’s approach to easing sanctions.

As Treasury Secretary, Besant is likely to play a significant role in shaping an American strategy that relies on economic force against Iran and its allies. This perspective is shared by Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, Elise Stefanik, Trump’s choice as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and Mike Huckabee, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, whom Trump described in his nomination statement as someone who “loves Israel, and the people of Israel love him,” despite Huckabee not being Jewish.

The current U.S. administration also includes a seemingly less hawkish Iran team, led by Vice President J.D. Vance, alongside Tucker Carlson and Thomas Massie. Additionally, General Mike Dimeo, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs, advocates for pragmatic approaches and restraint in dealing with Iran. Bainbridge Colby, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy known for being the architect of foreign policy in the previous Trump administration, has expressed skepticism about military actions against Iran but maintains a tough stance towards China.

This team prioritizes domestic issues and strategic competition with international powers that challenge the U.S. global standing, such as China, and they advocate for a policy that minimizes U.S. military intervention abroad, particularly in the Middle East and West Asia. Their focus is on strengthening U.S. borders, economy, and regional influence in the Americas.

This implies that the Trump administration is seeking to diversify its approach to Iran, returning to the “maximum pressure” policy but potentially shifting towards a more diplomatic or at least less confrontational strategy. This shift may also be reinforced by the exclusion of more hawkish figures like Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, and Brian Hook, Trump’s former Middle East envoy. Consequently, the current composition of Trump’s team appears more inclined to keep options open between hardline and moderate stances.

This inclination is reflected in Trump’s recent statements regarding the possibility of negotiating a deal with Iran, even if he hasn’t confirmed direct talks. This nuanced approach is further evidenced by the role of Steve Witkoff as the Middle East envoy, who recently played a key role in persuading Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza.

Iran and the ‘Maximum Pressure’ Strategy

This raises another question: To what extent has this policy succeeded in light of the Trump administration’s initial experience? While the “maximum pressure” strategy has severely impacted the Iranian economy, its effects have not aligned with the objectives set forth by the Trump administration, which claimed that the 2015 Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear deal) failed to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.

Interestingly, the chaos resulting from Trump’s policies may have inadvertently aided Iran in achieving advancements in this context, as confirmed by the reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, on January 18, coinciding with Trump’s inauguration, the Iranian government revealed the existence of an underground military base housing attack vessels located 500 meters deep near the Gulf and the strategically significant Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil production transits.

Simultaneously, the Iranian forces conducted extensive military maneuvers across the country named “Eqtadar” (meaning “strength”) during celebrations marking the 46th anniversary of the founding of the republic on February 10, 1979. Recent reports indicate that Tehran has expanded its enrichment facilities at the Natanz reactor and continues to increase its stockpiles of enriched materials at various levels.

Tehran has also benefited from support provided by major powers such as China and Russia, which have largely ignored U.S. and Western sanctions on Iran. This situation is unlikely to change unless either of these powers receives concessions from the Trump administration, and it is also unlikely that the U.S. president will acquiesce to this reasoning.

Furthermore, in recent years, Iran has successfully strengthened its ties with countries in the Global South. Its membership in BRICS has also provided a means to mitigate the impact of U.S. sanctions.

In this context, alongside strategic shifts in the regional environment in the Middle East—most recently demonstrated by the unwavering support of the U.S. president for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—Iran appears to be concerned about a potential backlash from Western countries. This backlash could manifest as a “fast backlash,” involving the reimposition of UN sanctions and increasing international isolation if no alternative agreement is reached.

Consequently, discussions are finally emerging between the government of Iran’s current reformist president, Masoud Pazeshkian, and the Revolutionary Guards about the importance of returning to the negotiating track. This is seen as a last chance to avoid a crisis without appearing desperate. In recent weeks, the Iranian government has shown indications to the international community of its willingness to agree to a conditional return to negotiations.

In this context, the recent visit to Tehran by Rafael Gross, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reflected a notable openness from Iran towards the agency. This openness is largely driven by the Iranians’ desire to avoid any harsh actions from the IAEA’s Board of Governors. During the last board meeting, the three major European countries—Britain, France, and Germany—along with the United States adopted a more stringent stance regarding the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the board did not take any serious actions against Tehran, indicating a degree of forced flexibility on the part of Western powers. This approach seems aimed at preventing Iran from following through on its recent threats, suggesting that the West is also attempting to balance its inclination to impose sanctions with the need to engage Iran diplomatically.

Options for the Future

In light of the above factors, despite Trump’s assertive stance on foreign policy issues—including the Iranian nuclear file—and the escalatory role played by his ally Netanyahu, future options may vary. On one hand, the U.S. may seek to finalize a deal that would alleviate regional security tensions in the Middle East and eliminate any security threats to Israel. On the other hand, it could consider executing limited strikes on specific facilities within Iran’s nuclear program to curtail its advancement while maintaining the “maximum pressure” campaign to inflict further damage on the Iranian economy and undermine the legitimacy of the ruling regime in preparation for its potential downfall.

However, this approach requires significant caution to prevent escalation—bolstered by the ideological rigidity of the Trump administration’s hawks—from derailing efforts to negotiate with Tehran. Iran might also feel compelled to enter negotiations to buy time, particularly given that its overall situation does not appear favorable.