ISIS in Syria: Challenges Following the Collapse of the Assad Regime and the Withdrawal of Iranian Militias

Recent major changes and developments in the Middle East, particularly the collapse of the Syrian regime and its military and security apparatus, along with the Iranian withdrawal from Syria, have revitalized the hopes of ISIS. This situation has resulted in the disappearance of the military presence and structures of Iranian militias and local militias managed by Tehran, creating a vacuum in vast areas that have long served as bases and havens for ISIS and its scattered groups. Some remnants of these groups still find refuge in these areas.

The Syrian Badia, in general, and particularly the rural areas of Deir Ezzor, Hasakah, and Raqqa provinces, serve as a rear base for ISIS. The group operates actively in this region, utilizing its rugged terrain to train members and launch raids on checkpoints and positions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

In addition to these significant shifts in Syria, ISIS continuously exploits attacks by the Turkish army and affiliated factions against the SDF and infrastructure in Northern and Eastern Syria, reinforcing its presence and executing bombing and sabotage operations. Historically, the group has also taken advantage of assaults by Iranian militias and “National Defense” groups to conduct surprise attacks aimed at seizing control, expanding its influence, and creating chaos.

Ongoing Campaigns by the SDF

The SDF have consistently conducted combing and search operations in large areas of the Hasakah and Deir Ezzor countryside to uncover ISIS cells, arrest their members, and confiscate their weapons. These ongoing campaigns include surprise raids and searches based on accurate intelligence, targeting homes and hideouts used by ISIS cells. This effort aligns with the SDF’s continuous strategy to pursue remnants of ISIS, monitor its sleeper cells, and thwart planned operations and attacks that exploit recent developments in Syria, particularly the collapse of the Syrian regular army, the Iranian withdrawal, and the ongoing assaults by Turkey and its affiliated factions against areas in northern and eastern Syria.

The intelligence services of the Syrian Democratic Forces have observed notable ISIS activity throughout the Syrian Badia, especially in the rural areas of Deir Ezzor and Hasakah, following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s operation “Deterrence of Aggression” launched on November 27, 2024. This observation coincided with the retreat of the Syrian regular army and early signs of the disintegration of former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in early December, with regular soldiers abandoning their posts and fleeing to residential areas, some seeking refuge in Iraq.

The SDF also tracked the withdrawal of Iranian militias and the fragmentation of local Syrian factions (National Defense Groups) that had been overseen by Iranian officers and supported with weapons and funding. ISIS attempted to seize as many abandoned military vehicles and materials as possible, targeting arms and ammunition depots to exploit the vacuum left by the retreat and flight of regular army personnel, Iranian militias, and local National Defense groups controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

As part of this strategy, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in the region of Northern and Eastern Syria announced the results of a security campaign launched in rural Deir Ezzor starting in the second half of January. This campaign aimed to pursue remnants of the former regime and members of the disbanded National Defense Forces (NDF).

In a statement delivered by Major General Ali Hassan, a member of the ISF General Command in Northern and Eastern Syria, it was indicated that their forces initiated the campaign with the participation of all relevant agencies and support from the Syrian Democratic Forces. He stated, “The aim of the campaign is to impose security, maintain stability, eliminate threats from the remnants of the defunct regime, and hunt down ISIS terrorist cells.” He added that their forces have “arrested 79 individuals involved in attempts to undermine regional security, create chaos, destabilize the area, and threaten civil peace.” Furthermore, he noted that they “seized communication equipment and significant amounts of ammunition and military gear from the detainees.”

On February 9, the commando forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the international coalition, launched a raid targeting an ISIS cell in the town of Markada in southern rural Hasakah. According to a statement from the SDF Media Center, the operation occurred after meticulous and continuous monitoring of the terrorist cell’s movements. Once information gathering was complete and their hideout was identified, SDF forces raided the location and established a tight perimeter around it. Upon encountering SDF forces, the terrorists opened fire, necessitating a reciprocal response. This led to clashes that resulted in the death of one terrorist, while the cell’s emir, identified as “Nawas,” detonated an explosive belt, killing himself. Overall, two terrorists were killed during the operation, and five additional members of the cell were arrested.

