As discussions renew regarding the integration between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration, based on the March 10 Agreement, a pivotal question arises: How can a project built on secular and pluralistic values integrate with one that derives its legitimacy from the roots of religious fundamentalism and embraces a strict unipolarity in thought and practice?<\/p>\n
The common, perhaps cynical, answer would be the word “democracy.” However, in his recent interview with CBS, directed at the American public, Ahmed al-Sharaa completely avoided using the term, neither as a symbol of political nor cultural pluralism. Instead, he presented himself as the “sole representative” of the Syrian people, transforming Syria into a geopolitical commodity offered for foreign investment, mocking the discourse on minority rights, and avoiding any reference to genuine self-critique.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, some Western academics believe that Al-Shara has undergone a pragmatic transformation, leading him to accept working within the framework of the nation-state, while others believe that his adoption of selective modern rituals is merely a cover for the idea of “empowerment”, a concept deeply rooted in religious fundamentalist doctrine, particularly concerning the monopolization of authority and state dominance.<\/p>\n
Distorted Modernity<\/b><\/p>\n
Al-Sharaa is not an exception to a wider phenomenon today known as “Authoritarian Modernity,” which relies on a central authority justifying its existence not through democracy, but through promises of economic growth and achievement. In this context, modernity is reduced to a value-less technocratic project, using market discourse as a substitute for politics, and economic openness as a mask for ideological obfuscation. In this sense, what al-Sharaa offers is not a project for a modern state, but a simulation of modernity: a modernity without freedom or public intellect. It is an extremist version of neoliberalism, hiding behind the slogan of “religious particularism” to reproduce the idea of a single Nation , and in the Syrian case: fundamentalist Sunni Arabism.<\/p>\n
Generally, the obfuscation of al-Sharaa’s ideology, and the derision of the idea of secularism and the constitutional state, are met with clear admiration by some international powers. This was recently evident in an article by former American diplomat James Jeffrey, known for his bias toward the Turkish position in Syria, where he called for accelerating the unification of the Autonomous Administration with Damascus. He argued that the stalled agreement, from the perspective of the Autonomous Administration, is due to several factors, primarily the violence directed against minorities and the unilateral decisions issued by the interim authority.<\/p>\n
However, Jeffrey, who previously served as the US Envoy for Syria, considered the deeper reason for the stalemate to be the Autonomous Administration model itself, which has achieved relative institutional stability; the Kurds see no incentive to abandon their secular and participatory experiment in favor of a vague project led by al-Sharaa. Concluding his analysis, Jeffrey clearly favored the option of “stability,” which prioritizes regional security, counter-terrorism, and curbing Iranian influence, over the idea of building a modern state. This is a stance shared by the majority of external powers in their approach to the Syrian file, especially after the West abandoned its liberal legacy and replaced it with the logic of “stability first.”<\/p>\n
Accordingly, a new centralism is being reproduced today, rooted in a Sunni majority with an Islamist character, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Trump described in Riyadh as the “strong man.” This is a re-enactment of an authoritarian model that prefers despotism over post-civil war chaos, in a Western, particularly American attempt during the Trump era, to correct what it considers the “mistake” of Saddam Hussein’s regime collapse, abandoning any illusion of freedom: the peoples of the Middle East, according to this logic, can only be managed by force, even if the price is the complete freezing of the modern state project.<\/p>\n
The paradox is that the power embodied by al-Sharaa does not work to end violence but to manage it, transforming it from an exception into a rule, meaning making it the foundational principle of authority itself. Instead of safeguarding societal rights, it has become a means of subjugation in the name of “coercive unity,” entrenching a totalitarian vision that views pluralism as a defect requiring eradication. This kind of consciousness cannot persist except by reproducing violence: once through actual extermination, and again through symbolic assimilation, as manifested in the attempts to dissolve the Autonomous Administration. Here, the original flaw of the Syrian entity since its founding is revealed: the refusal to recognize contradiction as a condition for life. This pattern of thinking does not ask how Syrian diversity can continue after fourteen years of war, but avoids the question altogether. It is a consciousness that views difference as a threat to its existence, not a creative energy for life renewal.<\/p>\n
Avenues for Coexistence<\/b><\/p>\n
The answer to this question leads directly to the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) and the Autonomous Administration system, as they are the closest expression of the idea of the right to difference, and the possibility of establishing a modern constitutional state stemming from this right, not its negation. The SDF does not only represent the Kurdish question; at its core, it constitutes a rare defensive secular force in an era of secular decline and the rise of fundamentalism. It attempts to give a new meaning to modernity\u2014a democratic modernity that transcends narrow nationalism and redefines sovereignty based on pluralism, not coercive homogeneity. This is what makes it a constant source of annoyance in the view of external powers, as its very existence exposes the fragility of the discourse that builds “stability” upon the negation of difference, which explains the resentment shown by figures like James Jeffrey towards it.<\/p>\n
