{"id":6457,"date":"2025-10-10T10:55:48","date_gmt":"2025-10-10T08:55:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/?p=6457"},"modified":"2025-10-10T10:59:59","modified_gmt":"2025-10-10T08:59:59","slug":"decentralization-in-syria-a-legal-study-on-the-legitimacy-of-the-self-administration","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nlka.net\/eng\/decentralization-in-syria-a-legal-study-on-the-legitimacy-of-the-self-administration\/","title":{"rendered":"Decentralization in Syria: A Legal Study on the Legitimacy of the Self-Administration"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Decentralization and self-administration is increasingly gaining international attention, especially in countries characterized by complex ethnic and sectarian diversity. In such contexts, the distribution of powers between the central authority and the regions becomes crucial for achieving political stability and social justice. In Syria, one of the most ethnically and sectarianly diverse countries in the Middle East, the issue is not<\/span>without historical, political, and legal complexities resulting from the armed conflicts that erupted in 2011. These conflicts have led to radical changes in the nature and concentration of power and have directly impacted the demands of minorities for political and administrative participation ([1]).<\/p>\n

From an international legal perspective, self-administration is a complex matter that requires careful examination of principles such as sovereignty, minority rights, and the right of peoples to self-determination. This necessitates a thorough analysis of the international legal framework regulating the relationship between the state and its internal components, especially when demands for autonomy or administrative decentralization arise in areas with cultural or ethnic specificities ([2]).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, international agreements related to human rights and minority protections play a pivotal role in establishing standards that must be respected. These standards must be considered when assessing the legitimacy of self-administration within complex conflict contexts ([3]).<\/p>\n

The importance of this research stems from its intersection with one of the most complex Nos in contemporary international law: the relationship between minority rights to self-administration and the principles of sovereignty and state unity, particularly in countries emerging from internal armed conflicts. The significance is especially heightened in the Syrian context, where political demands of minorities have intertwined with profound transformations in the nature of the state and the emergence of actual models of self-administration on the ground\u2014such as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria\u2014which has sparked extensive legal debate regarding its legitimacy and implications.<\/p>\n

Additionally, this research contributes to clarifying the international legal framework governing decentralization, exploring the scope of legal protections for minority rights, and analyzing the extent to which local Syrian experiences align with international standards. This serves researchers, policymakers, and international organizations concerned with shaping Syria\u2019s future after the conflict, and supports transitional justice and comprehensive political settlements.<\/p>\n

The aim is to provide an in-depth legal and analytical reading of the principle of decentralization in light of international law, and to explore the legitimacy of self-administration models that emerge within minority demands, focusing on the Syrian case as a complex and multidimensional model. The research seeks to highlight the extent to which these demands align with international legal principles, particularly those related to minority rights, sovereignty, and the right to self-determination within the framework of a unified state.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the study aims to shed light on the gap between political discourse and the centralized practices adopted by the new Syrian government, and the international standards that emphasize the importance of involving societal components in political and administrative decision-making. It also seeks to analyze the legal framework that could serve as a basis for rebuilding the Syrian state on just and inclusive foundations that respect societal diversity and reduce future conflicts, through comparative case studies and evaluations within the Syrian context.<\/p>\n

Despite the increasing demands for decentralization by various ethnic and religious groups in Syria\u2014including calls for Kurdish self-governance and federal or local autonomy from other minorities such as the Druze\u2014the Syrian state continues to adopt a centralized authoritarian model that rejects any redistribution of power, under the pretext of preserving national unity and sovereignty.<\/p>\n

In this context, fundamental legal questions arise regarding the legitimacy of these demands under international law, the compatibility of the autonomous governance\u2014such as that in northeastern Syria\u2014with international principles related to minority rights and sovereignty, and whether the central practices of the Syrian government constitute violations of collective or individual human rights.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the primary question of this research is<\/span>:<\/strong> To what extent are the demands for self-governance and decentralization raised by Syrian minorities legitimate under international law? How can these demands be reconciled with the principle of the unity and sovereignty of the state, especially in light of the stubbornness of the Syrian central authority?<\/p>\n

This research relies on a comparative legal analytical approach as a fundamental tool for studying both the theoretical and practical frameworks of the principle of decentralization and the legitimacy of self-governance. This approach involves analyzing relevant international legal texts, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international declarations and conventions related to minority rights, as well as resolutions by the United Nations<\/span> General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the study adopts a descriptive and analytical methodology to diagnose the current Syrian situation and identify the legal and political challenges facing the implementation of decentralization. This is achieved through the examination of official documents, political statements, and Syrian legislation, along with analyzing the various positions held by minorities and the central government.<\/p>\n

In addition, a comparative approach is employed to contrast the Syrian experience with those of other countries that have faced similar internal conflicts. The aim is to draw legal lessons and highlight potential obstacles that might impede the recognition of the legitimacy of self-administration within the Syrian context.<\/p>\n

The structure of the research is divided into two main sections, each addressing a complementary aspect of the overarching topic of decentralization and the legitimacy of autonomous administration in Syria, in the following order:<\/p>\n

Chapter One: The international legal framework for the principle of decentralization and self-governance.<\/em><\/p>\n

And Chapter Two: The Syrian reality and the challenges of implementing decentralization under a centralized authority.<\/em><\/p>\n

Chapter One: The International Legal Framework for the Principle of Decentralization and Self-Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n

The principle of decentralization is a legal and administrative concept that has gained increasing significance within the international system, especially in states characterized by multiple nationalities and minorities. It provides a framework to facilitate political participation and fair representation of these groups within a single national structure. From an international legal perspective, decentralization is viewed as a mechanism that allows the distribution of authority between the central government and regional entities, in a manner that respects the fundamental rights of minorities and bolsters the cohesion of the state ([4]).<\/p>\n

