It is difficult to determine what constitutes a \u2018root\u2019 or \u2018branch\u2019 in the foundation and meaning of societies (or what are considered societies) in the region, as well as the \u2018most influential factors\u2019 or \u2018favoring factors\u2019 for their formation at a specific moment or within a particular geographical, human, social, economic, and political context. This complexity, along with other factors, explains the difficulty in predicting the forms these societies may take or the response patterns they exhibit, especially in times of crisis and conflict.<\/p>\n
The social formation and meaning of a community are characterized by two main levels of \u2018heterogeneity\u2019: First, capturing meaning is problematic. Second, understanding the dynamics of formation and transformation is also challenging. New perceptions and identity directions may emerge that were neither recognized nor anticipated. There is always an element of surprise in identity, particularly regarding its social, political, cultural, and value-based \u2018representations,\u2019 especially during internal or civil conflicts. This leads to various tensions, overlaps, and divisions between an \u2018imagined,\u2019 \u2018assumed,\u2019 or \u2018pretended\u2019 national community that is more conceptual than it is embodied in social and political reality, and subnational groups or identities, some of which are ‘unpatriotic’ and \u2018non-state,\u2019 which are deeply divided against one another. Additionally, global influences and flows play a role in shaping these dynamics.<\/p>\n
1- The Meaning of Identity<\/strong><\/p>\n Identity determines an actor’s understanding and perception of their \u2018self\u2019 and the \u2018other,\u2019 their interactions and behavior, as well as their position and role in a specific temporal and spatial context\u2014whether as an individual or a group. Identity has both material and symbolic sources, typically characterized by \u2018relative stability\u2019 or shaped by dynamics of stability and change. At the same time, it is the result of numerous interactions, overlaps, and interconnections. While the term \u2018identity\u2019 suggests a certain degree of \u2018relative stability\u2019 in the understanding of the \u2018self\u2019 and its distinction from the \u2018other,\u2019 identity ultimately arises from a continuous process.<\/p>\n If an actor (individual or group) seeks to position themselves within the framework of a particular idea, value, or affiliation, or decides to \u2018embody\u2019 it and act within its scope, this inclination may transcend other material and symbolic determinants. However, this is not the whole story; identity is neither solely a subjective choice nor merely a product of objective factors. The dynamics of identity point to an indefinite number of actors and determinants, remaining open to an endless array of influences, trajectories, representations, and stakes. In fact, identity acts as both an input and an output, simultaneously constructive and constructed!<\/p>\n One can discuss an \u2018archaeology of identity\u2019 or \u2018layers of identity\u2019 that do not simply replicate or negate each other. Some layers may emerge prominently at certain moments, while others might recede, rendering identity a complex phenomenon of overlapping and accumulated \u2018deposits\u2019 or \u2018formations\u2019 that can be rearranged under various influences. Additionally, it is possible to speak of \u2018parallel identities,\u2019 analogous to the concept of \u2018parallel universes\u2019 in physics, which applies at both individual and group levels, making it challenging to determine what is coherent and what is similar.<\/p>\n 2- Identity Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n The issue of identity is often a \u2018political matter.\u2019 Political actors are interested in \u2018engineering\u2019 or even merely asserting the existence of a national identity. They seek to propagate their ideas and perspectives on \u2018society\u2019 and \u2018state\u2019 through institutions of education, media, and culture, as well as through various coercive institutions. However, the situation is more complex; political actors and governing systems can fail to create or engineer a \u2018national identity\u2019 for various reasons, including reliance on ideological constructs and narratives that do not align with social reality, ideologization that contradicts actual conditions, corruption or dysfunction in implementing policies, and the imposition of values upon society (or what is deemed society).<\/p>\n Conversely, shifts can occur in the value patterns of individuals and groups that may counter the wishes of those in power, influenced by interactions and flows with other actors and spheres. Additionally, external interventions and coercive pressures exert a significant and complex influence.<\/p>\n 3- Structures or Interactions?<\/strong><\/p>\n The \u2018origin\u2019 of \u2018social formations\u2019 and the \u2018national community\u2019 is not found in structures, numerical weights, relative blocs, or social configurations\u2014such as majorities and minorities in the context of group dynamics\u2014but rather in the \u2018dynamics of interaction\u2019 among them. It is not merely about formations, identities, ideas, ideologies, beliefs, and languages as entities within society; it is primarily about the dynamics of social interaction and communication in various patterns and forms, which are open to the understanding that everything within the boundaries and framework of the state is a \u2018social formation,\u2019 a \u2018collective spirit,\u2019 and a \u2018foundation of the state.\u2019<\/p>\n The \u2018dynamics of interaction\u2019 encompasses not only social structures, configurations, and segments among themselves, along with individuals’ ability to form networks and institutions beyond their group, religion, or society, but also includes interaction patterns between these groups and the authority and the state. This perspective extends to transnational dynamics of interaction as well.