On Saturday, June 21, 2025, an Israeli warplane traveled over two thousand kilometers to raid an apartment in the Iranian city of Qom, aiming to assassinate a lone resident. The individual was named Mohammad Saeed Izadi ( Hajj Ramadan), a general in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Izadi had gained prominence since the summer 2014 war in Gaza as the head of the Quds Force\u2019s Palestine Branch (Branch 2500). Following that conflict, Hamas began to renew its close relations with Iran after three years of strained ties due to disagreements over the Syrian situation.<\/p>\n
In 2017, Khaled Meshaal was dismissed from his leadership of the movement\u2019s political bureau. Yahya Sinwar assumed leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with Khalil al-Hayya as his deputy. Ismail Haniyeh took over the political bureau, with Saleh al-Arouri as his deputy, responsible for the West Bank. All four are close to Mohammed Deif, the commander of the Qassam Brigades, and to Marwan Issa, his deputy. The Qassam Brigades was the driving force behind the return to Tehran, whose representative in relations with Hamas was Izadi (Hajj Ramadan).<\/p>\n
Five months before he was killed in the Israeli raid (Meir Amit Center for Intelligence and Terrorism) in Israel issued on 30\/01\/2025 a file on Izadi’s activities according to documents seized by the Israeli army in the Gaza war after October 7 (25 pages).<\/p>\n
This file shows that the responsibilities of (Branch 2500), based in Lebanon, included coordinating Iran\u2019s relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and between them and Hezbollah, and that Izadi played a central role in 2022 in Hamas\u2019s meeting with Bashar al\u2011Assad, then acted as the coordinator between them (pp. 18\u201319). Izadi played the leading role in coordinating with al\u2011Arouri to turn the West Bank into a front against Israel (p. 20). For the first time the file mentions the (Meir Amit Center) \u2014 named after the second head of Mossad from 1963 to 1968 \u2014 stating that Izadi was the intended target in the Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus (01\/04\/2024); however, he was delayed for the appointment because of traffic congestion in the pre\u2011iftar Ramadan period, where General Reza Zahidi, commander of the Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon, and his deputy were killed at the consulate (p. 21).<\/p>\n
It was striking that the file uses the following phrases: \u201cSaeed Izadi played an important role in coordinating elements of the (Axis of Resistance) in the preparation for the 7 October 2023 attack… after analysis, it crystallized for them after the (Sword of Jerusalem, 10\u201321 May 2021, for Hamas, and Guardian of the Walls for the Israelis) operation that Israeli strikes on Gaza and Hamas\u2019s launching of thousands of rockets at central Israel constituted an unprecedented achievement, especially in demonstrating through the operation the capability to defeat Israel\u201d (p. 2).<\/p>\n
Following Izadi\u2019s death, the Israeli military issued an official statement describing him as \u201cone of the architects of the October 7 attack and one of the few who knew about it before it was carried out\u2026 a founding and leading figure behind Iran\u2019s plan to destroy Israel through a multi-front attack in two phases: first via missiles from Iran and its proxies, and second through an invasion of Israeli territory with tens of thousands of fighters from Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and the West Bank\u201d (The Times of Israel, June 21, 2025).<\/p>\n
Furthermore, Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir remarked that Izadi\u2019s killing was \u201ca pivotal moment in the multi-front war, and his death makes the Middle East safer\u2026 Izadi was one of the trusted planners and executors of the October 7 attack\u2026 He led the Iran-Hamas axis and was trusted by Sinwar and Deif\u201d (The Times of Israel, June 21, 2025).<\/p>\n
However, despite Israeli confidence in attributing responsibility for the October 7 attack to Iran, it\u2019s important to remember Iran\u2019s denial of any prior knowledge, a stance also shared by Hassan Nasrallah. When the official spokesperson for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ramadan Shariq, stated following the killing of General Radi Al-Musawi in Damascus by an Israeli airstrike that \u201cthe October 7 attack was one of the revenge operations for Qassem Soleimani\u2019s killing,\u201d (The Times of Israel, December 27, 2023), the Iranians quickly denied his statement. Meanwhile, Hamas declared that \u201cOctober 7 was planned and carried out by Palestinians.\u201d<\/p>\n