In this context, the right of minorities to international protection is a protected entitlement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which emphasizes the importance of respecting minority groups\u2019 rights to practice their culture and language within the framework of the state’s unity and sovereignty ([5]).<\/p>\n

This right serves as a foundational pillar justifying self-administration and decentralization as legal mechanisms aimed at safeguarding these rights\u2014particularly in countries experiencing internal conflicts or ethnic tensions ([6]).<\/p>\n

Furthermore, these principles interact with United Nations resolutions and international legislations that stress the need to strike a balance between minorities\u2019 rights to representation and participation, and the preservation of territorial integrity and the authority of the central government ([7]).<\/p>\n

In the Syrian context, where demands from minorities such as the Kurds and Druze conflict with the stance of the new Syrian government\u2014which emphasizes centralized authority\u2014it becomes crucial to understand the international legal foundations that delineate the boundaries and legitimacy of these demands. This includes assessing the extent to which self-administration can be implemented within the limits of international law.<\/p>\n

Based on these considerations, this Chapter addresses two demands. The first:<\/strong> the relevant international legal principles concerning decentralization and minority rights, and the second<\/strong>: examines the legitimacy of self-administration under international law.<\/p>\n

First Demand: International Legal Principles Related to Decentralization and Minority Rights<\/strong><\/p>\n

This subsection provides an essential legal basis for understanding how the principle of decentralization intersects with minority rights within the framework of international law. Decentralization, as a mechanism for distributing authority between the central government and regional entities, is not merely an internal administrative matter; rather, it is closely linked to the protection of minority rights and their political, cultural, and social participation. This principle is particularly important in multinational and multiethnic states like Syria, where demands from minorities\u2014especially ethnic and religious groups\u2014may clash with the policies of the central authority that aim to preserve national unity through tight central control ([8]).<\/p>\n

Legally, understanding decentralization requires a careful balance between respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and protecting minority groups\u2019 rights to manage their own affairs in ways that maintain their cultural identity and autonomy. The legal legitimacy of decentralization is grounded in international rules and principles that regulate this balance, including human rights law, international humanitarian law, and treaties that recognize and protect minority rights ([9]).<\/p>\n

The legal right of minorities to protection is of paramount importance, as it provides a safeguard against exclusion and discrimination, and helps reduce internal tensions and conflicts that may arise from attempts by central authorities to impose uniform policies across diverse communities.<\/p>\n

Therefore, analyzing the relevant international legal principles involves examining legal texts and international resolutions that clarify the rights and obligations related to decentralization and minority rights, to assess their compatibility or conflict with self-administration and political aspirations of minorities.<\/p>\n

First: The Right of Minorities to International Legal Protection<\/strong><\/p>\n

The right of minorities to legal protection is among the most recognized international rights, rooted in principles designed to enable these groups to preserve their cultural, social, and political identities. This right is explicitly enshrined in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: \u201cIn those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language\u201d ([10]).<\/p>\n

This provision offers significant legal protection, acknowledging the unique characteristics of minorities within the state, and serves as a basis for interpreting policies and measures related to decentralization and self-governance. The rights of minorities extend beyond cultural aspects to include their participation in political and administrative processes, providing a legal foundation for decentralization as a mechanism to realize these rights.<\/p>\n

In addition, the United Nations has Nod several resolutions affirming this right, including General Assembly Resolution 47\/135, which emphasizes the importance of safeguarding minority rights and encouraging their active participation in public life without discrimination ([11]).<\/p>\n

The UN Special Rapporteur on minority rights has also highlighted in his reports the necessity of establishing legal frameworks that guarantee these rights, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states ([12]). Nonetheless, the practical challenge remains in implementing these rights within complex political contexts, where central authorities might view broad minority rights granted through decentralization as a threat to national unity or as a precursor to division. Consequently, international law plays a vital role in setting clear boundaries that protect minority rights without undermining territorial integrity and sovereignty.<\/p>\n

Second: Principles of Respecting State Territorial Integrity and Balancing with Decentralization<\/strong><\/p>\n

The principle of respecting the territorial integrity of states is one of the fundamental pillars of modern international law. It affirms the right of states to maintain their territorial borders and to refrain from interference in their internal affairs. This principle embodies the essence of state sovereignty and is considered a cornerstone of international relations, ensuring stability and limiting border disputes and external interventions ([13]).<\/p>\n

However, this principle does not necessarily conflict with the principle of decentralization or self-administration. Instead, it requires a careful legal balance between preserving the unity of the state and accommodating the demands of minorities for self-governance or broad participation in managing their local affairs. International law recognizes minority rights and urges respect for their cultures and political rights, while simultaneously emphasizing that national sovereignty and territorial integrity must not be compromised ([14]).<\/p>\n

This balance is reflected in various international legal texts, most notably the United Nations Charter, which, in Article 2, emphasizes respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. At the same time, it encourages respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of minorities. This calls for legal and political formulas that enable central authorities to grant a degree of decentralization or self-administration without undermining territorial integrity or sovereignty ([15]).<\/p>\n

Many international experiences demonstrate that successful decentralization is achieved through constitutional and legal frameworks that guarantee the political and cultural rights of minorities, while reaffirming loyalty to the state as a whole. From this perspective, decentralization in Syria can be viewed as a legal and political pursuit requiring guarantees to protect national unity while simultaneously fulfilling minority aspirations for participation\u2014consistent with international law and treaties.<\/p>\n

Third: International Agreements and Relevant Legal Frameworks<\/strong><\/p>\n

The international treaty system provides the primary reference for assessing the legitimacy of minority demands for decentralization, especially in contexts marked by internal conflicts or a lack of central justice, such as in Syria. The international community, through various UN treaties and resolutions, has recognized that minority rights are not limited to cultural or linguistic aspects but extend to political participation and internal self-determination within a single state.<\/p>\n

