Three main issues – the porous and largely unmarked border, water allocation, and most importantly, the Kurdish question – have always shaped Turkey’s checkered relations with its southern neighbor,Syria, over the last century.<\/p>\n
Turkey has consistently approached Syria through the prism of its own national interests. Reviving a century-old ambition dating back to its loss of the country to Great Britain in late 1918, Ankara now seeks to orchestrate developments in Syria, positioning itself as the conductor directing events to its own rhythm.<\/p>\n
With Damascus now under Ankara\u2019s sway and Syria\u2019s claim to the Euphrates largely eroded, the most fragile issue still looming is the Kurdish question.<\/p>\n
Since 2011, Turkey has confronted complex security challenges in tandem with the escalating conflict in Syria. Chief among them has been the ascent of Syrian Kurdish forces, who since 2012 have carved out significant autonomy amid the collapse of Bashar al-Assad\u2019s authority\u2014an outcome that has deeply unsettled Ankara, which has sought persistently to curb their expansion.<\/p>\n
Given the current dynamics of Syrian politics, Turkey\u2019s foremost priority has become the removal of the YPG and its all-female counterpart, the YPJ, from the areas bordering its territory.<\/p>\n
To view Syria\u2019s uprising as confined within its borders is misleading; the power vacuum it created opened the door for both state and non-state actors to pursue their own agendas.<\/p>\n
From the onset, Sunni Jihadist groups, which had been fighting American troops in Iraq since 2003, propounding a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and receiving the support of extremist groups from across the globe, moved into Syria to confront Assad\u2019s Alawite-led regime. Their primary access route was through Turkey.<\/p>\n
Driven both by neo-Ottoman ambitions embodied in the National Pact and by anxiety over Kurdish ascendancy along its 900-kilometer frontier, Ankara did not remain passive. Exploiting the chaos in Syria, Turkey allowed its territory to serve as a conduit, channeling weapons, supplies, and foreign fighters into the conflict.<\/p>\n
In the late years of the protracted war, relentless efforts made by the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to convince his Syrian counterpart to converge on the Kurdish- led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a common enemy, failed to get off the ground.<\/p>\n
Assad’s intransigence and intemperance, added to Erdogan’s adamant rejection to retreat from the occupied Syrian territories, consigned desiderata of the Turkish president to the grave.<\/p>\n
The open and yet unexpected support given by Erdogan – Assad’s former close friend – to the opposition in Syria had stabbed the latter in the back, and spoiled their friendship. Now, things look easier for Ankara in having the decade-long perturbing obsession brought to an end.<\/p>\n
With the opposition emerging victorious in December, 2024, and the imposition in Damascus of a regime led by a former Jihadist, who had fought the Americans in Mosul, the seemingly repentant fighter seems more compliant with Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) expansionist projects in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire.<\/p>\n
Unsurprisingly, Turkey – playing the major role in supporting the opposition to Assad – has emerged as the main beneficiary of the unfolding situation in Syria. In two shakes of a lamb’s tail, AKP become the main central player in the Syrian affairs- maintaining closer ties with al-Sharaa and most importantly his inner circle, many of whom have the blood of Kurds on their hands, Turkey’s plans seem to have come to fruition.<\/p>\n
On August 13, following rounds of extensive meetings between the foreign and defense ministers, and intelligence chiefs, and fulfilling an official request made by Damascus in July asking Ankara for assistance, both sides finally inked the much- wanted and the long- sought defense agreement.<\/p>\n
Underscoring its colossal significance, the pact was formalized in a meeting that brought together Turkey’s Defense Minister, Yasar Guler, and his Syrian counterpart, Marhaf Abu Qasra, a warlord that has leapt into fame under al-Sharaa.<\/p>\n
Syria’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, his Intelligence Chief, Hussein Salameh, and Turkey Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, also attended the talks.<\/p>\n
Within the scope of the agreement, Ankara would share its knowledge and expertise, and supply military equipment, weapons system and logistical materials to help Damascus enhance its defense capabilities and establish concrete military cooperation, among other things. Turkey would also deploy technical teams to Syria to observe the needs of the Syrian army.<\/p>\n
