Jaldiran’s Shadow Looms Over Kurdistan in Unstable Regional System

By the end of Donald Trump’s first term, the major unrealized geopolitical prize was the establishment of normalized relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This issue has been a central focus of regional politics in recent years, whether pushed forward through projects like the India-Europe Trade Corridor or undermined, as exemplified by Hamas’s October 7th attack.

Following a meeting between the US President and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 5th, the prospect arose of Tel Aviv reassessing this “grand prize” from the Israeli perspective, specifically, normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia. Trump’s plan to displace the population of Gaza has, in the view of some, opened the door to Israeli ambitions that extend beyond normalization with Saudi Arabia: the permanent removal of Gaza’s population, in a manner that surpasses even the displacement undertaken at the margins of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The latter, at least, involved population exchange; in contrast, the proposed Gaza scenario resembles a Turkish pattern first implemented in the 1930 Wadi Zilan massacre, followed by Dersim in 1937, and in rural Kurdistan in the early 1990s. The use of chemical weapons in Halabja and the Iraqi Anfal campaign against the Kurds provide further examples. If one were to chart the course of ethnic cleansing and mass displacement in the region, the Middle East offers a stark illustration of the persistence of barbarity in contemporary politics, even in the modern era.

Unless Trump abandons the plan to displace Gaza’s population and transform the territory into imagined resorts, a renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas is inevitable.

A Palestinian State After October 7th?

Netanyahu abandoned his usual caution when speaking about Saudi Arabia, stating that the Kingdom possesses large areas of land sufficient to establish a Palestinian state. This is not just a bold act, and it angered the Saudis, who see that normalization has an Arab-Islamic price in addition to the national benefits, which is in fact the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Despite his previous keenness to keep the door open to potential relations, Netanyahu’s statements after meeting Trump signal a radical shift, as he confirmed his rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state as the price of normalization with Saudi Arabia, asserting that Israel will not conclude any agreement that does not take into account the risks threatening its security. He dismissed the idea, saying: “A Palestinian state after October 7?!”

With this position, Netanyahu is establishing a new basis for relations with Saudi Arabia, founded on the principle “relations for relations,” not “relations for a Palestinian state.”

If Tel Aviv maintains this stance, the Middle East could see a reshuffling of its already fragile regional balances, potentially leading to Saudi Arabia withdrawing from its “presumed” alliance with Israel. This scenario is notable for its assumed function: competing with the Turkish-Qatari axis in dividing territories vacated by Iran in the Middle East.

In any event, Israel undeniably played a leading role in containing Iranian “political Shiism” in the region, which automatically empowered “political Sunnism”. Without Israel’s involvement in this conflict, the entire region could have fallen under the domination of Iran and Turkey, two regional powers competing for distribution rather than unilateral control. This detail is critical for understanding the historical constraints on the rivalry between these two nations.

So long as Israel continues to limit Iranian influence, the power vacuum created by new actors (e.g., in Syria) heightens concerns about Israeli security. Netanyahu’s embrace of the Trump plan is likely to delay wider normalization with Arab states and push Saudi Arabia towards a more central position amidst competing blocs. We see this in Syria, where the Kingdom emerges as an independent contributor to stability, operating outside of a shared Turkish or Israeli agenda.

Such a shift in Saudi Arabia’s stance could halt Israel’s integration into the region – its aspiration to become a local Middle Eastern state. This goal appeared within reach after Israel weakened the Iranian axis in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Conversely, Turkey would benefit from Saudi Arabia’s more neutral posture, gaining an advantage over Tel Aviv.

Israel’s Options Amidst a Decline in Normalization

Israel has several options in response to these potential developments – specifically, the possibility of increased tensions with Riyadh – including strengthening its presence in areas of regional competition, especially Syria, and seeking closer ties with smaller actors, given the diminished prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia.

It is noteworthy that the diminished prospects of immediate normalization between the two countries stem from Netanyahu’s perceived lack of understanding of “Middle Eastern personality archetypes.” He cannot address the Saudis in the way he does – as if he can simply dictate their actions with respect to a Palestinian state if they prioritize their own interests. Furthermore, Netanyahu cannot speak about Saudi Arabia as if he were Donald Trump.

From another perspective, a Saudi shift toward neutrality between regional blocs might lead to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sunni-Shia conflict. This, in turn, could rebalance the military dynamic if Iran chooses to focus solely on conflicts within Muslim nations, rather than on the liberation of Palestine.

Uncertainty and Potential New Developments

This eventuality cannot be dismissed as impossible. Iran may develop a formula that ensures it avoids activities that threaten Israel’s existence. If this occurs, Israel may distance itself from supporting Sunni expressions against Iran, predicated on an ideological transformation in Iran that leads it to seek a new adversary to legitimize its rule, rather than Israel. Israel might also formulate comprehensive security scenarios to counter an “angry nation” that surrounds it but is neither supported nor financed by Iran.

Amid these variables, the situation remains fluid. No equation upon which to build has yet solidified, and ambiguity will persist until the nature of Saudi-Israeli relations and Iran’s redefinition of the State of Israel become more clear.

Accordingly, new geopolitical landscapes may emerge, with the Kurds as potential beneficiaries. They have begun to escape the “closed box,” a term coined by Talat Pasha concerning the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress government in Anatolia and the eastern regions; Pasha declared these regions would effectively be a closed box, implying confinement.

Turkey and Kurdistan: Agreement or Confrontation?

Kurdish political options are not guaranteedin terms of results and returns and are subject to conflicting possibilities. Kurdistan—or the Kurdish geographical area—is part of the turbulent Middle East, not the part that will necessarily triumph in every instance. Important and central Kurdish areas, such as Afrin, remain under direct Turkish occupation.

In this context, Turkey and Kurdistan face two choices:

1- Adapting to the new reality and responding to a just peace initiative, allowing both parties to embark on a joint political journey that extends south to the Levant and reaching ‘Arabistan’ (the Arabian Peninsula in Kurdish culture). This process begins with rebuilding the identity of the Republic.

2- Confrontation and the continuation of conflict, which prompts the Kurds not to reject the alliance offered by Israel.

Turkish-Israeli contradictions are not existential, but they carry a great deal of mutual harm, and they are likely to shape the contours of regional strategies in the Mesopotamian basin.

Kurdistan today finds itself in a historical position similar to that between 1500 and 1520, when the result of the Safavid-Ottoman clash at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 was decisive. The alliance of Kurdish emirs with Sultan Selim I broke the geographical boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, which had been confined for two centuries to the Euphrates River, and gave it the ability to expand east and then south. The social base for Ottoman expansion southward was not only in Anatolia but also through a shared political and social mass from Anatolia to Kurdistan.

The alternative to a bold and just Turkish-Kurdish agreement would be new major losses that would turn the region into a battlefield for another century. This would reopen mutual vulnerabilities and lead to renewed attrition in both Kurdistan and Anatolia.