In the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 27 explicitly states: \u201cIn those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the others of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their religion, or to use their language\u201d ([16]). This provision establishes a legal basis linking minority identity expression with the right to an administrative or political framework that guarantees these rights ([17]).<\/p>\n

Applying this principle to the Syrian context, the historical neglect of minority rights\u2014particularly the Kurdish community\u2014and the denial of their language and cultural identity justify, from an international legal perspective, the pursuit of decentralized administrative models that ensure a minimum level of political and cultural dignity for these groups, provided they remain within the national framework.<\/p>\n

The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Syria acceded to in 1969, is also a significant reference. It obliges states to take effective measures \u201cto ensure the equal enjoyment of all political rights, including the right to participate in government, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin\u201d ([18]).<\/p>\n

Given the exclusionary policies historically practiced against the Kurdish component in Syria, this convention provides a legal basis for advocating political reforms that guarantee local representation and power-sharing.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities emphasizes the right of minorities to participate in \u201cdecision-making in matters affecting their lives or the territories they inhabit\u201d and encourages states to adopt appropriate measures to facilitate this participation ([19]).<\/p>\n

This declaration is among the most influential tools for moral and political pressure, especially on highly centralized states such as Syria, where the central authority has monopolized political, economic, and security decision-making for decades, leading to a loss of trust among components of the state.<\/p>\n

Comparative analysis indicates that societies emerging from conflict or suffering from chronic marginalization often resort to models of autonomy or administrative decentralization as tools to restore internal balance and ensure stability, without compromising the unity of the state. Therefore, the implementation of these agreements does not diminish sovereignty but can strengthen it through internal cohesion based on fairness and participation.<\/p>\n

From a legal analytical perspective, the international framework does not oppose the concept of self-administration provided that it operates within the limits of national sovereignty and constitutional mechanisms. In the Syrian context, adopting a genuine decentralization model\u2014based on these treaties\u2014represents a legitimate pathway to rectify decades of marginalization and violations against minorities. This is especially relevant after 2014, when Kurdish local governance experiments in northeastern Syria emerged as tangible efforts to build an organized alternative administrative structure, which should be evaluated from a legal standpoint rather than through political or military confrontation ([20]).<\/p>\n

Second Demand: The Legitimacy of Self-Administration in International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

The principle of self-administration represents an important legal approach within the international legal system to achieve a delicate balance between the principle of national sovereignty and the right of local groups, particularly minorities, to manage their internal affairs. This principle gains particular significance in countries with a pluralistic nature ([21]) or those that have experienced severe political crises affecting national cohesion. The core legal debate revolves around whether self-administration is a legitimate model that can be accepted within the framework of a unified state, or whether it poses an implicit threat to the unity of the political entity.<\/p>\n

In the Syrian context, demands for decentralization increased after 2014, amid the gradual collapse of central state institutions in several regions. The model of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria ([22]) emerged as one of the most prominent examples in terms of organization, the formation of administrative structures, and the implementation of justice, education, and public services. This model did not, in practice, violate the principle of Syrian territorial integrity ([23]); rather, it represented an attempt to build grassroots governance structures aligned with the needs of the local population.<\/p>\n

This experience raises multiple legal questions regarding the legitimacy of its establishment, its consistency with the general principles of international law, and the possibility of adopting it as a permanent future arrangement within a unified Syria, or as a transitional solution that enhances local stability pending a comprehensive political settlement.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the legitimacy of this administration cannot be assessed in isolation from the conceptual framework of international law, which recognizes minority rights and grants local communities a margin of internal self-governance, provided that it does not conflict with the unity and sovereignty of the state.<\/p>\n

First: The Concept of Self-Administration and its Legal Aspects<\/strong><\/p>\n

Self-administration constitutes a form of local governance that grants communities or groups within a state a degree of authority to exercise their powers in specific domains, without seceding from the parent state. It is classified as a model of political decentralization or minority decentralization, whereby certain entities are granted the right to manage their legislative, executive, and cultural affairs within a defined geographic area, under a legal system that guarantees the unity of the state without undermining its sovereignty or its recognized international borders.<\/p>\n

The principle of self-administration is defined in international legal jurisprudence as: \u201cA legal system that enables local or national groups to manage their cultural, social, and administrative affairs within the borders of the state and under its sovereignty, as a means of respecting local particularities and achieving internal stability\u201d ([24]). This system is not a departure from the principle of sovereignty; rather, it is considered part of contemporary governance developments, as many multiethnic or multilingual states permit forms of self-administration aimed at reducing conflicts and facilitating peaceful coexistence among minorities.<\/p>\n

Among the most prominent examples implemented internationally are the autonomous regions of Trentino-Alto Adige in Italy and Catalonia in Spain, where broad local powers were granted without recognizing these regions as independent states. These examples demonstrate that self-administration does not necessarily conflict with national unity but can serve as a guarantee for cohesion within diverse societies ([25]).<\/p>\n

In the Syrian case, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria is the most notable practical example, established since 2014 through the creation of local legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. This administration comprises three main cantons (Al-Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin), which later expanded to other areas after the regime\u2019s withdrawal. It developed its own legal system, including civil laws, local courts, and education in multiple languages (Kurdish, Arabic, and Syriac), while striving to maintain a balance among the various societal components.<\/p>\n

Despite the lack of formal international recognition, this experiment has succeeded in establishing a degree of administrative and security stability in an area outside the control of the Syrian regime, through cohesive organizational structures and broad popular participation. From an international law perspective, this provides a foundational basis for considering it as a \u201clegitimate form of self-governance\u201d within the framework of the Syrian state, provided it continues to uphold the principle of Syria\u2019s unity and complies with international human rights standards.<\/p>\n