The agreement clearly underscores Turkey\u2019s expanding role in Syria following the rapid collapse of Assad\u2019s grip on power. Since then, Ankara has sought to consolidate its position in the vacuum left by Iran\u2019s retreat. For years, Iran\u2014motivated by ideological affinity\u2014had served as Assad\u2019s primary regional ally.<\/p>\n
However, being the biggest winner in the post-Assad Syria, Turkey feels so comfortable as the Syrian apple has fallen into her lap, even without shaking the branch of the tree. A fact that was highlighted by Donald Trump, then president-elect, when he said, not unprophetically, that Turkey conducted an unfriendly takeover of Syria, without a lot of lives being lost.<\/p>\n
For Ankara, Damascus, in the wider sense, is a strategic asset in its efforts to position itself in the region, and, most importantly, it poses itself as a daring pawn that unsparingly seeks to bring to an everlasting halt the Kurdish led- force and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).<\/p>\n
To Turkey’s jubilation, since the very moment of assuming power, al-Sharaa and his officials early manifested a preference for Turkey’s headache, and even giving justification for its evil acts against the Kurds. It’s Achilles’ heel.<\/p>\n
Echoing Turkey’s baseless and without any grounding in reality security concerns, al-Sharaa said in an interview with The Economist, on February 3, “Turkey feels a great concern from the presence of PKK in north- east Syria.” Al-Sharaa falsely claimed that the region of northeast Syria is an Arab majority one that opposes the SDF rule.<\/p>\n
Syria’s interim government, failing to comprehend the basic tenets of governance, has faced mounting challenges in restoring order and stability, and stitching back together the fractured country.<\/p>\n
Mudding the waters, it has instead found itself submerged in swamps of violence and bloodshed. Its ferocious ungoverned factions and unruly militias have committed massacres against Alawites, the Druze, and, though with a lesser degree, the Christians.<\/p>\n
To tame the beast, Israel, following the fall of the Assad regime, has carried out repeated and relentless aerial campaigns to destroy Syria’s military capabilities and scientific research centers across the country, out of fears that they might by employed by the extremists.<\/p>\n
For Damascus, as regional and global support shown to the regime in the early days is fading away step- by- step over its conduct towards the country’s minorities, Ankara would proceed determinedly to put spirit into the Islamist rulers, body and soul.<\/p>\n
There is indeed one way by which the Turk might gain a powerful influence in the vast emirate of al-Sharaa, by supporting the pretensions of the former Jihadist to Syria’s northeast Kurdish enclave. Rojava, among other things, is a most rational appeal that could make both sides converge.<\/p>\n
So being the case, the pact seems an appealing alternative to the Islamist rulers of Damascus to stand up to the growing internal challenges at home. It comes, however, short of Ankara’s expectations as the setting up of forward operating bases (FOBs) on Syrian soil– similar to the ones Turkey has established in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)– seems to have been omitted from the bilateral agreement.<\/p>\n
Initially, the idea of turning at least three Syrian airbases into Turkish FOBs, was intended to be the key component of the sought agreement as the mutual interests of both sides dictate so. The idea was thoroughly discussed and in consequent received consent during the talks held between al-Sharaa and Erdogan on February 4, where the “sultan” and his “vali” seem to have laid the foundation stone for the “vilayet” of Syria.<\/p>\n
Following the Ankara conference, the T4, and Palmyra air bases in the Province of Homs, and the military base in the Province of Hama, were all scoped and inspected by Turkish officials and concerned military technicians as the chosen sites for proposed FOBs.<\/p>\n
However, the scorched land styled bombardment by Israeli air force in early April rendered the three scoped bases unusable for military purposes, and prompted in the result Turkey to put the brakes on the idea. Israel openly reiterated its firm stance that Turkish moves in central Syria cross a red line.<\/p>\n
Controlling the T4 in particular would have given Turkey an unchallenged air superiority over Syria, and would have undermined, in consequence Israel’s operational freedom in the region. Israeli officials and military personnel vigorously stated they will never tolerate the idea that Syria become a Turkish protectorate. Turkey, not daring to navigate the serious challenge, apparently acquiesced.<\/p>\n
Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Turkey had been an important regional ally of the Jewish state in a hostile context. Ankara was the very first Muslim- majority country to officially give recognition to the state of Israel in 1949. However, things began to change in 2002. That same year, Erdogan’s Islamist- leaning party came to power. It would profoundly reshape the Turkish politics in the years to come.<\/p>\n
The U.S.- led ‘Crusade’ against Iraq in 2003, pushed Erdogan to the lap of Assad, a formidable and pioneering actor in the Iranian\u2013 backed ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Ankara, in the result, would detach itself Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n
Part of that short-lived bizarre partnership was to put an encumbrance to the establishment of the Kurdish autonomy that was taking shape in northern Iraq. Under the leadership of Erdogan and Assad, Turkish- Syrian relations improved significantly. Much to the ire of Israel.<\/p>\n
That Bashar Assad became the very first serving Syrian leader to visit Turkey in January 2004 is of immense consideration. However, relations began to suffer with the destructive advent of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011.<\/p>\n
More recently, Erdogan has been an avowed supporter of Hamas. The Turkish leader has time and again criticized Israel and quite the contrary, has praised the Palestinian ‘Mujahedins’ in the aftermath of Oct. 7, 2023. It is mistrust that dominates the situation as Erdogan has also given sanctuary to a number of Hamas leaders.<\/p>\n
While emphasizing the need to find a comprehensive solution to SDF’s lingering problem, the two sides seek to that Syrian- Turkish relations constitute an example in the region similar to the pre- 2011 model. Turkey aims to be a central partner and have the lion’s share in Syria’s reconstruction after more than a decade of civil war.<\/p>\n
The idea of integrating the SDF into the state’s structure, in conformity with the March Agreement, has become a mammoth challenge not only for the Damascus regime. Ankara has pledged to continue supporting Syria’s political unity and territorial integrity. It has repeatedly called on the Kurds to honor the agreement.<\/p>\n
In Ankara’s perspective, preserving Syria’s stability is crucially conducive to the region’s peace and stability. Based on the principle of One State, One Army, Turkey has been growing impatient with what it calls delay from the part of SDF in putting the March Agreement into execution.<\/p>\n
Signed by SDF’s commander, Mazloum, Abdi and al-Sharaa, on March 10, the hard- to- define agreement gives no specific details on how such a merger with an army whose soldiers, commanders, and senior officials hold extremist (Salafist- Jihadist) ideology, cold take place.<\/p>\n
Most recently, seemingly emboldened by the agreement, Ankara did not hesitate to declare its firm and full support to Damascus against the Kurds of Rojava. Hakan Fidan, the former chief of National Intelligence Services (MIT), with a commanding tone, warned the Kurds of buying time or playing the role of Israeli pawns in the region.<\/p>\n
Fidan, himself of Kurdish origin (on his father’s side), reiterated that Ankara has consistently supported\u2014and will continue to support\u2014the new regime in Damascus. He emphasized Turkey\u2019s longstanding position in favor of Syria\u2019s unity, territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, and its Arab and Islamic identity.<\/p>\n
Ankara has resolutely warned the Kurds of military action in case they keep bluffing. Turkish officials have also added that Ankara had informed Washington, that it would back Syrian Army in case of military engagement.<\/p>\n
For years, the Kurds have worked with the U.S., Turkey’s ally in NATO, in fighting the Islamic state in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). Yet, Turkey views both YPG and YPJ, which make up most of SDF’s fighting force, as an extension to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).<\/p>\n
Within the context of the war, Turkey launched multiple military incursions into Syria targeting primarily the Kurds. In August 2016, under the false pretext of distancing ISIS fighters from its southern border, Turkish armed forces and their proxies of the Syrian National Army (SNA) mounted an operation into the locality of Jarablus, in West Euphrates.<\/p>\n