The SDF Media Center stated that this cell was “responsible for terrorist attacks on oil tankers and checkpoints of the ISF in several areas of northern and eastern Syria.” The successful monitoring effort, supported by the international coalition, pinpointed the cell’s members in Markada, who were planning extensive operations, including an attack on the Panorama Prison in Hasakah city, which houses ISIS prisoners.

As for the SDF’s war against ISIS and the results of the operations conducted in collaboration with the ISF against the group in 2024, the SDF Media Center issued a detailed statement outlining the military operations and campaigns targeting ISIS cells and weapon caches in various areas of northern and eastern Syria.

The statement highlighted that these qualitative operations and precise raids conducted in coordination with international coalition forces resulted in the arrest of hundreds of terrorists, including key emirs and field officials, as well as the seizure of large quantities of weapons and ammunition.

The SDF’s statement provided a comprehensive overview of the outcomes of these military campaigns aimed at dismantling ISIS, eliminating its cells and organizational structures, cutting off its funding sources, and addressing its propaganda efforts among local populations. According to the statement, “The terrorist organization executed a total of 113 offensive operations, of which the SDF successfully thwarted 43. Additionally, 17 ISIS operatives were killed, including six emirs and field officials.” The SDF also arrested 278 individuals linked to ISIS. Furthermore, they conducted a total of 98 raids and searches targeting ISIS homes and hideouts, during which they seized significant amounts of weapons, ammunition, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive materials.

The SDF, along with the ISF and specialized intelligence agencies, continues to monitor ISIS’s activities and its ongoing attempts at reorganization and training of fighters to expand its influence. This includes exploiting various developments and events, especially the attacks by the Turkish army and its affiliated factions, to launch surprise operations and create confusion and chaos in rural areas. Additionally, ISIS persistently tries to attack prisons and camps in an effort to free its members and families loyal to the organization.

The SDF is intensifying its cooperation with the international coalition to thwart ISIS attacks and conduct preemptive military actions against its cells. Periodically, the SDF conducts large-scale combing operations involving thousands of personnel from various agencies and specialties. The largest of these was Operation “Permanent Security,” conducted from November 7 to 13, 2024, aimed at uncovering both active and sleeper cells associated with the group, dismantling them, arresting their members, and seizing caches of weapons and explosives.

Additionally, the SDF and relevant authorities are closely monitoring the activities of former National Defense Forces members, who have begun mobilizing against the SDF and the civil administration in several towns in eastern Deir Ezzor. These individuals aim to incite chaos, extort the civilian population, and provoke them against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF.

The Threat Posed by Prisons and Camps

The regions of Northern and Eastern Syria contain a total of 26 prisons and detention centers, housing approximately 12,000 ISIS prisoners and detainees of Syrian, Arab, and foreign nationalities. The Autonomous Administration authorities are holding around 56,000 individuals, including approximately 30,000 children, in 24 detention facilities and two large camps: al-Hol and Roj. Sources indicate that there are about 3,000 ISIS detainees of foreign nationality, the majority of whom were arrested after ISIS’s defeat in its last stronghold in the al-Baghouz area in 2019.

In January 2022, ISIS launched a significant attack on al-Sina’a prison, located in the Ghuwayran neighborhood south of Hasakah city. The assault lasted for nine days, resulting in the deaths of dozens of ISIS fighters and detainees, as well as approximately 140 prison guards and staff. Despite ISIS’s failure to free its members, and the Syrian Democratic Forces regaining control and taking the initiative—especially from the fourth day of the clashes—this attack marked a significant shift in ISIS’s efforts to liberate its members and leaders from the Autonomous Administration’s prisons.