Second: Conditions and Foundations for the Legitimacy of Self-Administration under International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

There is no single, definitive definition of the legitimacy of self-administration in international law. However, legal jurisprudence and international documents indicate that this legitimacy derives from a set of principles and standards rooted in the rules of public international law, particularly regarding minority rights, the right to internal self-determination, and the principle of territorial integrity of states. Based on these rules, four essential conditions can be identified that ensure the legitimacy of self-administration within the sovereign framework of the state.<\/p>\n

First Condition:<\/strong> Respect for the territorial integrity of the state and the non-advocacy of secession. This condition is the cornerstone for evaluating any model of self-governance; self-administration must not serve as a pretext for dividing states or threatening their internal stability. The United Nations General Assembly explicitly reaffirmed this principle in its 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations among States, emphasizing that \u201cself-determination shall not lead to the disintegration of the political unity of the existing State\u201d ([26]). This aligns with many national constitutions that explicitly recognize the principle of decentralization while maintaining adherence to national unity.<\/p>\n

Second<\/strong> Condition:<\/strong> The expression of the peaceful, genuine will of the local population. Self-administration must originate from the actual desire of the local residents, expressed through civil institutions or elected representative bodies, rather than armed groups or through forced imposition of facts on the ground. This condition is directly linked to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that everyone has the right \u201cto participate in public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives\u201d ([27]).<\/p>\n

Third Condition:<\/strong> Respect for human rights, pluralism, and the rule of law. Self-administration loses its legitimacy if it becomes a tool of repression, discrimination, or if it violates fundamental freedoms. The UN Human Rights Council, in its Resolution 36\/19 of 2012, affirmed that respect for the rule of law and equality before the law are indispensable conditions for any legitimate local administrative structure. Protecting minorities and the rights of religious and ethnic groups is an integral part of this context.<\/p>\n

Final Condition:<\/strong> The extent to which the self-governing administration contributes to achieving stability and civil peace within the state. Comparative experiences have demonstrated that successful models of self-administration\u2014such as South Tyrol in Italy or Aruba in the Netherlands\u2014have contributed to de-escalating conflicts rather than exacerbating them. The European Commission\u2019s 2015 report noted that \u201cpolitical decentralization is one of the constitutional means to overcome internal crises and prevent the disintegration of the state\u201d ([28]).<\/p>\n

In the Syrian context, the experience of the \u201cAutonomous Administration of North and East Syria\u201d can be regarded as a contemporary model that approaches these conditions in several aspects. This administration, officially established in 2014, has not declared any intention of secession but repeatedly emphasizes the unity of Syrian territory. It manages its affairs through local civil councils comprising representatives from various ethnic and religious groups. It has also succeeded in providing civil services and establishing a relatively stable institutional structure compared to other conflict zones. However, its fundamental legal challenge remains the absence of constitutional recognition by the central government, which weakens its domestic legal legitimacy and delays any international recognition.<\/p>\n

Third: Practical Models of Self-Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n

Over the past decades, the world has witnessed numerous cases of national and ethnic conflicts that prompted specific groups to demand self-governance or various forms of administrative decentralization as a means of achieving social and political justice within the framework of the nation-state. Examining these experiences reveals that self-administration is no longer an exceptional or extreme option, but has become an effective legal and political solution to many crises, especially when it is accompanied by a commitment to the unity of the state and respect for constitutional principles.<\/p>\n

One of the most prominent examples is the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. After decades of marginalization and systematic violence against the Kurdish component, the region was able to establish a genuine self-administration structure following the withdrawal of Iraqi forces after the Gulf War in 1991. This reality was later formalized in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which recognized the region as a federal administrative unit with its own parliament, government, laws, and the right to maintain security through the Peshmerga forces ([29]).<\/p>\n

Despite political challenges and disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil, this model demonstrated its capacity to achieve a degree of institutional stability and contributed to fostering a sense of citizenship and belonging ([30]). It is also important to note that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has gained implicit international acceptance, even without formal recognition as an independent state. This indicates that self-administration is not incompatible with state unity and can even serve as a guarantee of cohesion in cases of national division.<\/p>\n

In the same context, the Basque Country in Spain features another example of how national demands can be accommodated through legal channels. After decades of violence by ETA, the Spanish state realized that addressing the issue could not only be done through a security approach, but through a political and constitutional response.<\/p>\n

This was embodied in granting the region a broad autonomy under the 1979 “Basic Law of Autonomy,” which empowered it to establish its own parliament, manage taxation, education, and cultural affairs, all within the framework of the unity of Spain ([31]). Over time, this approach contributed to a gradual decline in separatist activities, with the Basque majority becoming part of a legal and constitutional system that respects its distinct identity, without engaging in an existential confrontation with Madrid.<\/p>\n

In Italy, South Tyrol faced a regional identity crisis following its annexation after World War I, during which the German-speaking population experienced policies of cultural and linguistic assimilation by the Italian state. Following Austria\u2019s international intervention and prolonged negotiations, the 1946 De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement was reached, which was later codified in the 1972 Autonomy Statute. This granted South Tyrol broad powers over cultural, educational, and local judicial affairs ([32]).<\/p>\n

What makes this experience particularly notable is that it was established with international guarantees and under the supervision of the United Nations, which enhanced local confidence in the regime\u2019s longevity and demonstrated that self-administration can be a tool for reconciliation rather than conflict\u2014if legally recognized.<\/p>\n

Applying these models to the Syrian context, especially in the north and east of the country where the “Democratic Autonomous Administration” emerged following the withdrawal of central government institutions, we observe that the Syrian experience is following a similar path. Despite lacking formal constitutional recognition, this administration has succeeded in establishing local institutions, creating legislative and executive councils, and managing diverse ethnic and religious communities, particularly with a relatively balanced presence of Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, and others.<\/p>\n