<\/p>\n 4- Origin or Role?<\/strong><\/p>\n The discussion focuses not on the \u2018origin\u2019 of social structures and formations\u2014ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, etc.\u2014in terms of their roots, whether their existence is ancient or modern, and whether they are \u2018indigenous,\u2019 \u2018immigrant,\u2019 or \u2018imported.\u2019 Instead, it is about their \u2018role,\u2019 their position and direction, and their aspirations. Are there any \u2018self-centered\u2019 identity trends that come at the expense of or contradict the main line of meaning of national identity?<\/p>\n This presents a relatively sharp paradox. The favoring or questioning of who is \u2018native\u2019 and who is \u2018immigrant\u2019 contradicts the \u2018primacy of the nation\u2019 in the religious sense over territory and geography, as is evident in societies in the Middle East, for instance.<\/p>\n For example, when Kurds are regarded as \u2018arrivals\u2019 in certain areas of the region, such as Jazira in Syria, this serves as a \u2018justification\u2019 for \u2018excluding\u2019 them, as Kurds, from the political dynamics in Syria, or to assign them a \u2018lesser status\u2019 in the dynamics of meaning and power in the country and the region. Conversely, there is a concerted effort to \u2018enable\u2019 groups and individuals \u2018arriving from both far and near\u2019 to engage in these dynamics and politics while granting them exceptional comparative advantages and privileges.<\/p>\n 5- Past or Future?<\/strong><\/p>\n Of course, what matters is not what was in the “past,” but the present that lays the foundation for the future. It is not possible to “sever” or “cut off” from what has been, but rather to “manage” and “transcend” it, not through repression, oppression, and domination, nor through policies aimed at erasing memory, commemoration, and impact, as this creates extremely dangerous injustices and an environment of internal and civil conflict, which may open up to external “penetration dynamics” and divisive tendencies. Instead, we must manage memory, history, and perceptions regarding the “self” and the “other” for each community or formation, so that the foundation for \u201cCoexistence” is established\u2014despite the ambiguity in the expression\u2014in the hope of a pluralistic society and state, in the modern and democratic sense of the word.<\/p>\n 6- Traditional or Modern?<\/strong><\/p>\n The countries of the region have struggled to form societies in the modern sense; rather, they exhibit a hybridization or overlap between traditional and modern elements. While modern currents, ideologies, structures, institutions, and political parties have emerged, the deep structures of interaction and social-political dynamics remain not entirely modern but rather hybrid, characterized by the predominance of traditional and pre-national elements (such as religion, sect, tribe, family, etc.) over the societal and state frameworks in the region.<\/p>\n This situation has not deterred political actors and authorities from continuously discussing a \u2018national community,\u2019 a \u2018society,\u2019 and a \u2018state,\u2019 albeit without fulfilling the legitimate requirements for such concepts. \u2018Communities\u2019 and \u2018national identities\u2019 have not formed in the region as understood traditionally; politics has not yet been established on the principle of citizenship, and the current situation remains quite distant from this ideal.<\/p>\n Achieving the \u2018formation of a society\u2019 in the modern sense and building a \u2018national community\u2019 based on social and political pluralism requires a \u201cmajor transition\u201d or \u201cshift\u201d from traditional to modern patterns of values and interactions. This entails moving from vertical relationships, interactions, and formations rooted in sect, tribe, and religion to horizontal relationships, interactions, and formations based on citizenship and national parties that transcend groups, formations, and classes. This also means transitioning from traditional religious and tribal structures to modern, institutional, civic, professional, and class-based organizations. The relationship between citizenship and the individual-state should serve as the foundation of politics, accompanied by various other factors and considerations that cannot be elaborated upon here.<\/p>\n 7- The Real and the Imaginary<\/strong><\/p>\n The relationship between the real and the imaginary is ambiguous; social formation and national identity require a degree of both. Often, reality governs, considering social, economic, and political conditions, the level of internal cohesion, prevailing value orientations, and so on. As for the imaginary, it is important for the establishment of the idea of a nation and a state, for the formulation of a general framework, and for expressing the “spirit of society.” This spirit is not merely the “sum total” of social formations, nor is it “separate” from them.<\/p>\n “Society” or “the national community” is not formed solely on the basis of real data; there must also be an imaginary and conceptual dimension, as well as the embodiment of ideas and propositions for the “engineering,” “creation,” and “construction” of society and state. However, this should not be exaggerated, as an increasing gap between the real and the imaginary threatens the social phenomenon and the concept of a nation and state. It is important to transcend stereotypical perceptions of “homeland,” “nationality,” “nation,” and “nationalism” towards more discursive and pluralistic understandings, which build bridges between social formations, peoples, identities, and so on, rather than destroying them. This aids in shaping a space or framework for awareness and thought regarding reality, politics, living, working, and production, with an eye toward justice, participation, and democracy.