However, the Autonomous Administration, literally adhering to the Hegelian dialectic in its principle of “Unity within Difference,” understands the nature of the siege imposed on it by regional powers with nationalist tendencies, and is often aware of the extent of international pressures. It practices a pragmatic policy conditioned by principle: it engages in compromises and understandings, not from a position of concession, but from a deep awareness of the necessities of survival and negotiation, as a rational alternative to the ideology of extermination and forced dissolution. Through the language of negotiation, it maintains the logic of the relationship with Damascus, keeping its democratic project alive in the heart of the Syrian tragedy.<\/p>\n
To understand the dynamics of the Syrian conflict, it is worth recalling Hegel’s logic: diversity is not a defect to be corrected, but a condition for consciousness and life, and the contradiction between the center and the periphery is a dialectical necessity that produces a rational totality from the political struggle itself. As for the attempt to impose a coercive unity in the name of the “One Homeland,” it is a pre-dialectical thinking that seeks to halt the movement of history by eliminating contradiction. Consequently, the truth of Syria is born only through the assimilation of this contradiction, meaning transforming the struggle itself into a moment of consciousness, not a war of extermination and violence.<\/p>\n
When entering the field of negotiation with this logic, and with the provisions of the March 10 Agreement document, the principle of integration becomes a recognition of difference within civil and military institutions, rather than dissolution into the central structure, as Mazloum Abdi recently indicated. Nevertheless, unilateral thinking continued to resist diversity over the past months, sometimes through the pressures of war advocates in Ankara, and sometimes through the ideology of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s own supporters, leading to a direct clash with reality, leaving massacres and repeated threats of civil war eruption. This is the essence of the structural tumor that has plagued the Syrian entity since its foundation. Faced with this reality, it appears that Damascus, and perhaps external parties, have finally realized that recognizing the Other is no longer an option, but an existential necessity to preserve the state and society, and the sole condition for the possibility of imposing stability.<\/p>\n
Contradiction as a Condition for Survival<\/b><\/p>\n
Despite all the daily tensions and inflamed regional developments, negotiation appears to have become an inevitable choice, even with the emergence of calls that went as far as demanding independence as a means to stop the Syrian massacre. Integration, according to the current negotiation track, does not erase adversaries into a single melting pot, but acknowledges the distances between them, and establishes a framework for difference and mutual recognition. Its essence lies in demarcating authorities, highlighting the differences between the center and the periphery, separation of powers, and protecting societal diversity, while granting each party the right to manage its own affairs.<\/p>\n
However, this does not mean that coexistence is based on an ideal harmony between a secular system and a fundamentalist one, or between the authority of the sheikhs in Sunni-majority areas and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). Nor does it mean imposing Islamist rule over non-Muslim subjects (dhimmis) under the guise of a “false unity.” Rather, it requires transforming the deep-rooted contradiction between adversaries who view the world from totally different perspectives into a shared space, managed through political and constitutional language, such as sovereignty, national wealth, borders and crossings, currency, powers of the center and the periphery, and counter-terrorism. Integration does not mean coercive unity, but keeping the contradiction within a symbolic space that prevents the slide into a genocidal clash.<\/p>\n
Undoubtedly, the political contradictions between these two projects will remain sharp, but the core issue here is clear: accepting to live with those we disagree with is not mere tolerance, but an inescapable shared reality, and a vital condition for the survival of post-war Syria. The acceptance of the philosophy of contradiction, and dealing with it, represents an essential condition for the success of integration, especially in the absence of a unifying national identity; the lack of this acceptance leaves the option of war as a potential alternative, which the Syrian reality cannot bear. The two models can coexist today if fundamentalist Salafism abandons the absolute, unipolar illusion of state management and accepts relative pluralism, while the Autonomous Administration is forced to interact with this new network of power. Accordingly, all forthcoming negotiation steps are obligated to institutionalize these shared and different spaces, through new laws and constitutional amendments, to ensure Syria’s continuation as a multi-party and resilient entity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
As discussions renew regarding the integration between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration, based on the March 10 Agreement, a pivotal question arises: How can a project built on secular and pluralistic values integrate with one that derives its legitimacy from the roots of religious fundamentalism and embraces a strict unipolarity in thought and practice? The […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3449,"featured_media":6499,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,61],"tags":[1031,937,725,40,964,62],"ppma_author":[1215],"class_list":["post-6496","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","category-slider","tag-ahmed-al-sharaa","tag-mazloum-abdi","tag-sdf","tag-syria","tag-united-states","tag-ypj"],"authors":[{"term_id":1215,"user_id":3449,"is_guest":0,"slug":"ferhad-hemmi-2","display_name":"Ferhad Hemmi","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-03-25-at-19.30.21.jpeg","url2x":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2025-03-25-at-19.30.21.jpeg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6496","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3449"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6496"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6496\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6500,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6496\/revisions\/6500"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6499"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6496"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6496"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6496"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=6496"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}