Over more than ten years, the autonomous administration has demonstrated its ability to provide a minimum level of stability and services, even under siege and political isolation. However, its fundamental legal challenge remains the absence of constitutional recognition, and the rejection of any deep decentralization by the new Syrian regime, which risks opening the door to new conflicts.<\/p>\n

In conclusion, comparative international models clearly indicate that self-administration does not constitute a threat to the state if implemented according to legal principles. Rather, it can be a safeguard for internal stability. According to principles of international law, any local administration derives its legitimacy from its representativeness of the population, its capacity to deliver justice locally, and its respect for the sovereignty of the state. This largely applies to the Kurdish autonomous administration in Syria, which seeks constitutional recognition that affirms a legal, non-separatist reality within a multi-ethnic, multi-component state.<\/p>\n

Second<\/strong> Chapter: The Syrian Reality and the Challenges of Implementing Decentralization Under the Central Authority.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Decentralization in Syria is among the most complex and sensitive topics, especially amid ongoing political conflict and the interplay of ethnic and religious factors. This complexity is heightened by the presence of multiple minorities and their diverse attitudes toward the central authority. Minority demands\u2014including those of Kurds and Druze\u2014for self-administration or expanded local governance have historically emerged as responses to marginalization and discrimination experienced by these groups over decades. Conversely, the central authority in Damascus has adopted policies emphasizing the centralization of decision-making and seeking to impose national unity at the expense of the minorities’ demands for diversity. This dynamic has complicated the application of any decentralization model that respects the rights of these minorities within the framework of the Syrian state.<\/p>\n

Legally, this tension raises fundamental questions regarding the extent to which the new Syrian regime adheres to international standards pertaining to minority rights and their right to political and administrative participation. It also questions the regime’s capacity to incorporate decentralization within a constitutional framework that safeguards national unity without oppressing or marginalizing various societal components.<\/p>\n

Based on these considerations, this section addresses two main demands:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. The First Demand: Syrian minorities and their positions on decentralization.<\/li>\n
  2. The Second Demand: Syrian centralization policy and the government’s response to decentralization demands.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The First<\/strong> Demand: Syrian minorities and their positions on decentralization<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The demands of minorities in Syria for self-management and decentralization are among the most important political and legal issues that have sparked widespread debate, especially with the complexities of the Syrian multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian reality. These demands stem from a long history of tension between national policies aimed at enforcing a unified decision-making system and local authorities seeking to preserve their political, cultural, and social identities.<\/p>\n

    The Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority in Syria, with a history marked by ongoing demands for their national, cultural, and political rights. Similarly, the Druze and Alawites enjoy a special status within Syria\u2019s social and political landscape.<\/p>\n

    These demands are rooted in a desire to protect fundamental rights\u2014such as cultural and political expression\u2014and to organize their internal affairs in accordance with internationally recognized principles, particularly those embodied in international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Moreover, these demands are embedded within a global context that affirms minorities\u2019 rights to protection and political participation within their states. This framework situates decentralization within a legal project that supports it, provided appropriate constitutional and practical guarantees are in place.<\/span><\/p>\n

    However, despite these demands, decentralization faces significant obstacles due to the insistence of the central authority on maintaining the unity of the national state. This insistence complicates the implementation of any form of self-administration, especially as this policy is intertwined with existing political and security tensions. Additionally, there are fears related to the potential disintegration of the state, which further hampers efforts toward decentralization.<\/p>\n

    First: The Backgrounds of the Demands of Kurds, Druze, and Alawites for Decentralization<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The backgrounds of minority demands in Syria differ according to each group’s specific circumstances. However, the common thread among them is the pursuit of safeguarding their cultural, political, and social identities through expanding decentralization or self-administration powers.<\/p>\n

    The Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority in Syria, estimated at around 10% of the population, predominantly residing in the north and northeast regions. Their calls for decentralization originate from a long history of political and legal marginalization, including denial of Syrian citizenship for years, restrictions on their linguistic and cultural rights, and attempts to alter the demographic composition of their regions ([33]). These circumstances led to the establishment of the Self-Administration, which created local institutions independent of central authority to manage administrative and political affairs\u2014an operational model of decentralization on the ground, despite the absence of official recognition by the Syrian government ([34]).<\/p>\n

    The Druze community’s stance on decentralization exemplifies a commitment to maintaining the unity of the state while advocating for a fair and balanced redistribution of authority. After years of administrative and security marginalization in the Sweida Governorate, clear calls emerged from Druze religious and social leaders, notably Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, for adopting an expanded decentralized system that would permit local communities to manage their internal affairs within the framework of a unified Syrian state. These demands are grounded in principles of constitutional justice, aiming to ensure the participation of all societal components in shaping public decision-making without infringing on the sovereignty of the state ([35]). It is important to note that these calls do not reflect separatist tendencies but are rather a response to a centralized system that has proven incapable of managing Syria\u2019s diversity. The “Men of Dignity” movement, for instance, has repeatedly emphasized its rejection of any partition plans, while supporting a decentralized administrative system that ensures local stability and genuine participation ([36]).<\/p>\n

    In this context, the Druze demands align with the modern understanding of political and administrative decentralization, as implemented in many comparative constitutional models. Local authorities are granted broad powers over security, services, and economic management, while sovereignty and overarching legislation remain the prerogative of the central government. Several local actors in Sweida have emphasized that adherence to decentralization is a crucial safeguard for protecting cultural and religious pluralism, and helps prevent the slide toward sectarian or separatist projects that contradict the principles of a civil state ([37]). This perspective positions Druze demands within constitutional approaches that see decentralization as a means of fostering political stability, rather than a pathway to dividing the national unity\u2014despite attempts by some political actors to portray it otherwise for political purposes.<\/p>\n