Since that attack, the SDF and special bodies have intensified security measures at prisons and detention centers, activating surveillance and detection systems to improve coverage around these facilities. They have also begun scrutinizing the identities of civilians and checking records of outsiders who are not local residents. These actions aim to prevent the recurrence of such attacks and thwart ISIS’s attempts to achieve a breakthrough that could allow them to free their detainees, thereby boosting the morale of their supporters and sending a message that the organization remains active and capable of striking.

The SDF and special bodies, in collaboration with international coalition forces, have gained expertise in guarding and managing prisons and detention centers housing dangerous ISIS fighters. Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration continues its diplomatic and political efforts to engage various countries in repatriating their citizens among the ISIS detainees, seeking to alleviate the burden on the administration regarding the supervision of these individuals.

The Autonomous Administration has repeatedly called upon the international community to establish a special international court to prosecute ISIS detainees for the crimes they committed against humanity while fighting for the organization. However, the international community has yet to take action in this regard, and no initiatives have emerged to lay the legal groundwork for such a court.

As for the camps housing tens of thousands of family members of ISIS fighters, efforts remain focused on obtaining approvals from various countries for them to repatriate their citizens from these camps. This would help alleviate some of the burdens on administrative and security institutions in northern and eastern Syria, which require special attention and care.

ISIS is attempting, through various methods, to influence detainees in the camps, particularly in the two largest ones: al-Hol and Roj. The organization aims to instill its extremist ideologies, spread hatred among detainees, and incite them against the Autonomous Administration and the staff managing the camps. Additionally, it seeks to reinforce its organizational structures within these camps, especially among the so-called “migrant women” section, who impose severe punishments on anyone attempting to defy the group’s teachings, engaging in brutal violence including murder against those who refuse to comply and hiding the bodies of victims.

Specialized agencies conduct regular search operations in the camps to locate electronic devices used by ISIS cells for communication, destroy hideouts and tunnels, confiscate ISIS flags and symbols, and dismantle organizational and administrative structures, particularly those related to the so-called “female Hesba” and “Cubs of the Caliphate.” Since 2021, the SDF has carried out four major search, combing, and raid operations targeting al-Hol camp and its surroundings. These operations have led to the arrest of dozens of ISIS members, dismantled sleeper cells and organizational structures, disrupted the Hesba and Shabab sections, and confiscated weapons, communication devices, and evidence of homicide or arbitrary detention within the camp.

Jihan Hanan Ahmad, the director of al-Hol camp, said in an exclusive interview with the Kurdish Center for Studies that ISIS’s activities abroad, along with the intensification of its operations and attacks, significantly impact the situation within al-Hol camp, providing detainees with hope of escape. She noted that the collapse of the Syrian regime, the flight of Assad, and the ascendancy of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to power through military means have renewed ISIS’s ambitions for military action to liberate its supporters and their family members.

She indicated that the camp administration received information from the international coalition and the Iraqi government regarding plans by ISIS to attack al-Hol camp to liberate detainees. However, the authorities responsible for securing the camp intervened promptly to thwart this plan before it could be executed in the field.

The camp director elaborated that there have been multiple escape attempts from Hol camp in recent times, but the relevant authorities managed to thwart them all, ensuring that no individuals could leave the camp. Meanwhile, coalition forces have increased their surveillance efforts using advanced equipment. Additionally, international pressure has successfully encouraged some countries to reclaim their citizens, such as the Iraqi government, which recently accepted the return of hundreds of Iraqi nationals.

Rapid Regional Shifts

Recent developments in the region have enhanced ISIS’s ability to continue its activities and adapt to changing circumstances. The group employs new strategies that enable it to expand and achieve breakthroughs on multiple fronts, benefiting from the collapse of the former Syrian army, the withdrawal of Iranian military forces, and the ongoing instability in Syria and the surrounding region.

International reports indicate that ISIS has seized weapons, equipment, and ammunition left behind by the disbanded Syrian army and its allied militias. The organization is presently operating at a high intensity to train new recruits and mobilize its forces in the Syrian Badia, aiming to rehabilitate and revive its project for establishing an Islamic caliphate.