The operation was, to all intent and purposes, to prevent the Kurds from connecting Manbij in the east with Tal Rifaat, in north Aleppo, in the West. Both strategic locations would be lost to the SNA factions in December 2024. A fact that highlights Ankara’s rising shares in the Post- Assad Syria.<\/p>\n
Back to the defense agreement. While the talks on defense issues is not a new idea, what makes the deal significant is its timing as it comes days after the Hasaka Conference for Unity of Stance, in which the attendees called for a decentralized Syria and a new constitution recognizing the country’s various ethnic and religious pluralism.<\/p>\n
With Damascus failing to build confidence, and trust lacking between the two ideologically different sides, the Hasaka Conference, added to the sporadic skirmishes that took place in east Aleppo, seem to have dealt a bloody nose to the agreement.<\/p>\n
Keeping the same classic rhetoric, Damascus condemned the meeting, accusing the conferees of harboring separatist ambitions against the state’s security. As a result, and amid rising tensions, Damascus– to Ankara’s delight– declared it will not take part in the planned meetings with the SDF in the French capital, Paris.<\/p>\n
Later, as the final nail in the coffin of Paris talks, the state- run news agency, SANA, as quoting an unmanned official source, made the statement that the government wants future talks to be held in the Syrian capital, Damascus, as “it is the legitimate and national address for dialogue among Syrians”.<\/p>\n
Quite reasonably, though with variances, many are of the opinion that the current agreement is but a replica of the all- security Adana Agreement of 1998, which ended the so-called October Crisis. Arguably, the August defense agreement seems though less compelling, as far as the Kurd is concerned.<\/p>\n
The Adana Agreement likewise broke the ice in that Ankara and Damascus overcame their old differences and improved their political, economic, and socio-cultural ties. In the result, the agreement set the stage for a new era of relations.<\/p>\n
Deploying troops to the border with Syria, Turkey was successful in making Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, acquiesce and dismiss from Syria the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. More broadly, the agreement formally ended Syria’s claim to Alexandretta. A Syrian land on the Mediterranean indention, which Turkey had annexed in 1939.<\/p>\n
The agreement likewise gave Ankara the right to take all necessary security measures within 5km deep into the Syrian territory, in case Damascus fails to do so. Today, under a similar pretext, Ankara seeks to consign the Kurdish aspirations to history, and put the Kurds once again to its military machinery and the sword of its proxies.<\/p>\n
Slowly but surely, Erdogan seeks to nurture al-Sharaa, and intends to become the new regime’s patron. Turkey also alleges, and has recently wooed the U.S. that the new regime in Damascus could replace SDF and to contain the ISIS.<\/p>\n
In response, as far as Turkey is concerned, al-Sharaa gives a blind eye to the presence of Turkish military forces in northern Syria. The fate of large chunks of Syrian land, under direct Turkish occupation, remains unclear. History often repeats itself.<\/p>\n
In 2009, Syria and Turkey held joint military trainings for the very first time in history. A year later, the Gaza-bound Mavi Marmara ship incident would implode the Turkish-Israeli relations to a point of no repair.<\/p>\n
At that time, shattering the Erdogan-Assad partnership became an urgent necessity evolving in Tel Aviv. When the Arab Spring reached Syria, a wedge was needed to be driven between the two friends. Erdogan, driven by expansionist Ottoman ideas, would exploit the chance to the limit.<\/p>\n
With Assad gone, the Kurdish question in Syria, as the clock ticks, is becoming a burning issue. Taking SDF’s military formations to pieces, and dismantling the civil bodies of AANES has become ever since the primary objective for both Damascus and Ankara in Syria.<\/p>\n
Prior to the August defense agreement, Turkey claimed the right to employ self-defense measures, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to give justification to its attacks against the Kurds in the northeast enclave of Rojava, and elsewhere.<\/p>\n
Today, Turkey could cite the agreement it has recently signed with the “legitimate” government in Damascus to justify any potential future interference in the Syrian affairs. That is contingent on getting the nod from its NATO ally: the U.S.- the main backer supporter of the Kurds of Rojava. A bitter reality the Turk himself begrudgingly admits.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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