    The Alawites, whose name has often been associated with the former Syrian regime, are not a monolithic group within the state nor beneficiaries of exclusive privileges. Only a limited segment of the political and military elite has historically held influence, while large parts of the Alawite community have experienced marginalization and repression, similar to other segments of Syrian society.<\/p>\n

    Since the current regime’s rise, Alawites have not been immune to targeted violence based on sectarian identity, which has deepened the group’s suffering. Today, like other groups, they are seeking ways to secure greater safety and stability\u2014whether through comprehensive political reforms or through local administrative mechanisms to govern their regions ([38]).<\/p>\n

    Legally, the demands of these minorities are grounded in international law principles that guarantee their rights to cultural and political expression, along with protections against discrimination, all while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Nonetheless, Syria\u2019s complex political and security environment poses significant challenges to implementing decentralization, especially given the central government\u2019s resistance, which fears that such measures could weaken the unity of the nation or provoke sectarian and ethnic divisions ([39]).<\/p>\n

    The question of decentralization in Syria remains closely tied to the balances of power locally and regionally, as well as the role of minorities in the ongoing political process\u2014particularly considering the influential Kurdish self-administration, and the cautious engagement of Druze and Alawite communities, which seek legal and security guarantees ([40]).<\/p>\n

    Second: The Right of Minorities to Demand Self-Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The right of minorities to demand self-administration is not a violation of international law. Instead, it rests on a foundation of well-established legal principles that recognize the right of culturally, ethnically, or religiously distinct groups to receive special protections and to manage their local affairs within the framework of the nation-state, provided that this does not infringe upon the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state.<\/p>\n

    Legally, Article (27) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
    \n“In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language in community with the members of their group” ([41]). This indicates that international law not only recognizes the existence of minorities but also obliges states to adopt positive measures to protect these rights.<\/p>\n

    Accordingly, the demands of the Kurds, Druze, and Alawites in Syria for local governance or decentralization are not inherently violations of the law but are expressions of natural rights that align with Syria\u2019s international obligations. The Syrian Constitution itself\u2014particularly Article 131 and subsequent provisions of the 2012 Constitution\u2014recognizes the principle of local administration, despite its vague implementation.<\/p>\n

    In the Syrian context, the long-standing denial of citizenship to the Kurds until 2011, coupled with decades of restrictions on their language and cultural identity, constitutes a clear violation of these international principles, thus lending legitimacy to their calls for self-administration. Similarly, the Druze demands to preserve their cultural and social identity within a protected local administrative framework are an extension of their historical independence, especially considering that the Sweida region has remained relatively neutral during the Syrian conflict, bolstering their aspirations for autonomous management of local affairs.<\/p>\n

    From an international humanitarian law perspective, a state’s failure to protect minorities from marginalization or discrimination can justify\u2014before international bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights\u2014the adoption of flexible administrative solutions like autonomy, federalism, or enhanced decentralization. Examples include the cases of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan. However, it is important to note that international law does not grant minorities an automatic right to secede; rather, it encourages peaceful and consensual solutions within the sovereignty of the state ([42]).<\/p>\n

    In the case of Syria, the ongoing suppression of decentralization demands by the central authority may be viewed as a breach of its international obligations. Additionally, the absence of a clear national legal framework defining the powers and competencies of local administrations makes any form of self-governance vulnerable to conflict and political disputes, as observed in the relationship between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.<\/p>\n

    The legal solution, therefore, lies in enacting a comprehensive local governance law that guarantees expanded powers to minorities and local communities to manage their cultural, educational, and administrative affairs\u2014ensuring these do not threaten the unity of the state or its political system.<\/p>\n

    Third: The Role of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a Representative of the Autonomous Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Since its establishment in 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have emerged as one of the most prominent non-governmental actors in the Syrian landscape, especially in the northern and eastern regions of the country. Their military role has intersected with a broader social-political project represented by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The SDF has positioned itself as the protector of this project, moving beyond its traditional combat role to become a supporter of an alternative political-administrative structure that challenges the authority of the central state, particularly in light of the vacuum created by the ongoing conflict and the retreat of the state from these areas.<\/p>\n

    In April 2024, the Kurdish Unity Conference held in Qamishli marked a significant shift in the approach to Kurds\u00a0 n Syria\u2014from cultural demands<\/span> to a comprehensive political and human rights project rooted in constitutional legitimacy and international standards. Participants from various Kurdish factions and groups adopted a unified vision to resolve the Kurdish question within the framework of a democratic, decentralized Syrian state. This vision emphasizes constitutional guarantees of national rights and adherence to international human rights treaties, especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.<\/p>\n

    The final declaration of the conference affirmed that the Kurdish struggle is an integral part of the Syrian national movement, and that decentralization is not a prelude to division but a means of ensuring balanced participation in governance and the protection of pluralism within a constitutional federal model ([43]). The issuance of this political document and the formation of a joint delegation to conduct follow-up dialogues represent a realistic step toward integrating the Kurdish vision into the broader Syrian political solution, aimed at preserving national unity and ensuring justice for all components ([44]).<\/p>\n

    Legally, this movement can be categorized under the principle of internal self-determination as outlined in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which permits local communities to organize their affairs within a single state, provided that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state are not violated ([45]). Under this principle, the experience of the SDF could be recognized as a legitimate political representation, especially if it is acknowledged as a negotiating party within the context of a comprehensive political settlement for Syria.<\/p>\n