On February 10, the United Nations warned of the ongoing threat that ISIS poses to international peace and security, particularly due to the stockpiling of advanced weapons and equipment in the hands of its members and its control over the Syrian Badia, which serves as a center for external operational planning. Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office, addressed the UN Security Council, stating that ISIS’s increased operational flexibility and control over weapon depots would significantly impact camps, detention centers, and other facilities in northeastern Syria.

He noted that 42,500 individuals remain detained, including 17,700 Iraqis, 16,200 Syrians, and 8,600 individuals from other countries. Voronkov remarked on the declining pace of repatriation, revealing that only five member states have returned more than 760 individuals from Iraq and Syria during the report’s timeframe. The Iraqi government has recently repatriated nearly 400 children from northeastern Syria to a rehabilitation center. Voronkov reiterated the UN Secretary-General’s call for member states to facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of their citizens currently trapped in these camps and facilities.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on January 25, in a report titled “Ahead of Its Withdrawal: Iranian Militias Transferred Weapons and Ammunition to ISIS Deployment Areas in Deir Ezzor,” that the Maizila Badia in Deir Ezzor experienced intense movements by Iranian-affiliated militias prior to their withdrawal from Syria where the organization operates. These movements involved leadership elements and non-Syrian fighters, especially from the Afghan “Fatemiyoun” and Pakistani “Zainabiyoun,” alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

The report indicated that these actions included the transfer of trucks loaded with weapons and ammunition smuggled from Iraq via illegal routes, disguised as commercial shipments such as sheep or food. According to sources from the Observatory, the weapons included heavy machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, assorted ammunition, and large quantities of TNT, previously utilized by ISIS in its various operations.

Moreover, the region has been the site of secret meetings between the leadership of both sides, although clear information about the discussions remains unavailable. However, existing intelligence suggests agreements aimed at creating chaos in diverse areas of Syria, particularly in Deir Ezzor.

The Syrian Observatory also referred to testimonies from local residents, indicating that Iranian militias left substantial quantities of weapons and ammunition in the al-Mayadeen Badia before withdrawing without transferring or destroying them. Witnesses reported ISIS vehicles entering those sites shortly after the Iranian militias’ departure, where they loaded weapons and moved deeper into the Badiya toward the administrative border between Deir Ezzor and Homs. Observers noted that the speed at which ISIS acted to access these locations, combined with prior knowledge of the arms’ whereabouts, indicated clear coordination between the Iranian militias and ISIS to ensure these supplies reached the organization.

Various sources have suggested strong ties between the Turkish state and ISIS, noting that for years, ISIS has exploited the Turkish military presence in several areas of Syria to blend in among the ranks of the pro-Turkish “Syrian National Army,” which is currently conducting a military offensive targeting the Tishreen Dam and the Qaraqozak Bridge. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported statements from its director, Rami Abdel Rahman, on January 29, indicating that some ISIS members have transformed into combatants within the ranks of the National Army groups, particularly in Liwa al-Waqas, while other members are operating in Ras al-Ayn. He criticized Syrian forces for harboring and training ISIS members instead of focusing on eliminating the group.

The fight against ISIS in Syria, primarily the responsibility of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the key partner in the international coalition—cannot be separated from the Iraqi government’s battle against the organization due to the geographic and demographic overlap between the two countries. ISIS exploits both the Syrian and Iraqi arenas for mobilizing and preparing for operations against forces it views as enemies. Iraqi security agencies are intensifying military operations to pursue ISIS elements in the Iraqi Badiya, attempting to separate this region from its extensions in the Syrian Badiya.

