The Trump administration and the Netanyahu government built a shared approach toward Iran, guided by launching two wars against Iran within a single year. According to the principles of modern international relations, this approach is based on excluding the Islamic Republic from the foundational ground of the Westphalian system. This system emerged from the treaty that ended Europe’s religious wars in 1648 on the rules that the state is the primary unit in the international system, that each state possesses sovereignty within its borders, and that other states have no right to interfere in its internal affairs or forcibly impose a change of its political regime. In return, internal guarantees were granted within each state to respect the basic rights of all population groups, across their respective sects, religions, and ethnicities. The logic of Trump and Netanyahu was built on the premise that the Islamic Republic’s regime has no right to claim sovereignty over Iran. It is a regime that lacks “Westphalian” legitimacy, which formed the core basis for the concept of “rogue states” formulated and activated by the United States after the Cold War.
In this sense, the American-Iranian agreement takes on a Westphalian character because it recognizes Iran’s sovereignty over its domestic sphere, and even avoids discussing its regional influence as well. It is a form of selective Westphalianism in the manner of Henry Kissinger. However, all of this analysis remains within a theoretical framework; there is no guarantee that the agreement will hold, and the resumption of war cannot be ruled out at any time during the coming months or even years. Until then, the clauses can be read through the concepts reflected by the words and meanings of the agreement.
The draft of the American-Iranian agreement, according to the version published by The Wall Street Journal, reveals that the core of the understanding respects Iran’s sources of strength and its regional armed assets. The agreement prioritizes halting the war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, lifting the US naval blockade, and opening a 60-day negotiating window regarding the nuclear file. However, it leaves out of the discussion two files that are considered among the most sensitive elements of Iranian power: the ballistic missile program and the network of proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq. It is true that the first clause speaks about ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, but it does not establish a mechanism to disarm the proxies, nor does it link sanctions relief to a change in Iran’s regional behavior.
The inclusion of Lebanon in the ceasefire clause could provoke major Israeli opposition, because it practically means bringing the “Hezbollah” front into an American-Iranian deal without clear guarantees regarding the future of the party’s capabilities, deployment, or arsenal. As for the other fronts, such as Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza, they seem almost absent from the text, despite being part of Iran’s leverage system in the Middle East.
The most notable observation is at Clause 13 of the draft:
After the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receiving guarantees regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States shall enter into negotiations regarding a final agreement restricted exclusively to the remaining articles.
This clause indicates that the scope of negotiation in the second phase will be limited, restricted only to the axes mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding, thereby excluding Iran’s ballistic missile program and its network of regional militias. This means that the agreement, in its proposed form, does not address the broader security and military architecture built by Iran over decades. Instead, it focuses on two practical files: freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and a temporary containment of the nuclear program pending a final agreement. This clearly signifies a strategic failure for the American-Israeli war, as the objective of the Memorandum of Understanding is to restore conditions to how they were before the war!
In this sense, the draft appears closer to turning back the clock, but with higher authorities for the Iranian regime internally. Clause 2 restores American recognition of Iranian national sovereignty and its decisions. This means that this clause carries an unambiguous meaning: if the regime in Iran faces an internal threat through an uprising or armed action, this clause allows Iran to demand that the United States issue statements of condemnation and denunciation against the “conspiracies” targeting Iran. Clause 2, according to the draft, states:
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
In return, Iran obtains early and tangible gains in the draft. The clauses related to lifting the naval blockade, allowing oil and petrochemical exports, the gradual release of frozen assets, and funding an economic rehabilitation plan worth no less than $300 billion grant Tehran massive economic incentives before final nuclear issues are resolved.
As for the nuclear file, the language appears cautious and deferred. Iran reiterates its pledge not to produce a nuclear weapon, but it does not provide a detailed commitment at this stage regarding the fate of enrichment or the nuclear stockpile; rather, it leaves that to the final agreement. Even Clause 9 temporarily solidifies the “status quo”: Iran does not expand its nuclear program, and the United States does not impose new sanctions or reinforce its forces in the region. This means that the agreement does not resolve the nuclear problem immediately, but rather freezes it for 60 days pending more difficult negotiations, or perhaps freezing the crisis at this point and looking for a way to bring back the Obama agreement, but under Trump’s name this time.
The draft separates the nuclear aspect from the regional aspect. It makes economic rewards primarily linked to Iran’s behavior regarding the nuclear file and opening the Strait, not its behavior toward the interior or the region. Hence, it can be said that the agreement, if signed in its current general form, will re-introduce Iran into the markets and ease pressure on it without touching the unconventional deterrence system it built through missiles and allies.
Therefore, the agreement may be read in Washington as a diplomatic breakthrough that ends a costly war and restores energy and navigational stability. However, it will be read in Israel and by Iran’s regional adversaries as an incomplete agreement: it restricts the nuclear program temporarily and opens Hormuz, but it leaves Iran’s real tools of influence off the negotiating table. Under this formula, Iran might lose some of its nuclear margin, but it retains its missiles and its regional network, receiving in return broad economic breathing room, and even a fund to finance what the American and Israeli war destroyed.
In this context, the $300 billion funding article stands out as one of the most sensitive points in the draft. Clause 6 speaks of a comprehensive plan for Iran’s rehabilitation and economic development, with funding of no less than $300 billion, with the participation of the United States and its regional partners. Although Trump says that Washington will not fund this plan from its own money, including this figure in the draft gives Iran a massive economic promise that could turn into a lever to rebuild its economy after the war. Most importantly, this funding, if not linked to clear restrictions on missiles and allies, raises specific fears and panic in Israel that reviving the Iranian economy will strengthen the resources of a state managing a regional military network of influence in Israel’s immediate surroundings.