    Despite facing accusations, the SDF has demonstrated through its civil institutions\u2014including local councils and legislative bodies\u2014that it adheres to an administrative system characterized by governance and organization. Its legitimacy is based on active community participation, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas, as well as engagement of other demographic components. However, the primary obstacle to formal recognition of its legitimate representation remains the Syrian central government\u2019s rejection of any administrative model that departs from strict centralization. This has turned the dispute into a debate over constitutional interpretations of sovereignty and national unity, rather than solely a military conflict.<\/p>\n

    The presence of the SDF in this context is not limited to its military role but extends to its position as a political actor seeking to transform territorial control into a negotiation project, thereby gaining leverage in any future political settlement ([46]). Many researchers emphasize that any future decentralization in Syria cannot be achieved without integrating the experience of the autonomous administration as a core element\u2014both structurally and legally ([47]).<\/p>\n

    We believe that despite some criticisms regarding its organizational structure and political orientation, the SDF is effectively a product of the collapse of the central state and its failure to manage the country\u2019s affairs in a comprehensive, participatory manner. Through its experience\u2014including the development of civil and legislative institutions\u2014it offers a model that can be further developed legally toward a balanced, democratic, decentralized system.<\/p>\n

    Furthermore, we see the importance of incorporating the vision of the autonomous administration, as expressed by the SDF and the outcomes of the Kurdish National Unity Conference, into Syria\u2019s upcoming constitutional process as part of a comprehensive national solution\u2014not as a regional exception. This approach aims to ensure justice and equitable representation for all Syrians, in accordance with the general principles of international human rights law and modern participatory democracy.<\/p>\n

    Second Demand: Syrian Centralization Policy and the Government<\/strong>\u2019<\/strong>s Response to Decentralization Demands<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Over more than a decade since the eruption of the Syrian revolution, the political landscape in Syria has undergone profound transformations. These include the collapse of the old central regime and the emergence of new authority structures striving to impose central control under exceptional circumstances and ongoing internal conflicts. Despite the complexities of this phase, the demands of Syrian minorities\u2014particularly the Kurds, Druze, and Alawites\u2014for political, administrative, and rights-based representation through a decentralized system remain a central No in any future political dialogue. This is clearly reflected in the aspirations of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which has formed a unique model of decentralization within a highly intricate political and security context ([48]).<\/p>\n

    However, the new Syrian government, despite some reformist tendencies, tends to maintain strong centralized control, adhering to a narrow concept of national unity that rejects any form of decentralization. This stance has led to increased tensions between the central government and regions characterized by diverse ethnic and religious compositions, such as Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite areas. As a result, implementing genuine decentralization has become politically and legally complex.<\/p>\n

    Consequently, several challenges hinder the realization of legitimate decentralization, including tensions between respecting the territorial integrity of the state and honoring the rights of minorities to self-rule. Political fears of disintegration or destabilization have also played a role. These dynamics are especially evident in the government\u2019s dealings with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which represent a prominent voice for the self-administration demands in North and East Syria.<\/p>\n

    First: Centralized Hardline Policies and the Policy of Imposing Unity<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Despite the fall of the previous Syrian regime in 2024, the policy of centralization in governing the Syrian state has largely remained unchanged. The new authorities continue to adopt a strict approach aimed at enforcing a tight central unity across the entire Syrian territory. This approach clearly rejects any demands for decentralization or self-administration, especially from minorities such as Kurds, Druze, and Alawites, who seek to enhance their political and cultural rights through models of decentralization that ensure their active participation in governance.<\/p>\n

    This centralist rigidity was evident in the response to security incidents in Sweida Governorate in 2025, where central forces were used to suppress internal conflicts between the Druze community and Bedouin tribes. This excessive use of force was not solely a security reaction but also an attempt to impose central dominance over a historically diverse region, reaffirming the rejection of any form of self-administration that could threaten national unity from the perspective of the central authority ([49]).<\/p>\n

    Such strict central policies conflict with international principles that protect minority rights, including the right to self-administration and cultural and political expression. International law\u2014including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\u2014recognizes minorities\u2019 rights to protect their identities and participate in governance in ways that balance state interests with territorial integrity ([50]).<\/p>\n

    In Syria, the policy of enforcing central unity has deepened divisions and fueled social tension, increasing minorities\u2019 feelings of marginalization and exclusion, thus paving the way for ongoing conflicts and instability. Although the events in Sweida involved a tribal conflict, they fundamentally reflect a broader dispute between decentralization demands and the central government\u2019s rejection\u2014a pattern also observed among Kurdish regions in northeastern Syria.<\/p>\n

    In light of this, it can be argued that the policy of centralist rigidity and the imposition of unity constitute major obstacles to achieving social and political justice in Syria. Legally, they hinder the implementation of any decentralization model capable of fostering stability and development. Adopting an inclusive, fair, and comprehensive decentralization model\u2014respecting ethnic and sectarian diversity and granting minorities their rights to self-governance\u2014would not only comply with international law but also be a strategic step toward rebuilding a unified yet diverse Syria.<\/p>\n

    Second: Impact of These Policies on Minority Rights Under International Law<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The policy of centralist rigidity in Syria is among the primary obstacles to realizing the rights of minorities, characterized by attempts to impose a uniform governance model across the country without regard to its cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. This approach directly conflicts with core principles of international human rights law, which emphasize respecting cultural diversity and minorities\u2019 rights to maintain their identities and freely exercise their political and social rights ([51]).<\/p>\n

    The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) affirms minorities\u2019 rights to use their languages, preserve their cultures, and participate in public life, emphasizing that states must protect these rights without discrimination. However, in Syria, centralist policies have led to exceptional measures against minorities like the Kurds, who have long demanded recognition of their right to self-administration. These demands are rooted in principles of decentralization and internationally recognized cultural and political rights. Despite the successful management of their autonomous regions in North and East Syria, the Syrian government\u2019s refusal to recognize this administration underscores a lack of political will to implement decentralization in accordance with international standards ([52]).<\/p>\n