In a summary of operations conducted by the Iraqi army and security forces against ISIS in 2024, Sabah al-Numan, spokesman for the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), reported that the agency executed a total of 341 security operations, resulting in the killing and arrest of 147 individuals. Al-Numan specifically noted that the military operations resulted in the deaths of approximately 63 individuals from various leadership levels, including the so-called “Wali of Iraq” and his aides in the Hamreen Mountains, along with 21 ISIS members in a specialized operation conducted by the CTS. Among those killed were the “Wali of Anbar,” the “Wali of the South,” and the official responsible for chemical operations outside Iraq, Abu Ali al-Tunisi.

Regarding the arrests of ISIS members, al-Numan stated that the CTS successfully detained 84 individuals, including key leaders, and destroyed over 260 ISIS headquarters and hideouts in various locations, particularly deep in the Anbar desert.

Conclusion

First: The vacuum created by the abrupt collapse of the Syrian regime, the deterioration of the regular army, and the exit of Iranian militias spurred a resurgence of ISIS, rekindling its hopes of regaining control over vast areas previously under its authority. Consequently, the organization quickly moved to seize arms and equipment deliberately left behind by the regime and Iranian militias, while also focusing on recruiting youth and establishing its ideological and organizational foothold in regions once dominated by the Syrian regime and its Iranian allies.

Second: The Syrian Democratic Forces proactively countered ISIS, aiming to block its expansion within the territory under their control. They conducted extensive raids and searches in rural areas that ISIS primarily targets, aiming to expose and dismantle its cells, arrest its members, and confiscate weapons, explosives, and other equipment. This proactive approach is designed to thwart planned attacks by the group, relying on support from international coalition partners for aerial cover and intelligence on ISIS movements, coupled with local residents providing crucial information.

Third: The SDF has actively dismantled groups from the defunct National Defense Forces whose former members began to engage with locals in the rural areas of Deir Ezzor and Hasakah to incite chaos and hostility against the civil structures and institutions of the Autonomous Administration, Internal Security Forces, and the SDF, ultimately preventing them from joining ISIS. This situation could have led to the formation of cells supporting ISIS’s agenda. Thus, disrupting and dismantling these groups became a priority task in the broader campaign to combat ISIS and prevent its influence from spreading.

Fourth: SDF is investigating the military cooperation between ISIS and remnants of Iranian militias, as well as pro-Turkish factions, to uncover the details of their collaboration. They aim to understand how ISIS exploits Turkish military operations against the SDF, leveraging this opportunity to execute infiltration and surprise attacks, as well as assassinations and sabotage operations targeting civil and security institutions associated with the Autonomous Administration.

Fifth: The SDF and Internal Security Forces have tightened security measures around prisons and camps housing ISIS fighters and their families, in collaboration with the international coalition, to thwart ISIS’s plans for attacks aimed at liberating its members. Relevant authorities are conducting raids within prisons and camps to dismantle ISIS’s organizational structures, such as those targeting the “migrant women” or “Cubs of the Caliphate,” while confiscating communication devices, weapons, and organization symbols, and arresting individuals involved in violent acts against anyone defying its orders.

Sixth: The SDF, in coordination with the international coalition and Iraqi government, has successfully thwarted multiple escape attempts from the camps and prevented ISIS from executing plans for armed attacks on these facilities to free its affiliates. Authorities within the Autonomous Administration continue to strengthen cooperation with various countries to facilitate information exchange and emphasize the need for foreign nations to repatriate their citizens held in Autonomous Administration prisons.

Seventh: Amid the sudden collapse of the Syrian regime, the departure of Iranian militias, and the unclear vision of the interim government in Damascus regarding combating ISIS and its ideology, various countries are beginning to enhance cooperation with the SDF and the Autonomous Administration. This collaboration aims at achieving better coordination on confronting ISIS and tackling all of its ideological and organizational manifestations. Recent developments affirm the importance of the SDF and its central role in fighting ISIS, preventing its expansion, and thwarting its attempts to regain control over territories in Syria. The SDF’s capacity to unveil ISIS’s plans, dismantle its cells, and foil its operations further underscores the critical necessity for this collaboration.