What General Esmail Qaani stated in an interview with the Iranian Tasnim News Agency on October 30, 2025\u2014namely that \u201cneither the Islamic Republic nor Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah knew the exact date of the October 7 attack, nor did Hamas leaders abroad\u201d\u2014may help explain the mystery surrounding this pivotal event in Middle Eastern, perhaps world, history. Qaani\u2019s statement suggests that Hamas may have consulted with Tehran and Hezbollah about the multi-front operation, as indicated in the Israeli military\u2019s statement on the day Izadi was killed, and then Hamas launched the attack on the Gaza border area alone, after hesitation about participating in a broader \u201caxis\u201d attack.<\/p>\n
The ongoing question remains: why did Hezbollah launch a \u201cwar of distraction and support\u201d starting October 8? Was this pre-arranged with Sinwar, Deif, and perhaps Izadi before October 7? Or did Deif and Sinwar, through the October 7 attack, convince Nasrallah that there was no way out, compelling him and Iran to engage in a battle they had neither approved nor initially intended? This is especially relevant considering the documents seized by the Israelis, which show that consultations with Hamas regarding what they called the \u201cgreat campaign\u201d (according to the Amit Center study, p. 2) began after \u201cOperation Sword of Jerusalem\u201d (May 2021).<\/p>\n
In this context, there are three sources that analyze the documents seized by the Israeli army from secret Hamas headquarters during the Gaza war following October 7.<\/p>\n
The first and second reports were published by the Meir Amit Center:<\/p>\n
In the first source, we find a letter from Haniyeh to Al-Daif and Issa (July 10, 2021), stating:
\n“Regarding the establishment of a defensive alliance between the resistance fronts, we presented the matter to Hassan Nasrallah based on what we had developed during the previous visit. It was noted that the Yemenis and Iraqis stand with Hezbollah, in addition to thousands of fighters in Syria, in preparation for participation in any future regional war. This requires:<\/p>\n
1 \u2013 Adopting a strategic directive at the leadership and political levels.
\n2 \u2013 Determining the nature and level of participation required from each front at the appropriate time, in accordance with what is agreed upon if a request is made by the active front.” (p. 8).<\/p>\n
In a letter from Sinwar to Haniyeh (June 19, 2022), Sinwar outlines three scenarios:
\n1 \u2013 A comprehensive strategic attack on the entire axis, without Iran.
\n2 \u2013 A Hamas-led attack alone, with partial participation from Hezbollah, the West Bank, and the 1948 territories.
\n3 \u2013 The main burden falling on Hamas, with Hezbollah not participating directly, at least in the initial phase. Later, there could be participation from Hezbollah, along with fighters from Syria, Jordan, and the \u201cAxis of Resistance.\u201d (p. 9).<\/p>\n
In a subsequent letter (June 7, 2022), Sinwar summarizes his impressions to Haniyeh:
\n“In my opinion, approval for joint action will not come easily. Even after losing Soleimani, Khairy Zadeh, and Mughniyeh, and after hundreds of Israeli airstrikes in Syria, Iran still adheres to a policy of not crossing certain red lines. Iran\u2019s considerations, and those of its proxies\u2014especially Hezbollah\u2014are entirely different from ours. Hezbollah\u2019s strength and Iran\u2019s efforts to build up forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are mainly aimed at constructing a defensive barrier against Iran\u2019s own security concerns and its nuclear program.” (p. 9).<\/p>\n
The second source discusses Hamas\u2019s response to the protests in Israel during winter and spring 2023, which saw hundreds of thousands demonstrating against Prime Minister Netanyahu\u2019s proposed judicial reforms. These protests included petitions from hundreds of reserve pilots in the Israeli Air Force refusing to serve if the reforms were enacted.<\/p>\n