    These strict central policies are not limited to the Kurds but also affect other minorities such as the Druze in regions like Sweida, where they face political and cultural marginalization. The Druze, a significant religious minority, have been deprived of meaningful participation in decision-making processes and the preservation of their unique identity within the central regime. This marginalization exacerbates social tensions and fosters feelings of exclusion, contrary to the principles upheld by the UN and international law regarding minority protections.<\/p>\n

    Legally, continued enforcement of strict centralization without clear legal mechanisms for decentralization or self-administration constitutes a violation of Syria\u2019s international obligations regarding human rights. Decentralization does not necessarily imply disintegration or division; rather, it is a means to enhance political participation and enable minorities to manage their affairs within a unified state, thereby promoting stability and social peace ([53]).<\/p>\n

    Ignoring minority demands and insisting on rigid central control increase the risks of internal conflicts and undermine prospects for lasting national reconciliation. Recognizing cultural and political rights and involving minorities in local governance and self-administration are constitutional and legal imperatives aimed at balancing state unity with respect for diversity. Achieving this requires comprehensive legislative and political reforms aligned with international human rights standards and responsive to current national challenges.<\/p>\n

    It can be argued that strengthening minorities\u2019 rights through effective decentralization policies is key to achieving stability and political development in Syria, consistent with international commitments and capable of reducing social tensions caused by previous policies of centralist rigidity.<\/p>\n

    Third: Evaluating the Feasibility of Decentralization in Syria from a Legal and Political Perspective<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Decentralization is among the most viable options for rebuilding the Syrian state after years of conflict and political and social tensions. It is closely linked to the principle of power distribution and empowering regions and provinces to manage their own affairs, thus offering a pathway to accommodate the aspirations of various components of Syrian society, especially minorities that have suffered from strict central policies.<\/p>\n

    However, implementing decentralization faces significant obstacles, chiefly the lack of strong political will among some central actors who fear losing control over resources and decision-making. Syria\u2019s political history is marked by policies of centralization aimed at enforcing strict unity, which have generated tensions between the central government and regions demanding greater rights and recognition. This centralist approach has weakened trust among different groups and often resulted in political and economic disconnection, especially in areas inhabited by minorities such as Kurds, Druze, and Alawites.<\/p>\n

    The decentralization project in Syria confronts complex political and security challenges. The current environment includes armed factions outside state control, the influence of non-state actors over local decision-making, and regional and international interventions that further complicate the internal landscape. These factors represent real barriers to establishing effective decentral institutions, as the success of decentralization depends not only on delegating authority but also on creating a stable environment where local communities can manage their affairs without political pressure or security threats ([54]).<\/p>\n

    Moreover, Syria\u2019s diverse social fabric\u2014comprising multiple ethnic and religious groups\u2014necessitates a comprehensive national dialogue that includes all components, especially marginalized minorities such as the Druze. Such dialogue must be supported by constitutional guarantees that protect their cultural and political rights and ensure their participation in governance, in line with principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in international human rights treaties and successful models elsewhere that have strengthened national cohesion ([55]).<\/p>\n

    To ensure the effectiveness of decentralized systems, a balance must be maintained between safeguarding state sovereignty and providing genuine legislative and administrative powers to local authorities. These powers should be exercised within a clear legal and constitutional framework that promotes oversight and accountability, prevents abuse of authority, and fosters transparency. Building strong local institutions, developing administrative capacities, and establishing robust oversight mechanisms are essential to achieving this goal ([56]).<\/p>\n

    Additionally, civil society organizations play a crucial role in monitoring the implementation of decentralization principles and safeguarding rights and freedoms. International support\u2014through technical expertise, capacity-building, and assistance to emerging institutions\u2014can facilitate this process, provided that such support respects national sovereignty and does not impose external agendas that could deepen internal divisions.<\/p>\n

    In conclusion, decentralization in Syria should not be viewed merely as an administrative model but as a strategic option for reconstructing a more just and inclusive state. Its success depends on political will, participatory processes, and constitutional guarantees that enable Syrians to overcome the legacy of conflict and foster sustainable stability and development.<\/p>\n

    Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

    This study highlights that the principle of decentralization is not a deviation from a state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity but rather a recognized international means to achieve social, administrative, and political justice\u2014particularly in countries characterized by ethnic, religious, or linguistic diversity. International legal frameworks, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with relevant United Nations resolutions, demonstrate that minority rights do not conflict with the principle of sovereignty; instead, they require legal and constitutional protections to prevent marginalization or exclusion from the political process.<\/p>\n

    The research shows that self-administration, as an advanced form of decentralization, is not necessarily a secessionist project but a lawful response to complex political and social realities, as exemplified by the Syrian context. The experiences of several countries that have faced similar internal conflicts\u2014such as Iraq, Ethiopia, and Spain\u2014offer diverse models for adapting decentralization while maintaining national unity. These examples underscore the flexibility of international law in accommodating such arrangements.<\/p>\n

    In the case of Syria, it is evident that the central government\u2019s adherence to a highly centralized structure and its rejection of any form of self-administration have exacerbated divisions and increased tensions among different national and sectarian groups. Legal analysis confirms that the demands of Syrian minorities\u2014particularly the Kurds\u2014are based on legitimate legal principles related to non-discrimination, participation in decision-making, and the protection of culture, language, and identity.<\/p>\n

    Furthermore, the legal and political role of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which advocates for the project of self-administration in North and East Syria, emerges as an attempt to implement a form of practical decentralization. Despite the lack of formal international recognition, this model presents additional challenges regarding its legitimacy within the absence of a comprehensive political solution.<\/p>\n

    First: Results<\/strong><\/p>\n