Six weeks after the October 7, 2023 attack, U.S. President Joe Biden wrote an article in The Washington Post, attributing the Hamas attack on the Gaza envelope to two reasons. First, the failure of the “Indian Corridor” project: This project was intended to connect the Indian coast to Europe via a land corridor that would start from the Omani and Emirati coasts on the Gulf of Oman to the port of Haifa. From there, it would continue with undersea pipelines for oil, gas, fiber optics, and green energy to the Italian and Greek coasts. This is in addition to goods transported in both directions by ships.<\/p>\n
Second, the obstructing normalization with Israel: The Indian Corridor was meant to pass through Saudi Arabia to Israel as part of Saudi-Israeli normalization. Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in a September 20, 2023 interview with Fox News, ten days after the signing of the corridor project, said that it was progressing “day by day at a rapid pace.”<\/p>\n
In the months leading up to that period in 2023, American companies that had contracted to build a pipeline to transport Israeli gas from under the sea via the islands of Cyprus and Crete to the Greek coast and from there to European countries had withdrawn. This was due to technical difficulties related to the construction, maintenance, and durability. This was an agreement that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had signed in the first week of 2020 with the Cypriot president and the Greek prime minister.<\/p>\n
When the Indian Corridor project, which Netanyahu said “would make Israel the heart of the region,” was signed months later, the same technical objections were raised in Israel about the pipes running under the sea. It was recalled and noted that the land route for pipes toward Europe via Syria and Turkey is technically the safest. This was the same path planned for the Qatari gas pipeline project that Bashar al-Assad rejected in 2009 in a step to appease Russia, which was the main supplier of gas to the Europeans at the time. Many estimates suggested that the Syrian conflict might not have ignited in 2011 if Bashar al-Assad had passed the Qatari project, or that multinational fire trucks would have rushed to extinguish it, as happened in Bahrain in March 2011.<\/p>\n
In the month following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a study by Dr. Eli Reitig was published on January 13 at the Begin-Sadat Israely Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Titled “The Syrian Energy Pipeline Game: How Will It Affect Israel’s Regional Ambitions?”, the study argued that the “collapse of the Assad regime has re-launched a number of important energy projects… A part of these projects can undermine Israel’s interest in becoming an energy bridge between the Middle East and Europe… (such as the Qatari gas pipeline through Syria and Turkey, and the Egyptian gas pipeline through Jordan and Syria to Turkey, which started operating in 2003. Recently, gas reserves were discovered on the Egyptian coast between Port Said and Damietta that will make Egypt one of the top ten in gas production).”<\/p>\n
The study then adds that “the energy connection between Qatar and Turkey via Syria can undermine the idea of the land corridor between the Gulf countries and Israel, known as the (Indian Corridor).” If the Qatari project succeeds, it will be easier for the UAE to join this line to export dry gas and other goods to Turkey and Europe. It will also be easy to add other structures to this line toward Europe via Syria, such as roads, railways, and electricity lines.<\/p>\n
The study then warns that “if Israel delays its response to the many developments related to establishing the mentioned infrastructures in Syria, especially those planned by Turkey, it may lose very valuable economic and political opportunities.”<\/p>\n
In the period after the fall of the Bashar Assad regime, many interpretations emerged to explain Israel’s intense and focused preoccupation with Syria. This focus was demonstrated by the destruction of core Syrian military capabilities in the days following the regime’s collapse, Tel Aviv’s violation of the 1974 disengagement lines, and a new Israeli proposal for a demilitarized zone across southern Syria. This is a demand Israel never made during the time of Hafez al-Assad or his son, not even at the peak of Tehran’s and its proxies’ military presence in southern Syria, which had even considered establishing an armed group to “liberate the Golan,” leading Israel to assassinate figures like Samir Kuntar, Imad Mughniyeh\u2019s cousin, and an Iranian general.<\/p>\n
Among these interpretations, the newspaper Haaretz reported that “an Islamic regime in Damascus linked to Ankara is more dangerous to Israel than an Islamic organization controlling Gaza and linked to Tehran.” The report suggested that the jihadist past of potential new Syrian rulers frightens Tel Aviv, which felt reassured by Hafez al-Assad and his son. Another interpretation is that if Turkey succeeds in making a post-Assad Syria subordinate to it\u2014similar to Iran’s influence over post-Saddam Iraq\u2014it would pose an extremely dangerous strategic challenge to Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n
It’s highly probable that these three interpretations are intertwined within a single framework guiding Israel’s new Syrian policy over the last nine months. However, what Dr. Eli Reitig highlights is the fundamental Israeli motive that explains this new, feverish push toward Syria. Without Reitig’s insights, it’s impossible to understand the new term that may last as long as “Southern Lebanon” (which has been an Israeli term since 1978): “Southern Syria.” Here, Israel is engaging in “security camouflage,” with its real focus not on the Golan or Suwayda, but on the Hauran region. Hauran is the alternative land route for the Israeli-led Indian Corridor, because if the Turkish-Qatari plans (and potentially Egyptian, Saudi, and Emirati ones) succeed, energy pipelines, railways, and highways will pass through Hauran, as Dr. Reitig points out.<\/p>\n
It’s currently unknown whether Netanyahu’s recent strike on Doha\u2014despite warnings from and the Mossad’s distancing from the operation\u2014was solely related to the Gaza war or if it represents a broader Israeli stance against the Turkish-Qatari alliance that could effectively kill the Indian Corridor. It is highly likely that Yahya Sinwar’s October 7th operation was aimed at this project, with the acquiescence of Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China. What is certain, however, is that the conflict over Syria\u2014and within Syria\u2014are the code names for the current Israeli-Turkish struggle for control of the Middle Eastern region, especially after Iran\u2019s influence was weakened or nearly removed from the playing field in the post-October 7th world.<\/p>\n
This reflects the argument made by Patrick Seale about the Egyptian-Iraqi conflict over Syria in the 1940s and 1950s, when he asserted that “whoever leads the Middle East must control Syria” (Seale: The Struggle for Syria, Dar Al-Anwar, Beirut 1968, p. 14). Today, the two strongest powers in the region are Israel and Turkey; their main battleground is post-Assad Syria, and their greatest struggle is over Syria itself, driven by their shared understanding of Seale’s statement.<\/p>\n
The current Syrian situation is further complicated by the fact that both Tel Aviv and Ankara are allies of Washington. Israel is a close U.S. partner, and Turkey is a NATO member. U.S.-Turkish relations have reportedly returned to their old Cold War-era “honeymoon” under a second Trump administration, driven by the “Trump Eurasian route”\u2014a land corridor connecting the Turkic world against China and Russia\u2014and by Erdogan’s shift away from balancing the White House and the Kremlin, a dance that began over a Syrian issue in 2016 and ended due to a different Syrian issue. The picture is made even more complex because Washington is the biggest international backer of the new Syrian authority.<\/p>\n
Here, it can be said that this dual Syrian image\u2014shaped between Israel and Turkey, with a third, elevated actor in Washington\u2014constitutes the main Syrian picture. Internal factors or factors, as well as other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, do not have a significant impact on this image. Neither Iran, whose influence has waned, nor international powers like Russia, which has become weaker after Ukraine and Syria, nor global actors like France, which is trying to strengthen itself through cracks in the walls of some crisis-ridden countries (having lost its footholds in North Africa and the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso triangle), play a major role. Meanwhile, the British puzzle remains unresolved in the context of the new Syria.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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