A summary of Sinwar\u2019s statements in a conversation with Muhammad Nasr, a Hamas Politburo member, (April 4, 2023) reads:
\n“The crisis within the entity is profound. It\u2019s not just a civil war; rather, it\u2019s the disintegration of the glue holding the entity together, and the breakdown of the equations that have sustained its existence and continuity.” (p. 4).<\/p>\n
The third source relates to the minutes of the ten meetings stored on a computer in Khan Yunis, which reveal that Hamas began planning the attack to coincide with Jewish holidays in October 2022. However, the operation was postponed to secure support from Iran and Hezbollah (p. 1).<\/p>\n
It was also noted that all leadership abroad was excluded from the plan, except for Ismail Haniyeh (p. 7). One motive for delaying the attack, according to the May 2023 minutes, was \u201cto undermine normalization efforts between Saudi Arabia and Israel\u201d (p. 7).<\/p>\n
In the final minutes from August 2023, Khalil al-Hayya was sent to discuss the plan with Izadi, who resides in Lebanon, and with Nasrallah. Al-Hayya informed Izadi of the need to strike sensitive points within the first hour. Hezbollah and Iran initially welcomed the plan but requested time to prepare (pp. 7\u20138).<\/p>\n
Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n It seems that Sinwar\u2019s conclusion in his June 7, 2022, letter to Haniyeh\u2014that obtaining approval from Iran and Hezbollah for the plan would not be easy\u2014was correct. Most likely, Hamas acted unilaterally on October 7. It is also probable that Qaani\u2019s statement was accurate: they \u201cknew\u201d about the plan and had been consulted. When they did not respond after the Izadi-Hayya meeting in Beirut in July 2023, Hamas acted independently and did not inform them of the date.<\/p>\n Hassan Nasrallah\u2019s participation, through \u201cdistraction and support\u201d the following day\u2014rather than full participation as Hamas had requested\u2014remains a compromise between Sinwar and Khamenei. It appears to satisfy Sinwar or serve as a cover for his pretexts, without directly disobeying the \u201cIranian Supreme Leader,\u201d who seems to have decided not to participate or prevent the operation after the Izadi-Hayya meeting.<\/p>\n There are no sources confirming what Israeli sources reported\u2014that Netanyahu\u2019s rush to mobilize forces in the north was due to a potential attack by the Radwan Brigade on the Galilee Peninsula on October 8. This alleged threat supposedly prevented the plan, which Israeli officials repeatedly discussed after the Radwan Brigade\u2019s leadership was eliminated in a raid on the southern suburb on Friday, September 20, 2024.<\/p>\n It is important to highlight the ideological and political vision that led to the decision to carry out the October 7 attack. This was based on the theory of \u201cthe weakness of the State of Israel,\u201d which Sinwar seems to have derived from Operation \u201cSword of Jerusalem\u201d in 2021, as well as from the massive Israeli protests in 2023 against Netanyahu and his government\u2019s \u201cjudicial reform\u201d project. This led him to conclude that a process had occurred resulting in the \u201cdisintegration of the glue that holds the entity together and the collapse of the equations that have maintained its existence and continuity.\u201d<\/p>\n Hassan Nasrallah had already expressed this idea years earlier when he said that Israel was \u201cweaker than a spider\u2019s web.\u201d Khamenei had preempted both of them in 2015, when he predicted that Israel would collapse within a quarter of a century. His forecasts intensified amid the 2023 demonstrations against judicial reform, when he stated: However, despite these predictions, they did not follow Sinwar\u2019s lead\u2014though the Palestinians and Arabs paid a heavy price for the consequences of Hamas\u2019s actions on October 7.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On Saturday, June 21, 2025, an Israeli warplane traveled over two thousand kilometers to raid an apartment in the Iranian city of Qom, aiming to assassinate a lone resident. The individual was named Mohammad Saeed Izadi ( Hajj Ramadan), a general in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 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\n“We had said since 2015 that Israel would disappear in 25 years, but now it is rushing to leave.” (April 4, 2023).<\/p>\n