<\/p>\n 8- The Constant and The Variable\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n The constant and the variable in the concepts of homeland, society, and state, whether in their determinants or their manifestations, are central to our discussion. In fact, we are addressing what constitutes \u2018homelands,\u2019 \u2018societies,\u2019 and \u2018states.\u2019 The concept of \u2018homeland\u2019 in the history, culture, anthropology, and sociology of the region does not hold the status of a supreme value in politics, nor does it constitute a social consciousness. Consequently, it is not one of the stable factors and determinants of identity. The relative weight of the concept of homeland is lesser when compared to other fundamental factors and determinants, such as community, tribe, sectarian divisions, and others, which represent constants in perceptions and attitudes within consciousness and thought.<\/p>\n In general, the concepts of \u2018community\u2019 and \u2018national group\u2019 are inherently linked to the notion of the \u2018state.\u2019 However, the state itself does not hold a favorable position, as it has not gained legitimacy or acceptability and cannot be established stably. It resembles \u2018power\u2019 more than a \u2018state\u2019 in the sense defined by social sciences and by the most developed and advanced countries in the world. From this perspective, it is challenging to derive a \u2018constant\u2019 from a \u2018variable.\u2019 This situation illustrates a highly complex dynamic within social formations in the Middle East and, more broadly, in societies outside of Europe, where religious, cultural, social, economic, political, and anthropological factors are intricately interwoven.<\/p>\n 9- Parallel Identities!<\/strong><\/p>\n When social formations engage in mutual interaction within the framework of a pluralistic and democratic state, they do not lose their \u2018identity\u2019 or \u2018self.\u2019 Instead, they construct and establish it by creating a \u2018parallel identity,\u2019 referred to as a \u2018national identity.\u2019 As previously indicated, this process neither \u2018breaks from\u2019 these identities and formations nor completely \u2018merges\u2019 with them. This concept serves as the foundation for forming a balanced society and a viable, stable state.<\/p>\n However, the discussion here often focuses more on the \u2018absent\u2019 than the \u2018present,\u2019 more on the \u2018changing\u2019 than the \u2018constant.\u2019 The conditions in conflict-ridden countries in the region, such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan, serve as prime examples for testing the paradigms of social identity and statehood in both the region and the world. These cases reveal significant and growing difficulties in this regard. There is a marked regression toward identity perceptions and trends that are \u2018non-state,\u2019 with some seeking to treat the \u2018state\u2019 and the associated perceptions\u2014including the idea of a homeland and discourse on national identity\u2014as a \u2018booty\u2019 to be seized, using it as a cover for political actors and power players to justify their existence.<\/p>\n The national community and national identity should not be viewed as a \u2018substitute\u2019 for the diverse groups, formations, or identities within society (or what constitutes a society). Rather, they represent a \u2018parallel entity\u2019 or \u2018parallel formation\u2019 founded on the creation, development, and dissemination of a culture that transcends these subgroup formations. This national identity encompasses and nurtures them positively without replacing them. Moreover, the national community does not derive from \u2018assimilation\u2019 or mere marginal \u2018insertion\u2019 and forced \u2018adaptation.\u2019<\/p>\n 10- Identity of Identities!<\/strong><\/p>\n Thus, the \u2018national community\u2019 and \u2018national identity\u2019 are not merely an \u2018addition,\u2019 \u2018sum,\u2019 or \u2018synthesis\u2019 of various \u2018formations,\u2019 but rather the \u2018product\u2019 of their dynamic and pluralistic interaction, situated within a cultural, historical, value-driven, and civilizational context shaped by a \u2018supra-political\u2019 and \u2018supra-constitutional\u2019 consensus, among other factors. This concept represents something new, which is not derived from the identities within the state (or what is considered a state); in other words, it does not originate from them and is not merely an expression of them, but exists \u2018above\u2019 them. While it is \u2018above\u2019 them, it is also \u2018not separate\u2019 from them.<\/p>\n It is essential to emphasize that the national community does not threaten or negate other formations and identities\u2014social, religious, linguistic, cultural, regional, etc. Instead, it represents a framework for these identities within the scope of citizenship and the rule of law. To be Syrian, for example, does not conflict with being Arab, Kurdish, Circassian, Muslim, Christian, Sunni, Alawite, or Druze; similarly, to be Iraqi does not negate being Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Muslim, Christian, Shiite, or Sunni. Likewise, to be Egyptian does not contradict being Muslim or Coptic.<\/p>\n The calls for these identities will persist; however, they are expected to exist within the context of a \u2018society\u2019 where its members and actors acknowledge the presence of diverse religious, linguistic, cultural, sectarian, and regional affiliations and identities, considering this diversity as normal. This should happen within the framework of a political system and a state grounded in citizenship.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It is difficult to determine what constitutes a \u2018root\u2019 or \u2018branch\u2019 in the foundation and meaning of societies (or what are considered societies) in the region, as well as the \u2018most influential factors\u2019 or \u2018favoring factors\u2019 for their formation at a specific moment or within a particular geographical, human, social, economic, and political context. 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